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Abstract
In my thesis I evaluate the experience of Kosovar refugees evacuated to
Australia in 1999 as part of the Howard Government’s ‘Operation Safe
Haven’. I investigate the experience of the Kosovars in Australia alongside
the role of the media in perpetuating the notion of “acceptability” in a
broader debate about immigration. The plight of the Kosovar refugees
provided much of the initial impetus for the introduction of the Howard
Government’s temporary protection regime. My discussion and argument
raise questions about Australian politics and refugee policy. These
questions include asking why some refugees have been considered worthy
of Australia’s charity and assistance, while others have not. I draw on
narratives of national identity while investigating popular discourse
surrounding the evacuation of Kosovar refugees to Australia.
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Introduction
The experience of the Kosovar refugees in Australia in 1999 reveals
much about the way Australian refugee policy has been conceived
throughout the nation’s history. Their temporary stay in Australia provides
insight into the continuities that have shaped refugee policy. Today, images
of Curtin Detention Centre (located in the far northern region of Western
Australia) and Christmas Island appear regularly on the evening television
news. Asylum seekers continue to be housed in camp-like conditions on
the mainland of Australia as well as in offshore processing centres. These
camps are guarded by armed security personnel and by their remote
locations the facilities provided to house refugees by-and-large deter them
from mixing with the general population. These conditions are very similar
to those faced by the Kosovars in 1999. The Kosovars were a “popular”
group of refugees who were openly welcomed by the Australian
government. Such conditions beg questions about the isolation of refugees
in remote regions in Australia and why quarantine-type accommodation
continues to be utilised.
The experience of the Kosovar refugees has remained largely
neglected by scholarship.1 In my thesis I explore the plight of the Kosovar
refugees. Their treatment provided much of the initial impetus for the
introduction of the Howard Government’s temporary protection regime.
In late March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) began a major air-bombing campaign against Yugoslav military
forces inside Kosovo aimed at defending local ethnic Albanians against the
violence being perpetuated by Serbian paramilitaries.2 By the end of the
1

See for instance D. McMaster, Asylum Seekers: Australia’s Response to Refugees,
Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, 2001 (reprinted 2002). See also S. Pickering,
‘Common Sense and Original Deviancy: News Discourses and Asylum Seekers in
Australia’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 14(2), 2001, pp. 169-186. See also J. Van Selm
(ed.), Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union, Pinter, London and New York, 2000.
2
Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA), ‘Report on RCOA field visit to Kosovo and the
Former
Yugoslav
Republic
of
Macedonia’,
November
1999.
URL:
<http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/docs/resources/reports/kosovo-visit.pdf>. Accessed 4th
February 2009. The conflict had intensified in previous months as a result of fighting
between the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and forces of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia in a dispute over the sovereignty of the Serbian province. Around 840,000
ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo, having been expelled by Serbian forces and in conjunction
with the displacement caused by NATO air strikes.
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following fortnight the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) formally appealed to the international community to evacuate
Kosovars waiting for help at the border of the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia. Concerned about ethnic tensions, Macedonian authorities
had closed the country’s borders to the fleeing refugees. It was feared that
the sudden influx of over 250,000 refugees into Macedonia would tip the
fragile balance between its own ethnic Macedonian and Albanian
populations.3 The domestic political climate in Macedonia was delicate and
there were a growing number of public demonstrations against the NATO
campaign.4 The Macedonian government’s concerns were further
compounded by the argument that NATO’s bombing campaigns had
caused the mass influx of refugees in the first place.5 Over the next two
months the evacuation saw 91,000 refugees relocated on a temporary basis
to 29 countries including Australia. The UN’s aim was to relieve pressure
on Macedonia and to ensure the border remained open to those refugees
fleeing Kosovo.6 NATO air strikes ended three months later alongside the
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the province.
On 6th April 1999 the Howard Government agreed that it would
temporarily relocate a limited number of Kosovar refugees to Australia for
three months, although it had initially rejected the UN’s request to do so.
The Government announced the new temporary ‘Safe Haven’ visa scheme,
establishing the first formal policy on temporary protection in Australian

3

ibid. See also J. Van Selm, ‘Reception in other states: information relating to other key
states involved in the reception of Kosovars (Appendix 1)’, in Van Selm, op. cit., p. 213.
Van Selm’s assessment is that ‘Macedonia had a substantial ethnic Albanian minority
already, and the political balance was already somewhat worrisome’.
4
Van Selm, op. cit., pp. 212-213. It is noted here that the country was still hosting 1250
refugees from the Bosnian conflict, indicating a source of tension in Macedonian domestic
politics. See also p. 213. Here, the Macedonian Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski stated
that the country was in danger of political and economic collapse. His government
questioned why Macedonia was expected to take endless refugees while other countries in
the region had refused to open their borders. Georgievski added: ‘How many [Kosovar
refugees] do we have to take to satisfy Europe and for the Kosovo people to say thank
you? All this time we have been trying to get the UNHCR to take care of the refugees.
The problem is they are not doing anything.’
5
ibid., p. 213. See also M.W. Manulak, ‘Canada and the Kosovo crisis; a “golden
moment” in Canadian foreign policy’, International Journal, Spring, 2009, p. 574. Here
the author states: ‘Not only did Milosevic not blink, but some blamed NATO bombs for
the mass exodus of Kosovar refugees.’
6
Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA), ‘Report on RCOA field visit to Kosovo and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, op. cit.
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immigration history. These changes culminated in the introduction of the
Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Safe Haven Visas) Act 1999
(Cth) on 11th May 1999. The Safe Haven program was defined by the
government as a ‘short term humanitarian’ measure, under which 4000
Kosovar refugees were to be given an initial three-month Safe Haven Visa
(with a view to possible extension as required by Phillip Ruddock, the
Immigration Minister). A “sunset” clause of six months also applied in
which an offer of safe haven would expire if not taken up before that time.
Under the arrangements the Kosovars would receive food, accommodation
(at eight disused or vacated military bases), health care and other
necessities, as well as an allowance of $20 for adults and $5 for children
per week.7 The legislation refused the right of the Kosovars to apply for
permanent residency or social security benefits and initially they were
explicitly banned from obtaining paid employment.
The legislation empowered the Immigration Minister to shorten,
extend or cancel a Safe Haven Visa at will. It denied the Kosovars the right
of appeal in applying for refugee status under the UN Convention on
refugees or to obtain any other type of visa. The Government would be
able to use the legislation to force entire Kosovar families to be repatriated
at any time.8 The Safe Haven legislation granted non-reviewable, exclusive
powers to the Immigration Minister to determine the status of Safe Haven
Visa holders, insulating the minister from external judicial review. The visa
denied the Kosovar refugees the right to be treated by the Australian
government with the protection afforded to them under international

7

B. York, ‘Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on
Official Sources’, Information and Research Services, Department of the Parliamentary
Library, Canberra, 16th June 2003, p. 81.
8
M. Head, ‘The Kosovar and Timorese “Safe Haven” Refugees’, Alternative Law
Journal, 24(6), December, 1999, p. 279. See also pp. 282-283. Here, Head states, under
the Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Safe Haven Visas) Act, there was
vague and sweeping language that entitled the Minister to refuse or cancel visas, such as
‘good character’ or ‘representing “a danger to the Australian community”’. He pointed out
that Safe Haven Visas could be used to discriminate on grounds of ‘national security’ and
‘prejudice to Australia’s international relations.’ The danger, Head says, was of the
refugees’ interests being subordinated to the Australian Government’s relations with
Indonesia or other countries. Moreover, refusals and cancellations of the Safe Haven Visas
automatically applied to applicants’ immediate family members.
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human rights conventions. Not surprisingly such limits generated some
criticism from the Australian Greens and Democrats in the Senate.9
Prior to the Kosovo conflict in 1999 the international community
had used ‘safe haven’ as the name for a variety of humanitarian programs.
For example, the United States military conducted its own Operation Safe
Haven as early as 1957 in which 20,000 Hungarian refugees were relocated
to the US following Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and offered
permanent residency.10 The US conducted another Operation Safe Haven
to resettle tens of thousands of Iraqis to the US as recent as 2009.11
Australia’s Safe Haven program was designed, unlike these operations, to
evacuate a limited number of Kosovars - whose rights and liberties would
be highly restricted by the Howard Government – as a short-term
temporary option.
The Immigration Minister described the Australian government’s
Operation Safe Haven on 4th May 1999 as: ‘a program of evacuation to
provide safe haven for people where there is an expectation they should be
able to return home.’12 The Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) said the
intent of the operation was very clear from the start. It was the first time in
Australian immigration history that refugees had been brought to Australia

9

See D. Margetts, in ‘Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Safe Haven Visas)
Bill 1999; Second Reading’, Senate: Official Hansard, Commonwealth of Australia
Parliamentary Debates, 29th April 1999, pp. 4557-4559. See also A. Bartlett, in ‘Migration
Legislation Amendment (Temporary Safe Haven Visas) Bill 1999; Second Reading’,
Senate: Official Hansard, Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 29th April
1999, pp. 4553-4557.
10
See ‘REFUGEES: Safe Haven’, Time Magazine, 17th December 1956. URL:
<http:www.time.com/magazine/article/0,9171,867401,00.html?promoid=googlep>.
Accessed 3rd August 2009. See also ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, Global Security.
URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort_2.htm>. Accessed
12th August 1999. Here, the less ambiguous name ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ was given
to the US program that assisted Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraq following the Gulf War in
1991, in which the US military offered protection to the refugees and ensured deliveries
humanitarian aid.
11
See ‘Operation Safe Haven Iraq 2009; An Action Plan for Airlifting Endangered Iraqi’s
Linked to the United States’, Centre for American Progress. URL: <http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2009/01/iraqi_airlift.html>. Accessed 1st August 2010.
12
P. Ruddock, cited in S. Gee and T. Skotnicki, ‘Mire ce vini ne Australia (That’s
welcome, in Albanian)’, The Daily Telegraph, 4th May 1999, p. 6.
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with the ‘express purpose that it be for short-term respite rather than
resettlement’.13
The Kosovar refugees’ experience of temporary safe haven in
Australia – including their flight from war in Yugoslavia, evacuation and
then arrival in Sydney - was widely reported by the media at the time. The
Kosovars’ story has in many ways been overshadowed by subsequent
heated public debates about asylum seekers from the Middle East, Sri
Lanka and Afghanistan. Yet, no other group of refugees have been
associated with challenging and changing the policies of a Prime Minister
with such profound immediacy - and no less that of John Howard, who has
since been credited with winning the 2001 Federal election while
demonising refugees involved in the “children overboard” affair.
This thesis explores the story of the Kosovar refugees’ stay in
Australia while, at the same time, investigating the extent to which the
heavily mediatised plight of the Kosovars ultimately forced the hand of the
Howard Government, causing it to retract its initial stance and provide the
refugees with temporary safe haven. There was minimal negativity
surrounding the arrival of the Kosovar refugees and very few public and
media commentators expressed concern about the evacuation as a whole.
After all, there were no boats illegally ferrying the Kosovars towards
Australia’s shores and the evacuation itself was sanctioned by the Federal
Government. The Kosovar refugees were even welcomed by Prime
Minister Howard with ‘open arms’ at Sydney airport.14 This investigation
provides avenues for understanding how the public acceptance of the
Kosovars was reflected, shaped and influenced by the news media. It
emphasises the ongoing importance of the mass media to the acceptability
of refugees.
Chapter 1 of my thesis explores the Howard Government’s
obligations to the Kosovar refugees under international conventions and its
responsibilities towards them under Australian law. I have incorporated the
13
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concept of virtue into my discussion and the implications of this idea for
the ways in which the Kosovars were deemed “acceptable” to the
Australian public. This chapter then elaborates on the usefulness of
analysing the news media as a primary source for investigating Operation
Safe Haven. Finally this chapter provides historical context for the ethnic
cleansing campaign carried by Serbvs in Kosovo and the nationalist frenzy
that occurred in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s.
The remaining chapters of my thesis (with the exception of my last
chapter) are aligned with the timetable created by the Federal Government
for Operation Safe Haven. Chapters 2 to 5 investigate the evacuation of the
Kosovars to Australia, their arrival at Sydney airport, residency at Safe
Haven accommodation and repatriation to the Balkans. These chapters
chart the narrative sequence presented by the media in its coverage of
Operation Safe Haven.
In Chapters 2 and 3 I have investigated the Howard Government’s
plans for evacuating the Kosovar refugees to Australia in April and early
May 1999. These chapters investigate the argument that developments in
refugee policy at this time and the Safe Haven Visa that was given to the
Kosovar refugees for the duration of their stay in Australia were the result
of both domestic political influences (including populism and the media)
and, to some extent, international political forces.
I then explore the ways in which the Howard Government
politicised the Kosovars’ arrival in Australia and its attempts to use the
evacuation program as a means of bolstering its own popular support.
Chapter 3 traces the journey of Kosovars refugees aboard the initial flight
to Australia, the welcome they encountered at Sydney airport and the
experience of arriving at the East Hills Safe Haven. This chapter
demonstrates that relations between the media and the Howard
Government during the arrival were close and complementary and how
there were significant limitations imposed on the media by the Federal
Government during this episode. The Government attempted to tightly
regulate public access to the refugees. I have explored how these
limitations increased the importance of the media as a mediator between
the general public and the Government throughout Operation Safe Haven.
19

The arrival of the Kosovars provided the media with an opportunity to
celebrate and “parade” national values.
In Chapters 4 and 5 I have explored the experience of Kosovar
refugees given accommodation at Singleton barracks Safe Haven and their
refusal to accept the facilities on offer at the barracks. The actions of these
refugees – which included those the media dubbed as engaged in the “bus
sit-in” protest - generated widespread media coverage and raised
significant questions about the quality of the services offered to refugees as
part of Operation Safe Haven. Chapter 4 investigates the Government’s
response to this question which included a heavily politicised effort to
discredit the refugees’ claims.
I have then investigated the circumstances in which the Kosovars
were repatriated by the Australian government. Chapter 5 examined the
closure of the Safe Havens by the Immigration Minister and the
repatriation of Kosovar refugees after July 1999. This chapter has explored
the rationale behind the Winter Reconstruction Allowance, a monetary
incentive offered by the Federal Government to the refugees to depart
Australia. This is followed with an analysis of some of the more coercive
means employed by the Immigration Minister to induce the Kosovars to
return home. Chapter 5 re-evaluates the legal ramifications of the Safe
Haven Visa program in light of the repatriation of Kosovar refugees in the
period immediately following the war. Kosovars who continued to reside
in Australia in the earlier months of 2000 had mixed experiences. Some
mounted a High Court challenge to prevent their repatriation and some
were subject to a Department of Immigration “hunt” for refugees deemed
“on the run”. At this point the discourse of “compliance” shaped news
reports.
In Chapter 6 I effect a change of focus. This chapter is used to, in a
sense, balance the books when it comes to attitudes to the Kosovar refugee
situation. I explore media representations of Serbian communities living in
Australia during the Kosovo refugee crisis in March and April 1999. A
great number of Serbian Australians reacted with contempt towards the
Australian government’s decision to support the NATO air strikes against
Yugoslavia. This last chapter of my thesis has explored the effects of
20

media representations of Serbs and evaluated the response of that
community to this discourse. It investigates the mobilisation of binaries by
the media about “good/bad” ethnic Serbs in both Australia and Yugoslavia
and how these played out alongside notions of “loyalty/disloyalty” within
Australia during the Kosovo war. I have discussed the protests conducted
by Serbian communities in Australia against the NATO campaign and
media representations of these demonstrations.
The implications of providing temporary safe haven to the Kosovar
refugees in Australia continue to be prominent in debates about Australia’s
refugee policy. There are significant continuities evident in Australia’s
refugee policy that are highlighted in my thesis. These include the
influence of populism on Australia’s refugee policy, the obligations of
federal government in responding to humanitarian crises and practices of
the news media. The experience of the Kosovar refugees can be viewed
within the broader context of Australia’s immigration history. Their story
reflects the global implications of refugee policy as well. The Kosovars
were individuals who experienced persecution and tragedy. They were also
the beneficiaries of the compassion of the Australian community.
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Chapter 1: The Howard Government’s Operation
Safe Haven and Media Representations of the
Kosovars

Introduction
This chapter begins by exploring the Howard Government’s obligations to
the

Kosovar

refugees

under

international

conventions,

and

its

responsibilities towards them under Australian law. It has incorporated the
concept of virtue into the discussion. Chapter 1 elaborates on the
usefulness of analysing the news media as a primary source for
investigating Operation Safe Haven. The latter part of this chapter has
sought to deconstruct news media sources concerned with the Kosovar
refugees in Australia. It explores the nationalist frenzy that occurred in the
former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s and provides historical context
for how the Kosovo war was represented by the media in Australia.

1. Operation Safe Haven in the Context of the International Sphere
1.1 The Howard Government’s obligations to refugees under international
conventions
Asylum seekers were, until the early 1990s, dealt with under the 1958
Migration Act which incorporated Australia’s obligations as a signatory to
the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter
referred to as the Convention).15 As a signatory, Australia is obliged to
offer protection to persons defined as a refugee by the Convention,
including those who have a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion … and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
15
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unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’.16 Australia’s
response to refugees under the Convention has included (and continues to
include) the provision of an annual number of places for refugees to
resettle in Australia pending referral by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There was a quota of 12,000 places
reserved for refugees referred to the Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) by the UNHCR for the fiscal year 19992000, under the humanitarian component of Australia’s immigration
program (the ‘humanitarian program’).17 Another 3,100 places were
available under DIMA’s ‘special humanitarian program’ (SHP) for persons
who had suffered discrimination amounting to gross violation of human
rights.18 These programs were not made available to Kosovar refugees
evacuated as part of Operation Safe Haven, who were instead offered a
new temporary visa class named the ‘Safe Haven Visa’.
These policies must be viewed in the context of the broader
restructuring of the Department of Immigration with respect to the
processing of refugees. Under the Howard Government, the humanitarian
program (which accepted refugees via UNHCR referral) remained the main
program under which refugees gained access to Australia. Yet DIMA was
increasingly tasked with more punitive roles that transformed it into an
agency more concerned with border protection. While the Howard
Government was not the first government to implement changes in
immigration law that enhanced DIMA’s border protection responsibilities,
it was instrumental in popularising the notion that refugees were to be
automatically regarded with a degree of mistrust and scepticism. The
Howard Government played a significant part in watering-down
humanitarian engagement over the plight of refugees in public debate. The
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Government shifted the focus to the need to police Australia’s borders with
increasingly tough measures.
A formal policy on refugees was first introduced in 1977 by Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser to assist those displaced during the Vietnam War.
By the 1990s, under Australian law, many asylum seekers were placed on
Permanent Protection Visa’s (PPV) under which they were offered both
permanent protection and the right to apply for Australian citizenship.
Even before the Kosovar evacuation Australia had already experimented
with a number of temporary visas, granted to people already in Australia
and who were unable to return home (mainly from Iraq, Lebanon, China
and Sri Lanka). In 1989, for instance, the Federal Hawke Government
provided a four-year temporary protection for Chinese students already in
Australia following the Tiananmen Square massacre, which were later
upgraded to permanent visas.19 It was the Keating Government that first
introduced a kind of good/bad dichotomy with regard to refugees; by
introducing the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth), Keating established
mandatory detention for “boat people”.20 The legislative changes also
featured a sub-category to provide four-year temporary protection visas to
particular refugees. This first attempt at temporary protection was highly
unsuccessful due to the uncertainties faced by applicants and because many
Australian employers found the scheme unattractive and were reluctant to
provide work to these kinds of visa holders.21 In 1994, the Federal
Government returned to offering more permanent protection and it was not
until war unfolded in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 that the notion of
temporary protection regained prominence.22
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1.2 Refugee mobilities in a global context; Australia’s search for “skilled
migrants”
Between 1984 and 2004 the number of refugees worldwide almost
doubled, peaking in 1994 following the Rwanda genocide.23 The world’s
refugee population (as specified by the UNHCR) was around 21 million
people at the time of the Kosovo war.24 At the turn of the twenty-first
century, countries in the developing world were responsible for the welfare
of about ninety-five per cent of the world’s refugee population, while only
five per cent of refugees were being sheltered by developed countries.25
Still, the context for Operation Safe Haven was one in which governments
were witnessing the increasing movement of the world’s population from
underdeveloped to wealthier countries. A major problem for the UNHCR
was (and continues to be) an increasing reluctance by wealthier countries
to accept refugees on a permanent basis. Their position has been promoted
by domestic backlashes against immigrants that have sometimes been
fuelled by racial overtones.26 This trend is further reflected in the fact that,
by 2008, forty per cent of countries had implemented policies to reduce the
level of immigration.27 The typical response by Western governments has
seen a situation arise in which, ‘in the name of guarding “national”
interests, immigration controls have rarely been as tight as they are at the
start of the twenty-first century, aided in particular by the intensified
surveillance than can be conducted using new information technologies.’28
The NATO campaign against Yugoslavia can be viewed as directly
linked to the regional instability that emerged after the breakdown of the
Yugoslav state and the rise of the US as a sole global superpower.
International, post-Cold War politics significantly implicated the ways in
which the refugee situation was conceived of and dealt with by NATO and
its allies. Frans J. Schuurman makes the point that during the period of the
Cold War, ‘the advanced industrialised countries used the existence of the
communist bloc (especially the Soviet Union) as a legitimation to uphold
23
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the military strength of individual countries (especially the USA) and of
NATO… Military interventions from both sides [of the Cold War] in their
own periphery were accepted strategies.’29 Schuurman goes on:
With the end of the Cold War this legitimation of the armed forces
ended. The search was then on for new legitimation, which was
found in a number of opportunities [including] “ethnic cleansing”
in Africa and the Balkans, etc. US military power is still being
wielded as the hegemonic global military force. In contrast to the
previous period the legitimating discourse is now the defence of
human rights, a defence against drugs, and an urge to help countries
on the road to democracy and the free market system.30
At the time of the Kosovo war, many media and political commentators in
Australia regarded the Yugoslav communist regime as “backward” and
archaic. Sheltering and providing safe haven to refugees from this part of
the world was frequently construed as liberating by Western political
leaders including Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. As a supporter of NATO,
the Australian government’s response strongly reflected these kinds of
judgements about the global order in the post-Cold War era.
Australia’s response to the Kosovars further reflected ongoing
ramifications of the rapid breakdown of post-colonial societies in the 1960s
and 1970s, and the increasing burden placed upon wealthier nations to
assist in the resettlement of refugees from these countries (including in
South East Asia and Africa). The Australian government resettled around
85,000 refugees from Indochina between 1975 and 1985.31 Australia’s
acceptance of refugees, however, has been mediated by a culture of
stringent selection procedures. Jackie Davies comments that Australia’s
annual quota of 12,000 places for refugees has been rarely filled, ‘because
the conditions that Australia places upon who they will accept as a refugee
29
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are too narrow to fit with the profile of many refugees needing
resettlement.’32 Some of these conditions included the ability to speak
English, a relatively high standard of education, physical and mental health
as well as an age threshold. It is little wonder, Davies argues, that an
average of only 4,000 Convention refugees are actually accepted each
year.33
Despite these selection procedures, Australia’s refugee quota has
been no less or more harsh than other countries in the developed world. A
significant part of the rationale behind immigration policies has been the
need for governments to promote a balance between population growth, the
economy and the environmental capacity of a country to sustain such a
population. Australian governments have continually emphasised the need
for “skilled” migrants under the humanitarian program as well as offering
preference to those that are not only healthy and willing to work, but who
also have desirable skills relative to industry demands.34 Since 2001, the
“war on terror” has often been used to justify even tougher standards for
the acceptance of refugees into Western countries, with the Howard
Government readily drawing on the notion that “terrorists” might enter
Australia under the guise of being refugees. The irony is that Australian
government policies, particularly those of Howard-led coalitions, have
been hostile towards those deemed “economic refugees” - those persons,
sometimes conceived of as “middle class” refugees, who leave poorer
countries for rich ones in search of a better life. While the use of this
terminology by governments continues to resonate with the electorate, the
legal ramifications are drastic for those deemed to be “economic refugees”,
as countries are under no legal obligation to grant asylum to such persons
under the Convention.35
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1.3 The Howard Government’s obligations towards the Kosovars
The UNHCR’s request for Australia to evacuate and temporarily provide a
safe haven to Kosovar refugees as part of its Kosovo Humanitarian
Evacuation Program (HEP) in early April 1999 was extraordinary in terms
of Australia’s obligations under both domestic law and international
conventions. The procedures did not follow the usual process of referral via
which Australia would admit refugees for the purposes of permanent
resettlement. The UNHCR typically administered the process whereby
refugees were “screened” before being referred to the Department of
Immigration. In this case, however, Australian immigration officials were
dispatched by the Federal Government to the refugee camps in Macedonia
to screen refugees themselves for temporary safe haven in Australia. This
was because the UNHCR was unprepared and overwhelmed by the
immediacy with which refugees had flooded across the borders of Kosovo
and into camps hastily erected as emergency accommodation.
As noted early the Australian government implemented significant
changes to immigration law in order to accommodate the Kosovar refugees
by dividing protection visas into two subclasses – permanent visas and
temporary visas.36 These measures passed both Houses of Parliament on
11th May 1999 and increased the Howard Government’s coercive powers
in dealing with non-citizens. As part of the Migration Legislation
Amendment (Temporary Safe Haven Visas) Act 1999 (Cth) these changes
were designed to control almost every aspect of the visitors’ lives. The
Safe Haven legislation granted non-reviewable, exclusive powers to the
Immigration Minister to determine the status of Safe Haven Visa holders.
The new powers were designed to uphold the integrity of the existing
Australian immigration program, and insulate the minister from
accountability via external review. They granted the minister the authority
to cancel an individual’s Safe Haven Visa, and prevent the Kosovar
refugees from attaining more permanent residency in Australia. The Safe
Haven Visa legislation severely diminished refugees’ access to rights
afforded to them under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Convention
36
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Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment
(CAT), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).37 One of the protections offered to refugees under the 1951
Convention, for example, was the right not to be returned (nonrefoulement) to a situation where such persons could face torture or other
cruel or degrading treatment. These and other aspects of the 1951
Convention did not apply to refugees who had been given a Safe Haven
Visa.38 From the start, Operation Safe Haven was designed to select
particular kinds of refugees to be evacuated to Australia that ensured their
compliance with the visa program. The Safe Haven Visa legislation had
‘far-reaching provisions to extinguish the legal and democratic rights of
unwanted asylum-seekers.’39 At the same time, the Immigration Minister
promoted the legislation, which passed through both houses of Parliament
largely unopposed, as ‘a magnanimous and humanitarian offer of haven.’40

2. Operation Safe Haven, Australian Nationalism and ‘In the National
Interest’
2.1 The Howard Government and ‘White virtue’
The opportunity to evacuate the Kosovars as part of a global humanitarian
mission allowed many Australians to reaffirm a triumphal sense of ‘White
virtue’ as central to their country’s conception of citizenship. It is the idea
that whiteness is able to triumph over “Other” racial or cultural groups
when it can be construed as ‘uplifting, noble, universal, and pure’.41 The
common link between representations of the Kosovars and asylum seekers
is how refugees in a broader sense have been incorporated into White
national identity discourse. Richard Wazana states that, in the refugee
37
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discourse of the Howard era, there was a definitive re-emergence of the
White Australia policy.42 Australia’s geographical position, as a bastion of
“western civilization”, has had important ramifications for Australia’s
sense of identity and its fears around how many “foreigners” it is ready to
receive. For early British settlers, Wazana states: ‘this obsession has
transformed itself into various measures meant to “protect” Australian
culture and traditions, including an inhuman refugee policy [sic].’43
Overall, popular discourse about the Kosovar evacuation is part of a
broader story about how Australians have imagined the continuing history
of immigration to their country, a story about the ways in which new
arrivals are welcomed, and a legacy centred on the selection of migrants.
Don McMaster reflects on this period stating that Australia’s
refugee policies were acts of exclusionary politics based on notions of
citizenship, identity and belonging, or in most cases “not belonging”.44 He
notes how the Kosovars received a much more compassionate reception
than other refugee groups. The coincidental arrival of both Chinese boat
people and Kosovar refugees in Australia in the first half of 1999 attracted
considerable media attention, but public and official reactions could not
have been more different. McMaster states, on one hand, the Chinese were
decried in the media with headlines such as ‘Invaded’ and ‘Outcry over
illegals’, and they were placed in detention. On the other, the Kosovars
were met with headlines such as ‘Sanctuary’ and ‘Safely Into Our Arms’.
Moreover, ‘They were welcomed; they were European and not the “other”.
These events highlight the discriminatory manner in which Australian
refugee policy and citizenship have been used to exclude its “other.”’45
McMaster asserts their ‘mode of entry’ (i.e. an arrival that was
“authorised”, and not via boat) into Australia played a significant part in
their acceptance and legality.46 The legal changes undertaken during the
Kosovar evacuation were an extension of such a mindset. They were
42
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embodied in the coercive powers acquired by the Federal Government as
part of Operation Safe Haven. Developments in refugee policy at the time
of the Kosovo war and subsequent refugee crisis were part of a broader,
culturally conservative approach to immigration that has historically
reflected the anxieties of Australians.
Much of the literature surrounding refugee policy in this period
makes a narrow assertion. It asserts that popular national identity discourse
be demanded of refugees who might be construed as cultural and/or racial
“others” and that they conform to the hegemonic mode of belonging. This
discourse was part of a long-standing regulatory culture that has tended to
govern Australian immigration, and is inherited from, or at least linked to,
the exclusionary racial practices promoted by the White Australia policy.
This discourse played an important part in the rationale and
implementation of Operation Safe Haven. In many ways, the Kosovars
were conceived as a threat (as “boat people” came to be) and the media
was able to justify their stay by promoting it as a controlled, temporary
intrusion. The Kosovars’ mode of entry and then their confinement to army
camps in Australia was a notable factor in the public mindset.
Undoubtedly, there are links between the coercive powers of the Safe
Haven legislation and a conservative discourse that has tended to dominate
Australian immigration.
Since the early 1990s, coercion has increasingly been used by
Australian federal governments with the support of the dominant cultural
group to dominate and overwhelm minorities (particularly asylum seekers)
who are collectively identified and subjugated into more manageable
subject positions. Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, following Antonio
Gramsci, assert that consensual hegemonic relations are always backed by
‘the armour of coercion’.47 Their study on the Australian media suggests
how it is often used to signify authority by more subtle means. The media,
they maintain, is central to disseminating the perception that the State
should be able to police elements that are popularly felt to threaten core
47
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morals and values. Public backlash to the Tampa and ‘children overboard’
refugee incidences in 2001 reflected a growing consensus in the Howard
era in support of increased regulation of immigration. Popularly
constructed social wrongs in the media, typified by the dominant “invader”
and “queue-jumper” mentality of the period, played a substantial role in
justifying the State’s acquisition of greater coercive powers – most notably
the ‘temporary protection visa’ (TPV) and the ‘Pacific Solution’. Scholars
have often noted the ‘moral panic’ that gripped popular identity discourse
in the Howard era and the ways in which this panic legitimated the
expansion of the coercive powers of the Government in its dealings with
asylum seekers. 48
Immigration (and its control) has also remained central to the
consciousness of how Australians have constructed their identity. As Sonia
Tascon says, border control has played an ongoing role in the
(re)production of colonial power based on the exclusion and/or subjugation
of inferior racial and cultural Others. Colonialist aspirations in Australia
have continued to mobilise popular ‘binaries of opposition’ against
subordinate migrant groups and those deemed popularly “undesirable”.49
They are commonly played-out alongside ‘racialised knowledges’
extending from ‘the maintenance of the coloniality of power’.50 This is
despite the fragmentation of such power in the face of globalisation, which
has often served to rally popular anxieties about the decline of colonialist
power and traditions. Tascon asserts that these anxieties have increasingly
been exploited in Australian politics with the promise of reinstating the
prominence of White colonial power structures. It has produced
governmental attempts to fix “borders” as a permanent marker between the
nation and Others, offering certainty as opposed to the uncertainty that lies
beyond them.51 The outcome, Tascon says: ‘is a situation which left, and
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continues to leave, certain peoples “outside” the borders that bestow
benefits and privileges.’52
Such practices, Jupp says, must be viewed from the traditions of
British empire-building and the identities that extend, both consciously and
unconsciously, from this as an ongoing historical process. This is why the
same xenophobias we might attribute to fears in the 1850s about Chinese
goldminers, which continued to shape immigration policy for the next
century, have not yet disappeared.53 In more recent times, Jupp observes,
rather than engineering society by subsidized British migrants, it is done by
exclusion and selection, via the Department of Immigration and its various
branches and policies. The ability to select how and who to migrate to
Australia has remained a continuing historical norm, fundamental to
national cultural policies. The 2001 budget for the Department of
Immigration

reflected

a

declining

concern

for

settlement

and

multiculturalism, turning instead to its increasing ‘obsession’ with control
and compliance. It is reflected in the fact, for instance, that detention for
asylum seekers and the Pacific Solution cost more than migrant education
schemes.54
Scholarly consensus on how Australians have viewed refugees and
asylum seekers is varied. Many view temporary protection as reminiscent
of the White Australia policy and disagree with State aspirations to
increase its control of immigration by coercion. Katherine Betts urges that
negativity towards asylum seekers in this period was not racism, but
involved the sentiment that refugees did not fit in with the ‘Australian’ way
of life. She says that public opinion on this matter revolved around doubts
about asylum seekers’ bona fides, the wish for a strong Australian
community, and a ‘common sense of peoplehood’.55 This view supported
Howard Government rhetoric about meeting its obligations to protect
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national borders. That is, popular sentiment mandated Government
officials to punish and seize refugees deemed to be “illegal immigrants”.
Such claims have been disputed and it has been noted that that a
highly politicised language had galvanized public opinion. The Federal
Government’s implementation of TPVs was fraught with labels such as
“illegals” and “queue jumpers”.56 One study describes how societallyprevalent ‘false beliefs’ – about “queue jumpers”, “genuine refugees” and
“illegal” asylum seekers - were connected with false information and
comments made by political leaders. This punitive language was also
implicit in Department of Immigration and media commentary that linked
asylum seekers with being ‘queue-jumpers’, ‘terrorists’, ‘cashed up’, ‘nongenuine’ and ‘illegal’.57 The Tampa incident in 2001 demonstrates best
how, in using these kinds of terms, the Government was able to galvanise
popular accord. The demonising of boat people prior to the 2001 election
helped to re-establish a legitimate claim to political leadership by the Prime
Minister. The language was crucial to the election success, particularly
when it was likely the Government would lose office. It is also evident that
the language resonated with a much deeper resentment of non-invited
refugees, as border protection has continued to remain a prominent issue
beyond 2001. This is supported by a 2003 study on negative attitudes
towards Baxter Detention Centre which found that seventy per cent of
respondents viewed asylum seekers as ‘illegal’, ‘an economic burden’,
‘problematic’, ‘unwelcome’ and ‘ungrateful’.58
This exclusivist, popularly-imagined criteria for national belonging
were often played out with a subtext of White nationalism, prompted by
official government discourse demanding tougher border control. The
underlying purpose of this kind of discourse was to confirm ‘an image of

56

Humpage and Marston, op. cit., pp. 67-76.
Pederson, Watt, and Hansen, op. cit., pp. 105-124. See also p. 108. Here, they point out
that, in Klocker and Dunn’s 2003 study, 90% of Government press releases regarding
asylum seekers were negative, with politicised terms (such as ‘illegal’) outweighing more
neutral terms (eg. ‘asylum seekers’) in the discourse.
58
N. Klocker, ‘Community antagonism towards asylum seekers in Port Augusta, South
Australia’, Australian Geographical Studies, 42, 2004, pp. 1-17. As also cited in ibid., pp.
106-107.
57

34

the White Australian as a manager of national space,’59 while
(re)producing the legitimacy of the State and its increased use of coercive
powers against non-citizens. As Foucault has argued in relation to
governmentality, while paraphrasing La Perriere: ‘government is the right
disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end.’60
Attempts by the State to establish a causal link between criminality, racial
or cultural identity and “mass” breaches of national space at the borders
have been used increasingly to generate political consensus since the early
1990s.61

2.2 Temporary protection, sovereignty and the ‘In the National Interest’
White Paper
Refugees have often been used to promote as normative a coercive element
that has continued to underpin popular constructions of Australian identity.
Similar sentiments about non-British Others were prominent in antiChinese anxieties of the 1850s on the goldfields, and in relation to the
arrival of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s. By 2001 Middle Eastern
refugees had become what Poynting and Mason refer to as a “fifth column”
threat within Australia during the US-led ‘war on terror’. That is, an
“enemy within” who raised new questions about citizenship, identity and
loyalty at times when the country of residence is in conflict with their
country of origin.62 The Kosovar refugee evacuation requires a slightly
different interpretation where the Australian government supported the
NATO bombing of Kosovo in lieu of human rights. However, it is clear
that the Kosovars, like boat people, were simultaneously imagined from the
outset, albeit more subtly, as a possible threat to Australia’s border
protection policies. There remained concern for the Kosovar visit to be
officially regulated, producing a form of temporary protection legislation
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that discarded a range of human rights otherwise available to refugees. As
Head says, the Safe Haven Visa legislation introduced to accommodate the
Kosovar refugees was part of continuing efforts by successive
Commonwealth governments – both Coalition and Labor – to withdraw
and restrict, if not abolish, access to judicial review by those people
classified as ‘unlawful non-citizens’.63
The Kosovars were imagined in a more popular light during the
evacuation on account of their background as Europeans and other values
thought to be shared with Australians. As has been argued, there are some
humanitarian crises – such as the Nazi Holocaust – that have been given
high visibility not only because of the great numbers involved, but also
because of their ‘Europeanness’.64 This implies that these events were so
disturbing because they took place ‘within … white borders’ rather than
elsewhere: in Africa, Asia or Latin America.65 Popular identity discourse
and policy making merged during the Safe Haven evacuation program
because, as has been argued: ‘belonging has the capacity to mobilise
individuals … around the contentious question of citizenship rights’.66
Increasingly control-orientated refugee policies in this period
reflected the Howard Government’s concern about national sovereignty,
but they also pandered to popular fears that “Australian culture” and its
territorial independence were under attack from refugees. As Wazana says,
the ‘natural sequence of events [was such that] if one believes that one is
under attack, one will naturally want to defend oneself.’67 Immigration
Minister Ruddock emphasised the notion of sovereignty during
Parliamentary debates over the Border Protection Bill (2001), stating that
new approaches to asylum seekers were due to ‘increasing threats to
Australia’s sovereign right to determine who will enter and remain in
Australia.’68 John Howard commented in Parliament during the Tampa
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incident in 2001: ‘Every nation has the right to effectively control its
borders and to decide who comes here and under what circumstances, and
Australia has no intention of surrendering or compromising that right.’69
The Prime Minister was attempting to normalise a link between the
unpredictable “threat” posed by refugees and popular discontent over nonBritish migrant groups. This is, in more general terms, indicative of the
way in which federal politics was contested in the period that immediately
followed Pauline Hanson’s brief career as a Senator. Humpage and
Marston comment accurately that, in the Howard era: ‘it is clear that
refugees and asylum seekers have been regarded as physically embodying
an external threat to jobs, living standards, welfare, and the dominance of
the nation-state as the focus of social belonging.’70 Political debates in such
a climate frequently became contests between political parties as to who
was the toughest on “illegals”.71
The fundamental area of interest for the Howard Government’s
foreign policy, as noted in the 1997 White Paper In the National Interest,
was ‘the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of
living of the Australian people’.72 The Government promised to ‘apply this
basic test of national interest’ in all of its activities associated with the field
of foreign and trade policy.73 The Howard Government later described its
approach to foreign policy as a “realist” approach.74 Such an approach
reflected the prominence of the popular discourse of the national sphere in
areas of policy that might have otherwise been dealt with as a matter of
foreign affairs, including border protection. The Howard Government’s
approach to foreign policy had a significant influence on the way in which
the Department of Immigration operated. The international humanitarian
focus within the Department’s operations was significantly watered-down
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and was compensated for this loss by a much greater regard for national
political currents. As international relations commentators Gary Smith and
David Lowe note, the Howard Government’s approach to foreign policy
‘sought not only to make foreign policy in response to new regional and
global agendas, but also to respond to and to seek to manage new forms of
electoral challenge.’75 They observed that the Howard Government’s selfpromoted “realist” approach saw the line between domestic and
international politics become increasingly blurred. This was particularly
evident following the 2001 refugee incidences involving the Tampa and the
‘children overboard’ affair, which demonstrated how new forms of
Australian nationalism weighed-in on an incident with international
consequences.76 The Howard Government frequently played on popular
notions about “queue-jumpers” in the media and in policy statements, a
term deeply offensive to many Australians’ sense of “fair play”.77
Responses by federal governments over the past two decades to the issue of
refugees mirrors the ways in which many States have attempted to deal
with increasing tension within their societies between globality (the
influence of the extra-national sphere) and nationality (domestic resistance
to the global sphere).78 In reality, Australia’s foreign policy has continued
to encompass varying degrees of both local and international political
influences, even while aspirations for domestic political success have
encouraged governments to promote (what is purported to be) the national
interest ahead of global concerns.

3. Media as Useful to the Howard Government
3.1 Promoting “acceptability”
This section elaborates on the significance of media representation of the
Kosovar refugees and note the methods employed in this thesis to analyse
media coverage. It discusses the role of the news media using a sceptical
lens that is critical and evaluative. Here I evaluate this role alongside
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purposive attempts by the Howard Government to position itself in a
favourable light throughout Operation Safe Haven. The cultural
implications of mass media coverage are considered briefly in this section
as well in order to provide insight into the ways in which the relationship
between the corporate media, government and popular discourse is most
often complementary and serves to reproduce the hegemony of the existing
social order.
This investigation draws on more than a year’s newspaper coverage
in The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), The Australian (distributed nationally)
and The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney). I have examined news stories,
opinion columns, editorials, features, letters-to-the-editor, photographs and
cartoons. My choice of these newspaper sources was based on the need to
establish clear analytical boundaries for my case study. These newspapers
produce daily publications and weekend editions as well - The Sunday
Telegraph, Weekend Australian and The Sun-Herald.79 The Daily/Sunday
Telegraph catered to the largest readership in Sydney throughout 1999,
outselling the nearest rival (The Sydney Morning Herald/Sun-Herald) by a
ratio of approximately 1.1 to 1, including average weekly sales of
4,097,000 newspapers.80 The Sydney Morning Herald/Sun-Herald sold
around 3,697,000 per week in this period, while The Australian/Weekend
Australian distributed an average of 1,363,000 copies weekly to a national
readership for the same year.81
Newspaper evidence was gathered by utilising the electronic
database Factiva and conducting keyword searches within the date range of
July 1998 until December 2000. Further exploration of microfiche records
of each of the newspapers allowed for a much more thorough analysis – in
terms of, for example, being able to catalogue images - and involved
tracing developments on a day-by-day basis. This thesis incorporates a
79
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variety of other media (such as Internet-based documents) into my
analysis, although these were not included in the media content analysis of
news sources. It further investigates almost two years of Australian Federal
Parliamentary debates (Hansard) that discussed the Kosovar refugees, the
Safe Haven legislation and Operation Safe Haven (these are cited in my
bibliography). I was able to download complete proceedings of the
Australian Federal Parliamentary sittings using online Hansard records,
examining Hansard proceedings - from both the House of Representatives
and the Senate - dated between August 1998 and May 2000. Although oral
testimonies were not used as part of the investigation, my primary sources
provide a broad perspective for evaluating the Howard Government’s
refugee policy and the implications of media representations of the
Kosovar refugees.
Newspapers are one of the most highly consumed mass media in
Australia, although television, radio and “new” media content (including
the Internet) are invaluable primary sources as well. The production and
consumption of newspapers provides a useful avenue for understanding the
reproduction of consensual relations within Australian society and the
relationship that is often formed between the media and State as part of this
process. Some commentators have stated that the media’s influence over
populism and public opinion can be described as fickle at best, and that
media discourse is merely a reflection of the prevailing social consensus.82
Those who support this position suppose that media organisations are, by
virtue of good business practice, required to construct news stories around
pre-existing social discourse. This grants licence to news media companies
to claim to be representative of the community’s interests. They claim they
have been “feeding-off” public concerns and trends.83 However, the news
media has considerable ability to construct and shape public opinion by
offering, for example, space and voice to some social, political and cultural
groups while excluding others. It is often the absences in media content –
what equates to the effective muzzling and marginalisation of some social
82
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groups and ideas – that provide the clearest indication of the political
leanings of a particular news organisation.84 By utilising these
perspectives, my thesis elaborates on the links between mass media
practices, the ideological leanings of the newspapers that I have drawn on
and the responses of these newspapers to the Kosovar refugees.
My decision to analyse newspapers is not intended to diminish the
role or the importance of other mass media reporting on the Kosovar
refugees. It is evident throughout my thesis that the relationship between
radio, television, newspapers and other media is an interactive one. News
sources often feed off each other, reinforcing the salience of the dominant
narrative. However, the different news organisations can also challenge the
stories being reported by other media (as is the case in Chapter 4) when it
is in their interests to do so. There is the potential for media companies to
profit by taking on board alternative positions and by the controversy that
is generated by not towing the popular line. Various news organisations
also, at times, rely on each other for source material as well as independent
news analysis to sustain representational narratives. This includes statistics
from news polls produced externally to news organisations - such as by AC
Nielson and Newspoll - from which newspapers and their journalists pick
and chose information to incorporate as well as ignore. There is, as such, a
degree of flexibility in the production of news narratives including in the
relations between newspapers and other sources of news. My main
concern, however, is to evaluate the production of dominant news stories
about the Kosovars, and to uncover as well as analyse the preferred stance
of these newspapers in their representations.

3.2 Method of analysis; the power of representation
The analytical method that is used to analyse media texts in this thesis
owes a debt to scholarship that draws on the notion media framing. Other
scholars might prefer the terms spin, representation or discourse and I have
chosen to employ these notions at various times as well. The intention is to
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investigate the power of representation in the media as well as the
representative power of the media. The task in using this method is to
identify how consensual social relations are maintained through the
relationships formed between governments and the media. This method
provides a useful avenue for investigating ‘deliberate strategies for
securing stronger consensus’ by the Howard Government as evident in its
publicity campaigns surrounding Operation Safe Haven.85 It is a means for
making clearer the ways in which ‘consent can be manufactured’ in liberal
democracies.86
The argument of scholars using this method is that consent can be
manipulated and that this manipulation occurs through the persuading,
pressuring and managing public opinion.87 The notion of media framing
allows researchers to understand how those in a ‘commanding position’ –
particularly media proprietors, often in conjunction with hegemonic
political groups or individuals - work to shape and transform opinion
within a political schema that privileges the dominant moral or social
framework.88 An important work in this area of media analysis is
Manufacturing Consent; the Political Economy of the Mass Media by
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. They identify how the mass
media mobilise bias via patterns of news choices. They examine how the
mass media ‘serve to mobilize support for the special interests that
dominate the state and private activity, and that their choices, emphases,
and omissions can often be understood best, and sometimes with striking
clarity and insight, by analysing them in such terms.’89 In deconstructing
the news media, Herman and Chomsky’s analysis challenges the
democratic postulate that the media are independent and committed to
discovering and reporting the truth. The media goes much farther than
merely reflecting the world as powerful groups wish it to be perceived.90
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What is particularly interesting about this case study is the initial
tension between the media and the Howard Government over the
evacuation of the Kosovar refugees. The Government at first rejected calls
by the UNHCR to evacuate some of the hundreds of thousands of Kosovars
from the refugee camps of Macedonia. Its policy stance was quickly
overturned in-line with widespread public concern for the refugees, intense
media criticism and pressure from the international community among
other reasons. This study of news production provides a way of measuring
(through content analysis) and rationalising why the media’s position
toward the refugees shifted over the course of their stay, while
predominantly supporting the strategic aims of the Howard Government.
While this work is not based on a ‘pure’ form of media framing, it
does owe this approach considerable due.91 Media framing provides
researchers with a method to explore the paradoxes in media opinion – for
understanding not only the correlation between the media and the Federal
Government’s ‘strategies for securing stronger consensus’, but also their
need and ability to remain flexible in responding to popular views. This
method of analysis opens avenues for understanding the degree to which
hegemonic groups bend and shift in relation to the position from which
their interests are able to benefit most. By adapting to the popular
perspective as it bends and shifts, the media reproduces its own
significance and remains at the centre of (and a catalyst for) popular
opinion.92
Research concerned with media framing is often based on both
quantitative and qualitative insights. Herman and Chomsky employed
content analysis to present ‘media priorities and biases’ in the US,
alongside the suppression of certain issues or perspectives in news
reports.93 Herman and Chomsky examined the ‘attention given to a fact –
its placement, tone, and repetitions, the framework of analysis within
which it is presented, and the related facts that accompany it and give it
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meaning (or preclude understanding).’94 They were also concerned with
‘whether that fact received the attention and context it deserved, whether it
was intelligible to the reader or effectively distorted or suppressed.’95 This
assisted in their aim to demonstrate clear discrepancies not only in the
quantity but also ‘the quality of treatment’ of particular issues and whether
some of these were given more generous treatment than others.96
One of the benefits of conducting content analysis is that it provides
avenues to demonstrate how an ‘observable pattern of indignant campaigns
and suppressions, of shading and emphasis, and of selection of context,
premises and general agenda, is highly functional for established power
and responsive to the needs of the government and major power groups.’97
These patterns can be observed across a range of newspaper items – in
editorials, news stories, features, opinion columns, images, cartoon satire,
and even the public contributions (such as letters or vox-pop articles) that
are selected for publication. These kinds of media interventions work to set
the boundaries of public discussion on government policy as well as the
overall political agenda, via longer-term priming and the framing of
content. Such patterns in the media ‘constitute the commons’, creating
consent ‘intuitively – without anything being said or even in implicit
opposition to what is said.’98 Patterns of media framing can be viewed to
‘persist through time’ and are ‘durable’ indications of political life that
‘stand outside language’ telling us how political actors “build” and what
they “make” through consent.99
My analytical method provides firm though not incontestable
boundaries for the study at hand. This method is useful for understanding
the political power of the media, though there are critical limitations to
media framing. Chomsky’s work on media analysis has been described as
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an ‘almost conspiratorial view of the media’.100 Chomsky utilised content
analysis to trace media behaviour not to state directives or backroom
intrigue, but to institutional imperatives. The method illuminated the
‘nature of institutions, not the machinations of individuals’.101 It provided a
framework for investigating the coalescent relationship of institutional
pressures and self-censorship in the production of news.
Rai says that one of the key mechanisms in mass media processes is
the recruitment of media personnel ‘who are selected by media
corporations on the condition that they already possess the “right”
attitude… it is the pre-selection of “right-thinking” journalists and scholars
which accounts for much of the censorship in [Chomsky’s work including]
the Propaganda Model.’102 Pressures to self-censor are institutionalised.
The argument is that journalists who don’t conform to the discourse of the
dominant media are given the options of either career advancement through
comformity or taking the independent path and accepting exclusion from
major publications; ‘Journalists may be led into a process of steadily
adapting their judgements until they conform to the prevailing norms.’103
There is significant contention with this theory on grounds it is
premised on the assumption that the mass media simply communicate
“messages” and thereby inculcate individuals with values, beliefs, and
codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structure of
the larger society.104 What is ‘absent from this interpretation is an analysis
of the major transformations of the modern era that have altered the nature
of social relations, persons, and our conscious and unconscious
functioning… Absent is any systematic reference to the root features of
modern

life

[such

as]

industrialization,

ubiquitous

technological

transformation, the fragmentation of belief and morality under the
influence of specialization, secularization, and bureaucratization … the
segmentation and growing powerlessness of individual resistance; and the
manipulation of unconscious psychological processes beyond the limits of
100
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any previous historical periods.’105 The issue of contention is a
sender/receiver framework of communication, with critics arguing that
consciousness is not determined primarily by the flow of media transmitted
information and misinformation: ‘As human beings we are rooted in and
permeated by the economic, social, cultural and psychological dynamics
which structure our lives. We are constructed not merely by ideas, but by
the social forces which determine the valence and viability of our
conceptual existence. In fact, the ground of media distortion is already
prepared in the deep structure of social and family life…’106
While Chomsky’s analytical method has been criticised for being
“simplistic”, micro-analysis through content analysis is useful for
understanding the underlying social pressures of media performance. This
is pariculalry in regards to the ideogical commitments of journalists whose
work is cultured in such as way as to provide ‘a picture fairly close to
reality for investors and other decision-makers’.107 The institutionalisation
of the dominant political ideology renders media discourse a cultural
phenomenon practiced by the agents of the institution - the journalists,
editors and sub-editors and other perputators of the dominant news
narratives who have over time accepted the parameters set by long-term
internal organisatonal priming. This kind of self-censorhsip is reinforced
by the effects of external long-term agenda setting by the mass media. The
radar for newsworthiness is thus subject to the mediating role of a duallayered scope set both internally and externally.
Chomsky concedes: ‘Just how that works in the editorial offices I
can’t tell you.’108 Empirical inquiry through content analysis does not
provide an absolute depiction of media processes as a mediator of social
and political discourse. While individual reporters learn to frame stories in
particular ways as appropriate to their media organisation and the audience
it “serves”, there is also an element of suddenness that needs to be
recognised. It can be conceded that some events which are reported on
often emerge seemingly out of nowhere, leaving questions about the
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consistency of supporters of the political economy thesis. I do not dispute
this criticism in my thesis. The analytical method, however, provides
useful parameters for exploring particular aspects of the case study while
highlighting media bias and the prefential treatment of facts by news
companies.

3.3 Content analysis
The identification of which parts of a media text to analyse via content
analysis is an ambiguous and problematic process, and it is difficult for
researchers to avoid questions about bias and robustness of the coding
categories selected.109 The claim has often been made that coding
categories are chosen following a “deep” or “careful reading” of the
material, or by a simple acknowledgement that they “emerged from the
analysis”. 110 The selection of categories is implicated by many factors,
particularly the researchers’ own subjectivities and even carefully chosen
categories are, across different schools of thought, often questioned for
their reliability. The problem is that researchers run the risk of extracting
researcher categories, rather than media categories (or frames).111 Coding
categories are often based on quite abstract variables that are both difficult
to identify and to code in content analysis and, as a result, the process of
coding commonly falls into a ‘methodological black box.’112
Despite these kinds of ambiguities, content analysis provides many
useful avenues for determining how particular news narratives are shaped
by and infused with ideological meanings. I coded news items manually for
this thesis and a different coding sheet was constructed for each chapter or
relative area of investigation. The first task in constructing each coding
sheet was to overcome any ambiguities in the language of the texts that
were deconstructed. To do this I identified a variety of keywords as
indicators - to indicate particulars in the language used to support those
109
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frames being deployed in news reports. These include common phrases,
metaphors, emotive keywords, symbolic jargon, words that are valueladen, judgements with connotative meanings or any other frequently-used
terminology which can be deconstructed because of its lexical meaning.113
These keywords are listed in the footnotes section throughout this thesis
(where they are not cited in the body text). Via the coding of the language
of the news, content analysis provides a systematic, quantifiable method
for identifying the preferred position of a media source in relation to a
particular issue, view or social group – in this case, to the Kosovar refugees
and the Howard Government.114

4. The Emergence and Breakdown of Yugoslavia
This section provides a brief overview of the history of Yugoslavia. It
reflects on the period of Ottoman-ruled Balkans to the kingdom of the
South Slavs (the “first” Yugoslavia). This section investigates relations
between Western European powers and Balkan countries from the late
nineteenth to early twentieth centuries and how they impacted on
subsequent historical events. This includes the World Wars and the Cold
War. It will then explore the organisation of the Federation of (or the
“second”) Yugoslavia and the leadership role played by President Josip
Broz Tito during the Cold War period. Yugoslavia’s political and
economic decline in the 1980s is assessed as well as the inability of Serbia
to “salvage” Yugoslavia from collapse under the leadership of Slobodan
Milosevic. It is argued that Serbia’s nationalist “turn” in the late 1980s
hastened Yugoslavia’s decline and conflict within the federation. This
overview provides useful background for rationalising ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo and the NATO intervention in 1999. Yugoslavia struggled to
modernise throughout the twentieth century. It was industrially inefficient
and failed to maintain pace with the global economy. Even with attempts
by the Tito regime to increase industrialisation, horizontal economic
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planning and a vertical political structure eventuated in the collapse of the
Federation. ‘Anti-modern’ tensions provided the setting for the Yugoslav
‘wars of succession’, which began in Croatia in 1991 and ended in Kosovo
in 1999.115

4.1 Emergence of Yugoslavia from the Ottomans to Tito
Slavic speaking ethnic groups initially migrated to the Balkans in the 6th
and 7th centuries. Subsequent waves of migration to the region were
undertaken by ethnically diverse Slavic groups including Slovenes, Croats,
Bosniaks, and Serbs, while Albanians have claimed much older lineage
that pre-dates colonisation by the Roman empire.116 In 1453 the East
Roman (or Byzantine) capital Constantinople was conquered by the
Ottoman Turks. At this time Turkish power was firmly established in most
of the territories previously governed by the Byzantines. By the mid-15th
century the Ottoman sultante controlled most the Balkans, governing an
ethnically diverse local population.
A large Slavic-speaking Muslim community emerged and was
significantly concentrated in Bosnia. Conversions from Catholicism and
other sects of Christianity to Islam were not usually forced on the local
populations. The Ottoman government preserved many features of Balkan
life including social and ceremonial customs.117 Conversion was attractive
to many, particularly Albanians and Bosniaks. It increased career and
business prospects within the Ottoman class system. In the 15th and 16th
centuries Catholics were subjected to greater suspicion by the Ottoman
government than Orthodox Christians. This was because the religious
allegiances of Catholics lay in Rome, and to the foreign power of the
Papacy. On the other hand Orthodoxy was fragmented along ethnic lines
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and patriarchs kept office within the empire, and were able to be more
greatly influenced by the Ottomans.118
Constant military conflict in the 18th century along the AustroHungarian/Ottoman frontiers, encompassing modern-day Croatia and
Slovenia, rendered economic conditions unstable in these areas. Following
their failed siege of Vienna in 1683 the Ottomans handed over Hungary to
Austria in 1699. Serbs embarked on a mass migration to Hungary and
elsewhere after fighting for Austria during the war, particularly emigrating
from Kosovo where they faced punishment by Turks.119 In Kosovo the
local population of Serbs and Albanians had revolted against Ottoman rule
in 1689, after which Catholics were treated with hostility and many priests
were killed or fled the province.120 The frontier was heavily
underpopulated, and coupled with military instability this meant the growth
of markets and industry was limited. It wasn’t until the end of the 19th
century that these lands began to be industrialised (and not until the end of
the Second World War for some rural areas).121
By the early 1700s Balkan cities such as Pristina, Sarajevo, Mostar
and Visegrad grew into major regional centers of trade and urban
culture.122 Sarajevo ‘was exceptional among Balkan cities’, experiencing a
boom in the late 18th and early 19th centuries to develop into a major centre
of international commerce.123 Bosnia played a significant role in European
affairs because of mining, textiles and metallurgy, though its trade was
never directed primarily at Istanbul, looking more so towards the
Dalmatian ports, especially Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Split.124 Towns
situated at key river and coastal ports were important crossroads for trade
and cultural exchanges between the Ottoman empire and Western Europe.
European political disputes, however, led to a decline in commerce and
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industry in Sarajevo after it was ‘demoted’ during the Austrian occupation
of 1878.125
Citing these kinds of continued relations with the rest of Europe,
Allcock disputes tendencies to separate the Balkans from within Europe’s
sphere of influence. This is because it provides grounds for Western
Europeans to disconnect themselves from the “troubles” of the late
twentieth century such as ethnic cleansing and the wars of succession.
Allcock says: ‘If “the Balkans” have come to signify conflict and
fragmentation, this is because the region has been the arena in which the
larger conflicts of European powers have been concentrated and, to some
extent, conducted by proxy.’126 This thesis rejects primordial assumptions
because they tend to be ahistorical. Such disconnect enables Western
Europeans to separate themselves from having played an historically
influencial role in the affairs of the Balkans.
The popular view of 19th century Balkan history is extremely
simple: ‘it is a story of people struggling to be free on the one hand, and an
illiberal, autocratic Ottoman state trying to suppress them on the other.’127
By the late 19th century the idea began to circulate in Western Europe that
the Balkans was “backward”. Western European powers promoted their
interventions and meddling in the Balkans in the 19th century in binary
terms, propagating the notion that Austria was “advanced” and the
Ottoman empire was anti-modern.128 Railway lines were sparser than in
Europe and it wasn’t until very late in the 19th century that industrialisation
began to accelerate. However, much of the popular view, even today, has
been based on many Europeans’ own xenophobia and their haste to mark
comfortable boundaries between East and West.129
There are historical reasons for challenging commonplace
generalisations about the Balkans in regards to slow economic
development, and in particular the lack of industrialisation, of the former
Ottoman provinces. The basis for these generalisations can be traced back
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to the 19th century when Western European capitalists were vying for
industrial contracts in Ottoman Balkan territories. The overall volume of
Ottoman trade continuted to grow with the industrialising countries
thoughout the 19th century, although cheaper, mass-produced manufactured
imports from Western Europe had a considerable impact on Ottoman
markets, undermining local production.130 Industrialisation of the Balkans
was slower in comparison to wealthier Western European countries like
Germany, Austria, France and Britain. Part of the reason for this, Allcock
says, can be linked to Ottoman institutional conservatism and suspicion
which prevented direct investment and the importation of advanced
technologies until the mid-nineteenth century. This thwarted, to an extent,
industrialising projects including the rapid expansion of railways, making
the Ottoman empire more dependent on Western Europe for the supply of
industrial products rather than establishing it as an industrial producer in its
own right.131 Still, ‘one should refrain from overgeneralisation about the
necessary or inevitable character of “Ottoman backwardness”, recognising
not only that the backwardness of the empire relative to Western Europe
has varied over time, but also that this process has been shaped at many
points precisely by the nature of the relationship between the two.’132
European powers played a significant role in limiting the
development of the Balkan economy in the nineteenth century. In fact, ‘the
competition between the major European powers began to act as a brake on
development by creating, in effect, a mutual veto on Balkan railway
investment. Austrian and German transcontinental projects competed with
each other … for the compliance of the other powers.’133 Consequently, the
main north-south rail link, which had significant potential for increasing
Ottoman trade, was not completed until the 1880s. This was particularly
detrimental for the development of Serbia. The lateness of industrialised
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communication networks resulted in Serbia’s relative isolation and low
levels of foreign investment.134
Unable to maintain its frontier provinces and facing international
pressure, the Ottomans handed over Bosnia in 1878 to the Habsburg
Austro-Hungarian empire under terms of the Treaty of Berlin. Modernising
reforms brought about by the Habsburgs, such as railway extensions and
establishing more effective communication networks, were hampered
because adminstration of the region was divided between Austria and
Hungary.135 The uncooperative nature of these factions left BosniaHerzegovina without effective rail contact with the rest of the Austrian
empire. Habsburg administration also meant its military interests
effectively overruled local market interests. Bosnia was subsequently
highly dependant on shipping and ports in Dalmatia for trade and
communication with the outside world.136
It was during the late 19th century that Croats, Slovenes, Albanians,
Serbs, Bosnians and Herzegovinans developed nationalist ambitions and
were increasingly resentful of foreign influence. The idea of a unified state
of South Slavs (Yugoslavia) also became popular across the region in the
early 1900s. Austria’s decision to formally annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in
1908 generated a sense of urgency for Balkan nationalists.137 Political
tensions culminated in a plot in Sarajevo which unfolded on 28th June 1914
when Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated the heir to the AustroHungarian throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The assassination was the
catalyst for the outbreak of the First World War, setting in motion military
responses by the major European powers based on the treaties between
them. Russia supported Serbia’s claim to independence, Germany
advocated for Austria’s claim to the Balkans, while France and Britain
acted to defend Russia against German hostility.138
With Austria’s defeat at the end of World War I, the different
segments of the Balkans, corresponding still more to ethnic groups rather
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than geography, came together under the guise of mutual strength and
protection from foreign powers. The result was establishment of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, though the country was
renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. Unable to quell German aggression the
Kingdom was invaded by Nazi Germany in April 1941. Yugoslavia’s King
Peter II fled the country while royalist supporters appeased the Nazis and
accepted their program to persecute Jews. Atrocities were also committed
by the various ethnic groups against each other amid efforts to re-take
control of Yugoslavia. Paramilitary groups were established and mobilised
during this period such as Ustashi (Croatian fascists) and Chetniks (Serbian
mercenaries).139
In response to the Nazi invasion Yugoslav communists under the
leadership of Josip Broz Tito organized a multi-ethnic resistance group
called ‘partisans’ who fought against the Axis powers and the Ustashi. In
November 1943 Tito founded the Anti-Fascist Council of National
Liberation of Yugoslavia in an attempt to establish the Yugoslav
federation. Upon military success the Allies recognised Tito as the leader
of Yugoslavia. By 1946 the partisans had established the Federal People’s
Republic of Yugoslavia. This meant there were six semi-autonomous
republics within the new state - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia,
Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro. There were two provinces as well –
Kosovo and Vojvodina – which had limited autonomy and were
administered directly by Serbia.
During the early period of the “first Yugoslavia” from 1918 to 1930
the country’s economy centred on the extraction and export of primary
products. It was predominantly an agrarian society.140 The world
depression was ‘catastrophic’ for trade, though coastal areas recovered
more quickly in the 1930s due to a boom in tourism.141 During World War
II the Nazi occupation led to the nationalising of key Yugoslav industries.
Production in the Balkans was subordinated to the needs of the Nazi war
effort, and then those of the partisans as Tito gained control of the country.
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The centralisation of resource distribution underpinned the planned
economy envisioned by the Communist party under Tito.142 Attempts by
Tito’s regime to increase industrialisation were undermined by an
experiment in paradox. The experiment began in the early post-war period
and

combined

horizontal

economic

management

(workers’

self-

management) with a vertical political structure. The outcome produced
significant internal contradictions: instead of a flexible, market needsbased system of resource allocation within the federation, there was rigid,
planned allocation of resources.143 As a result the period 1945 to 1991 was
characterised by a deep contradiction between the imperatives of
modernisation and the fundamentally anti-modern features of the Yugoslav
‘road to socialism’.144
Yugoslavia’s slow economic growth reflected the country’s
struggle to insert itself into global patterns of development.145 Localised
strengths were often sacrificed to the desires of the Federation. Primary
resource production remained central to the economy of Tito’s Yugoslavia,
rendering the country dependent on imports for capital and technological
advancement. The planned economy was thwarted by problems such as
inefficient production and inflation as well as self-interest by republican
political elites to “rescue” their own republics from the mire.146 The break
up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s can be attributed, in this sense, at least in
part to the ideological goals of its elites and their failure to adapt
economically to the globalising world.147
Tito’s death in 1980 was a significant factor leading to the
disintegration of Yugoslavia; he was in many ways a kind of keystone
holding all the republics together.148 Malcolm says Tito’s legacy was a
‘stultified political system and a collapsing economy’, and created the
conditions under which a politician such as Slobodan Milosevic ‘could rise
to power and manipulate Serbian nationalism to his own destructive
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advantage.’149 In Tito’s absence, nationalism increasingly undermined
relations between the republics alongside differences in economic growth
which were openly politicised by Slovenia and Croatia.150
In 1989 the collapse of the USSR lifted the unifying threat and
pressure from the north. Russia’s political influence and military
capabilities had been a major incentive for the unification of the Yugoslav
republics.151 Economic decline, poverty, high inflation and Serbia’s heavyhanded attempts to maintain Yugoslav cohesion were immediate factors in
the eventual break up of the federation.152 By 1990 unemployment was up
to 16.4% in Serbia and 38.4% in Kosovo.153 In the search for explanations
for their own difficulties, republican political leaders resorted to blaming
other republics, creating a culture of paranoia: ‘Eveyone was surrounded
by enemies, although the “enemies without” of the Cold War period were
now replaced by the “enemies within” of other republics and other
nations.’154
Diametically opposed to Western historical thought, which is
typically respresented as an image of ‘ineluctable historical continuity’, has
been repeated insistence on the importance of discontinuity in the histories
of Balkan peoples.155 The history of Yugoslavia is often represented by
academic and non-academic observers absolutely as ‘a series of abrupt
breaks with the past’; UN military commanders during in Bosnian war
made constant references to the “historical” and fanatical divisions
between Serbs, Croats and Muslims. 156 Historical accounts invoke a sense
of mechanisation through the use of labels such as “first Yugoslavia” and
“second Yugoslavia”. These notions are fraught with generalisations about
capitalism giving way to socialism, and centralist royal power to federalist
republicanism. A preoccupation with discontinuity has constituted much of
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the prevailing understanding about the history of Yugoslavia.157 Use of the
phrase “wars of succession” is another indication of the central role played
by the notion of discontinuity in contemporary understandings of the
history of the Balkans.158 “Succession” conveys an image of momentum
because of discontinuities. This provides a comfortable, sequential ordered
historical narrative, but reduces history ‘to the more or less constant
outworking of basically fixed psychological predispositions of cultural
traits’, segmenting the history of the South Slav peoples into a series of
static, ordered processions.159
Fixations with dis/continuity have reinforced the image of the
Balkans as disconnected from Western Europe. In doing so the South Slavs
are often construed as Western Europe’s relative “other”, uncivilised and
fractured. Paradoxically, because of the interests of Western European
capitalism, the Balkans is also considered to exist within the moral sphere
in which Europeans are obliged to take notice of their affairs and thereby
compelled to “fix” Balkan troubles. Such discouse is present in the jargon
used by NATO and its allies who construed military operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo as civilising missions. These were interventions into an
ongoing sequence of uncivilised historical successions.
As Allcock says, a common representation of the independence of
Croatia and Slovenia depicts them as regaining their “rightful” place in the
West, as opposed to the “oriental” societies further to the near and far
East.160 Rather than a series of breaks with continuity, the development of
the region ought to be viewed as the journey of South Slavs towards
modernisation and their struggles to overcome barriers to globalisation:
‘the region is involved in essentially the same processes of development
upon which we ourselves are embarked.’161
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4.2 The fall of communism and demise of Yugoslavia
This section evaluates the ‘nationalist frenzy’ that occurred in the former
Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s and the ways in which this facilitated
Serbia’s campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 162 The aim is to establish
a greater sense of depth and context to the Kosovo war by highlighting the
historical implications impacting on Australia’s decision to accept ethnic
Albanian refugees. This provides useful context for understanding how the
Kosovo war was represented by the media in Australia and influenced the
Howard Government’s decision to accommodate the refugees under the
Safe Haven program.
A surge in ethnic-nationalism within the republics of the former
Yugoslavia played a fundamental role in mobilising armed forces during
the 1990s Balkan wars. Historians and other scholars have offered varying
interpretations about the origins of the conflicts. Popular history attributes
six centuries of Ottoman rule to producing ethnic tensions in the Balkans.
Naimark disagrees with this interpretation, stating that the nationalist
frenzy in the former Yugoslavia is related much more specifically to the
political history of Europe in the twentieth century as opposed to centuries
of Turkish rule. The rise of communism after World War II was a much
more immediate influence, and ‘The breakup of communist Yugoslavia at
the end of the 1980s unleashed forces of national antagonism that
recapitulated, in some ways, those [held by Serb Chetniks, Croat Ustashas
and Bosnian SS fighters during] World War II.’163
Communism not only gave way to radical ethnic-nationalism in
Yugoslavia in the 1980s but its demise was made more likely because of
widespread dissatisfaction with the hardships that accompanied communist
economics.164 Throughout the 1980s Yugoslavia faced endemic economic
problems such as severe inflation, high unemployment and credit strain.
These factors encouraged the wealthier republics of Croatia and Slovenia
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to sever ties with the Yugoslav federation for fear of being pulled down
with the “sinking ship”. 165 Where Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Kosovar
Albanians had lived in relative peace for centuries, there emerged in the
1980s growing resentment of each other alongside mass poverty.166
Naimark states: ‘With nationalism’s major enemy – Soviet-inspired
communism – defeated and everywhere [in Europe] in retreat, nationalist
ideologies naturally sought out other enemies, usually “other” nations,
whether minorities within one’s own nation or one’s neighbours.’167
While nationalism lent to escalating tensions within Yugoslavia,
Allcock disputes the notion that it was a ‘congenital disease’ typical of the
Balkans.168 Despite the comfortable image of the Balkans being
fragmented from Europe, and of hostile nationalist fragmentation within,
nationality ought to be viewed as meaning different things in different
areas. National identities are produced by disparate processes that are
specific to the relationship between local conditions (including kinship,
locality, religion and traditionalism) and global influences.169 Nationality
can thus be viewed as resulting from the need to adapt to the modern
world, and nationalism is not in itself the reason for the Balkan wars of the
1990s.

4.3 Rationalising ethnic cleansing and the Serbian nationalist ‘frenzy’
The term ethnic cleansing ‘exploded into our consciousness in May 1992
during the first stage of the war in Bosnia’.170 After the atrocities
committed by Serbian military leaders and paramilitaries in Bosnia, the
concept quickly became part of the international lexicons of crimes
associated with Serb aggression.171 The Bosnian government declared the
country to be a sovereign state, cutting ties with Yugoslvia on 15th October
1991. The referendum that followed on 29th February 1992 produced an
affirmative result for independence from Yugoslavia. Most Bosnian Serbs
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boycotted the referendum out of protest. The leaders of Bosnia and
Herzegovina declared the country to be an independent state on 3rd March
1992. Bosnian Serb leaders counter-claimed the breakaway from
Yugoslavia, declaring the formation of the Republika Srpska in territories
located to the east of Sarajevo.172
After a month of rising tensions, open war began with the siege of
Sarajevo on 6th April 1992, even though the UN recognised BosniaHerzegovina as an independent state. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)
officially withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the JNA’s
Bosnian Serb members simply became members of the Army of Republika
Srpska. These troops were armed and equipped from JNA stores in Bosnia
and were reinforced with volunteers from Serbia. Successful offensives by
Republika Srpska for the remainder of 1992 saw much of BosniaHerzgovina come under its control. By early 1993 about 70% of the
country was under its control.173 With Sarajevo surrounded, Bosniak
Muslims maintained control of the Sarajevo airfield, enabling BosniaHerzegovina to withstand the siege. The international community under the
auspices of the UN was able to fly in supplies to the city while snipers and
artillery lined the hills overlooking the airport and the city. Most buildings
in the city were either destroyed or damaged by shelling and Muslim
casualties were high.
In July 1995 Bosnian Serb troops under the command by general
Radko Mladic carried out the murder of 8,000 men and boys in the
supposed “safe haven” of Srebenica. The bodies were buried in mass
graves. The incident was captured by camera operators accompanying the
Bosnian Serb army as well satellite footage of mass graves taken by the
United States.174 These images and other evidence have since been used as
part of war crimes trials for the Bosnian Serb leadership in The Hague. The
siege of Sarajevo was lifted and the war ended officially in February 1995
when the leaders of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed to
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Bosnia’s independence and the federation of three regions, namely Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.
While Naimark argues the term “ethnic cleansing” first ‘exploded
into our consciousness’ in 1992, it had been used for at least a decade
beforehand by the Serbian government to describe what was supposedly
happening to their ethnic kin in Kosovo at the hands of the majority
Albanian ethnic group. The myth that ethnic Albananians were purging
ethnic Serbs was propagated by Serbian nationalists and used to justify
state persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.175
This myth was fanned by political leaders in Serbia to legitimate
military action against insurgents in Kosovo as well as war with
neighbouring countries. Ethnic cleansing was part and parcel of Serbia’s
governing rationale throughout the 1980s and a dominant feature of
Serbian popular psychology at this time. It had ‘the intent of driving
victims from territory claimed by the perpetrators,’ though it has also been
articulated as a euphemism for genocide by international commentators.176
Ethnic cleansing involves attempts to remove a particular group of
people through fear and intimidation. In Bosnia, ethnic Serbs (as well as
Muslims and Croats) were involved in rounding up other ethnic groups for
execution followed by mass grave burials. In Kosovo, like Bosnia, Serb
paramilitaries and military units raped, tortured and committed other acts
intended to demoralise and humiliate ethnic Albanians with the intent of
forcing them to flee.
Ethnic cleansing is not ‘a necessary corollary of nation-state
building; it is a path chosen by governmental elites with concrete political
goals in mind.’177 The charismatic leadership of Slobodan Milosevic was a
crucial factor in the popular turn to ethnic nationalism in Serbia. Ethnic
cleansing was not merely an instrument of the Serbian state; it was a
central part of the political compromise that had elevated Milosevic to the
leadership of Serbia’s national government.
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The practice of ethnic cleansing was endorsed by Serbia’s
intelligentsia and political leaders. Serbia’s political elites and intellectuals
‘exploited the appeal of nationalism to large groups of resentful citizens in
the dominant ethnic population. Using the power of the state, the media,
and their political parties, national leaders have manipulated distrust of the
“other” and purposefully revived and distorted ethnic tensions’.178
Milosevic was particularly skilful in the ‘harnessing of historical
memory to national causes’, using stories of Ottoman oppression, Albanian
insurrection, Serbian national greatness, loss, victimisation and retribution
which readily resonated with the population.179 These factors, alongside
Serbian Orthodox populism, were interwoven seemingly with ease by
Milosevic into the popular nationalist consciousness of a country
attempting to re-define itself following the demise of communism.180
Milosevic galvanised his constituents with the belief that Serbs have never
been aggressors but instead saw themselves as “liberators” ‘who try –
unselfishly and by way of great sacrifices – to help others (other Serbs) in
need’.181
The Serbian government steered a path to the wars of succession,
contributing to and exacerbating rising tensions between the former
Yugoslav republics. A key turning point in the lead up to the beginning of
the wars of succession was Serbia’s persecution of Kosovar Albanians. The
first major repression was in 1981 following major unrest by student
protesters, leading to a declaration of a state of emergency in Kosovo.
Throughout the next decade attempts by Kosovar Albanians to resist
restrictions imposed on their democratic rights were met with violent
Serbian countermeasures and brutality.182
Serbia’s repression of the rights and liberties of Kosovar Albanians
was given intellectual force and legitimated by the 1986 ‘Memorandum of

178

Naimark, op. cit., p. 10.
ibid., p. 141.
180
See L. Kuhle and C. B. Lausten, ‘The Kosovo myth; Nationalism and revenge’, in T.
B. Knudsen and C. B. Lausten (eds.), Kosovo between War and Peace; Nationalism,
Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship, Routledge, London and New York, 2006,
esp. p. 28.
181
A. J. Vetlesen, in Knudsen and Lausten, op. cit., p. 39.
182
Clark, op. cit., p. 40. See also Naimark, op. cit., p. 148.
179

62

the Serbian Academy of Social Sciences’. In the Memorandum leading
intellectuals captured the mood of the Belgrade nationalist intelligentsia
who called for extreme actions to be taken against Kosovar Albanians in
order to strengthen Serbia’s control of the province.183 In the document
they recommended removing Kosovo’s autonomy and subordinating the
interests of the Kosovar Albanians to those of the Serbs. By 1987 the
Memorandum embodied the political consensus of Serbia, and its core
principles mirrored in the elevation of Milosevic to the presidency.
Milosevic would ‘ride the wave of nationalism’ until the end of the Kosovo
war.184
The president’s political success was largely premised on his ability
to blend widely felt victimisation and Serbian aggression into a new,
volatile mix of nationalism. Milosevic ‘appealed to populist slogans and
antigovernment sentiments among the peasants’, and his ‘mix of Serbian
chauvinism and Yugoslav integralism meant that non-Serb nationalisms
were interpreted as reactionary and separatist.’185 By the late 1980s, in the
Serbian media and in mass rallies in Belgrade, Milosevic’s propaganda
portrayed Kosovar Albanians as the natural enemy of Serbs - as dirty,
primitive, nasty, rapists, and even baby-killers.186
By 1989 Kosovar Albanians involved in protests were being
arrested en masse and Albanian schools had been shut down. As Naimark
described: ‘Serbs were openly favoured in economic policies, Albanians
clearly discriminated against.’187 Kosovo was effectively governed by
martial law until the NATO campaign in 1999. Only Serbians were
permitted to work in Kosovo’s public service. Significant numbers of
skilled Kosovar Albanians left their homeland to find employment in
Western Europe. The courts were placed in the hands of Serbs. Albanianlanguage press, radio and television were banned and Albanian ceased to
be an official language of the province. Hundreds of lecturers were sacked
from the University of Pristina and thousands of its students expelled. This
183
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was because: ‘Intellectual, academic and linguistic ties to Albania […]
strengthened Kosovars’ identity either in an independent republic or within
greater

Albania…

Education-related

socio-economic

development

concerns partly explain the riots and resistance that grew in the 1980s.’188
State repression of ethnic Albanian Kosovars was heavy-handed and
systematic. Every government support service was unavailable to ethnic
Albanian Kosovoars. The Serbian government set out to make life brutally
unpleasant for ethnic Albanians. The intent was to encourage as many
ethnic Albanians to leave Kosovo of their own accord. For Allcock:
‘Kosovo symbolises as does nothing else the failure of the Yugoslav state
to embody its own normative ideals… The state became identified with
blatant repression and the prisoner of one of the most anti-modern
segments of Yugoslav society – Kosovo Serbs.’189

4.4 Perceptions and representations of Serbian cruelty in the “West”
Throughout this thesis I evaluate the response of the Australian media to
the Kosovo conflict. Particular focus is placed on the ways in which
Western media rationalised the war, the actions of the Serbian regime and
the ethnic cleansing that led to Kosovar refugees fleeing their homeland.
By the time of the NATO campaign in Kosovo the atrocities committed
during the Bosnian war had already convinced many international
commentators of the willingness of Serbs to resort to acts of cruelty. The
Srebenica massacre carried out by Bosnian Serbs was one of the worst and
most visible acts of genocide committed throughout the wars of succession.
What is clear is that, by the start of the Kosovo war, Western media
commentators viewed little difference between Serbs living in Serbia
proper and those living in other countries of the former Yugoslavia.
Considering Bosnian Serbs carried out the siege of Sarajevo while
receiving military and financial support from the Serbian government, it is
not difficult to comprehend how impressions of an “evil” plan based on
pan-Serb collusion gained momentum. Hammond and Herman argue that
188

W. Nelles, ‘Foundations and fractures of Kosovo’s educational system; Towards
conflict or peace?’, in Knudsen and Lausten, op. cit., p. 97.
189
Allcock, op. cit., p. 208.

64

there was a ‘Nazification’ of Serbian atrocities at work in the media and
policy discourse of NATO countries: ‘While NATO politicians were eager
to push the Second World War comparison regarding Kosovo, in doing so
they drew on a ready-made image of the Serbs developed by crusading
journalists in Bosnia.’190 Such an impression was reinforced by the
orchestration of the mass rape of Muslim women by Bosnian Serbs.
Systematic rape was intended not only to drive Muslims out of the country
but also to “breed” them out. At rape “camps” and “rape houses”
established during the Bosnian conflict, Serbian soldiers partook in
‘sexual-sadistic fantasies’ that included beatings, gang rape and even the
tattooing of perpetrators names on the skin of the rape victims.191 Rape
camps received financial and logistical support from the Bosnian Serb
government and the campaign was ‘organised and directed from above’.192
Like Bosnia, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was intended to compel all
ethnic Albanians to leave without exemption - the elderly, women,
children, peasants, men of fighting age, the middle class and intellectuals
were compelled to flee Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians were completely
disenfranchised from state protection by the time of the NATO campaign.
Albanian protests were consistently met with arrests, assaults and
imprisonment and even torture. Yugoslav government records show that
between 1981 and 1988 there had been 586,000 Kosovars (over a quarter
of the population) taken by police from the street, interrogated at police
stations, and gaoled.193 By the late 1990s there was little Albanians could
do to prevent ethnic cleansing as tensions began to escalate in Kosovo.
Thousands of young Albanians turned to the Kosovar Liberation Army
(KLA) for protection and to resist Serbian repression as armed combatants.
When Serbian forces assaulted the Kosovar village of Racak in
January 1999, resulting in the massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians, the event
was a major turning point for the NATO alliance and is often viewed as the
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catalyst for militarily intervention by the Western powers.194 Racak was a
pertinent reminder in the minds of many Western analysts of the atrocities
committed by Serbs during the Bosnian conflict. In the months that
followed, Serbian military and paramilitary forces conducted a sweeping
operation aimed at forcing Albanians to leave major cities including
Pristina.195 It was clear to the NATO alliance that a humanitarian disaster
was a looming in Kosovo. NATO’s decision to undertake a military
intervention in Kosovo was purportedly to prevent further ethnic cleansing
by Serbia.

Conclusion: the Media and Operation Safe Haven
The Kosovo refugee crisis prompted significant changes in refugee policy,
and many aspects of the Safe Haven legislation were questionable as far as
Australia’s commitments to international treaties were concerned. The
media played an essential part in reassuring Australians during the refugee
crisis that the nation’s commitment to human rights was extraordinary,
while neglecting the point that the Safe Haven Visa program contravened
many of the human rights of the Kosovars. As evident in the news items I
analyse in this thesis, the media consistently packaged Australia’s response
to the Kosovo crisis as compassionate and worthy of applause. News
reports throughout Operation Safe Haven commonly reproduced the notion
that Australians were the most generous people in the world and their
efforts (including charity and the evacuation program) were highly
commendable.
The Australian media was useful for the Howard Government in
promoting the acceptability of the refugees – or at least those selected for
evacuation to Australia by immigration officials – who were often deemed
“white”, “clean” and “middle class” and generally not too dissimilar to
Australians. It assisted in the Government’s effort to position itself in a
194
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favourable light throughout Operation Safe Haven. News coverage
commonly invoked notions of whiteness in representations of the refugees.
The coverage supported the cultural platform of the Government as a
defender of national hegemony and propagator of Australian virtue. The
majority of editorials made little attempt to disguise their political
preferences for the Howard Government throughout Operation Safe Haven.
Media coverage collectively worked to make the whiteness that
underpinned governmental practices invisible and to leave it unmarked in
media discourse. This relates to Richard Dyer’s argument that whiteness is
socially constructed and that the success of such politics is based on the
consistent representation of Whites as the “norm” – as a valued, privileged
and moral “mainstream” – without leaving any traces (to remain
“unmarked”). That is, the power to conceal whiteness at the ‘level of
representation’, in which ‘whites are not of a certain race, they’re just the
human race.’196
While not over-extending the nature of the media’s relationship
with the Federal Government in this episode, such ties appeared (or were
presented in such a way that they appeared) somewhat more accidental
than symbiotically conjoined. In one sense this investigation centres on
how the press “dropped” (or signified) its approval of government policy
throughout the various stages of Operation Safe Haven by more subtle
means – signifying its “approval”, for instance, for the process by which
particular refugees were selected for the evacuation program; of the use of
Government coercion to repatriate the Kosovars after their initial threemonth stay; and, of the Government position that refugees who contested
repatriation were “ungrateful” and “undeserving” of Australia’s assistance.
This chapter provided historical background for understanding
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the NATO intervention in 1999. It has
explored Yugoslavia’s difficulties with adapting to an increasingly
globalised world economy. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the 1990s
was underpinned by ‘the frailty of the federal state, caught in the dual
processes of international and domestic social and political realignment
196
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after the Cold War.’197 The Federation of Yugoslavia inherited structural
inefficiencies in industry that had limited economic growth and stability in
the region since the 19th century. Still, the modernising reforms enacted by
the Tito regime were impacted by paradoxical factors. Horizontal
economic planning and a vertical political structure failed to maintain the
unity and stability of the Federation. Economic hardship, nationalism and
the end of the Cold War created conditions under which nationalist
political leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic rose to power. Serbia’s
grievances with Albanian Kosovars are directly linked to economic decline
as well as Milosevic’s manipulatation Serbian nationalism for destructive
purposes.
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Chapter 2: Selecting and Evacuating the Kosovar
Refugees and the Politics of Operation Safe Haven
Introduction
This chapter investigates the Howard Government’s plans for evacuating
the Kosovar refugees to Australia in April and early May 1999. It explores
the notion that developments in refugee policy around this time and the
legal restraints imposed on the Kosovar refugees throughout the duration of
their stay in Australia were the result of both domestic political influences
(including populism and the media) and international political forces. The
analysis also explores the influence of the media in shaping the
Government’s Kosovar refugee evacuation program, and investigates the
way in which the media represented public pressure to support
international evacuation efforts. Extending from this is an investigation
into media representations of public charity during the crisis and the
implications of charity for the changes made in refugee policy at this time.
Important aspects of the Australian government’s response to the
refugee crisis include the means by which immigration officials working in
Macedonia selected refugees for evacuation and how the selection of
refugees for the evacuation program worked alongside media depictions of
the Kosovars as “acceptable” for temporary resettlement. Significantly, the
language surrounding the selection process overwhelmingly promoted the
refugees as a familiar and “compatible” cultural group.
This chapter evaluates how the Federal Government was able to
utilise the evacuation as part of a strategy for producing stronger political
consensus. Overall, I have explored not only the (re)production of
conservative cultural binaries surrounding the evacuation that enhanced
popular support for the Howard Government, but also provided a clearer
view of how media, community and international pressure contributed to
the Government’s response to the Kosovo refugee crisis.
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1. Images of the Kosovo War
1.1 The media and representations of human tragedy
What is clear in media discourse surrounding the evacuation of the
Kosovar refugees is the way the phrase “safe haven” promoted a sense of
national goodwill as well as an obligation to shelter the refugees on
humanitarian grounds. Providing a temporary haven to the Kosovar
refugees was part of what the Telegraph portrayed as ‘Australia’s duty of
care’198 alongside the responsibility to provide a safe, secure and enclosed
space to recuperate from war.199 By providing safe haven, Australia offered
an opportunity for ‘survival’200 to the Kosovars, along with a ‘new
home’201 and ‘Sanctuary and hope in Sydney’.202 The news-friendly
catchphrase, ‘safe haven’, in no subtle terms, emphasised the overall
emotion of the evacuation, carrying with it a sense of obligation and
national “duty”.
The Safe Haven Visa, in another sense, can be viewed as a
metaphor for reasonable control and compliance within a humanitarian
context. The implications of the visa reveal darker aspects of Australian
immigration, promoting safe haven on the rationale of temporary
protection. King aptly describes the Safe Haven Visa as a ‘restrictionist
policy, severely limiting the rights and opportunities of the Kosovars in
Australia.’203 Assessing the Safe Haven legislation, Liz Curren argues that:
‘The problem in the main is that Australia continues to deal with the issue
of refugees as an issue of domestic politics… and [requiring] the
preservation of an illusive largely Anglo Saxon identity’.204 The TPV,
introduced five months after the Safe Haven Visa, was permeated with
similar xenophobic connotations. The parallels between the visas,
198
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particularly the restrictions they imposed on the human rights of refugees,
must be viewed alongside the re-emergence of popular xenophobia within
Australian society in the Howard era. One Nation party leader David
Oldfield reinforced the point, commenting that John Howard’s decision to
accept the Kosovar refugees on a temporary basis was a ‘direct application’
of One Nation’s immigration policy.205
When writing this chapter I have interrogated 106 news articles
published in the Telegraph, Herald and The Australian between 5th April
and 7th May 1999.206 Much of the news coverage in these newspapers
noted the importance of “humanitarian obligation”, “compassion” and
“empathy” for the Kosovar refugees. The Australian offered 41 references
to “humanitarian” concepts in this regard, which was similar to the Herald
(noting 42), while the number of these terms in the Telegraph comprised
31. This sentiment was generally supported by a broader moral framing of
the Kosovo war as a whole, although the content analysis for this section
reflects only those articles specifically related to Australia’s evacuation
effort.
This analysis of media portrayals of the Kosovar refugees
demonstrates the way the Howard Government was able to tap into public
sympathy and to reappropriate popular consensus after a brief period of
backlash against its initial decision not to evacuate them. It highlights how
the Prime Minister shunned utilising nationalist sentiment in reestablishing public support for the Government - something that had been
otherwise commonplace for Howard during his term of office. As Judith
Brett later noted, Howard’s ‘convincing consensual language’, focussed on
the ‘Australian way, Australian values and identity’, was a significant
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factor in three election victories.207 There remained (for the most part) a
clear separation between “humanitarian” concepts and Australian “values”
in the analysis with significantly fewer references to concepts such as
“mateship”, “mates” and “fair go” across the newspapers.208 This
examination affirms a strong correlation between media discourse and how
the Prime Minister sought to promote the evacuation as an issue of ‘moral
obligation’ and being a good world citizen.209 It was the idea that
Australia’s part in the international aid effort was a gesture that extended
beyond the interests of national community resonating in a much more
global sense that connected Australians with the wider world. In the
following comment I examine the development of humanitarian sentiment
in the Australian news media about the Kosovo war before returning to
Howard’s appropriation of such a discourse.

1.2 Massacres, women and children
The Kosovo war was depicted by the news media as a series of human
rights atrocities not seen in Europe since the rise of Nazi Germany.210 It
was repeatedly noted that the conflict had resulted in the ‘biggest
humanitarian disaster in Europe since World War II.’211 Images of refugees
and reports from journalists in the Balkans worked to generate widespread
empathy in Australia with headlines such as ‘Orwell comes true in
Kosovo.’212 This complemented the common representation by journalists
of a “doomsday” scenario that was facing the Kosovar refugees. In the lead
207
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up to NATO air strikes, news reports focussed on the Serb “orchestration”
of massacres throughout the Kosovo countryside and the building of a case
for “war crimes” against the Yugoslav regime by international human
rights monitors. The Telegraph’s ‘WAR IN EUROPE’ series promoted the
air strikes as both inevitable and a just, moral crusade. The Telegraph often
referred to “massacres” on a mass scale, as well as “mass” or “summary
executions” committed by Yugoslav forces.213 The newspaper relayed an
image of Serbian forces using (what NATO referred to as) “rape houses”
and “rape camps”, along with the “emptying” of whole city populations of
their ethnic Albanian inhabitants.214 By early April 1999, newspaper
readers were witnessing the final stages of the campaign to expel ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo.215
Much of the media’s coverage in the lead-up to the air strikes
relayed information disseminated by the media offices of NATO, closely
espousing sentiments promoted by Jamie Shea and UK Foreign Secretary
Robin Cook. Media commentator Phillip Knightley points out that a
recurring emphasis on “systematic” massacres and atrocities in the Western
media was part of a well-orchestrated NATO public relations campaign. In
his analysis of the Kosovo conflict Knightley says the purpose of the media
campaign was to shore-up support in the UK, US and other NATO member
states. NATO’s goal was to persuade Western nations of the humanitarian
justification for the conflict. Even before the NATO bombing began,
Western media generally referred to the Balkans conflict as “ethnic
cleansing” and painted it in black-and-white terms with simply “goodies
213
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and baddies”, “evil vs good”, between civilisation and barbarity.216 NATO
states needed to publicly justify the fighting, by selling war to democracies
that were not being attacked, and to demonise the leader of the enemy Slobodan Milosevic - as inhumane. Referring to the exaggeration of
atrocities by NATO, Knightley asserted: ‘the public drowned in wave after
wave of images that added up to nothing.’217 As he further points out, there
were 2700 media people accompanying NATO forces when they entered
Kosovo at the end of the bombings in June 1999. This is compared to the
total number of 500 correspondents for the Vietnam War.
Virtually all of the reporting about the war in the Australian media
during the conflict was conducted from the sidelines. The Telegraph,
promoting a humanitarian justification for the war, repeatedly emphasised
civilian atrocities committed by Serbs, but often relied on explicitly
partisan sources. Western journalists had been expelled from Kosovo by
the Yugoslav government and relegated to the refugee camps along its
borders at the beginning of the NATO campaign. There, Knightley notes,
they eagerly waited to pester traumatised refugees for eyewitness accounts.
Much of the information reported about life inside Kosovo was provided
via the KLA news agency, the media arm of the militant group fighting
against Yugoslav forces alongside NATO.218 No British or American
correspondents were able to enter the battleground to make their own
critical assessments. They reported from NATO headquarters in Brussels,
or simply by peering over the borders into Kosovo.219
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On 3rd April 1999, the media began to describe horrific scenes on
the streets of Pristina (the capital of Kosovo). Thousands of ethnic
Albanians had been forced onto over-crowded trains by Serbian police to
be taken to the Macedonian border.220 Over the next week, life at the
border camps was miserable and hopeless, a crossroads between freedom
and the horrors of war left behind. Thousands of all ages congregated in an
open field at Blace (a town on the Macedonian border with Kosovo).221 By
5th April, the Telegraph reported, thousands of Kosovar refugees had
erected makeshift homes from plastic and other materials on the muddy
ground. In several photographs, hundreds of these tents extended into the
horizon, hastily erected from the belongings refugees had brought with
them.222
Paul Harris, reporting from Macedonia, depicted the scene: ‘There
were so many aching bodies sprawled in the field you could barely see the
ground… a small border crossing in Macedonia [turned] into a vast sea of
misery yesterday. Freedom was a bare field, with no shelter or
sanitation.’223 Eleven refugees, including two babies, had died waiting to
be allowed into Macedonia by guards who had closed the border crossing.
They had been among 50,000 Kosovars, ‘herded into a valley where they
have waited up to six days to be allowed into Macedonia, where armed
troops bar the way.’224 Aid workers at Blace complained that the
Macedonian soldiers were stopping them from reaching the refugees who
included many elderly Kosovars as well as small children. The refugees
slept under the open skies on the freezing mud without food, water or
medical treatment. In the makeshift encampment, they waited for days
before the UNHCR was able to begin co-ordinating international relief
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efforts. The Telegraph, like other international media, presented an image
of Kosovar refugees simply waiting for help.225
An official refugee camp in Skopje (the Macedonian capital) was
quickly established by the UNHCR known as ‘Stenkovac 1’. It became the
temporary home of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees who had arrived
before the border was closed by Macedonian authorities. By 8th April, the
remainder had been evacuated to nearby countries as an intermediary
solution. Journalist Patrick Quinn, reporting from Blace, wrote of the
scene: ‘All that remained today […] was a giant, smouldering pit, with
garbage burning and tonnes of muddy clothing and plastic sheeting strewn
about. Filthy, primitive conditions in the camp had led to an outbreak of
illness and some deaths.’226 The conditions at Skopje were reportedly far
less than improved. The Herald described how one convoy of refugees
arriving at Skopje carried ‘a defeated people’, who entered a camp that
‘reeked of stale urine and faeces’.227
The media portrayed scenes of chaos in the refugee camps, home
for the time being to thousands of Kosovar exiles. A significant portion of
photographs in the Telegraph centred on Kosovar children suggesting a
broader context of innocence (or the loss of) and hope (a chance to redeem
and rebuild). The effect of mass media images such as these is to express
the ideological commitments that generate political agency.228 Images of
children as helpless victims of war are often included in news content to
bolster a sense of moral urgency, promoting emotional disbelief and
outrage. They work to decentre more rational understandings and are
geared towards bringing disbelievers into the political fold that underlies
media messages. 229
The effects of Yugoslav politics on Albanian Kosovar children had
long been a point of contention for international commentators. In the early
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1990s a Serbian school curriculum was imposed in Kosovo by the
Yugoslav regime alongside the banning of Albanian language education.
The province’s health services were largely dismantled, and the remaining
public hospitals were closed to Albanians. At the time it had been alleged
in the local Kosovo press that thousands of Albanian school children were
being poisoned, though evidence remains disputed as to whether the
Yugoslav State was involved.230 Ethnic and nationalist tensions between
Serbs and Albanians within Yugoslavia had impacted significantly on the
safety and wellbeing of Kosovar children. Worried about the decline in the
number of Serbs in the province (mainly due to emigration to Serbia
caused by poverty) Serbian leaders used the term “demographic genocide”
to describe the relatively high birth rate for Albanians in Kosovo and to
justify

ethnic Albanian

repression.

Serb

nationalists fantastically

exaggerated Serb emigration from the province, linking it to the higher
percentage of ethnic Albanians being born.231 Ethnic Albanian Kosovars
had responded by setting up local schools independently of the State along
with medical clinics. Tens of thousands of children attended classrooms in
houses and makeshift rooms while teachers attempted to avoid arrests,
intimidation and assaults by police.232 The context for images of refugee
children was much broader than the Kosovo war, following in many ways
from the Cold War. The subtext of freedom and liberty extended directly
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from the US’ attempts to provide NATO with a moral premise in
maintaining global order.233
Publishing images of ethnic Albanian children, the Telegraph’s
‘WAR IN EUROPE’ series presented the NATO intervention as an
opportunity for the West to bring liberty and freedom into their lives.
Alongside a concerted campaign by NATO to justify the war, images of
children reinforced the need for the international community to protect the
innocent and those oppressed by the Yugoslav regime. From a total of
twenty-three images in the Telegraph depicting the crisis between 1st April
and 7th May 1999 there were at least seventy-nine children pictured
individually, and in significantly greater quantity than adults (see examples
in Appendix 1).234

Ardita Hajdini first appeared in The Daily Telegraph on 19th April 1999, p. 19

The face of nine-year old girl Ardita Hajdini accentuates how the
media presented the image of children during the NATO air strikes. In the
image (above), Ardita is weeping. Her lips and cheeks are puffed. The
233
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caption beneath Ardita’s image reads: ‘Scared and alone … Ardita Hajdini,
9, weeps as she arrives in Kukes [an Albanian town near the Kosovo
border] after walking from Citak in Kosovo. She lost her parents and three
sisters.’235 This image eventually replaced the Telegraph’s ‘WAR IN
EUROPE’ logo in June 1999 along with the caption: ‘KOSOVO – The
Aftermath’.236 The emphasis on children continued throughout April and
early May in the Australian news press and those refugees being evacuated
to Australia as part of Operation Safe Haven were regularly referred to as
“missing”, “orphaned” or “lost” children.237 The Herald emphasised the
point by citing the increasing number of Australian families offering to
adopt orphaned refugee children.238 The centrality of “childlike innocence”
in news reports emphasised compassion for the plight of the Kosovar
refugees and assisted in NATO’s efforts to maintain the moral support of
its allies.
Kosovar women were depicted by Telegraph journalists as being
the helpless victims of Serbian barbarity. Repeatedly, there were questions
raised in the newspaper about the unknown whereabouts of husbands,
fathers, sons and brothers who had left the women to their own defences mainly because they had been detained by Serb police or joined the KLA
to fight against Yugoslav forces. The Telegraph described recent reports of
“mass rapes” against Kosovar women as ‘the most evil war crimes.’239 The
newspaper stated that, like the Bosnian war several years earlier, ‘the Serbs
are using rape as a weapon again’.240 These images presented the war as a
tragedy for humanity, appealing to the compassion of the Australian
community. They featured alongside countless descriptions that flooded
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the Western media of women and children being harassed, beaten,
murdered, raped and exiled from Kosovo.
The number of deaths (which continues to be disputed) and the
scale of the Albanian exodus caused by the Yugoslav regime remains
abhorrent. Media coverage of the NATO air strikes promoted strong
consensus that it was Australia’s ‘duty’ to accept its humanitarian
obligations in assisting the refugees by offering short-term resettlement.241
The Telegraph compelled Australians to support the evacuation as part of
the nation’s ‘duty of care’.242 The newspaper’s editor-in-chief, columnists,
political commentators and war correspondents mobilised to promote the
idea that humanitarian obligation was an essential component of Australian
nationhood. The Telegraph’s ‘duty of care’ campaign in the first week of
April 1999 played-out alongside developments in Federal politics –
contesting the Howard Government’s initial rejection of the UN request to
temporarily accommodate ethnic Albanian refugees in Australia. The
Herald and The Australian also attempted to generate moral urgency by
criticising the Federal Government for not obliging the UNHCR’s request
to evacuate refugees as soon as possible.243

2. The Federal Government and the Politics of Operation Safe Haven
2.1 Ruddock maintains the party line
The plan to evacuate the Kosovar refugees was an unlikely resolution for
the Australian government. On 4th April 1999, Immigration Minister
Ruddock ruled out taking any Kosovar Albanian refugees following NATO
air strikes, saying: ‘Flying planeloads of refugees into Australia would not
be an appropriate response.’244 The following day the Federal Government
again rejected outright the UNHCR’s formal request for Australia to
temporarily resettle some of the 370,000 Kosovar refugees who had fled
the province at that point in time. The Immigration Minister defended the
241
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Government’s initial reluctance to offer the Kosovars temporary refuge in
Australia. Ruddock noted that Australia did not have ‘a temporary
residence culture’.245 He upheld the official stance of the Department of
Immigration - that Australia only accepted refugees on a permanent basis
so they could immediately begin to rebuild their lives. He stated that past
experience had shown that temporary solutions had always led to
permanent outcomes.246
The Immigration Minister cited two incidences to support his
argument - Australia’s experience with Chinese students fleeing their
homeland after the Tiananmen Square massacre, and with East Timorese
fleeing violence earlier in the decade. The Minister said that these
incidences revealed the difficulty in sending people back home:
You have to look at what we’re able to do and if you look at our
past experience with temporary location of people, it generally
becomes a permanent residents outcome[.]
…Temporary outcomes have never been successful in terms of
moving people, locating them for a short period of time and then
returning them.
That’s really the reason that I am hesitant about providing
temporary arrangements.247
Ruddock argued that it would be preferable if the Kosovar refugees were
accommodated within existing programs, by adding 1000 extra refugee
places from within the immigration program itself.248 The next day,
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however, Ruddock’s proposal was overturned by senior members of
Cabinet.

2.2 The public backlash and the media
Organisational pressure began to mount on the Government, with the NSW
Council of Churches urging authorities to accept the refugees, ‘on
compassionate grounds and humanitarian grounds.’249 The Telegraph’s
editor was particularly critical of the Federal Government, saying it had a
‘duty’ to ‘Get to the heart of things.’250 The editorial asserted:
It is […] unrealistic for Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock to
suggest that only another 1000 places could be found for Kosovar
refugees[.] It would have been better if he had said nothing.251
The editor commented that, as a member of the international community,
Australians ‘must be prepared to play a greater role than Mr Ruddock
proposes,’ and that it was ‘the duty of Federal Cabinet to immediately
reconsider the number of Kosovar Albanians it will accept’.252 The
newspaper’s cartoonist Warren captured what some critics had suggested
about the Federal Government being unsympathetic and insensitive (see
below). With growing criticism, and while other nations were offering
assistance to tens of thousands of Kosovar refugees, John Howard risked
becoming unpopular by being unsympathetic.253
Following the reversal of the government’s decision, many news
commentators championed the way in which the Australian media
facilitated public pressure to support international evacuation efforts. In the
two days leading up to that decision the Telegraph cited members of the
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Albanian community as well as former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser
who voiced concern with the government’s refusal to evacuate Kosovar
refugees. The newspaper reported that Sadik Binakaj, a spokesperson for
members of the Australia-Albania Association, had ‘pleaded’ for an
increase in the number of Kosovo refugees to be accepted under the
existing humanitarian refugee visa program from the present figure of 4500
to about 20,000.254 He stated: ‘the present number is not enough. I am sure
that is not enough because there is going to be at least one and a half
million refugees from Kosovo.’255 Malcolm Fraser, who was the head of
CARE Australia, further argued on 5th April that Australia should accept
30,000 refugees from Kosovo. Fraser added: ‘We haven’t seen anything
like this in more than 50 years, it is difficult to envisage the hardship and
suffering involved’.256 He further articulated that there was ‘no excuse’ for
Australia not to accept up to 30,000 refugees, arguing: ‘We haven’t seen
anything like this in more than 50 years, it is difficult to envisage the
hardship and suffering involved’.257 Although Fraser was no longer a
leading figure in the Australian Liberal Party, he nevertheless retained
personal prestige and his position as director of CARE carried significant
weight. His concerns were worthy of citation in the media. Mounting
public pressure was also noted by the Herald’s letters editor who indicated
the consensus building around the issue of the Kosovar refugees
throughout the week prior to 5th April. She stated: ‘The NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia has preoccupied letter writers all week, with every possible
explanation put forward for the crisis in Kosovo. It has been analysed from
historical, ethnic and superpower perspectives. Our readers have also
expressed anguish over the human suffering caused by the conflict,
especially among civilians who were feeling the effects of war…’258
Howard confirmed the Government’s support for the evacuation via
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a press conference on 6th April. Announcing the Safe Haven Visa scheme,
he stated: ‘This is something where a nation of Australia’s strength and
wealth and comparative affluence has an overwhelming moral obligation to
play a part in.’259 It is worth noting that the long-term success of John Ho-

John Howard offering assistance to the Kosovar refugees, as drawn by
Warren, The Daily Telegraph, 6th April 1999, p. 10

ward as leader of the Australian Federal Government was often the result
of his ability to be responsive to popular undercurrents and to change
policy where needed. Commenting on the ‘children overboard’ incident in
2001,260 this aspect of the Prime Minister’s approach to politics is
succinctly described by David Marr and Marian Wilkinson: ‘John Howard
is a master of ambiguity. His words must always be read with care.’261 The
259

Howard, cited in Farr, ‘SANCTUARY – Australia to accept 4000 from Kosovo’, op.
cit. The story also reappears in similar form in M. Farr, ‘Australia takes 4000 refugees’
The Daily Telegraph (Afternoon Edition), 7th April 1999, p. 4. A similar comment by the
Prime Minister was noted in D. Shanahan, P. Green and M. Stevens, ‘Safe Haven for 4000
souls – Howard bows to refugee pressure’, The Australian, 7th April 1999, p. 1.
260
It is widely believed that the ‘children overboard’ incident in 2001 ensured John
Howard’s re-election as Prime Minister. See, for instance, D. Marr and M. Wilkinson,
Dark Victory, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003.
261
ibid., p. 47.

84

Prime Minister’s management of public relations during the early stages of
the Kosovo war was timely. A ‘source’ had told the Telegraph, after three
hours of debate, that: ‘There was a very strong feeling across the board in
Cabinet that something additional had to be done’.262 This was despite
Ruddock’s reservation that once in Australia the refugees would take
exhaustive court action to stay permanently.263
Ruddock emerged as ‘a solitary voice’264 with the Herald
describing how the Immigration Minister had been isolated by the episode:
‘Ruddock stood silent beside John Howard through the Prime Minister’s
news conference’, at which the announcement was made on reversing
Ruddock’s earlier decision.265 The newspaper added that ‘it must have
been agony for Mr Ruddock’ to have held firm on the official position and
be overruled in such a public manner.266 By overruling the Immigration
Minister Howard was able to capitalise on growing support from within the
Australian community to evacuate the Kosovar refugees to Australia.
However, it further demonstrates the Prime Minister’s dominant position
within the Cabinet and his abilities to direct, formulate and implement
party strategy. The Prime Minister stated that he expected some criticism
of the plan, dubbed ‘Operation Safe Haven’, but he was ‘not prepared to
see Australia turn its back on these people.’267 Following the lead of the
international community with its offer to temporarily relocate 4000
refugees, the Federal Government obliged public pressure, ensuring
Australia played a part in the ‘biggest humanitarian operation’ undertaken
by the international community since World War II.268
The Australian noted that at least 100 people had telephoned radio
stations around the country throughout the week following the
Government’s refusal to evacuate refugees. Most described the decision as
262
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harsh.269 A Herald-ACNielsen poll found that eighty per cent of
Australians approved of giving support to the Kosovar refugees, which
included allowing them to be relocated to Australia on a short-term
basis.270 The editor of The Australian described Australia’s initial response
to the UNHCR request as ‘niggardly and over-cautious’, urging Australia
to ‘recognise its responsibility to make every effort to resettle the victims
[of the war] as quickly as possible.’271 The editor later added that the Prime
Minister ‘must have had his eyes and ears closed’.272
Gerard Henderson, writing in the Herald, described Australia’s
initial response to the refugee exodus as ‘woefully inadequate’ adding that
the Government’s attitude contrasted with ‘that of our traditional allies and
friends in the European Union (EU) and NATO.’273 He argued that the
attitude of the Government toward the Kosovar refugee crisis reflected
recent developments in Immigration policy as well as in Foreign Affairs,
which had drifted significantly away from Asia. These policies, Henderson
added, had produced ‘disturbing signs of insularity in Australia’.274
Paul Kelly described the initial rejection of the UNHCR request in
The Australian as providing ‘insight into [the Federal Government’s]
streak of incompetence and myopia,’ adding, ‘Ruddock had misjudged the
situation grievously.’275 He was doubtful that the Federal Government had
been sincere in its change of heart: ‘the question is being asked whether the
Government’s policy reversal is inspired by the humanitarian crisis or to
pacify public criticism.’276 Kelly doubted the Prime Minister’s ‘credibility’,
arguing that he was only compelled to change the Government’s position
due to public pressure, and that: ‘if Howard was so concerned about
Australia’s moral obligation, why didn’t he interfere [to overrule
269
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Ruddock’s decision] earlier?’277 The Government’s approach to the
Kosovar refugees was similarly criticised by Ian McPhedran in the
Telegraph: ‘Mr Howard’s reaction on Kosovo proves he is a creature of
public opinion… Ruddock held the government line only to see Howard
capitulate to public opinion.’278 The Herald applauded the policy reversal
stating: ‘A continuing paltry response by Canberra would have been
unpopular as well as morally indefensible.’279 The policy reversal was, to
some media commentators, very clearly a political response. It typifies the
need for dominant political groups to maintain legitimacy by being ‘able to
claim with at least some plausibility that their particular interests are those
of society at large.’280
One of the main immediate criticisms from ethnic and migrant
welfare groups, which had voiced criticism of the initial refusal to accept
Kosovar refugees prior to the reversal, was that the temporary Safe Haven
program was a “band-aid” solution and “tokenistic”.281 The offer of
temporary safe haven displeased Ethnic Communities Council of NSW
chairman, Paul Nicolaou, who said that the Government must consider a
‘long-term policy’ of allowing the 4000 refugees to stay in Australia.282
Kelly criticised the Government on this issue, arguing that the offer of
temporary Safe Haven was a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction that reeked of ‘politics
and panic.’283 He stated that the decision reflected the ‘bizarre rules of
today’, that the ‘logical response’ of permanent protection was overlooked
because it was deemed ‘to be a concession to Milosovic’ who was seeking
to eradicate ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. 284 Federal Court judge and
human-rights campaigner, Justice Marcus Einfeld, further criticised the
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temporary Safe Haven program, arguing: ‘There is no such thing as a
temporary refugee.’285
Commentators across the Telegraph, Herald and Australian often
noted that it was the public and media backlash that had swayed the
Australian Government to reassess its position and oblige the UNHCR
request. McPhedran, for instance, advised Ruddock to ‘watch the
editorials’ in order to be more responsive to public opinion and avoid mass
backlash in the future.286 The intensity of the criticism varied between each
of the newspapers, particularly in the ways they attributed accountability
for the initial “lapse” in judgement and then policy reversal.287 The
Australian offered the most critical opinion citing 53 negative criticisms of
the Government in total, while there were 26 in the Telegraph and 24 in the
Herald. Further analysis revealed that the Telegraph and Herald positioned
Ruddock as slightly more accountable than the Prime Minister for the
initial rejection of the UNHCR request. On the other hand, the Prime
Minister was more greatly scrutinised by The Australian than Ruddock for
rejecting the UNHCR request, with nine direct criticisms of the Prime
Minister.288
Comparatively, in lieu of these figures, The Australian was least
supportive of the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole, while the
Telegraph and Herald produced only around half of the total amount of
criticism as The Australian. Textual analysis (as noted below) further
revealed much more moderate criticism of the Government in the
Telegraph than the other newspapers. The analysis reflects significant
differences between each of the newspapers in terms of their political
leanings and sympathies for the Howard Government. It also provides a
285
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clearer view of the extent of the pressure on the Government as a whole, as
well as on the key figures – mainly, the Prime Minister and Immigration
Minister - behind Australia’s decision to allow the Kosovars to be
temporarily resettled in Australia.

2.3 Media representations of human tragedy and the implications for the
Australian Government
There was, undoubtedly, a significant amount of media criticism
concerning the Government’s initial refusal to evacuate the refugees to
Australia. Politics within the Cabinet, along with mounting pressure to
uphold international humanitarian obligations, further prompted the policy
reversal. Until the morning of 6th April, as Denis Shanahan commented in
The Australian, the Immigration Minister, ‘in the absence of any
forewarning from the Prime Minister to play a cooler hand, [was] entitled
to think the Government’s policy of not taking any refugees would hold
firm.’289 However, senior ministers in the Cabinet had endured a ‘barrage
of criticism’ over the decision and were quickly ‘convinced more had to be
done.’290 Shanahan argued it was the spirit of the generosity shown by
some ‘families [who] were prepared to throw open their homes’ to the
refugees that led to the policy reversal – suggesting that Australians
‘wanted the Government’s action to enact and represent their feelings.’291
The policy reversal, Shanahan noted: ‘left Ruddock on the beach, high and
dry’, though Howard defended the Immigration Minister by pointing to
policy consistency.292 Although Ruddock was ‘admired’ by Cabinet
ministers for ‘the way he walked the line between giving into the
Hansonites’ agenda and cleaning out the excesses … there was concern
[within Cabinet] the Government was now seen as “too hard”’.293
According to Cabinet members, the decision made by the
Government was far-removed from any direct criticism by the media. The
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Government propagated the notion that it had committed to the evacuation
by stressing the importance of such a “moral obligation” to Australian
families. According to The Australian, the Easter long weekend prior to the
policy reversal had allowed leading Ministers time to observe the situation
at the Macedonian border on television news alongside their families. As
Shanahan stated:
[It] is a long time since the views of small children were aired in the
Cabinet room. Wives, sons and daughters, some young children and
other family members had a significant impact on policy around the
Cabinet table on Tuesday [when the policy reversal was decided].
[The Easter holiday] had a positive effect on the decisionmakers.294
The human tragedy unfolding on television had prompted calls for a ‘moral
decision’ from the National Party deputy leader and Transport Minister
John Anderson as well as at least four senior ministers, including Foreign
Affairs Minister Alexander Downer (who played a leading role),
Agriculture Minister Mark Vaile, Health Minister Michael Wooldridge and
Finance Minister John Fahey.295 The Prime Minister also said that a moral
decision was necessary after he had watched the news over the weekend,
while Vaile noted that the ‘effect on families of watching the refugees’
misery unfold’ was the driving force in the Government’s decision.296
The policy reversal is indicative of the ways in which hegemonic
groups are often compelled to assert their legitimacy by adopting some of
the values of subordinate groups.297 By changing its position the
Government significantly capitalised on the media’s insistence to reverse
its policy stance on the Kosovar refugees. Ministers received praise from
The Australian for drawing on their ‘collective and individual souls’ and
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acting with a ‘generous spirit.’298 The Cabinet, it was noted, wanted to
‘ensure that this decision, which would provide a palpable and highly
visible moral dimension to the Government’s character, was made in that
spirit.’299 The Government played-down the impact of public sentiment
with Downer suggesting that it was humanitarianism that had prompted the
policy reversal. Downer was asked during an interview on 6th April 1999
on the ABC Television program, The 7:30 Report: ‘Was Cabinet’s
response today based partly at least on public sentiment, given what Philip
Ruddock was saying yesterday [about not taking any refugees]?’ The
Foreign Affairs Minister replied: ‘I think it’s based, above all, on a
humanitarian sentiment… there was just a strong sense that we needed to
make a contribution. I think the Australian public will strongly support
that.’300 Although Downer argued in the media that the Government’s
policy reversal was a gesture of humanitarian goodwill, there is evidence to
support the notion that Australia’s foreign relations played an important
role in this decision as well.

2.4 International relations, the US and the Howard Government’s policy
“backflip”
A range of international influences on the Australian government during
the Kosovo war require further attention. The NATO bombing campaign in
Kosovo (led by the US) was undertaken without the full support of the UN
and United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Surrounding the military
campaign was the US and NATO’s desire to justify, on humanitarian
grounds, a war that could not be sanctioned in international law.301 Another
major strategic dilemma for the US quickly emerged, as the NATO
campaign unexpectedly produced a general state of panic in which
298
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thousands of ethnic Albanians fled directly to the Macedonian border.302
There emerged immediate consensus within leading NATO countries to
resolve the situation as soon as possible. This added pressure on the
Howard Government to accept Kosovar refugees for temporary safe haven.
The dilemma foreshadowed NATO’s plans to utilise Macedonia as
a launching pad for 10,000 ground troops to enter Kosovo following initial
aerial bombardments. Morten Kjaerum describes the impact of the closure
of the Macedonian border: ‘mass influx situations [such as these] are often
considered to constitute a threat to internal stability’.303 The image of
starving and dying refugees that was heavily reproduced in the Western
media added pressure on the US to deal with both a public relations
disaster (at home and abroad) and a significant strategic dilemma.304
Before allowing more refugees to cross the border and seek assistance at
UNHCR

refugee

camps

the

Macedonian

government

requested

international assistance and assurances that at least some of the refugees
would be transferred elsewhere.305 Michael Barutciski and Astri Suhrke
noted that: ‘The spectacle attracted intense international attention for days,
creating strong incentives for states and organisations concerned to find a
solution.’306 In order to proceed with a ground attack (which did not
eventuate), the US was compelled to resolve Macedonia’s reluctance to
accommodate the refugees and assist in overcoming the escalation of a
‘destabilising effect throughout the region.’307
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Barutciski and Suhrke state that: ‘Once the border crisis occurred,
the central policy challenge was to persuade Macedonia to admit a massive
influx of refugees that the government initially rejected. The eventual
solution was based on a “burden-sharing” scheme involving transfer of
refugees to other countries, both in the region and outside.’308 Thus, under
pressure from the US government, UNHCR committed to evacuations out
of the region and ‘produced guidelines for the innovative humanitarian
evacuation program that involved airlifts.’309 As Terje Einarsen says: ‘the
international promise of airlifting refugees from the camps in Macedonia to
other countries was a crucial factor in the effort to persuade the
Macedonian government to keep the Blace border crossing open.’310 The
Australian government eventually moved to support ‘the controversial
United States-backed call for an “air bridge”’ for refugees to be evacuated
by the UNHCR.311
As Joanne Van Selm points out, the Australian government agreed
to accept its quota of 4000 Kosovar refugees, on 6th April, ‘even before
many EU states had decided on co-operating with evacuations.’312 The idea
of being a “good world citizen” with a sense of “moral obligation”
significantly influenced the Australian government’s response to the
Kosovar refugee crisis. 313 However, the role for Australia sought by John
Howard in international affairs reflected Anglophonic and US-centric
interpretations of what this meant. Australia’s response was in-line with a
growing consensus in powerful Western states that had largely rejected the
demand for aid in Africa, and come to favour assistance for white
Europeans.314 Moreover, unlike previous Labor governments which had
promoted closer relations with Asia, Howard’s foreign policy was typified
by his push to promote Australia-US relations as a kind of “special
relationship”. As Douglas T. Stuart argued, upon entering office, ‘Prime
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Minister Howard made it clear that the cornerstone of this new Australian
security policy was direct and consistent cooperation with the United
States.’315 Howard’s move away from Asia towards the US was in many
ways predicated on the assumption that a ‘common sense of values and
common traditions’ would make any clash between the two countries
unlikely.316 The Prime Minister promoted the idea that the economic and
military relationships formed between US and Australia during his term of
office would be equally beneficial.
However, as has been said: ‘Although the US has created a liberal
international economic order that is broadly supported by its allies, its
dominant position means that it can flout its own normative prescriptions
when it chooses to do so.’317 The Australian government’s position on the
Kosovo war reflected the long-standing benevolence of the US toward
Australia. The government’s back flip on denying the refugees safe haven
mirrored the position of the US as the dominant world power in the postCold War period. Moreover, while the Prime Minister promoted the need
for Australia’s foreign strategy to be closely aligned with the US’ during
the Kosovo war, he was in various ways reiterating a much older policy
tradition of dependence upon the US that had existed since the Second
World War, both militarily and economically.318
International pressure was played down by the Foreign Affairs
Minister, although he did acknowledge the importance of international
affairs in relation to the Government’s policy reversal. Downer commented
on The 7.30 Report, following the closure of the border by Macedonia to
thousands of Kosovar refugees:
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Well, we’re part of the international community and there was a
feeling in the Cabinet that it would be appropriate for us to make a
humanitarian contribution to this simply appalling crisis.319
Nonetheless, the influence of the US on Australia during the crisis
remained strong, as Shanahan writes: ‘Although no direct pressure came
from [US President] Bill Clinton before the decision [to offer temporary
safe haven], there was an expectation in Cabinet that there would be.’320
Barutciski and Suhrke argue that the combination of strategic and
humanitarian sentiments ensured that the Kosovo refugee crisis received
extraordinary attention from the powerful Western states.321 What is clear,
however, is that in many ways Operation Safe Haven provided Australia
with a more prominent role in global politics. The Prime Minister
embarked on a fundamental re-assessment of Australia’s foreign and
defence policies immediately on entering office, in which, ‘Canberra
moved away from its traditional role as a status-quo orientated regional
actor toward a more pro-active and globally-orientated posture.’322 The
foreign policy arrangements sought by Howard and Downer in the late
1990s not only represented the Government’s desire to forge a more
significant place for Australia in world affairs, but also one that reflected
the eminence of leading “Anglo” nations. The increasing independence of
NATO from the UN in this period, under the leadership of the US and UK,
provided Howard with an opportunity to promote stronger ties with these
countries and enhance Australia’s role in the ‘so-called anglosphere
coalition’.323 This policy reiterated the US’ desire for ‘English-speaking
democracies’ to be the ‘foundation for a full unity of a democratised world’
and as the best means of giving NATO a new sense of energy and
direction.324
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3. Charity, Donations and NGOs
Operation Safe Haven provided the Australian government with an
opportunity to profess (and position itself alongside popular views about)
the moral importance of being charitable. Government and nongovernment organisations (NGOs) made important financial contributions
in aid of the Kosovar refugees. The Federal Government had initially
offered a $2 million aid package following NATO air strikes, which was
increased to $6 million by early April, to be distributed amongst
international aid agencies.325 By 6th April, the Telegraph reported how
Australians had ‘pledged’ $1 million to the aid agency World Vision for its
campaign to assist the Kosovar refugees.326 Australian NGOs, the
Telegraph noted, had set a $5 million target for public donations for the
Kosovo crisis. CARE Australia donated $850 000 to Operation Safe
Haven, while World Vision Australia provided $304 000.327 By 13th April
Australians had donated about $2 million to the cause over the previous ten
days.328 By 3rd May about forty-five NGOs including the Red Cross, St
Vincent de Paul and the Salvation Army were working with DIMA, ‘to
ensure [those being evacuated to Australia] a smooth transition to
Australian life’.329
A considerable focus in the Telegraph, Herald and Australian was
to make explicit reference to the kinds of offerings made by Australians to
the Kosovars. The sentiment of praise that had been espoused to reports of
these offerings in the media is contradicted by the reality that welfare and
charity groups had faced increasing pressure in the Howard era to assist
needy Australians. This is because, as Philip Mendes says, the election of
325
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the Howard Government in 1996 presented welfare organisations with
enormous challenges, immediately imposing massive spending cuts on
services to help the poor and disadvantaged. Howard’s social welfare
policies amounted to a ‘substantial retrenchment of the welfare state.’330
The analysis of “charity” in the Telegraph, Herald and Australian
examined how news sources described acts, donations, costs and material
objects that were undertaken or offered by both the Federal Government
and the wider Australian community. The Herald publicised at least 430
charitable offerings, while the Telegraph and Australian noted around 300
and 270 respectively. A key issue is the question of how the Howard
Government was able to legitimately dismantle social welfare institutions
while exempting the Kosovars from this ideological practice.331
Clive Hamilton et al explain this paradox by noting how the
dominant political discourses of the Howard era were able to legitimate a
dramatic shift in public expenditure from lower to middle income earners.
They question why there was, through various schemes initiated by the
Howard Government (such as Family Tax Benefit Plan B), an increasing
amount of welfare and tax breaks available to middle income earners while
those on lower incomes were increasingly excluded from such benefits. As
Hamilton et al suggest, central to the Howard Government’s abilities to cut
and then shift welfare expenditure away from the poorer sections of the
Australian community was the Prime Minister’s consistent promulgation of
the idea of a “crisis of the middle class”. The Howard Government’s
policies substantiated this myth to the point that, ‘for every genuine battler
there are three or four who imagine they fit the description.’332 Hamilton et
al comment: ‘That is why our political leaders keep the myth of the battler
alive and exploit it for all it’s worth.’333
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One form of charity discussed by the media and offered by some
individual Australians was billeting. The notion of inviting a stranger or
strangers into the “sanctified” space of the Australian family home was
symbolic, particularly in a period in which the notion of the “white picket
fence” was central to popular political discourse.334 The offer to billet the
refugees in Australian homes was mentioned on dozens of occasions across
the newspaper sources and was repeatedly urged as an alternative mode of
accommodation (instead of army bases) by Opposition leader Kim
Beazley.335 The editor of The Australian commented on the significance of
billeting for the refugees: ‘That would reduce the emotional trauma for the
refugees, many of them already suffering from the murderous break-up of
the family unit at the hands of ethnic cleansing squads.’336 The Herald
noted the enthusiasm of one Australian resident: ‘A Mount Druitt disabled
pensioner with one room to spare has offered to take in a [refugee]
family.’337 Billeting was not an option explored by the Government,
although there was nothing legally preventing refugees from leaving the
barracks and staying with Australian families. The Immigration Minister
did, however, make it clear that the Kosovar refugees would not be able to
access any of the health benefits or other services available under the Safe
Haven program outside of the barracks, thereby discouraging the refugees
from dispersing into the community.338
Excitement about the evacuation was captured in the Herald’s
front-page headline: ‘Australia Joins The Rescue’.339 The newspaper noted
how Australia’s Governor-General Sir William Deane, patron of CARE
Australia, had donated part of his ‘vice-regal salary’ to assist aid work in
334
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refugee camps around Kosovo.340 Southern Cross Quilters, an organisation
of 800 quilters from Australia and New Zealand, launched an appeal for
hundreds of quilts as part of the Kosovo Quilt Drive which would
culminate on the 15th May ‘Make A Quilt for Kosovo Day’.341 Sydney
resident Maria Campo from Baulkam Hills delivered two bags to the
Chester Hill Albanian Australian Community Centre, ‘brimming with
clothes, shoes and stuffed toys, which her daughters, 10 and 4-year-old
twins, had agreed to give up.’342 Mrs Campo, the Telegraph wrote, said her
family was heartbroken by the experiences of the refugees:
It really makes you grateful for what you have[.] I explained to the
kids why they [the Kosovars] were coming here and they were
happy to help. It’s just some clothes and shoes and some toys
because they’ve got nothing.343

Brian Dickey assesses the motivations of charity and welfare
groups throughout Australian history, saying that the acts of these
organisations intend to be universal ‘expressions of the dignity of human
beings wholly admirable in intent.’344 He urges caution towards those who
may appear to have altruistic intentions, arguing for the need to recognise
processes of objectification in acts of charity. That is, to identify how
charitable groups have ‘treated the objects of action: the people being
offered social welfare.’345 Understanding charitable acts in this way
provides an avenue for identifying ‘the dominant social and economic
forces in society’; how hegemonic groups define who is deserving of
assistance (often colloquially defined as the “deserving poor”); and the
implications of that understanding for public offerings of assistance. 346
340
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In varying degrees, the charity offered by Australians to the
Kosovars was motivated by popular sentiments about Australia being the
“most compassionate country in the world”. The evacuation very clearly
allowed the Australian government to parade a positive image of the nation
internationally and in the local media as “charitable” and “caring”. There
is, however, an element of continuity in both the ways in which charity was
offered to the Kosovars and the kind of assistance that has been offered to
refugees, particularly those from the former Yugoslavia, since the Second
World War. Australia had accepted 180,000 displaced persons (DPs) at this
time for permanent resettlement, largely due to the leadership of
Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell.347 The language employed in official
resettlement policies to sell those refugees as “acceptable” to the Australian
public in the late 1940s has continued to shape popular perceptions of
Balkan groups in a variety of ways. The acceptability of these migrant
groups was often achieved by accentuating their usefulness to the national
economy. Most of those who came were contracted to undertake priority
work schemes that required rigorous manual labour. Even when the
migrants had high educational skills these were rarely recognised and they
had a non-threatening class status as low-skilled workers.348
A similar feature in the media coverage surrounding the Kosovar
evacuation was that the refugees did not appear to challenge popular
notions about the racial superiority of British Australians. Of the post-war
era, Egon F. Kunz says: ‘Australian insularity and xenophobia made it
almost inevitable that to continue the [DP labour] program, charity had to
be served up as utilitarian gain, and calculated gain as charity.’349 What
developed was,
dogma that newcomers are “lucky to be here” [which] absolved the
community from the responsibility to help the New Australians in
any meaningful way. Indeed, it put the onus of contented

347

Kunz, op. cit., p. xvii.
ibid., p. 256. See also p. 164.
349
ibid., p. 256.
348

100

gratefulness on the immigrant, and ensured that any criticism from
them be rejected as ingratitude.350
As evident in public discussions concerning the Kosovar evacuation,
notions of gratitude and egalitarianism in the Calwell era promoted the
ability of dominant Australian social groups to categorize who might be
considered worthy or unworthy of their assistance. These notions
strengthened perceptions held by these groups that they were members of
“valued” social and cultural categories. They also created, in this sense,
moral grounds for dominant groups to withdraw their offer of charity to the
Kosovars when they were no longer viewed by the public to need it.351
Anne Summers, commenting in the Herald: ‘found it heartening,
and affirming, last week when the rage and shame of talkback radio callers
forced a change of heart in the Government’.352 However, she questioned
the way ‘We can congratulate ourselves on our considerable compassion
quotient.’353 She cited figures showing how Australians had ‘dug deep’ on
a regular basis since the Vietnam war in support of a variety of
humanitarian crises, yet: ‘When put into perspective against other appeals,
our response to Kosovo while not stingy, is certainly not outstanding.’354
The amounts given to some agencies in those cases still exceeded
donations for the Kosovo refugees. This brings to the fore questions about
the distribution of charity in Australia in light of the broader economic
climate typified by continuous growth in national wealth and falling
unemployment since the mid-1990s.355 As Summers says: ‘many of us
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have far more to give. The day the Government did its backflip on the
Kosovo refugees, the Australian Stock Exchange hit an all-time high.’356
My analysis provides a clearer view of the ways in which the
Howard Government attempted to appropriate popular empathy for the
Kosovars as a means of developing political consensus. It demonstrates the
response of the Federal Government in repositioning itself in line with
public interests and re-establishing popular legitimacy following a growing
backlash. The political discourse implicated in the Safe Haven program
reflects an attempt by the Government to organise and naturalise a
particular consensus ‘in which one class dominates another, becomes
accepted as inevitable and desirable by most people.’357 However, the
analysis accentuates the limitations of the assistance offered to the
refugees, both in popular discourse and under the Safe Haven program.
The context for popular empathy was heavily premised on the notion that
the Kosovars were non-threatening along class, cultural and racial lines.
The motivation behind these kinds of charitable offerings, albeit highly
conditional, becomes much clearer when I examine the language
surrounding the selection of the refugees for the evacuation program.

4. Selecting the Kosovars: Appropriate Candidates for Evacuation
4.1 The work of Australian Immigration officials at Stenkovac 1
The Federal Government created an operational task force on 7th April
1999 headed by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(DIMA), which included the Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT), Health, Finance and Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Collectively these departments would determine the most suitable ways of
proceeding with the operation and accommodating the Kosovars on their
arrival. A team of eight DIMA officials working alongside the UNHCR
were given the task of selecting potential candidates for evacuation to
Australia, via a series of interviews with refugees at Stenkovac 1. Locating
such persons was reportedly a simple process. DIMA officials conducted a
356
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‘door-knocking campaign’ of refugees’ tents.358 DIMA spokesperson
Stewart Foster, who was also director of the department’s Public Affairs
unit, told the Telegraph that those selected had been asked to meet several
criteria. Firstly, abandoned or unattached women, especially those with
children, were given high priority, followed by entire families. The team
then concentrated on those who had not expressed any wish to be reunited
with relatives in nearby European countries. Each family and individual
refugee was required to sign a declaration in Albanian, indicating they
understood the terms. That is, as stressed during the screening process, they
understood that they would only be in Australia until able to return
home.359 The Telegraph wrote: ‘It is understood that the main selection
criteria for the refugees were health, fitness and a willingness to be moved
out after three months.’360
The selection of the Kosovars was promoted as an important part of
Operation Safe Haven in the media. Much of the media coverage reassured
the public that only the most desirable kinds of refugees would be selected
for the evacuation program. It often appeared as though DIMA officials
were far less concerned with evacuating those refugees who were perhaps
most in need than those (who could be represented by the media as)
persons who were healthy and willing to be compliant with the
arrangements offered by the Federal Government. The Safe Haven Visa
was designed, as stipulated in the Migration Legislation Amendment
(Temporary Safe Haven Visas) Bill 1999, so that it could be granted at
short notice by DIMA staff working in Macedonia with the UNHCR – in
situations where Kosovar refugees had been stripped of their credentials by
Yugoslav forces, and more extensive character checking was not
possible.361 The paradox is that DIMA officials provided significant detail
in the media about the kind of refugees being evacuated to Australia. They
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often described the refugees in terms of those attributes that appealed to
Howard voters - middle-class, family values, cleanliness and generally not
too dissimilar to “mainstream” Australians.362

4.2 Media representations of the refugees selected for evacuation:
constructing the “Other”
Sweeping assumptions were evident in media and Federal Government
statements about the Kosovars prior to “getting to know them” through the
evacuation program. The refugees, it was commonly assumed, were
somewhat backward, uneducated and docile, ignorant of the world and
particularly Australia. Media reports over the past year about the spiralling
Kosovo conflict had consistently portrayed an image of the locals as
farmers and villagers exiled from rural Kosovo, or living as dispossessed
hill-folk attempting to evade the violence. The Telegraph often reported on
“remote villages” being attacked by organised Serb military units, and
“villagers” fleeing on tractors, carts and horses.363 Indeed, Balkan countries
have been susceptible to some of the lowest educational and economic
growth rates throughout the twentieth century.364 What was severely
lacking before the NATO air strikes began, particularly in the Telegraph,
were stories about how life was being experienced in the capital Pristina.
Telegraph readers were given an overwhelming impression that Kosovars
were industrially inept, living under primitive economic and political
systems that were inefficient and sub-standard.
Government officials were somewhat startled to discover that
Australia was to provide safe haven for refugees mainly from the
provincial capital of Pristina, rather than the villages and backwaters of the
Balkan countryside. According to ALP Senator Chris Schacht, who visited
the Macedonian refugee camps as part of a parliamentary study mission in
mid-April 1999:
362

See Brett, op. cit.
See for example J. Flieshman, ‘Go in and you’ll die; Tanks clear Kosovo villagers’,
The Daily Telegraph, 6th July 1998, p. 21: ‘Serbian offensives to rout [the KLA] have
skipped from village to village, as hundreds of families flee on tractors and horse carts.’
364
See, for instance, Kunz, op. cit., p. 117 and 133. He provides figures concerning the
poor educational standards and literacy rates in Yugoslavia at the time when refugees
from Balkan countries departed Europe for Australia in the late 1940s.
363

104

you are dealing with people who are well educated in the middle
class/upper middle class who had comfortable lives and had very
good houses in places such as Pristina. You are dealing with people
who are tertiary educated – I met doctors, psychiatrists, school
teachers, technicians and tradespeople – and even those from the
farms are well educated and are running successful farms. You are
not dealing with a Third World population of illiterate peasants.365
The image that the refugees were middle class was reaffirmed by various
news reports. The Australian, for instance, described how ‘the middle-class
nature of the Stenkovac refugees’ had created ‘particular problems’ for
staff providing aid there.366 For Jo Hutton, an Australian citizen coordinating CARE Australia’s aid effort at Stenkovac, these problems
included the range of items the refugees desired whilst awaiting
resettlement: ‘Ms Hutton has to deliver some of the basic necessities of a
middle-class life… “We need scissors to cut their hair, the men want
razors, we need toys for the children, something for the teenagers to do.
We are taking a table tennis table up there tomorrow”.’367 DIMA’s Stewart
Foster, speaking to the media at the Stenkovic 1 refugee camp,
commented: ‘Of course, we have had people with a sense of adventure…
One man told us he had always wanted to see the Australian Open tennis.
Who knows? Maybe he will.’368 He emphasised the point that some of
those selected included nurses, a computer expert, businessmen and (the
more expected) agricultural workers. As the Telegraph described,
generally, officials were ‘dealing with people of sharp intelligence.’369
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Foster further commented: ‘Most of them understand that it’s two days in
the plane’.370
DIMA officials were susceptible to circumstantial pressures and
opportunities during the selection process. The UNHCR reported abuse of
its evacuation program by some Kosovars as ‘a rapid way of obtaining
tickets to the West’.371 According to one NGO: ‘UNHCR concedes that
refugees have bought and sold places on departing planes, and falsified
their identities.’372 UNHCR further reported that some refugees were
deliberately seeking evacuation to particular countries. It is unclear
whether Australian immigration officials participated in this kind of abuse
of the UNHCR evacuation program. What is evident, however, is that the
evacuation ‘allowed some governments to score public relations points by
appearing “humanitarian” in receiving a limited number of “popular”
refugees.’373 The significance of the Government’s political investment in
the Safe Haven program - including a highly organised public relations
campaign - presented staff from the Department of Immigration with
opportunities to further their own careers. This is reflected in the language
utilised by DIMA officials to describe evacuees in the media - one that
promoted the “acceptability” of the Kosovars to the Australian public, and
which emphasised “acceptable” qualities possessed by evacuees (such as
high intellect and middle class credentials). The use of this type of
language was criticised in The Australian by commentator Ramona Koval,
who wrote: ‘And while hearts go out to refugees from Kosovo, who look
like us and have middle-class clothes and mobile phones, in January an
even bigger refugee crisis emerged from Sierra Leone… But those people
are black, aren’t they? And they don’t have mobile phones.’374 This
criticism is supported by figures that emerged in August 1999 in which
Kosovar refugees had received 21 times more in humanitarian aid from the
international community than those in Africa. Around 800,000 Kosovar
refugees were given an average of $US13 per day in food and medical aid
370
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since the NATO intervention, while Africa refugees continued to receive
only US$0.60 per day.375
Kunz notes the existence of similar sentiments in the methods
employed by immigration officials dispatched to Europe to select
immediate post-war refugees for resettlement in Australia. Much of the
focus was on ‘Australia’s stringent health criteria’, resulting in the
acceptance of predominantly younger age groups.376 The ‘search for
quality’ consisted of recurrent references to ‘high quality’ and ‘finest
quality’ in the migration officers’ vocabulary, and the ‘overeagerness to
please Canberra by recruiting “high quality immigrants”’.377 Kunz adds,
‘the selection missions imposed a uniformity of youthfulness and health,
which became the hallmark of Australia’s DP scheme’, and often meant
‘the rejection of illiterates’.378
While Government and immigration spokespersons often promoted
evacuees as acceptable, there remained an element of xenophobia in media
discourse surrounding the evacuations. Ethnic “caging” is reflected in some
of the language used to describe the Safe Haven evacuees in the media.
That is, attempts by journalists to categorise (or “cage”) the Kosovars with
patronising language and to represent them as unintelligent (both directly
and by implication).379 Bruce Wilson’s article, ‘Kosovo refugees take off
for Sydney’, was based on interviews with Kosovar refugees on their bus
trip from the Stenkovic 1 camp to Skopje airfield before departing for
Australia. Noting the refugees’ ignorance and emotional trauma, Wilson
described how one man tugged on his sleeve, asking: ‘In Australia… will
we be put in a house, or a hut? Will we have a roof? Will there be
water?’380 The journalist asked one of the women what they knew of
Australia; she replied through an interpreter: ‘Nothing’. After a long pause,
the woman went on: ‘Kangaroo.’381 Such representations of the Kosovars
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reflect similar sentiments publicised elsewhere by the Telegraph about the
level of ‘intelligence’ displayed by the refugees.382 This patronising
perspective of the Kosovars before their arrival is captured by columnist
Ray Chesterton who surmised the potential for Australians to benefit from
the cultural exchange brought by the evacuation. Noting the menu arranged
for the refugees at East Hills barracks on their first day in Australia, he
commented: ‘There could also be a jar or two of Vegemite on breakfast
tables. Perhaps the cultural exchange will be both ways.’383
Despite the Howard Government’s efforts to promote an image of
the refugees as intelligent, “middle-class” people, there remained tension
within news reports with long-standing stereotypes about Balkan migrants.
Stereotypes about Balkan migrants have historical connections with the
xenophobia embodied in the White Australia immigration policy, as well
as the migrant labour programs introduced at the end of the Second World
War. Jock Collins describes the experience of Central Eastern European
refugees at this time who, after fulfilling their labour contracts with the
Australian government, suffered substantial downward employment
mobility in coming to Australia. One study emphasised ‘the devastating
effects of loss of professional, vocational and social standing among East
Central European intellectuals’.384 As Collins notes, university professors,
surgeons, lawyers and artists were to be found on the production lines and
undertaking a variety of manual labour work. He recognises the
frustrations of one of these refugees who was unable to find more
appropriate employment, citing: ‘The Australian migration policy does not
allow the use of my intellectual values; the Australian society does not
accept us at equals.’385 These migrants were inhibited by ‘a history of
racial antagonism and xenophobia’ against refugee workers, labelled
popularly as “reffos”.386 Central Eastern Europeans along with other
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groups of “reffos” were acceptable to Australians as long as they remained
in their “second class” roles. 387
The positioning of the Kosovars within Australian political
discourse is not limited to the national sphere. Larry Wolff says that, in
much of Western thought, the Balkans (which he views as part of Eastern
Europe) have tended to assume the role of Western Europe’s internal
“other”. He comments: ‘It was Eastern Europe’s ambiguous location,
within Europe but not fully European, that called for such notions of
backwardness and development to mediate between the poles of
civilization and barbarism. In fact, Eastern Europe in the eighteenth
century

provided

Western

Europe

with

its

first

model

of

underdevelopment, a concept that we now apply all over the globe.’388 As
K. E. Fleming says, for Wolff: ‘the Balkans provided Europe’s first
experience of the other (and thus concretized the Western category of
“Europe”)’.389
In Australia, however, popular discourse has tended to promulgate
precisely where Balkan refugees ought to be situated – as worthy of
humanitarian assistance, though largely because of their supposed nonthreatening class and cultural status. The experience of the Kosovars
highlights the continuance of this humanitarian/racial superiority binary
within Australian immigration history. This is noted by Kunz in his
account of Australian attitudes towards refugees in the post-war era: ‘[The
pressures to assimilate] often exerted with an air of generous naivety by
well-meaning Australians ready to share their “superior culture” with the
newcomers, were a potent cause of anxiety and resentment [for many
refugees].’390

387

ibid. See also Kunz, op. cit., p. 165.
L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe; The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, p. 9. Also cited in K.E.
Fleming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography’, American Historical
Review, 105(4), October 2000, p. 1230.
389
Fleming, op. cit., p. 1230.
390
Kunz, op. cit., p. 166.
388

109

4.3 Representations of the familiar
Summers was sceptical of the way in which the Kosovars were identified
by relief agencies in their attempts to elicit financial support from the
Australian public - as they competed for the ‘compassion dollar’.391 She
wrote, ‘Agencies report a high degree of identification with the refugees:
“People can really associate with them, they wear clothes like ours, they
really feel for them”, says World Vision’s Ian Neil.’392 Despite the
prevalence of negative stereotypes, “othering” and ethnic “caging”, those
Kosovars selected for evacuation were overwhelmingly represented in the
media as possessing what was typified as core Western lifestyles and social
roles. The central role of the family in Kosovar life was commonly
emphasised, as were the tastes and trends they shared with their host
country.
The Telegraph mainly described the Kosovars, in relation to those
involved with Operation Safe Haven, as “family people”, making 61
references to mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, brothers, aunts and uncles
(and other family roles). These were the people who required Australia’s
assistance. The newspaper referred to the refugees in a more general sense
as “Europeans” (or “like us”) twice, while eliciting 11 references to the
Kosovars as significantly “dissimilar, alien or “Other”, noting the language
and cultural barriers they were likely to face upon coming to Australia.393
The Herald produced similar reports about the Kosovars, describing them
in terms of their “family” titles on 56 occasions. The newspaper depicted
the Kosovars as significantly “different, alien or Other” 11 times, while
they were viewed in a much more general sense as “Europeans” 25 times.
The Australian produced much less commentary about the Kosovars in this
regard, describing them as “family” types on 21 occasions, and as
“Europeans” and “dissimilar, alien or Other” six times respectively.
391
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The ideological purpose of these kinds of binaries in the media
works to remove the Other from the bounds of the dominant moral
community, while strengthening the appearance of the dominant group as
superior within the discourse.394 Instances where the Kosovars appeared
morally or culturally compatible with Australians, by the same measure,
make implicit judgements about the hegemonic categories assigned to and
used to displace less desirable social groups. Male refugees, teenagers
Prindon Sadriu and Gent Prokshi, interviewed by the Telegraph at
Stenkovac 1 before their departure to Australia, were noted to be fans of
the Australian television series Heartbreak High.395 Labelled, ‘The new
best mates’, Sadriu and Prokshi were depicted as typical teenage boys
(pictured below). Wearing baseball caps and giving a “thumbs up” in the
photograph, they were said to be ‘excited adventurers to a land that until a
week ago had seldom entered their minds’.396 Sadriu, along with his
parents, brother and sister, had fled from Gjilan (eastern Kosovo). It was
also reported that Prokshi had urged his family of five to go to Australia,
having fled Pristina at the height of Serbian atrocities. The Herald further
noted the importance of Heartbreak High to Kosovar youths in the article
‘Flight to land of Heartbreak High’. One young refugee, who had informed
the Herald that his relatives had disappeared, honed-in on how ‘All the
kids in Kosovo love that movie’.397
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Seventeen-year-old Valmira Abazi (pictured above), interviewed
before her departure to Australia, was depicted as a typical teenage girl,
ensuring that the Telegraph’s photographer avoided capturing her ‘baggy
pair of camouflage combat fatigues.’398 Describing Ms Abazi as ‘Clothes
conscious’, the article stated: ‘Refugee camp or not, girls want to look their
best for the camera.’399 It was reported that Prindon Sadriu was Abazi’s
‘new boyfriend’ who she met at Stenkovac 1. Abazi’s father had been an
economist in Pristina, and, along with her brother and sister (aged 16 and
14), had ‘lived a comfortable life in Pristina’.400 It was reported that her
father’s telecommunications company had been stormed by Serb forces thought to be used by Albanian activists – along with the family home.
Media portrayal of the Kosovars in these ways affirms Sharon Pickering’s
study on the Australian media and discourse about refugees. Pickering
found that the ‘ideal refugee’ was typically represented as passive, invited
and visibly grateful.401 Abazi was not only submissive for the cameras, she
also professed strong family-ties, and was willing to work with the
Telegraph in its attempts to position her as “acceptable” for the evacuation
program.
Families of a variety of shapes and sizes were pictured in the
Telegraph patiently waiting at Stenkovac 1 to be evacuated to Australia.402
These descriptions reinforced the idea that family-type people had been
selected by the Department of Immigration for temporary relocation to
Australia. The symbolic weight of the family in reports about the
evacuation is linked to the prominent position of family politics during the
era of the Howard Government. Popular notions of the “traditional”
Australian family were central to many of the Howard Government’s
policies. The Telegraph’s emphasis on “family” values reaffirms its place,
compared to the Herald and Australian, as most supportive of the broader
political agenda Howard Government – one that was highly geared towards
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upholding the sanctity of the “traditional” Australian family.403 This kind
of media discussion promoted consensus for the Government’s Safe Haven
program. It was not only useful for the Howard Government in reestablishing support after considerable backlash, it further supported the
way Howard had mobilised cultural conservatism, a crucial factor in
successive election victories for the Prime Minister.
Further to this are the continuing historical ramifications impacting
on refugee policy which have tended to pander to an element of
xenophobia. Kunz notes that politicians attempting to sell the post-war
migrant and refugee intake from Europe were compelled ‘to cater to
pressure groups and flatter the egos of their constituents’ in order to sustain
their political careers.404 He adds:
Those few, like [Immigration Minister] Calwell, who tried to do
better, could only counter the prevailing xenophobia by portraying
the [displaced persons] as patient, willing to take anything, eager to
learn anything, happy New Australians who were perennially
smiling into cameras and ever ready to change into national
costumes… This reassuring presentation of so many foreigners, up
until then resented and feared, helped to disarm opposition to the
[migrant labour work] scheme, but at the same time made the hosts
smug in their belief that they and their government had done
enough for the refugee. Hence, if an immigrant had any complaint,
he must have been exceptional: an ungrateful person, badly
selected.405

Conclusion: Humanitarianism, Politics and the Implementation of the
Temporary Safe Haven Visa
The evacuation of the Kosovars to Australia was co-ordinated alongside a
dramatic new direction for Australian refugee policy based on the rationale
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of temporary protection. As Jupp commented in The Australian People, the
Kosovo refugee crisis not only mobilised the Australian community behind
charitable activities, ‘[it] also marked an important shift in refugee policy
towards temporary protection rather than permanent settlement.’406 Kelly
commented on the significance of these changes, describing the Safe
Haven program as ‘a significant and historic change in Australia’s
immigration policy, which, presumably, was neither recommended by
Ruddock or his department.’407 In this sense, the Safe Haven program was
implemented in conjunction with a variety of strategies for appropriating
popular consensus following a dramatic policy backflip undertaken by the
Federal Government.
The politicking surrounding the implementation of the Safe Haven
program reflects a populist response from the Howard Government. The
editor of The Australian aptly described the early stages of the
development of the Safe Haven program as ‘policy on the run’, as the
Howard Government scrambled to formulate a strategy that would regain
public favour.408 This chapter has demonstrated how, in each of the
responses made by the Howard Government to the Kosovo refugee crisis, it
worked to maintain the position from which it was able to retain popular
support. The initial refusal to oblige the UNHCR evacuation request
denotes the deployment of popular xenophobia by the Howard
Government. Under other circumstances - such as, for instance, the arrival
of Chinese “boat people” in 1999 - a “tough” stance on refugees remained
popularly desirable. The reversal of this decision was a symbolic attempt to
re-establish a perception of the Howard Government as compassionate and
in-line with popular interests.
The Safe Haven policy was the result of a highly successful
political compromise by the Howard Government. It embodied the
conservatism of the Government and demonstrated the ability of leading
Cabinet members, particularly the Prime Minister, to capitalise on popular
406
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sentiment. The Government significantly benefited by pandering to public
pressure and acting compassionately towards “popular” refugees. This
image was bolstered by an emphasis on the kinds of refugees selected for
evacuation in the media - those deemed middle class, family-types and
White Europeans.
The Howard Government’s refugee policy changes in 1999 were, in
no small measure, impacted upon by international forces, particularly in
relation to the US’ lead role in the NATO military campaign against
Yugoslavia. The Government undertook these changes with an eye on both
the national political arena and how Australia was being perceived
internationally as a “good world citizen”. The Government’s response was
heavily influenced by a policy of compliance with US foreign strategy.
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Chapter 3: The Kosovar Refugee Arrival and its
Politicisation in the Media
Introduction
The first group of Kosovar refugees arrived in Australia on 7th May 1999
suffering from experiences of war, personal loss and State-sponsored
atrocities. When the first refugee flight landed at Sydney airport the
Kosovars encountered significant media interest. They were formally
greeted by the Prime Minister. This chapter explores the ways in which the
Howard Government politicised the Kosovars’ arrival and attempted to
bolster support for its response to the refugee crisis. In particular, the aim is
to show how aspects of the media worked to legitimate the leadership of
the Howard Government, and analyse the implications of this approach for
Operation Safe Haven.
This chapter traces the journey of the refugees aboard the initial
flight to Australia, the emotional welcome they encountered at Sydney
airport and the experience of the first Kosovars to arrive at the East Hills
Safe Haven. The media presented the Howard Government in a favourable
light throughout the arrival. Significantly, there were a range of limitations
imposed on the media by the Federal Government during this episode. The
Government tightly regulated access to the refugees which increased the
importance of the media as a mediator between the general public and the
Government. The news coverage underlines the importance of the media in
reproducing the agenda of powerful political groups.
The arrival provided the news media with an opportunity to
celebrate and “parade” Australian national values. The newspaper media
frequently portrayed the Kosovars as relinquishing the lives they had
known in Yugoslavia for a “new” and “better life” in Australia. Media
sources analysed in this chapter positioned the Howard Government as
central to this parade. They portrayed the Prime Minister as an exemplary
political leader. The analysis demonstrates how the news media supported
perceptions about the moral qualities of the Howard Government, its
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nationalist platform and the appropriateness of the temporary Safe Haven
Visa program.
In this chapter I examine news reports from the Telegraph, Herald
and Australian.409 This includes content analysis of news (general),
features, opinion columns and editorials drawn from the first five days
following the landing of the first plane of refugees in Sydney (7th to 11th
May 1999).410 The intention is to analyse media representations of the first
plane landing - a highly co-ordinated and pre-planned media event - and
the ways in which it generated publicity for the Howard Government over
the course of the week that followed. This chapter has also drawn attention
to images and letters to the editor that accompanied or responded to these
articles. Newspaper reports assisted in the Government’s attempts at
gaining consensus on the changes to refugee policy.

1. The Initial Plane Ride to a Safe Haven
The Howard Government embarked on Operation Safe Haven as a plan for
temporary resettlement, responding to international obligations and
growing pressure from within the Australian community. Despite having
formally requested Australia’s assistance to evacuate refugees on 5th April
1999, the UNHCR’s humanitarian evacuation program (HEP) stalled for
several weeks. This was mainly due to the concerns of some of the
organisation’s members over the legal rights of refugees being granted
temporary protection in Convention countries around the world. Under
pressure from the US, the UNHCR resumed the evacuation program
despite being what Barutciski and Suhrke describe as a ‘hesitant
participant’.411
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The UNHCR formally renewed its request to the Australian Federal
Government for assistance on 1st May 1999, asking for the evacuation of
the refugees to commence. The first refugee flight to Australia departed on
5th May 1999, in which 414 exiled Kosovars were flown from Skopje to
Rome, Bangkok and then finally to Sydney.412 The Telegraph published a
photograph of smiling refugees on its front-page as they boarded a Qantas
aeroplane (see Appendix 2), alongside the headline, ‘Sanctuary and hope in
Sydney’.413 It was implied that the refugees were happy to be relinquishing
their former lives for the protection and opportunities offered to them in
Australia.
On the evening of 7th May 1999, the refugees landed at Sydney
airport after a 22-hour flight from Rome aboard a Qantas Boeing 747. It
was the first of ten chartered flights arranged by the Federal Government to
temporarily relocate almost 4000 Kosovar refugees to Australia. The group
comprised 216 males and 194 females – 27 under the age of two – and
eight over the age of 60, including a 95-year-old man.414 The refugees had
watched Patch Adams during the flight, a popular American film that the
Telegraph called ‘emotionally safe viewing’.415 The image given by the
newspaper portrayed operational workers as treating the Kosovars with
significant amounts of care and caution.
Journalists from the Telegraph, Australian and the Herald obtained
access to the flight from Rome to Sydney, situated alongside ‘refugees
jam-packed into economy class’.416 Journalists Doug Conway and John
Hamilton relayed their account after being aboard the refugee flight from
Bangkok to Sydney. Some students among the refugees were browsing a
map, the journalists said, who took note of ‘the longitude and latitude of
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their Australian landfall and possibly a new life.’417 As the newspaper
suggested, for Australians, the ‘landfall’ offered to the Kosovars was
something special, not to mention highly irregular for a country with a
history of tough immigration policies. There was no question, at least for
the Telegraph, that the “compassion” shown by Australians to the refugees
was paramount in their survival.
In reports about the flight, it was said that the Australian cabin crew
were, in no small measure, going to extraordinary lengths to assist the
evacuees. The Kosovars were served ‘specially prepared’ halal food
provided by cabin crew aboard the flight and the children were kept busy
‘playing with new toys given to them by Qantas staff and drawing
furiously in colouring books.’418 The Herald pointed out: ‘There was even
a caretaker brought from Australia to clean toilets in flight.’419 There was
the underlying sense in these reports that it was Australians who would
benefit most from the exchange by vindicating their innate altruistic
character. As the Telegraph (and the Herald) highlighted: ‘Many of the
Qantas crews on each sector volunteered for the privilege of serving the
refugees.’420 Noting the efforts of the flight crew, the newspaper seized the
opportunity to present Operation Safe Haven as exemplary and indicative
of the moral fortitude of the Howard Government.
Conway and Hamilton described how, for those refugees who
spoke English aboard the flight, the questions posed to the journalists
‘never stopped’. Some of these included:
What was our money like? How long would it take for a letter
posted in Australia to reach Europe? Would they be allowed to go
to school? Would they be allowed to go to University? What would
Australians think of them? How big was Australia? What were its
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animals like? Were they friendly? We [Conway and Hamilton] tried
our best to help them.421
The Kosovars were portrayed as excited and inquisitive travellers who
were anticipating some of the freedoms that might be available to them in
Australia. A tension emerged in the Telegraph’s narrative, which would
continue throughout its coverage, between the idea that the Kosovars were
somewhat backward and poor and indications of their social status as
middle class and educated. In one sense, for the Telegraph, the flight to
Australia offered a world of opportunity to the Kosovars unlike anything
they had been able to explore while living in Yugoslavia. It was the
perception that Operation Safe Haven had allowed the refugees to
experience a more democratic system of government and a better way of
life in general by being temporarily relocated to Australia. This was despite
the reality that the Safe Haven program - which resulted in the refugees
being largely dependant on (and hence confined) to army bases significantly limited the opportunities for the Kosovars to travel, obtain
education and experience Australian life without restrictions imposed by
the Australian government.
For Shefshet Kaqkini, one of the refugees interviewed during the
flight, Australia offered the chance of a “new life” and to start over. It was
noted that Mr Kaqkini’s son had been decapitated and his wife had been
‘stabbed in the heart’.422 Mr Kaqkini stated, through an interpreter: ‘I want
to show Australia the reality of what is happening in Kosovo. I love my
family. But I must accept what has happened. I must live. I am going to
live again. I think I am going to find myself in Australia. You are peaceful
people, kind people.’423 Australia’s generosity was described as
overwhelming for Mr Kaqkini who was worried that Australia was
spending too much money helping Kosovo’s refugees. An interpreter for
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Mr Kaqkini said: ‘He feels you are now his family. He is worrying about
you.’424 The interpreter added, ‘This man [Mr Kaqkini] is incredible.’425
The Australian published four images captured by Grant Turner, a
photographer aboard the flight from Rome. The central figure of the
photographs (see Appendix 4) was: ‘An elderly woman, travelling alone,
[who] sat silently for the entire 22-hour journey.’426 The woman, wearing a
headscarf, was consistent with many images of Kosovar Albanians
depicted as village-peasants which had been published in the media over
the previous few months. The newspaper was surprised to find, as the
caption read: ‘they were well-educated and many had good English.’427 In
the photographs the refugees appeared excited about coming to Australia.
In one photograph, ‘Passengers scramble[d] to portholes to gain their first
glimpse of the Australian coastline’.428 It was the sense that a world of
freedom awaited them.
The Herald emphasised two aspects on the morning before the
arrival, including the ‘rush’ by Kosovar refugees to sign up to come
Australia, and the similarities between Kosovar and Australian youths. A
photograph on the front page of the Herald (below) depicted this “rush” as
somewhat aggressive, with the caption: ‘Next stop, Sydney’.429 It further
described how: ‘Kosovar refugees in the Stenkovac camp in Macedonia
crowd around the noticeboard listing those chosen to fly to sanctuary in
Australia.’430 The Herald contrasted this desperate image with the
excitement expressed by several youths about being able to see the country
in which the Australian film Heartbreak High had originated. The 18-year
old male refugee, Eashkim Leqiei, told the Herald that he knew nothing of
Australia except for this film which was ‘his favourite movie’.431 Leqiei
stated: ‘All the kids in Kosovo love that movie’.432 Another young man,
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25-year old Niti Arianit, commented that he had seen Heartbreak High
three times. The idea was that Australians ought to extend their compassion
to the refugees because they were just “like us”.

Photograph of the Kosovar ‘rush’ to come to Australia,
in Sydney Morning Herald, 7th May 1999, p. 1

The newspaper media presented the Kosovars as extraordinary
survivors during the flight. They had overcome the persecution suffered
under the Yugoslav regime. These reports are indicative of the effects of
the media discourse used, particularly by the Telegraph, to mobilise public
support for Operation Safe Haven. The refugees were portrayed by the
Telegraph as highly deserving of compassion and overwhelming in their
gratitude for the Australian government’s offer to evacuate them. More
importantly, the refugees were positioned on one side of a binary that
highlighted everything that was “good” about Australia (its compassion
and values), as opposed to all that was “wrong” with Yugoslavia.
Even before the Kosovars had arrived in Australia, there was a
significant aspect of media coverage that represented them as coming from
an alien, backward world much different to Western European societies.
Fleming says that the perception of Southern Europeans as somewhat alien
or “Others” extends from a general historical disconnect between colonial
(and post-colonial) European cultures and the Balkans. Assumptions in
both the popular media and intellectual literature over the last several
hundred years have resulted in the development of fears in the West about
122

Balkan cultures as “unstable” and that such an influence might bring the
“uncivilised” to the “civilised” world. Fleming says: ‘The Balkans’ liminal
status – at the interstices between worlds, histories, and continents – is
tantamount not so much to marginality as to a sort of centrality. To be
“liminal”, after all, is to be between (and overlapping) two (or more)
domains, while to be marginal is merely to be at the edges of one.’433
There has emerged, Fleming argues, in much of Western thought the
notion that Southern Europeans constitute an “inside other”. This is due to
‘Western Europe’s uncertainty as to where to place them’.434
The media have played an important role in the dissemination of
these kinds of conceptions of Balkan peoples in Australia. Mass print
media assert significant powers by working to legitimate a particular
agenda about the popularly conceived nation, as well as its culture and
interests. This is often undertaken in a process of juxtaposition: by
exemplifying and parading a particular set of ideal national traits and
denoting symbolic national boundaries in depictions of the national
“Other”. This juxtaposition can be viewed in how the Kosovars were
simultaneously constructed to embody White national traits, whilst being
used to depict “otherness” as a marker of national boundaries. As stated by
Zlatko Skrbis, Loretta Baldassar and Scott Poynting, national belonging
has the capacity to be ‘enacted, displayed, paraded, exaggerated and
frequently articulated in the jargon of essentialism and authenticity.’435 The
excited tone of the in-flight reports indicates how the news press utilised
the arrival as an opportunity to parade Australian, including White
Christian, national values as morally praiseworthy. This binary about the
Kosovars continued throughout the media’s coverage of Operation Safe
Haven.

2. The Arrival as a Media Event
There was a large media presence at the arrival of the first evacuation flight
at Sydney airport. The landing was attended by high-profile government
433
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representatives, including John Howard, Philip Ruddock, and Opposition
Immigration spokesperson Con Sciacca. As DIMA stated, the sizeable
media presence was an important part of the landing ceremony and a
highly coordinated affair:
The [DIMA] Public Affairs team was responsible for managing the
immense media interest the Operation generated in [the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Australia. More than 120
media representatives were present for the arrival of the plane
carrying the first group to Australia. Public Affairs Officers were
temporarily located in [Macedonia] and at each safe haven to
manage the continuing strong media interest.436
The public was shut out of the media event, as The Australian wrote:
‘Media security was tight, with journalists and photographers required to
show two forms of identification. While Sydney radio stations had earlier
in the week been encouraging Sydneysiders to be at the airport to welcome
the refugees, no public access was permitted.’437 The fact that the public
was not allowed to greet the refugees, however, was not publicised by the
Telegraph which attempted to position the Prime Minister as surrounded
by public acolytes. When the refugees exited the plane, the newspaper
described how they were met with ‘clapping’, ‘cheering’, and a barrage of
camera

flashes,

welcoming

speeches

and

ceremonial

pomp.438

Documenting each moment, the Telegraph promoted the arrival as a way
of demonstrating unity between the goodwill of the Australian people and
the moral standing of the Howard Government. The Federal Government
had experienced significant media backlash a month before the arrival of
the Kosovars when it rejected the UNHCR’s request to temporarily
relocate some of the refugees waiting for assistance along the border of
436
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Macedonia. The official welcoming offered by the Prime Minister allowed
him to assume a central role in media coverage of the event. It was an
attempt to regain public support.
Broadly favourable media coverage of the Prime Minister was a
likely outcome because the Immigration Department carefully managed
public relations surrounding the Kosovar refugees. I noted earlier how the
media was granted limited access to the refugees during their arrival. The
Herald commented on this situation, noting how the Immigration
Department was ‘keeping the media away from the refugees for a few
days.’439 Ruddock stated this was because of concerns for the psychiatric
welfare of the refugees: ‘They are not circus animals to be dealt with as a
matter of perverse interest’.440 Nonetheless, a handful of journalists did
gain access to the East Hills barracks over the next few days. Their reports
shaped the image of the Kosovars in a particular (though highly regulated)
light. Evident here were attempts by the Government to mobilise popular
acclaim via the media behind particular shades of truth. As Nicholas Rose
states, in assessing the mobilisation of consent what matters is ‘analysing
what counts as truth, who has the power to define truth, the role of different
authorities of truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical
conditions for the production and circulation of truths.’441
The Telegraph’s choice of language and imagery supported the
Howard Government, capturing the determination of the Prime Minister to
be perceived as welcoming the refugees “with open arms”. In newspaper
reports ‘words and language used are deliberate choices… the choices are
not just about accuracy but about portrayal, imagery and representation.’442
The Telegraph consistently represented the Prime Minister in a favourable
light throughout its coverage of the Kosovar refugees because the populist
sentiments promoted by Howard supported the ideological platform of the
newspaper and its readership. The Telegraph highlighted the central role
439

Stephens and Darby, op. cit.
Ruddock, cited in ibid.
441
N. Rose, Powers of Freedom; Reframing political thought, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 30.
442
P. Manning, ‘Arabic and Muslim People in Sydney’s Daily Newspapers, Before and
After September 11’, Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy,
109, November 2003, p. 52.
440

125

played by the Howard Government in Operation Safe Haven in its
coverage of the landing ceremony. It noted how the refugees participated in
a formal ceremony to be welcomed by the Prime Minister, before being
delivered to the safe haven that awaited them at East Hills. Tracing the
ceremonial procedure, the event was represented by the Telegraph with
‘deliberate choices’ of imagery that lent moral weight to the leadership of
the Prime Minister and produced favourable publicity for the Howard
Government in a more general sense.443
The next morning, the front-page of the Telegraph described how
the refugees had arrived ‘SAFE IN OUR ARMS’. Coverage of the landing
was dominated by the theme of tears - of sadness, relief and elation.
Photographs depicted the Kosovars leaving the Qantas jet, stepping onto
the tarmac and into the terminal overwhelmed with tears and wiping their
eyes (see Appendix 3). Ray Chesterton commented in his front-page

This image of a young Kosovar refugee with a toy plane in his hand dominated the cover of The
Daily Telegraph on 8th May 1999
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report: ‘Australia’s newest visitors broke down and cried last night as they
embraced freedom in a new country far away from war-torn Kosovo.’444
Even the Prime Minister, who attended the arrival, ‘was close to tears
himself as he welcomed the Kosovars to Australia.’445 Chesterton wrote:
‘The journey from the insanity of Kosovo to the compassion of Australia is
beyond measurement.’446 The moment was summarised as: ‘Feelings of
relief, apprehension and joy jumbled around the turbulent atmosphere as
Sydney opened its heart to the Kosovars. Men and women wiped tears
from their tired eyes as they left the plane while children embraced trauma
teddies and other gifts with wide smiles.’447
The Kosovars were portrayed as “overwhelmed” and “emotionally
fragile” in a majority of Telegraph articles, while in lesser degrees they
were depicted as “relieved”, “excited” and “crying”. The crowd and
government officials were described as overwhelmed by the emotion as
well and the number of times “tears” was mentioned or implied (29) is
indicative of the weight the image carried for the arrival for Telegraph
readers. The emotional climax of the entire airport being a scene of tears
bolstered the perception that Operation Safe Haven was the result of the
moral resolve of the Australian government to assist the refugees. For the
most part these linguistic choices were similar in the Herald and
Australian, although “tears” featured much less in The Australian (five
times) and was mentioned only three times in the Herald.448 The Herald
focussed more on the refugees being “relieved” to have landed in Australia,
while The Australian centred more on the Kosovars being “emotionally
fragile” rather than “crying”.
A major difference between each of the newspapers’ coverage of
the arrival was the emotive images used to capture the scene at the airport.
The Telegraph pictured the Kosovars wiping tears from their eyes with
444
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their heads front or down and looking very tired (see Appendix 3). On the
other hand, The Australian captured on its front page an image of a smiling
child refugee giving a peace sign with his forefingers, surrounded by
dozens of others holding their heads up and patiently waiting (see
Appendix 4). The caption read: ‘A symbol of love and a victory sign from
a small child’.449 By comparison, The Australian captured a less griefstricken image of the refugees at the airport than the Telegraph which
reflected broader stylistic differences between the newspapers in discussing
the issue.
The images of the Kosovars’ arrival presented a view that all those
involved in Operation Safe Haven had been “carried away” by the emotion
of the landing, despite the stylistic differences between the newspapers.
Responding to this sentiment, the Telegraph’s coverage of the arrival
focussed significantly on the idea of the Kosovars being offered a “new
home” by the Australian government. It was, the Telegraph suggested,
Australia’s goodwill and compassion that had delivered the Kosovars to a
“new life” and “freedom”:
Teenagers threw their arms into the air in delight and waved to the
crowd as they clambered down the stairs to a new life, free of pain
and suffering.450
The image was one of relief and elation, reinforcing the perception that the
Australian government had delivered the Kosovars to a new life motivated
by a sense of compassionate obligation. Chesterton noted how the refugees
regarded Australia as a ‘safe country’ without enemies where they could
relax from the horrors of war ‘without having to look over their
shoulder’.451 The Telegraph described in one headline how ‘Life starts
anew for hell’s exiles’, with the evacuation presenting an opportunity for
the refugees to start over.452 It was noted, though exhausted by the long
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journey, ‘the refugees’ relief and gratitude was palpable’ for being offered
such an opportunity.453

3. Media Representations of the Temporary Safe Haven Policy
The political response of the Howard Government was a deliberate attempt
at mobilising ‘the domains or entities to be governed: to govern one must
act upon [a range of] forces, instrumentalize them in order to shape actions,
processes and outcomes in desired directions.’454 The kinds of images that
dominated media coverage of the Kosovar arrival complemented the
Federal Government’s attempts at generating favourable publicity,
particularly the notion that it had acted compassionately and generously.
There were significant differences between the Telegraph, Herald and
Australian’s treatment of the arrival, particularly in relation to the level of
emotive verbiage. Analysis of the Telegraph’s use of the terms “new
home” and “temporary home” around the time of the arrival revealed
preferential treatment of the former. The concept “new home” was used at
least 14 times during the first week of the arrival, about one-and-a-half
times more than “temporary home”. This preferred position of the
newspaper is in clear contrast to what various other studies have revealed
about media representation of refugee policy during the era of the Howard
Government.455 The idea of the Kosovars being offered a “new home” in
Australia conflicted with the aims of the Safe Haven program and the
rationale of temporary protection on which it was premised.
The idea of “temporary home” was retained by the Herald, in
which the idea of “new home” was mentioned only twice, while
“temporary home” was noted 12 times. The Herald was adamant: ‘the
Howard Government was right to provide temporary sanctuary … But it is
also right that the refugees be prepared to return home when conditions
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permit.’456 The Herald cited, uncritically, Ruddock’s comments about the
possibility of accepting any further refugees from the UNHCR under the
temporary arrangements: ‘We want to be generous, but the responses we
take need to be appropriate.’457 The idea of a “new home” was only drawn
on by the Herald in making the distinction between the “lesser” life the
Kosovars has known and the “better” life they were being offered in
Australia: ‘For [refugee] Valmira Abazi, the contrast between a bleak
existence as a refugee on the Macedonian border and a new life in
Australia could not be more jolting… She is desperate to see Sydney while
she is in Australia – to visit sights like the Opera House and Taronga Zoo
which she knows only from picture books.’458
The Australian also favoured the idea of “temporary home”, which
was drawn on seven times, while “new home” was only mentioned twice in
the first week of arrival coverage. 459 The Australian’s use of “temporary
home” was less emotive than the Telegraph’s, resisting the popular
inclination to become carried away by the emotion surrounding the Safe
Haven program and focussing more so on policy suitability and the
obligations of the Federal Government to assist the refugees on arrival.
Although The Australian tended to support the notion that Australia was
obligated to provide a temporary rather than permanent home, the
newspaper encouraged a sensitive response by the Australian government
under the obligations set out in the Safe Haven policy. As the editor of The
Australian wrote:
Australia’s duty of care and respect extends beyond material
comforts… they are not in custody. They should be allowed to
make contact, if and when they want, with the Australian Albanian
community and beyond… Australians must also recognise that our
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commitment to Kosovar refugees extends beyond three months…
The Federal Government, with tact and sensitivity, should realise
this and allow for the possibility [to stay in Australia] sooner rather
than later.460
This is further reflected in a report by Matthew Stevens, published on 8th
May. He cautioned that: ‘Australian immigration workers at Stenkovac
understand the Government’s policy. Privately, many of them also know
the desperate reality that faces the refugees… [Australia is] a nation that
has accepted the challenge of a multicultural future and rejected the cause
of ignorance and racism. How can it justify images of Kosovars […] being
dragged against their will back on to the jumbo jets which brought them to
Australia?’461
This indicates a significant disjuncture in the narratives employed
by the newspapers in supporting the Howard Government during the
Kosovar refugee arrival. The Telegraph was to promote a punitive stance
against the Kosovars over the next three months. Its momentary adoption
of “new home” is viewed critically as a means of corroborating the broader
human-interest story unfolding in the newspaper’s arrival narrative. While
the Telegraph, Sydney’s most popular newspaper, went to some lengths to
promote the notion of “new home”, the Herald and Australian were much
more reserved in their attempts to galvanise an emotional audience
response.
The contrast is made clearer in comparing the editorials of The
Australian and the Telegraph following the arrival. While the editorial of
The Australian (8th May) focussed on the ‘Freedom’ of the refugees upon
landing in Australia, commenting on government policy, the Telegraph (9th
May) centred on ‘our hearts’ and ‘Aussie mateship’.462 The Telegraph
orientated the focus of arrival coverage via a particular brand of popular,
nationalist discourse and iconography. On the other hand, The Australian
presented a more sophisticated, rational response with some consideration
460
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for the humanitarian implications of the Safe Haven legislation being
introduced at the time.
The point here is to recognise that there are important implications
in terminological choice for media representations. As Peter Manning says:
‘The choice of adjectives and nouns can turn the reader’s sympathies one
way or another.’463 While the media often remain “open” (in a Gramscian
sense) to public opinion,464 the effect of terminological choice on “ordinary
readers” is that they are often drawn to ‘natural conclusion[s]’ about who
may be deemed deserving of compassion and assistance.465 The political
implications of this are clear, considering the power of the mass media to
introduce or enhance a particular agenda that is favourable to hegemonic
groups. This kind of media discourse is ‘highly functional for established
power and responsive to the needs of the government and major power
groups.’466 The Telegraph’s preferred use of “new home” must be
understood as part of an agenda that was adopted by the newspaper for its
news value. This is particularly because these representations of the
Kosovars served to naturalise the appearance of unity between the moral
standing of the dominant cultural group and the Howard Government.
The Telegraph, Australian and Herald further publicised the arrival
with consistent references to Kosovar children. On the morning before the
arrival the Herald described how ‘Bibs for 26 babies will be waiting’ for
those refugees arriving in Sydney, along with ‘jumping castles for
children’.467 Attending the arrival at Sydney airport, the Telegraph’s Ray
Chesterton described how, when the doors of the aeroplane finally opened,
younger Kosovars ‘ignored their weariness and came tumbling and running
down the stairs.’468 Children leaving the plane were said to have ‘eyes wide
in wonderment’ and were pictured holding signs of thanks that they had
drawn in crayon.469 One of these hand-drawn signs stated, as cited in the
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Telegraph and The Australian, ‘NATO 1949-1999’, celebrating the
organisation’s recent 50th anniversary (see Appendix 3).470 Another boy
had drawn a sign that read, ‘I love Australia’, in bright red crayon.
The impact of the media’s coverage of the NATO air strikes on
Australians had been profound. A month before the arrival, the Telegraph
had compelled Australians to support the UNHCR evacuation as part of the
nation’s ‘duty of care’.471 The newspaper had actively promoted the notion
that compassion and humanitarian obligation were essential components of
Australian national identity. Following the arrival, the newspaper once
again centred on the idea that Australia’s role was important for the
restoration of child-like innocence. These images also linked to the barrage
of photographs used to justify the NATO bombing in the Telegraph during
the month beforehand – a campaign propagated to save the innocent and
children from systematic persecution. As Philip Knightly states, the
Western media overwhelmingly propagated the official view of NATO and
its goal to persuade Western nations of the humanitarian justification for
the conflict.472
By focussing on children and innocence, the main purpose of
propagating moral discourse for the media is to ‘set about persuading by
first separating “correct” from “incorrect” views. The rhetoric of
correctness cast an aura of intellectual implacability and moral urgency
around even the most naïve assertions of opinions.’473 Peter Murphy adds,
in this kind of media coverage: ‘The mix of truth and morality in politics
generates huge pressure to agree. The “how could you think otherwise?”
factor quickly rises to the surface.’474 He concludes: ‘Get into a nation’s
soul [in this way], and you have strong consent.’475 In this light, the image
of children exiting the plane corresponded to a broader narrative about
moral restoration in which the Howard Government was to play a central
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role. This kind of coverage was, moreover, the culmination of a variety of
political factors beyond the national sphere. The subtext of freedom and
liberty extended in many ways from the US’ attempts to provide NATO
with a moral premise in maintaining global order. Operation Safe Haven
inevitably catered to the Australian Government’s desire to forge a more
central role for the nation in global politics and its support for US
ambitions to instil in NATO a new sense of energy, direction and
independence in determining world politics.476
The unification of moral and popular consensus has far-reaching
implications for the politics of the modern nation-state. Core to the
(re)production of consensual relations is the idea that: ‘Once political
power takes as its object the conduct of its subjects in relation to particular
moral and secular standards, and takes the well-being of those subjects as
its guiding principle, it is required to rationalize itself in particular
ways.’477 The moral and political consensus brought about by the arrival
was confirmed by the Federal Opposition Immigration spokesperson Con
Sciacca in debating the Safe Haven legislation in the Lower House on 11th
May. Having attended the landing, Sciacca stated: ‘The sight of those
people … left little doubt in my mind about our decision to support their
relocation. At that time, all the political debate in the world about the
wisdom of bringing people to such a faraway country like Australia did not
even come close to looking into the eyes of those hundreds of men, women
and children as they marched down the stairs smiling, crying and thanking
us for possibly saving their lives.’478 He later added, about the evacuation
program: ‘The opposition has been very glad, very happy, to go along with
the government. I think this is something that the country can be proud
of.’479
The Safe Haven Bill passed both houses by 11th May with
bipartisan support. The main opposition to the legislation was expressed by
476
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senators from minor parties (Democrats and Greens). Parliamentary
discussions on the 7th May arrival at Sydney airport confirmed bipartisan
support for the Bill as far as the major parties were concerned. Sciacca’s
comments indicate the way both the media and the mainstream parties
largely avoided offering significant criticism of the radical changes being
made in refugee policy. This was affirmed in Ruddock’s comments during
the Safe Haven legislative debates about the consensus formed by the
evacuation. He noted the ‘cooperation that we have seen between the
government and the opposition, … the Commonwealth and the states, and
… between the Commonwealth and the voluntary sector.’480
The moral consensus was not enough, however, to dissuade
Ruddock’s self-confessed ‘sense of realism’ towards the Safe Haven
refugee policy.481 As he argued in the debates: ‘Our international
obligation is to provide [these] people with protection. The obligation is
not to provide permanent resettlement; the obligation has only ever been to
provide protection.’482 The “realist” approach reflects the broader program
of the Howard Government which, unlike the international relations
strategies of previous governments, was highly responsive to both
international and domestic influences. Successive Howard governments
‘sought not only to make foreign policy in response to new regional and
global agendas, but to respond to and to seek to manage new forms of
electoral challenge’.483 Ruddock’s “realist” position indicates that he was
committed to maintaining the conservative party line. Perhaps this also
explains his relative absence in media coverage, allowing the Prime
Minister to take most of the credit for Operation Safe Haven.484

4. Representations of the Prime Minister
John Howard was positioned as a major star in the media’s landing
coverage and a central figure in Operation Safe Haven. The Prime
480
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Minister’s face-to-face meeting with the first planeload of Kosovars added
to a sense of anticipation in the newspaper. He was portrayed as caring and
compassionate in the Telegraph and quoted or referred to directly eight
times in coverage following the arrival of the first refugee plane. This is
similar to The Australian, which quoted or referred to John Howard at least
seven times in this period. Howard featured much more in reports about the
arrival in the Herald, referred to at least 22 times. He was a central figure
for the Herald, and on the morning before the landing the newspaper had
noted the importance of ‘the welcoming presence of the Prime Minister
and Mrs Howard.’485 There was only one newspaper report about the
arrival that was critical of him. It was published in the Herald (discussed
below).486 Both the Telegraph and the Herald published photographs of the
Prime Minister shaking hands with the Kosovars upon their arrival at
Sydney airport.487 The caption underneath the Telegraph photograph read:
‘Our home is your home … Prime Minister John Howard last night.’488
The Immigration Minister, a crucial player in Operation Safe Haven, was
comparatively absent in newspaper coverage of the arrival.

Photograph of Prime Minister John
Howard shaking hands with a
delegation of Kosovar refugees at
Sydney airport, in The Daily
Telegraph, 8th May 1999, p. 4;
Cartoon by Warren, in The Daily
Telegraph, 8th May 1999, p. 10
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Howard was adept at utilising the media to promote favourable
coverage of his policies and individual persona throughout his term as
Prime Minister. Gwynneth Singleton describes how Howard ‘engaged in
populist and pragmatic politics in playing the political game whenever he
has deemed it necessary to do so.’489 She further depicts Howard as a ‘very
astute, pragmatic, practical politician who reads the political “tea leaves”
very well.’490 The Telegraph noted how John Howard, ‘reacting to the
delight of the plane’s safe arrival, started waving at faces in the windows as
it pulled into the hangar.’491 The article described how two families,
including three children, representing the refugees were ‘presented to Mr
and Mrs Howard.’492 Chesterton went on, the Prime Minister ‘embraced
them all warmly, later paying tribute to the bravery of all displaced ethnic
Albanians of Kosovo.’493 John Howard said: ‘We admire your courage’,
and ‘we extend our open arms in welcome.’494
Once again, The Australian differed slightly from the Telegraph’s
“new home” theme, assuming a more reserved approach and maintaining
perspective on the landing as a matter of refugee policy. It noted: ‘The
Prime Minister told the refugees he hoped they would soon be returned to
their homeland but, in the meantime, the Australian people would do
whatever they could to make their stay a happy one.’495 However, The
Australian did touch on the emotional investment that typified Telegraph
coverage, citing John Howard: ‘As you prepare to spend your first night
under the stars of Australia, we want you to know this is a very happy
country that extends its arms in welcome to all of you.’496
The Herald applauded the Prime Minister’s behaviour at the
airport, providing significant details concerning his interactions with the
refugees. Tony Stephens wrote, after the plane landed: ‘the Prime Minister
then stood at the bottom of a gangway, shaking hands with all those who
489
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descended, hugging some of them and tickling the cheeks of a couple of
children. Mr Howard then addressed the refugees from a dais, in front of an
Australian flag, welcoming them on behalf of the Australian people.’497
By contrast, another, less flattering image of the Prime Minister
appeared in the 8th May edition of the Telegraph. A cartoon by Warren
reproduced the same visual stereotypes about Southern and Eastern
Europeans to convey an image of the Kosovars as backward and poor. As
Jock Collins states, this relates to how Eastern European refugees and
migrants in post-war Australia were inhibited by ‘a history of racial
antagonism and xenophobia’ against refugee workers.498 What is
interesting, however, is the fear and mistrust being expressed by the
Kosovars about the Prime Minister. Frightened, and pointing at John
Howard as they exit the plane, the refugees ask: ‘Is Koala? Is Wombat? Is
Crocodile? Is Black Snake? Is Blue Bottle? Is Red Back? Is Funnel
Web?’499 While the cartoon satirises the notion of “safe haven” being
provided in an “unsafe” country, it further depicts the Prime Minister
capitalising on the media event, alluding to his antagonism to a more open
border policy for refugees.500
Another cartoon that appeared in The Australian on 10th May made
a subtle comment about the media event at Sydney airport. The cartoon by
Nicholson depicts the refugees alighting the Qantas jet and facing a camera
crew before having even stepped onto the tarmac. A reporter is shown
asking one refugee: ‘Enjoy the flight?’, who replied, ‘Yes… but I still call
Kosovo home.’ The refugee’s comment was a pun on the Qantas
advertising theme song (‘I Still Call Australia Home’), a popular tune
regularly performed at major Australian sporting events. Evidently, the
image was commenting on the promotional value of the event, particularly
for Qantas.
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Frustration about the media spectacle was expressed in a letter by
Paul Kleywegt of Lindisfarne (Tasmania), published by The Australian.
The author described the episode as ‘selfcongratulatory back slapping at
what a warm, giving nation we are’ and connects with the satire drawn on
by the Warren cartoon but otherwise unmentioned directly by the press.501
He makes the point: ‘The repetition of clichés such as “safe haven” and the
use of headlines such as “Safely in our embrace” and “Deliverance…” [in
The Australian] is cringing given the magnitude of the situation. Imagine
suffering the indignity of stepping off a plane on the other side of the world
to have a bright light and a camera shoved in your face and being expected
to smile and tell the world in a foreign language how grateful you are.’502
The author adds: ‘No one is spared the humiliation of the inevitable media
circus.’503 The author was correct in emphasising the media’s attachment to
the arrival, particularly its promotion of the idea that the refugees were
indebted with gratitude for Australia’s assistance – a theme that was
reproduced throughout the Kosovars’ stay. Each of the newspapers
concerned noted the thankfulness of the Kosovars upon their arrival.504
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Both the Telegraph and The Australian cited some of the refugees as
saying, through an interpreter, ‘thank you, thank you, thank you’.505
The only direct criticism of the event was published by the Herald,
written by journalist Bernard Lagan who had travelled with the refugees
aboard their flight from Rome to Sydney. Lagan noted the frustration of the
refugees forced to endure a broken air-conditioning system while the plane
was stationary - a problem known by Australian officials since the plane
departed from Rome causing several hours delay. He described how the
Kosovars waited aboard the plane on the Sydney tarmac while the Prime
Minister prepared for the media ceremony. As Lagan says, the refugees
‘were made to wait and wait and wait aboard the stinking, stationary,
airless, broken aircraft.’506
The support given to the Howard Government across the
newspapers is only differentiated by Lagan’s reproach on the arrival media
event. The exclusion of critical content challenges, as Herman and
Chomsky assert, the ‘democratic postulate’ that ‘the media are independent
and committed to discovering and reporting the truth, and that they do not
merely reflect the world as powerful groups wish it to be perceived.’507
Lagan went on to describe how the plane then had to be towed into the
hangar: ‘Why? Well, that was where a dais had been erected for the [Prime
Minister] so he could greet some of the refugees in front of the waiting
media.’508 The refugees waited another 20 minutes, Lagan explains, while
‘officials outside fussed over arrangements for selected refugees to be
greeted by Howard’.509
When the refugees disembarked the plane they ‘were given little
stuffed koalas to hold – so nice for the television cameras.’510 Lagan
mimicked Howard’s words during his welcoming speech. He argued that
‘any other free and happy country would have long before let the refugees
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do what they most wanted: have a shower and go to bed’.511 The journalist
concluded: ‘as the dazed refugees were delayed behind the fences for more
media pictures, you couldn’t help but think these people were being used
for domestic political purposes. Why couldn’t the Prime Minister instead
have visited the East Hills base … over the weekend (after they were
bathed and rested)?’512 Apart from Lagan’s article, there was no direct
criticism of the Government for the welcoming ceremony at Sydney
airport, despite its obvious attempts at politicising the event.

5. “Fundamental” Australian Values and the Arrival
Following the arrival media event, busloads of refugees departed the
airport in a 20-police motorcycle motorcade bound for Sydney’s East Hills
army barracks. According to the Telegraph, they were flanked by
onlookers, television cameras, journalists and photographers and despite
strict security:
Sydney turned on a rousing and compassionate welcome. Outside
the airport, handfuls of Australian-based Kosovars waved national
flags and cheered as their countrymen were driven past in buses.
… The refugees attracted media attention usually reserved for rock
stars and royalty, with an army of photographers around the
hangar.513
The attendance of the Prime Minister at the arrival of the first evacuation
flight was more than simply a public relations exercise in the national
media. In some ways it was also part of an attempt by the Federal
Government to show that it was taking its foreign policy obligations
seriously. As the editor of the Telegraph suggests, international as well as
domestic concerns were an important part of the Prime Minister’s agenda,
commenting on 9th May 1999: ‘This [Operation Safe Haven] is the sign of
511
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a nation which recognises its responsibilities as a good world citizen.’514
The Australian too had written: ‘If ever evidence were needed that
Australia was an international citizen, a caring, generous, charitable
community – this was it.’515 Although the Federal Government had a
month earlier cited broader humanitarian concerns that “something had to
be done”,516 Barutciski and Suhrke recognised that the UNHCR’s
evacuation program ‘probably allowed some governments to score public
relations points by appearing “humanitarian” in receiving a limited number
of “popular” refugees.’517
Particular “fundamental Australian values” provided an important
subtext to John Howard’s motivations for participating in the evacuation
which is most heavily reflected in the Telegraph, although this sentiment is
somewhat evident in the Herald and The Australian as well. The Howard
Government’s foreign policy was typified by a nostalgic blend of ideas
about the “British world” and an Anglo-nationalist vernacular. In Howard’s
idealised concept of moral order and cohesion in international affairs the
Prime Minister viewed himself and his fellow Liberal Party members as
‘standard bearers of accumulated wisdom from the British world.’518 In an
address in 2004 at the Australian National University, the Prime Minister
commented that there should never be a sense of ‘disconnect between
foreign policy and national values’, and those national values that flow
from Australia’s identity as ‘a Western country’.519 In capturing vernacular
nationalism – often drawing on the notions of “mateship” and “battlers”,
for instance – Howard was able to ‘build popularity for a society that gives
priority to values with lineage rather than bold social or cultural
innovation, and for government management of “national interests” ahead
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of sectional ones.’520 The underlying rationale behind a range of Howard’s
foreign policy strategies – including Operation Safe Haven - was a
reverence for British-Australian nationalism in responding to international
obligations.521
In domestic policy, the symbolism of the arrival corresponded to
Howard’s vision of “fundamental Australian values”. Howard’s official
speeches regularly promoted ideas about ‘persistence, mateship, voluntary
effort and optimism’, the ‘primacy of family values’, ‘strong and enduring
communities’, ‘equality’, and ‘tolerance and harmony’.522 Hage expressed
concern over Howard’s use of these ideas, referring to as the
fundamentalist ‘causal essence’ that the Prime Minister commonly
assigned to particular nationalistic acts and values.523 It is the idea that
these values were “uniquely” and “exclusively” Australian, ‘making the
ludicrous claim that other people in the world are less committed to them
or actually committed to opposing values’.524 Howard’s insistence on these
values popularised the notion that, to truly possess humanitarian virtue, one
had to accept a particular view and live as Australians supposedly did.
The editor of the Telegraph utilised similar sentiment in describing
Australia’s contribution to the Kosovar refugee crisis, stating on 9th May:
‘So Australia’s willingness, its near-insistence that we lead the global
effort to help the Kosovars, is a comforting sign of this nation’s
compassion, maturity and downright kindness… [W]ho could deny that the
very best aspects of Aussie mateship has [sic] been on show in helping the
Kosovars?’525 For the Telegraph, mateship was a defining feature of why
the Kosovars had been evacuated to Australia and would now shape how
they were to be treated by the Australian community as they arrived at safe
havens around the country. The larrikin “Aussie mateship” focus was
further reproduced by the Herald in a feature article that was addressed to
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the Kosovars entitled: ‘Feel at home with us, mate.’526 The author, Terry
Smyth, proclaimed mateship to be an educational tool for the Kosovars, a
‘code of mutual respect, demonstrated in rituals we call “bonding
sessions”, which is why you [refugees] will need to learn the word
“shout”’.527 Mateship has often been tied with broader conceptions in
popular discourse of Australian national identity as predominantly white,
egalitarian, masculine and democratic. The concept was drawn on in the
media to promote the idea that the Australian national paradigm offered a
world of opportunity for the Kosovars, albeit from within the confines of
army barracks.

6. Changing Clothes: a “New Life” for the Kosovars Beginning at East
Hills Safe Haven
Media reporting of the arrival at Sydney airport was complemented by
post-arrival news reports centred on the ‘Sanctuary’ provided for the
refugees in Australia. As noted in the Herald: ‘“The Sanctuary at Voyager
Point” says the sign at the road turnoff to the East Hills Army Barracks…
After two days in Sydney, the barracks have become just that, a
sanctuary.’528 What the Herald did not mention was that ‘Sanctuary’ was
the name of a housing estate near the barracks.529 The Kosovar arrival was
consistently accompanied with news headlines including ‘Sanctuary’ and
‘Into Our Arms’.530 It was a much different reception than that
accompanying the Chinese “boat people” who had arrived in recent months
with headlines such as ‘INVADED’.531 In their ‘sanctuary’, the Kosovars
were not allowed to leave the barracks. They would only ‘be allowed to
roam free within the compound’.532
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Newspaper reports presented two opposing scenarios to readers
following encounters with the Kosovar refugees after their first day at East
Hills - the Kosovar way of life, and the Australian way of life. The
Telegraph, in particular, depicted the Kosovars shedding their Balkan
“otherness” in favour of the opportunities provided by Australia. On 9th
May journalists Sarah Harris and Sasha Westwood made comparisons
between the life Kosovars had known and the “better life” offered to them
in Australia. They wrote that toddlers, teenagers and even ‘bent old women
in headscarves and the precious menfolk who had survived the holocaust of
Kosovo’ had made the journey from Macedonia.533 They went on, referring
to those who had arrived aboard the first evacuation flight:
Four hundred and fourteen souls dressed in the mismatched
costume of refugees providing stark contrast to the crisp uniformed
police, ambulance officers, paramedics and official greeters who
flanked the plane.
It was, a colleague observed, like the scene from the movie Close
Encounters of the Third Kind. And, indeed, these people are alien
to us.534
‘Most Australians’, the article went on, ‘have never experienced the kind
of hardship and horror that unite the Kosovars.’535 In turn, it commented,
the refugees ‘have little knowledge of the far-away land that has become
their temporary home and haven.’536
The Herald further noted the divides between Australians and the
Kosovars accentuating the need for the refugees to be educated about the
Australian “way of life”. Upon arriving at East Hills, the Kosovars would
undergo not only health checks but also ‘a broad Australian familiarisation
course.’537 The newspaper cited Federal Finance Minister John Fahey, who
533
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said, defending the government’s refusal to allow the refugees out of the
East Hills compound: ‘Outside of this complex there is a world that they
don’t know; no-one out there knows them.’538 This was reinforced by the
juxtaposition: ‘Refugees who on Friday night were bedraggled, tired and
unkempt [on their arrival] were, at breakfast [the next morning], clean
shaven, refreshed and no longer hungry.’539 The representation of the
Kosovars as ‘alien’ in this context (as opposed to being familiar, or “like
us”) supported the subtext in these reports that the refugees were
transcending the barriers of their former existence for a “better life” in
Australia.
The significance of the compassion promoted by the Australian
government was further noted in the Telegraph as more personal aspects
about the refugees’ lives began to emerge. For some of these refugees,
hopes for a “new life” were more apparent for those about to give birth in
Australia. The Telegraph noted that three pregnant women were aboard the
first evacuation flight with one of these taken immediately to hospital. She
was due to give birth within two weeks time.540 According to Dr Jo
Karnaghan (manager of NSW Health Services Australia), most of the
refugees had arrived in good health. The main issues, she explained,
included ear infections and sore throats for some of the children and blood
pressure in older refugees. For others, the “new life” began with more
standard medical checks at the East Hills barracks and ‘the first hot
showers in months’.541 As one of the refugees noted, many had not
showered for several months. They were afraid of being raided by Serbian
police. ‘Behind the barbed-wire fence of their temporary home at Sydney’s
East Hills army barracks’, the newspaper reported, the Kosovars ‘had their
first taste of a decent existence in recent memory.’542 The Herald noted the
significance of the showers for one of the refugees, Mr Fitim Konjufca,
538
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who said: ‘I lost myself in the shower’, which lasted for one hour.543 High
on the agenda was ‘the chance to brush their teeth’, as some had been
unable to do so having spent the last ‘twelve months’ hiding in the hills of
Kosovo.544
As part of official “processing” procedures at East Hills, the
refugees had number tags placed around their necks, proceeding to have
their photograph taken for identification purposes (see Appendix 2).545
After filling out personal details on official forms, the Kosovars were sent
into the next room where there were rows of tables piled with second hand
clothing. As the Telegraph described it, there was:
everything from underpants to brightly coloured Bananas in
Pyjamas raincoats. There they could choose new clothes for their
new life.546
The Australian described how the refugees were given three changes of
clothes, ‘“plus socks and jocks”, one pair of shoes, one coat and some
baggage to transport their belongings to Tasmania when they leave
Sydney.’547 On passing through processing and clothing rooms at East
Hills, the refugees were allocated a room to sleep. Their time at East Hills
was, the Telegraph and Herald indicated, a comfortable experience.
According to The Australian, the refugees had proclaimed East Hills a
‘paradise’, enjoying their time ‘Under flowering gums’.548 With ‘lots of
smiles’549, wrote the Telegraph, the refugees’ first breakfast had included
cereal, eggs and sausages. The breakfast was further described as a ‘hearty
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selection’ by the Herald that included ‘hash-browns’, ‘pancakes’, ‘toast’,
‘orange juice’, ‘tea and coffee’.550
The first dinner provided for the Kosovars, according to the
Telegraph, was a seven-course meal that included chicken, fish and lamb
dishes, soup and casserole, ‘with some dishes prepared halal style for
devout Muslims’.551 A major concern for the refugees was getting in touch
with relatives at home via Internet and telephone services available at the
East Hills barracks. As noted on 10th May, an immigration official told the
Herald that most of the telephone calls ‘were getting through and there had
been many happy faces.’552 The generosity of Australians was further
highlighted in the actions of members of Sydney’s Albanian community.
The Herald noted: ‘A member of the Albanian Cultural Centre was
handing out Mother’s Day roses to the mothers in the camp while refugees
were being given a briefing about Tasmania as a promotional video played
in the background.’553 One refugee (unnamed) informed The Australian
that travelling to Australia was a journey from ‘darkness to light’, although
the ‘gums and new flora played havoc with their sinuses’.554 It was further
noted: ‘Children were ecstatic at their Australian surrounds, with
computers [providing] entertainment… Albanian music bellowed from a
CD player. Kosovar male youths took up a game of soccer… Those who
had been given army fatigue-style clothing boasted the most about their
new clothes and shoes.’555 The nationalist sentiment in The Australian was
clear, with the reference to ‘flowering gums’ featuring alongside a
photograph of a child refugee laughing with (and wearing the hat of) a
female Australian Army soldier at the barracks (see Appendix 2).
The refugees had been shown a video aboard their flight to
Australia consisting of ‘aerial shots of the Sydney Harbour Bridge and
Ulura Rock’.556 The media had viewed the operation as an opportunity to
promote Australia’s natural and man-made tourist sites. However, after
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only a short-term visit to Sydney, and without being able to explore the city
itself, the first group of Kosovars were taken to Brighton barracks in
Tasmania on 11th May 1999.557 For the Herald, the refugees had no
complaints about not seeing the city. One of the Kosovars informed the
newspaper that he was simply surprised by how ‘green’ Australia was: ‘I
thought we were coming to a desert.’558 The media did not note any
significant concern about how quickly the refugees had been relocated to
Hobart by the Federal Government and kept away from the public eye.

Some of the Kosovar refugees as well as Red Cross and other volunteers with clothing tables at East Hills Safe Haven, in The Daily Telegraph, 9th May 1999, p. 4

7. Trading-up: a “Better Life” Beyond the Initial Arrival
The theme of a “better life” continued to feature prominently in news
coverage for several more weeks. The second evacuation flight landed at
Sydney airport on 12th May 1999, although without the same level of
media attention as the initial plane arrival. Repeating the procedure
undertaken only five days beforehand, the second group of refugees were
transported to East Hills Safe Haven for processing. Evacuation flights
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were thereafter scheduled to arrive every three to five days. The refugees
would stay at East Hills for several days before heading for army bases
around the country.559
In the first two weeks of the refugee arrival in Australia the
Telegraph consistently portrayed how the Kosovars were trading-in the
lives and culture they had known in Yugoslavia for the Australian way of
life. This is captured on 20th May when the Telegraph reported on the
cultural exchange unfolding following the arrival of the third “rotation” of
refugees at East Hills barracks. As part of the welcoming celebrations
organised by camp staff, the Sydney Army Band played an Albanian folktune for the refugees, arranged after hearing an elderly refugee play the
song on an electronic keyboard. Journalist Will Temple wrote: ‘the tune
had the Kosovars dancing into the afternoon before trading their traditional
goulash for an Aussie barbecue.’560 The implication was that the refugees
were upgrading to a freer, better life and shedding themselves of the
political repression they had endured before their arrival in Australia. This
sentiment was affirmed by The Australian which cited Albanian migrant,
Kola Nikolaj, a professional chef and former president of the Albanian
community centre in Chester Hill (Sydney): ‘It is a better life for [the
refugees] here, we should thank the Australian Government.’561
The idea that Australia offered a better alternative to the repression
and violence of Yugoslavia is, at least in the media discourse surrounding
this episode, linked to a variety of stereotypes in Western societies about
Eastern and Southern Europeans. Fleming says, for some outside
observers, it is difficult ‘for Balkan peoples themselves to stop making
distinctions between themselves, and to stop killing one another senselessly
over those distinctions. “Killing one another” is not just a sort of “national
hobby” but an intention or imperative that must be obeyed, and that can
only be exhausted, not avoided.’562 Fleming goes on, there has been a
559
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tendency in Western countries to lump all Southern Europeans together and
to overlook any differences that might exist between countries, regimes,
peoples or even names of countries. It is commonly proclaimed in the
language of the West that to “Balkanise” means ‘to divide, or fragment,
along absurdly minute and definitionally obscure grounds’.563 Many in the
West continue to insist upon using stereotypes that the peoples of the
former Yugoslavia constitute a kind of “outsider within” and come from an
“unstable” and “abnormal” part of Europe.564 Echoing European colonial
confrontations with new, foreign or “Eastern” lands, Fleming surmises:
‘The Balkans stand as Europe’s resident alien, an internal other that is an
affront and challenge by virtue of its claim to be part of the West, as well
as its apparent ability to dramatically affect Western history.’565
These kinds of stereotypes are evident in several letters to the editor
concerned about the arrival. B. M. Welfare from Curl Curl wrote to the
Telegraph criticising the cartoon (above) that portrayed the Prime Minister
capitalising on the landing. The letter, published on 11th May 1999, plays
on assumptions about Balkan peoples being violent and unstable:
The Prime Minister played a big part in getting the Kosovar
refugees to this country. He further showed his compassion by
greeting them at the airport. Your cartoonist drew a tasteless and
vile image on the subject [date given]. If this had been done in
Kosovo it would have brought out a firing squad.566
Welfare’s letter indicates several factors at work in the Telegraph’s
representation of Operation Safe Haven. In one light, it suggests that the
public was significantly concerned about the safe arrival of the refugees in
Sydney and was comforted by the way the Prime Minister embraced this
responsibility. The passionate support given to the Prime Minister by the
author indicates the success of the Government’s media strategy to
563
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mobilise a positive reaction to its response to the refugee crisis. It further
suggests that the Safe Haven program resonated with popular
preconceptions about the status of Balkan peoples as a violent and unstable
national “Other”, needing to be provided with the opportunity for a “better”
or “new life”.
In another letter published in the Telegraph shortly after the initial
arrival, there is further evidence of the assumption that Balkan peoples are
inclined to be violent and unstable. Stuart Cant from St Helens Park,
describing his time as a soldier, wrote:
No doubt the Kosovar refugees are delighted to be safe and alive.
When the crisis is over, they will take home many happy memories
of Australia and its people.
What will happen next? If Kosovo becomes dominant, there will be
another wave of ethnic cleansing and a flood of Serbian refugees as
the Kosovars take back their homeland.
I hope not; I wish the two races could live in harmony. I fear that
may be too much to ask. The Kosovars cannot be expected to forget
being expelled at gunpoint from their homes and losing everything.
Nor can the Serbs be expected to forget the bloodshed in Croatia
and Bosnia.
At least different groups can live together in Australia. To be
members of the defence forces, they have to be Australian citizens,
and I served with a Serb, second-generation Croatians, a Hungarian
refugee and the grandson of a Nazi, which proves people can leave
all this behind them.567
These letters to the editor reinforced the overall picture being constructed
by the Telegraph about the Kosovars. They lent weight to the idea that
567
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Balkan peoples were being given an opportunity to experience a “better”
and more harmonious way of life in Australia. In a more general sense, the
letters page of a newspaper provides an avenue for the public to engage in
a dialogue with each other through the media about their national identity.
These letters indicate the way the Telegraph’s readership discussed and
“acted out” particular conceptions about national identity by adopting
preferred meanings in relation to the refugees. As Anthea Taylor states:
‘Letters to the editor, as a form of social action, can be seen as an
important performance, not just of self but also of mediated citizenship.’568
By including these letters, the Telegraph reinforced the notion that
Operation Safe Haven was a responsible course of action and that the
Australian government was “rescuing” the refugees from an undesirable
way of life. In media coverage there was much to suggest that, by tradingin their old lives for the Australian way of life, the Kosovars might achieve
the status most desired by Western (white) Europeans. That is, that the
Kosovars might not only aspire to be but also succeed at becoming
“civilized” and achieve a ‘decent “civilized lifestyle”’.569

Conclusion
This chapter has explored the Howard Government’s politicisation of the
Kosovar refugee arrival in Australia and its attempts to gain popular
support for Operation Safe Haven in the media. The Australian government
hastily implemented the Safe Haven program, having embarked on a plan
to temporarily resettle Kosovar refugees at the request of the UN which
was itself under significant pressure from the US. The Howard
Government’s response was shaped by a broad range of demands, most
notably popular nationalism, party conservatism and media and
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international

pressure

to

act

responsibly

under

the

guise

of

humanitarianism.
The Howard Government received widespread acclaim for its
response to the humanitarian crisis. The Prime Minister utilised media
coverage of the arrival to promote the Government in a favourable light as
compassionate and supportive. This can be viewed as an attempt by John
Howard to regain public support after the media backlash that occurred a
month earlier when he rejected the UNHCR request for assistance. The
media positioned the Prime Minister in a popular light as a political leader.
He was commonly represented during the arrival as a responsible leader
and a good world citizen. There was very little criticism of the Government
for its policy towards the Kosovars giving the impression of mass popular
consensus for the way the arrival was represented in the media.
Media coverage of the Kosovars’ arrival and their interactions with
the Australian community supported the cultural and political standing of
the Howard Government. News consumers were drawn to the notion that
the Kosovars were worthy recipients of compassion and assistance, even so
far as advocating (at least in the Telegraph) during the arrival for Australia
to become the “new home” of the Kosovars. However, the media
(re)produced

popular nationalist

binaries in attempts to

control

representations of the Kosovars. The Kosovars were not completely
dissociated from notions that refugees presented a threat to long-standing,
highly regulated immigration procedures in Australia, despite the popular
sentiment that was aroused by the evacuation program. News coverage of
the arrival in the Telegraph can be viewed in relation to broader refugee
discourses of the Howard era by playing on the binary of “good”
established Australian citizens and “bad” Others. In this sense, conceptions
of the Kosovars in the media reflected a continuing imagining of refugees
as “Other” or “alien” and ‘a threat to … western, core values or democracy
itself’.570
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Chapter 4: Accommodating the Kosovar Refugees
and the ‘busniks’ of Singleton Safe Haven
Introduction
In mid-June 1999 over eighty Kosovar refugees who had recently arrived
in Australia refused to accept the accommodation provided for them by the
Federal Government at Singleton army barracks. They generated
significant media coverage and questioned the quality of the services
offered as part of Operation Safe Haven. The Government’s response to
this question was to take an overtly and highly politicised approach. It
mounted a campaign to discredit the refugees’ claims. This chapter
evaluates several aspects of the Singleton episode, including the validity of
the refugees’ claims, the Government’s attempts to manage public relations
over the weeks that followed and the media’s response to the
Government’s agenda during this period.
This chapter is arranged in three sections, with the first
investigating the Federal Government’s plan for accommodating the
Kosovars. It includes an assessment of the concerns noted by various
commentators about the use of army bases during the planning stages of
Operation Safe Haven. I then analyse media portrayals of (what was often
referred to by the media as) the “protest” or “bus sit-in” that occurred at the
Singleton army barracks. Further explored are representational themes used
to depict the Kosovars staging the protest. The investigation then turns
toward media coverage of the Salihu family who continued to refuse the
offer of accommodation at the Singleton barracks for the longest period of
time.
The latter two sections of this chapter explore news articles
published in the Telegraph, Herald and Australian between 16th and 30th
June 1999.571 The breakdown of articles (including editorials and opinion
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columns) comprised 24 from the Telegraph, 15 from the Herald and 32 in
The Australian.572 I examine how the language used by the media to
describe the refugees during the protest was fraught with contradiction and
inconsistency. It differed considerably from earlier coverage concerning
the evacuation and initial arrival of the Kosovars. Much of the coverage
drew significantly on notions of chauvinism, aggression, and claims about
affluent, “designer” refugees who were “ungrateful” for Australia’s
assistance. Broadly, this chapter evaluates the extent to which the refugees
were supported by the Federal Government and whether this was only if
they remained compliant, passive and unheard in media coverage. It
examines a concerted effort by the Federal Government to discredit those
refugees

who

were

viewed

as

non-compliant

and

the

Government’s attacks on the character of those involved in the Singleton
protest.

1. The Accommodation Debate in April and May 1999
1.1 Location, location: the distances imposed between the Kosovars and
the Australian population
In 1953, a supporter of Australia’s post-war resettlement program for
European refugees reacted to recent criticism: ‘According to [this
criticism], Australia is herding honest, cultured Europeans into
concentration camps’.573 Similar sentiments came to the fore in debates
over where to house the Kosovars in April and May 1999. Debate centred
on the moral ramifications of placing them into camps and the re-hashing
of a decades-old policy that involved isolating DPs from the Australian
community. The ways in which the Kosovar refugees were accommodated
as part of Operation Safe Haven further reflected the broader immigration
barracks. The period ends with the decline in coverage covering the protests at Singleton
barracks.
572
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agenda of the Howard Government and its rationale of temporary
protection. As Jupp points out, there was an increasing reliance after 1999
upon exclusion and selection that came to embody the role of the
Department of Immigration and its various branches and policies.574 Both
the Prime Minister and Immigration Minister were careful to note that the
provision of Safe Haven for the Kosovars was only a temporary measure.
The Government assured the Australian public that the Kosovars would not
have access to the means (legally or financially) to overstay their threemonth welcome. As noted by the Telegraph on 10th April 1999, John
Howard was ‘at pains to assure Australians’ that the Kosovars would ‘have
to leave when the Government says so’.575 The Herald added, ‘The
Government has been careful to insist [the Kosovar refugees] will not be
able to apply for a change of status’, from temporary to a more permanent
form of protection.576
There were two issues regarding accommodation to be resolved by
the Australian government in the early stages of Operation Safe Haven.
These were the type of accommodation provided to the Kosovars and the
locations of the Safe Havens and their proximity to where most of the
Australian population was concentrated. The choice of army barracks
limited the ability of the Kosovars to gain independence from the Federal
Government and some of the locations chosen to accommodate the
refugees would isolate them from the general community. Although the
option of billeting the refugees within Australian homes was promoted by
the Federal Opposition, Ruddock effectively ‘ruled out’ the idea,577 stating:
We won’t be encouraging people to leave [the Safe Havens] but we
won’t be building walls around them so that they can’t… We’re not
going to imprison people… Any long-term billeting arrangements
574
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are very difficult to manage and it is for that reason that we will not
be providing financial support for people who do go out.578
Ruddock said the refugees would be ‘free to move’, but the Government
was not keen to have them spread throughout the community.579 Some
concern about this policy was noted by ALP Senator Jim McKiernan
(Western Australia) in parliamentary debate, when he stated:
A military establishment might not be an appropriate place for
persons who are traumatised in the way that these people have
been… it might be better if they were placed in a more integrated
part of society. I am sure there are those in our community,
including the church groups, who could handle that number of
4,000.580
In terms of the location of the Safe Havens, initially Ruddock said
that it was unlikely, but did not rule out the possibility, that refugees would
be sent to remote barracks.581 However, on 9th April it was reported that
John Howard - overruling Ruddock for the second time within the space of
a week – had rejected a proposal that the refugees be placed in remote
areas.582 Very remote barracks - such as Woomera, which is in the South
Australian desert – were excluded as an option by the Federal Government.
It was decided that accommodation be provided for the refugees at eight
barracks, including at Brighton (Tasmania), Puckapunyal, Bandiana and
Portsea (Victoria), Leeuwin (Western Australia), Singleton and East Hills
578
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(New South Wales) and Hampstead (South Australia). Despite Howard’s
initial rejection of the proposal to place the Kosovars in remote barracks,
several of the Safe Havens would be located at a considerable distance
from the general population.583

1.2 The appropriateness of the facilities provided at the army bases
The plan was to operate the East Hills Safe Haven (also known as
Holsworthy barracks) as the initial reception centre for all Kosovars. The
barracks had catered to refugees since World War I.584 There, the refugees
would spend an average of three to four days undergoing medical checks,
before being issued with travel documents and identification cards. The
Kosovars were then to receive new clothing, phone cards and their first
weekly cash allowance.585 The plan recognised a range of needs that would
be required by the refugees while living at the Safe Havens, including
transport, health care, education and proximity to Albanian Australians.586
DIMA explained the official view that service provision would be more
practical and efficient by being delivered at the barracks, including
medical, dental, education, recreation, specialised torture and trauma
counseling, and language services.587 A Defence forces spokesperson told
the Telegraph, regarding the East Hills army barracks being converted into
a Safe Haven, that: ‘The reason the barracks was chosen was because it’s
secure and provides a safety haven for the displaced persons.’588 The
Telegraph described the East Hills barracks as a ‘5ha fenced site’, within
583
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which the refugees ‘will live in 52 free-standing two-storey townhousestyle buildings each containing three-to-four room dormitories.’589 In
accommodating the Kosovars, barracks staff recognised that the refugees
had suffered greatly from systematic violence and displacement from their
homeland. It was thus decided by operational officials, in responding
sensitively to the circumstances, that there only be a minimal number of
armed military personal at the base upon the arrival of the refugees.
Nonetheless, over the next three months, the location, age and facilities of
the barracks would have a significant impact on the quality of welfare
provided to the Kosovar refugees.
It was clear that the Immigration Minister did not want the
Kosovars to become comfortable with the idea of living in Australia. As
the ALP’s Con Sciacca noted during the Safe Haven legislative debates:
‘These measures seem quite drastic and seem designed to discourage these
people from leaving the camps.’590 The allowance of $20 offered by the
Australian government to the refugees effectively rendered them to be
dependent on the Safe Havens from the beginning. This was heavily
criticised by some commentators, who noted how other countries offered
substantially more to the refugees. Germany, for instance, had provided an
allowance of $80 per week for adults.591 Friar Adrian Lyons, Chair of the
Jesuit Refugee Service Australia Council, demanded in the Herald: ‘No
internment camps, please. We owe the Kosovar refugees better than
that.’592 Lyons criticised the Government’s plans to provide only (quoting
the Prime Minister) the ‘basic necessities of life’,593 and described the
temporary arrangements as ‘mean-spirited’ and ‘hurtful’.594 The allowance
was later increased on 1st July (which would take effect by the end of the
month) to $27 for adults and $10 per child. The Kosovars would further be
allowed to work for up to 20 hours per week after this time, though the
allowance would be taken away.595
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Throughout the planning stages of Operation Safe Haven, Ruddock
promoted his desire for the refugees to be concentrated together and
confined to the army barracks, having determined that a refugee’s benefits
would be unavailable on leaving the Safe Havens. However, the location of
and services provided at the Safe Havens remained the main concern for a
number of critics. These included Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett who
stated that Australia could do more harm than good to the refugees if it
simply offered shelter without an extensive support network: ‘You can’t
bring in a large number of people and isolate them.’596 Health experts and
ethnic leaders, reported the Herald, had warned the Government that the
use of remote army barracks to accommodate the refugees was a ‘serious
mistake.’597 Albanian-Australian National Council chairperson Erik Lloga,
who was involved in Operation Safe Haven as an adviser and interpreter
for the Federal Government, deemed the option of remote military bases as
inappropriate.598
The editor of The Australian asked, on 8th April 1999, in reference
to the location of the proposed Safe Havens: ‘Why is remoteness an
important criterion?’599 The editor added that depriving the Kosovars of
‘contact with mainstream Australia, and members of the Albanian
community, will only add to their trauma,’ rendering the refugees to be
‘unwelcome outcasts.’600 The Australian’s Greg Sheridan criticised the
locations of the military bases offered as accommodation, saying that
instead the Government should ‘treat [the refugees] decently and avoid the
mentality of punishment and control that has characterised so much of our
recent refugee policy.’601 The journalist further added that the refugees
should be placed in the major cities rather than in ‘isolated military
facilities’, preferably in Melbourne, which had the largest Albanian
population in Australia.602 Sheridan argued: ‘The fumbling, backflipping,
596
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detail-absent, incoherent way in which this decision was arrived at and
announced by the Government inspires no confidence.’603
The Immigration Minister announced on 9th June 1999 that
“patrons” (Members and Senators) would be appointed to the Safe Havens
with the purpose of ensuring that the Kosovars had full access to a
representative of the Federal Government and made as welcome and
comfortable as possible. Patrons, he said, were expected to visit their
designated Safe Haven every two to three weeks.604 Initially, the
appointment of patrons to each of the Safe Havens by the Immigration
Minister was based on several factors, including the electoral region of
Members and Senators (and hence their proximity to the army bases), and
membership of the Liberal Party. The role of patrons provided a more
direct point of access between the refugees and the Federal Government.
However, any concerns expressed by the Kosovars would only be managed
and acted on by Liberal Party politicians.605 It was only after the Singleton
protest (see below), on 22nd June, that the Immigration Minister announced
that members of the Opposition would act as co-patrons to the Safe
Havens, heeding the advice of Con Sciacca, the shadow Immigration
Minister.606
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2. A Wintery Tale: Singleton Barracks in Central NSW
2.1 The Singleton community
Singleton barracks had been an army barracks for over 50 years when the
first Kosovars arrived there in early June 1999.607 It is in rural NSW, and
140 kilometres from Sydney. The base is approximately 6 kilometres from
the township of Singleton, which had a population of around 20,000 at the
time. Five busloads of Kosovar refugees arrived at their accommodation at
Singleton Army barracks on 1st June 1999, coinciding with the start of the
winter season in country NSW. Temperatures drop to an average of less
than 7 degrees Celsius at this time of year.608 In total, the Singleton
community was preparing for the arrival of 800 refugees who would be
able to access the township via a free shuttle bus service. The refugees
were staying in ‘renovated dormitories’, and the Telegraph reported: ‘A
professional soccer player, nine pregnant women and 22 toddlers are
among the first group of Kosovar refugees to be housed in NSW [at the
Singleton Safe Haven].’609 The newspaper report went on, with only the
clothes and toiletries they had received at East Hills, ‘some families as
large as 11 had nothing but a plastic bag between them, which held all they
had left in the world.’610 It was noted by the co-ordinator of the
‘Samaritans’ emergency relief program in Singleton how the refugees’
spirits had lifted since arriving:
[When they arrived on Friday night] many of them were crying and
traumatised[.] By Saturday morning the children were running
around and you could already see the change in them.611
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Initially, media coverage concerning the arrival of the refugees at Singleton
was supportive of the operation, depicting the reception of the refugees by
the local community as both a positive and highly anticipated response.
A team of local doctors, counsellors and a translator were on hand
to assist at the Singleton barracks, while the Samaritans had recently begun
to collect donations from the community. Samaritans director Cec Shevels
said, in the Telegraph, the organisation was appealing for teddy bears,
warm clothing and bicycles for the children to play with.612 Singleton had
not previously dealt with a population influx brought by the organised
relocation of refugees, unlike some other barracks made available to the
Kosovars. The community at Bandiana (near Albury-Wodonga), for
instance, had accommodated over 300,000 refugees in the decades
following World War II.613 This is significant, particularly considering that
Singleton would eventually house the largest number of refugees of any of
the barracks (alongside Puckapunyal).614

2.2 The refugees and their gripes
The Singleton incident centred around two aspects: the initial “bus sit-in”,
which began on 15th and ended on 16th June, and stories about the Salihu
family who continued to reject the Singleton accommodation for another
day afterwards. On 15th June, three coaches transported Kosovar refugees
who had recently arrived in Australia from Macedonia from the East Hills
barracks to their designated temporary Safe Haven at Singleton. The 83
refugees involved in the initial two days of the protest - some had
612
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conducted a brief inspection of the facilities, while others had spoken to
Kosovars already at the barracks via mobile telephone - re-boarded the
transfer coaches where they slept for their first night.615 The main concerns
expressed by spokespersons for the refugees were a lack of running water
inside the accommodation huts, no baths for children, inadequate heating
and wind protection from mid-winter winds and the absence of privacy for
family groups.616 There were also reports of electrical cables, light bulbs
and piping being dangerous exposed.617 The ‘stand-off’, wrote the
Telegraph, continued over three days, but by the third night, only three
Kosovars were left ‘barricaded in a bus’ outside the Singleton Safe
Haven.618 They were members of the Salihu family.
On the 16th June the news media reported on the objections
expressed by “leaders” of the protest. The refugees’ grievances included, as
stated by The Australian, the ‘substandard accommodation and kangaroos
and snakes in the NSW Hunter Valley “jungle”’.619 They argued that the
accommodation offered in Singleton was too cold and that the toilets were
too far away from the sleeping huts, claiming they were hundreds of metres
away. Spokespersons for these refugees said that Australian government
had misled them over accommodation standards. Some asked to be
relocated back to East Hills barracks, while others asked to be returned to
the Balkans.620 According to The Australian, one of the protesters, 19-year
old Elvana Muqaj, stated that Singleton was ‘just like [the camps in]
Macedonia.’621 The Kosovars, the media reported, were afraid of the local
wildlife, with refugee Adrian Kastrati commenting: ‘It’s like a jungle
here[.] Everywhere is kangaroos, snakes and everything. We just want
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elementary comfort [sic].’622 The refugees at Singleton barracks were
confronted with a sign placed near the sleeping huts that stated, in both
Albanian and English language, ‘No Unauthorised access’, followed by
‘Snakes’. The sight, according to some reports, had frightened both
children and adults alike, unaccustomed to Australian wildlife. Mr Kastrati
further ‘complained’, wrote The Australian, that the $20 allowance offered
by the Australian government was not enough to spend at local towns,
saying that ‘$1000 would be better.’623 The group ‘demanded’ to be
relocated back to East Hills Safe Haven where they had enjoyed more
acceptable accommodation and facilities.624

‘Snakes alive: A warning sign near
the huts at Singleton’, from The
Australian, 16th June 1999, p. 2

Responding to the refugees’ claims, manager of the Singleton Safe
Haven, Tricia Flanagan, said the accommodation was basic, but not
substandard and was being improved with more heating and comforts.625
Likewise, the Federal Government quickly refuted some of the negative
publicity developing around the Safe Haven program. Singleton Safe
Haven patron, the 53-year old NSW Liberal Senator John Tierney, along
with DIMA officials, attempted to ‘negotiate’ with the protesters.626 This
was a situation which quickly broke down as the Government refused to
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relocate the group back to East Hills. The Immigration Minister
immediately ‘ruled out’ settling the protesters at East Hills.627 Ruddock
said that, at this stage, it was not possible to return the refugees to Kosovo
because the province was unsafe and that East Hills was filled to
capacity.628 East Hills was only being operated to house refugees for a few
days as they waited in transit before moving on to other Safe Havens
around Australia. It was impractical to return the protesters to East Hills, at
least while other refugees continued to arrive aboard evacuation flights,
and their request conflicted with the operational timetable. Senator
Tierney’s description of the protesters aboard the bus was unsympathetic.
He stated that the group was being led by six men who had ignored pleas to
at least allow the women and children to spend the night indoors.629 He
refuted their claims about the standard of the accommodation, arguing that
‘the only viable option is that they get off the bus and enter the facility’,
and adding, ‘They can’t really criticise the facilities. They haven’t even
been in them.’630

2.3 Media empathy for the Singleton “bus sit-in”
Some of the media coverage of those involved in the initial protest was
sympathetic towards their concerns. The Herald described, in the 16th June
article, ‘Cold, hungry refugees shun new home’, the ‘fear’ and ‘distress’ of
the refugees.631 It depicted ‘an elderly woman, her head tightly wrapped in
a kerchief, […] shivering with cold.’632 The image contrasted with a
comment about Senator Tierney, the ‘so-called patron of the safe havens’,
and depictions of operation staff as heartless in denying the refugees
aboard the buses food and other requests.633 A photograph presented the

627

ibid.
‘Cold, hungry refugees shun new home’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 16th June 1999,
p. 5.
629
Niesche and Zubrzycki, op. cit.
630
Tierney, cited in ibid.
631
‘Cold, hungry refugees shun new home’, op. cit.
632
ibid.
633
ibid.
628

167

image: ‘one of the younger Kosovar refugees finds some comfort at the
wheel of the bus at Singleton.’634 The newspaper went on:
A new mother is trying to breastfeed her daughter, but milk won’t
come. “She can’t make milk, because she hasn’t eaten”, says [one
of the other refugees]. “They won’t give us milk or juice for the
children, or sugar for the tea. We are hungry and cold. The warmest
place is on this bus.”635
The Herald further described the conditions on the bus as ‘terrible’ and
reported that: ‘The most crowded [bus] smelt like one might expect a bus
with 60 people, 17 of them infants, to smell after 24 hours.’636 The image
of children was central to depictions of the refugees’ suffering aboard the
buses. As the Herald noted, 3-year old Hyrije had been ‘sucking on a
baby’s bottle full of water, taken from a tap in a concrete bathroom because
the barracks staff would not give milk or juice to her mother unless she left
the bus.’637

Kosovar refugee boy asleep at the wheel of a transfer
coach, from Sydney Morning Herald, 16th June 1999, p. 5
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The refugees were reportedly suffering from hunger, having not
eaten for 24 hours since they had departed East Hills Safe Haven the day
before. This was because, the Herald stated: ‘Australian officials in charge
of the camp refused to provide food, saying the people would be fed only if
they got off the bus.’638 The Herald reported how two refugee men had
walked into the food hall to ask for milk and juice for the infants on the
bus, and for tea, milk and sugar for themselves, but the request was
refused. An Australian staff member working in the food hall repeated the
position, that: ‘There’s plenty to eat if they get off the bus.’639 Imagery and
scenes of sadness added to the media’s narrative of the Singleton protest,
providing greater depth to a story about human tragedy as it unfolded
(albeit much closer to home).640 Nonetheless, most media commentary
disagreed with the refugees’ claims that the Singleton barracks was
unsuitable or “worse than Macedonia”. Textual analysis further indicated
that, as Pickering says, the ‘ideal refugee’ is usually ‘very young or very
old, afraid’.641 They are supposedly unable to retain this kind of innocence
when they seek to represent and speak for themselves - a perception that
was typified by the shifting media stance on the Kosovars.

2.4 Evaluating the refugees’ concerns
The Australian provided a breakdown of the facilities provided at each of
the barracks being used to accommodate the Kosovars. In Singleton, it
638
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stated that the refugees were given rooms to sleep three to six persons,
communal bathrooms up to 80 metres from the sleeping huts and a dining
room up to 80 metres from the sleeping quarters. Each family
accommodated at Puckapunyal, the Safe Haven catering to approximately
the same number of refugees as Singleton, were given their own hut, with
some rooms partitioned with dividers, and toilets and showers ‘a few
metres’ from the huts.642 Comparatively, at least on paper, the Kosovars at
Singleton were offered similar conditions to those accommodated
elsewhere. Nonetheless, complaints about the facilities at Singleton
barracks are worth investigating further.
Some reports presented an image of the refugees using Superloos
(portable toilets) rather than toilet blocks. There were concerns about
modesty expressed by some of the Kosovars, the lack of privacy and the
inappropriateness of males and females from the same family sharing
rooms.643 In one article, the Herald, having gained access to the Singleton
barracks despite Federal Government restrictions, provided a detailed
account of the facilities offered to the Kosovars: ‘After permission to view
the site was officially denied, [one of the refugees reported to be leading
the protest] led the Herald on a surreptitious tour: in the shower block, the
cubicles are made from fibro cement. There is no door, and no shower
curtain.’644 The newspaper vindicated some of the refugees’ concerns,
reporting that, inside the bathrooms: ‘There are no baths for the children.
There is, however, a pile of plastic potties, stacked near the door. Hot water
642
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pipes, light bulbs and electrical cables are exposed. Water from the sinks
drains straight into a concrete trough dug into the floor. There are no
toilets, just Superloos.’645
Senator Tierney admitted that Singleton barracks was built for
single people, 646 though it is uncertain at what point he or other operational
officials acquired this knowledge. It is further unclear, as such, with the
program mainly designed to accommodate families, why the Government
proceeded to use Singleton army base to house Kosovar refugees.
Recognising the problem, Tierney stated without elaborating in the
Telegraph: ‘But we can get it to a level that will be quite comfortable.’647
The Herald described a situation where, in some areas of the barracks,
Kosovars were sleeping up to six in a room with families kept separate by
temporary partitions. The newspaper report went on: ‘In one of the worst,
there are three single beds, but no glass in the windows. There is a sink, but
no water comes from the tap.’648 Ardian Frusina, a photojournalist from
Pristina, commented that, after living in a Macedonian camp for three
months, an Australian official presented him with a piece of paper, which
described what the facilities would be. However, he went on: ‘they have
made us feel like we are living on an animal farm, in a zoo.’649 Another
refugee, Fisnik Hoti, stated in the Telegraph that he felt misled: ‘They said
we would have our own building and bathrooms. There’s nothing to do
here. At East Hills we could play tennis, volleyball, basketball, but here all
we can do is go into Singleton. Singleton is quiet, it’s for old men, it’s
boring.’650
The Australian confirmed some of these claims, describing its
inspection of a family’s room at the Singleton barracks. The room,
accommodating four persons, was one of four in a yellow fibro building.
The newspaper went on: ‘On the floor was cracked, discoloured linoleum,
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but authorities said the room would soon be carpeted. It was 80 metres
from the toilet.’651 The father of the family occupying the room, who spoke
no English, pointed at the small heater on the floor and mimed being cold.
As The Australian observed: ‘He pointed to the foot of the door to show
where the wind rushed in at night.’652
A significant problem that emerged at Singleton barracks was that
the military did not cease artillery exercises once the refugees had arrived
at the Safe Haven. Parachute infantry completed the two-week training
exercise during the week of the ‘sit-in” involving field guns and other
weapons at Singleton Army training area, about five kilometres from the
refugee haven. According to the Herald, local Singleton residents ‘talked
about how insensitive it seemed’.653 One farmer had heard the exercises
from his property 30 kilometres away.654 Defence Minister John Moore,
whose Department was part of the team organising Operation Safe Haven,
had authorised artillery exercises at Singleton, Puckapunyal and
Holsworthy (East Hills) army bases. A military source stated that a recent
audit of the sound found that 80 per cent of the noise failed to register or
registered minimally at the Singleton Safe Haven.655 Lloga said that he was
‘concerned as a matter of principle’, although he also was aware that the
exercises were scheduled to take place.656
The Australian indicated that the core of the dispute was a
misunderstanding between the refugees and Australian immigration
officials in Macedonia. At the Stenkovac camp immigration workers had
instructed Kosovar refugees to sign an agreement that was printed in both
English and Albanian. The Singleton situation was centred, The Australian
asserted, around the misuse of a particular word in that paperwork. The
agreement stated, in English, that ‘rooms will be furnished with basic beds,
furniture and cupboards’.657 However, as Lloga explained, the Albanian
651
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word chosen for “room” was more correctly interpreted by the refugees as
“dwelling”.658 Lloga stated, after speaking with refugees aboard the buses,
that they had understood that they were going to be offered a house or an
apartment in Australia, and they ‘felt Australia had not fulfilled its end of
the bargain.’659 Director of public affairs at DIMA, Stewart Foster,
informed the Telegraph that the Australian government had divulged
information accurately to the refugees about the kinds of facilities they
would be offered. A copy of the form provided to the refugees, as cited by
the Telegraph, read: ‘the centres have running water, toilets and bathrooms
which you may have to share with other families.’660

2.5 The “showdown”, headlines and “voice”
The language used by the media to depict the protest was, at times,
scathing and severely critical, particularly in the Herald and Telegraph. On
16th June the Herald depicted the situation as a matter of compliance, and
no longer one of understanding and empathy, constructing a “showdown”
between DIMA officials and those aboard the buses; ‘the protest, which
began on Monday night, weakened about 7pm [last night] when at least 34
refugees backed down and entered the barracks… “Reality is beginning to
set in”, said an Immigration Department spokeswoman.’661 Newspaper
headlines presented a similar scenario. In the Telegraph, these included:
‘Ingratitude of the five-star whingers’, ‘Ungracious act’, ‘THANKS A
LOT’, and ‘Rebel refugees to be sent home’. In The Australian, which was
much more supportive of the protesters, headlines read: ‘Creatures and no
comfort: refugees’, ‘Barracks cold comfort for Kosovar who’s lost it all’,
and ‘Refugees are entitled to complain’. For the Herald, headlines
included: ‘They survived Kosovo, but won’t hack Singleton’, ‘Cold,
hungry refugees shun new home’, and ‘Kosovars “ashamed” of protest
leader’. Headlines, like all newspaper content, provide an opportunity to
658
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elaborate the themes and meanings presented in the meta-narrative of the
news. However, this is always a deliberate and selective process where
headlines remain relative to both public issues “of the day” and broader
hegemonic interests.662
This situation relates similarly to the selection of “voices” used to
complement media representations of the Singleton incident.663 A point
made by Pickering is, in her study on media representation of refugees in
Australia: ‘what is absent from the press examined is any consideration of
seeking asylum from the point of view of the asylum seeker.’664 The
refugees involved in the Singleton incident were granted some voice in
media coverage, with The Australian, Telegraph and Herald quoting or
referring to their statements 52, 16 and six times respectively. This
contrasts with the much larger number of statements made by Government
officials – mainly Ruddock, Senator Tierney and various DIMA
representatives – which numbered at least 71 in The Australian, 55 in the
Telegraph and 38 in the Herald. As Richard V. Ericson et al state, a
common element in news content is how individuals tend to defer to
experts and officials of the administered society who parade before them in
the news media.665 The reality is that the idea of a free market of opinion in
the media is as fictional as a free market economy and that individuals
have ‘little effective opportunity to answer back’.666
Pickering’s assessment of the Australian press is that priority is
given to ‘the deviant problem that asylum seekers and refugees constitute,
and how a strong state is required to regulate this problem: preferably
keeping the problem out.’667 This ideology is reflected in the regulations
imposed on the media in relation to the Safe Haven program which is
supported by the data on “voice”. One explanation for the variance in
figures is related to the notion that journalists were not generally permitted

662

Ericson, Baranek and Chan, op. cit., p. 56.
This was evaluated by considering the range and frequency of sources (or “voices”)
drawn on to shape news articles about these events. This includes persons directly quoted
and/or whose statements were referred to in the news article.
664
Pickering, op. cit., p. 183.
665
Ericson, Baranek and Chan, op. cit., p. 18.
666
ibid.
667
Pickering, op. cit., p. 183.
663

174

to engage with the refugees due to the restrictions imposed by the
Immigration Minister at the beginning of Operation Safe Haven. Another
variable is that, for The Australian, many of the quotes from those refugees
involved in the events in Singleton were made by Sabit Salihu after
departing the town - because The Australian had offered to provide a taxi
and accompanied the Salihus to Sydney.668 The lack of insight given as
direct statements made by the Kosovars parallels Pickering’s conclusion,
that: ‘views that undermined the stability of established relations of power
and subordination in society were curtailed or excluded.’669 The limited
voice offered to the Kosovars reinforces the criticism that refugees have
often been ‘put on trial by the media without the power to narrate their own
stories, their own account of their crimes.’670
The media granted some “voice” to members of the general
Australian population. Offering voice to individuals who “represent” the
“community” works to naturalise the perception that news narratives are
shaped by and recognise the importance of “commonsense”, “public”
input. One Nation Party leader Pauline Hanson gained some exposure for
her comments that the Singleton protesters ought to be sent ‘home’, that
‘charity begins at home’, and authorities should ‘put them on a plane and
wave them hooray’.671 Hanson’s effect on popular politics was immense in
this period, and her impact is captured by Saunders: ‘What still remains
both elusive and fascinating is why a poorly educated, inarticulate, gaudily
attired woman could mobilise such fervent devotion and attention.’672

668

Other, non-Government commentary was given from people involved with these
events as well, comprising at least 33 of these statements in the Australian, 32 in the
Herald, and 64 in the Telegraph. The far majority of these “outsider” statements in the
Australian were made by Eric Lloga the Albanian-Australian lawyer from Melbourne who
acted as a “negotiator” on behalf on the Federal Government. His role, as noted
throughout this media coverage, was to attempt to convince the “protesters” to leave the
bus and enter the Singleton barracks. For the Telegraph, most of these “outsider”
statements (at least 29) came from workers and refugees living at Brighton barracks in a
single expose about the refugees’ lives in Tasmania.
669
Pickering, op. cit., p. 183.
670
ibid., p. 185.
671
P. Hanson, as cited in ‘And another thing’ (editorial), The Australian, 17th June 1999,
p. 12. Reference to ‘hooray’ in ‘Is “no thanks” no thanks?’ (The Rehame Report), The
Australian, 24th June 1999.
672
K. Saunders, ‘Taking the International Spotlight: Pauline Hanson and Pauline Hanson’s
One Nation Party’, Queensland Review, 12(2), November 2005, p. 78.

175

In The Australian, four local Singleton residents were cited,
whereas none appeared in the Herald. By contrast, there were 33
statements made by local Singleton residents (including police and
shopkeepers) that featured in the Telegraph.673 Being interactive with the
“public”, allowing it to be both a consumer and a producer of news,
provides a means by which the mass media is able to develop the authority
of its own political opinions. The media’s semi-transparency and
interactivity is one way in which consent for corporate hegemony is
reproduced.674 News consumers often function as news sources by calling
in story ideas, and by being the subject of ‘person in the street’ segments
that demonstrate reaction to news stories.675 In this way news reports are
able to make a firmer claim to authenticity and authority by incorporating
what is purported to be popular public perception.
A particular concern for the Telegraph was how the Kosovars’
‘welcome was wearing thin as [Singleton’s] shopkeepers told of isolated
incidents of shop lifting, refusal to pay for goods and the “rudeness” of the
refugees. Shopkeepers and residents believe “enough is enough” declaring that if the refugees are not happy in Singleton they should go
home.’676 The Telegraph said that ‘simmering discontent’ had emerged
within the Singleton community, as noted by local shopkeeper Kaye
Cartwidht: ‘The Singleton community was so excited about them coming
here and they all worked hard to make their stay as comfortable as
possible[.] Now, it seems, their attitude is negative. They seem to think
they can have everything for nothing.’677 The Australian noted the
transition in media focus and was sceptical of the timing of the negative
exposure. The newspaper was critical of other media coverage attempting
to localise the incident, writing, in reference to the family who stayed the
longest aboard their transfer coach: ‘The Salihu’s imagined sins stained a
community.’678 The emphasis placed by the Telegraph on the opinions of
673
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individuals representative of the Singleton community must be viewed as
strategic and deliberate. As Ericson et al state, the hegemony and authority
of media institutions are reinforced by the strategic placement of
individuals in the news. Individuals tend to appear in the news when there
is no specific implication of an institutional arrangement or questions of
status. In this sense individuals do not “speak” for the majority in any sense
of the word “public”, but they do represent a kind of public when they do
appear. At best the individual presents the fiction of “the public” that is
central to mass democracy.679
Najdim Sejdim, designated by the Telegraph as one of the protest
“leaders”,680 commented that the refugees were not coping well with the
near freezing conditions at the camp.681 Mr Sejdim said that it was ‘500m
to the showers and toilets from the barracks’ and ‘there is no hot water in
the accommodation and it is very cold.’682 Site manager of the Singleton
barracks, army officer Larry Tanner, responded simply: ‘Well, it’s cold in
Singleton. We’re all cold.’683 Ruddock’s response, which was repeated in a
number of articles, was that Australia had never promised 5-star hotel
accommodation.684 As the Herald stated, the Immigration Minister ‘would
not be dictated to by those refusing to get off the buses’.685 Ruddock
commented, on 16th June:
These people came from tents where running water is not available,
where toilet facilities were built for an emergency situation in
which there was significant overcrowding and risk of disease.686
There was no indication in the Herald as to whether Ruddock’s refusal to
“negotiate” with the refugees was affected by a concern for providing the
679
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optimum care available. Rather, his comments indicated that he was
willing to provide only what was immediately on hand and convenient for
the Government - a sentiment expressed throughout Operation Safe Haven.
During the Safe Haven legislative debates, for instance, Ruddock
reiterated comments by the UNHCR High Commissioner that the
evacuation program was not intended to be nor was it suited to being a
permanent resettlement program. He suggested that such a program was
not designed to offer options available to other categories of refugees,
arguing instead: ‘It could not be clearer. That is what the UNHCR was
seeking.’687 Ruddock indicated that his perspective on the matter was not
extraordinary, that the UNHCR had other, more important concerns to deal
with than the protests of few dozen Kosovars evacuated to Australia. On
29th June, he speculated about the lack of interest displayed by the UNHCR
about the Singleton protest, describing: ‘The UNHCR’s priority is with the
hundreds of thousands of people living in camps on the Kosovo border.’688
As is consistent with similar statements made by the Immigration Minister
throughout Operation Safe Haven, Ruddock was unwilling to explore
alternative accommodation options for the Kosovars. The Herald
emphasised how the Government was ‘prepared to wait out the
impasse.’689 The newspaper pointed out, supporting the Federal
Government and ridiculing the protesters: ‘Immigration officials trying to
resolve the protest said the sit-in had taken on farcical proportions, with
those on board the buses leaving to use toilet facilities, even having meals,
before returning to their seats.’690
Initially, Lyndall Sachs from the Australian branch of the UNHCR
expressed support for the protesters, pointing out the arrangements were
‘inappropriate’, and the bathroom facilities (portable “Superloos”) were
500 metres from the wooden-hut sleeping quarters. Moreover, she
commented: ‘having to take the kids to the toilets at night would be a very
687
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frightening experience for anyone.’691 Sachs quickly retracted her
comments, however, saying the Australian government’s response had
been generous. One journalist noted how: ‘The whole [Singleton
accommodation] situation is an absolute shambles. Even one UN official
said so, too, before being forced to retract her criticisms presumably for
fear of us throwing a tantie and sulking off from the international aid
effort.’692 There was no other criticism of the Singleton affair offered by
the UNHCR, although there were clear political motivations for the silence
imposed on its staff. It is plausible to suggest, too, that the main strategic
issue for the organisation had been resolved - to relocate refugees from
Macedonia, and thereby assist NATO with its plans for launching a landassault from that country against Yugoslavia. Staff from the UNHCR had
indicated concern at the beginning of the evacuations about the conditional
(i.e. temporary) basis of the program. It is likely that these concerns
included the flexibility the evacuation program afforded to national
governments in setting out the protection arrangements as well as the
inability of refugees to determine their own standards of living, although
these concerns are not directly specified.693 The Federal Government,
nonetheless, was bound by no formal obligations to provide better quality
Safe Haven facilities under the UNHCR evacuation arrangements.

2.6 Masculinity and aggression
News reports were further shaped by the idea that the “bus sit-in” was
being conducted at the insistence of, at first, several male refugees and then
later by Mr Sabit Salihu.694 These men were often set apart from the
remainder of the Kosovars in Singleton in media coverage. They were
described as coming from a male-dominated society, whereas the other
refugees who had accepted the conditions at Singleton were commonly
depicted as rational and reasonable. These kinds of representations of male
Kosovar refugees were used at least 10 times in the Telegraph, nine times
691
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in The Australian and four times in the Herald. As D.D. McNicoll wrote,
in a highly critical commentary piece about the protest in The Australian, it
was the ‘blokes who ran the protest’, further noting how ‘women have very
little say in Kosovar society’.695 Gendering of the issue served to
undermine

the

motivations

of

those

asking

for

better

quality

accommodation and facilities by denigrating supposed aspects of Kosovar
culture. As Kate Lyons, spokeswoman for DIMA, explained: ‘Because
their society is very patriarchal a small group have organised the sit-in and
the others won’t budge.’696 Senator Tierney repeatedly asserted that it was
the male-dominated culture of the Kosovars driving the refugees’ protest,
stating: ‘It is a patriarchal society and five men are leading this group.
What they say goes – the others are falling into line.’697
There were a variety of descriptive terms employed by critics,
conveying an image of the refugees as aggressive, violent and agitators in
their ‘stand’ against the Federal Government.698 These kinds of references
were produced at least 147 times in the Telegraph, 34 times in The
Australian, and on 20 occasions in the Herald.699 The Australian continued
to draw on many of these terms to describe the actions of the refugees,
despite the support offered by the newspaper to the protesters’ perspective
and its rebuff of Government criticism about the incident. This
complements Pickering’s findings that, not only were refugees more likely
to be represented by the media as a significant “problem”, but there was the
quite “common sense” assumption that they were a “deviant” problem.700
Frameworks of deviancy can be viewed as part of broader attempts at
orchestrating consent by the media by routinely criminalising subordinate
groups.701 This is often undertaken when the State appears to be losing
control of subordinates and when there are actual or symbolic challenges to
its legitimacy. The response of the State has commonly been to attempt to
695
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naturalise and make popular the links between “criminal” or “deviant”
behaviours and insubordinates.702 This is usually achieved in conjunction
with campaigns that identify entire minority communities as the “whole
problem”, especially considering Australia’s history of popularly excluding
those deemed to be culturally different.703

Kosovar refugees on their transfer coach at Singleton barracks,
from The Daily Telegraph, 17th June 1999, p. 4

These kinds of depictions of the protesters affirmed growing
perceptions of the refugees as irrational, tricky and ungrateful.704 It was in
such a light that the Telegraph reported about Kosovars shoplifting in
Singleton, noting how, according to a shopkeeper, one refugee demanded
two packets of cigarettes even though he only had enough money for one.
The man reportedly ‘got angry and abusive and left’.705 A local police
source described the refugees as ‘cunning as rats’, although admitting there
had only been ‘two or three instances where Kosovars have been stopped
in the process of attempting to shoplift’.706 One Kosovar reportedly told
staff at a local supermarket: ‘We are Kosovar. We don’t have to pay’ and
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then left after making an ‘offensive gesture’.707 The cost of cigarettes
severely depleted the weekly allowance of $20 offered to the refugees
under Operation Safe Haven. This kind of detail was ignored by the
Telegraph. It was later noted by The Australian that the Government, at the
insistence of Ruddock, had recognised that a lack of ‘access to cigarettes’
in some centres had led to ‘anti-social behaviour’.708 The main reason
Ruddock wrote to John Howard, urging Cabinet to allow the Kosovars to
work up to 20 hours per week, was because most of the males were heavy
smokers. Ruddock stated that giving cigarettes to the Kosovars would
contravene the Government’s public health policy. Instead, he said:
‘Certainly, the Government thought it would be inappropriate to be buying
cigarettes to give away just because people were finding it difficult to
break a tobacco-related addiction [sic].’709
The image of the aggressive and irrational nature of the Kosovars
was again highlighted in a Telegraph article published almost a week after
the protest had began. The article, entitled ‘100 armed refugees in brawl’,
highlighted how: ‘More than 100 Kosovar Albanian refugees, some armed
with cricket bats and road barriers, were involved in a brawl at the
Singleton safe haven… The battle […] was sparked by two women over
[loud] music.’710 One of the refugees reportedly suffered a broken nose and
another man’s arm was injured when struck by a teenage girl wielding a
cricket bat. As I noted earlier, there were around 800 refugees sharing the
facilities at Singleton at this time.711 Social life at the barracks was
understandably tense, considering the circumstances. Refugee Najim
Sejdim indicated how one of the reasons for the ‘brawl’ was that Singleton
‘can be boring, and we are all stuck in here together day after day.’712
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2.7 Comparative agendas: editorials and opinion columns
Editorials and opinion columns, while not always complimentary of one
another, provide insights into the ideological position of a newspaper. The
editorial performs a “flagship” role within the assemblage of a newspaper.
It is also the point from which the interests of the proprietor are expressed
via the commanding position of the editor. Editorial positions on the
Singleton protest varied dramatically between each of the newspapers. The
Australian noted its support for the Singleton protest in three separate
editorial pieces and granted direct support for the Salihu family in one of
these articles. The Telegraph was heavily critical of the refugees involved
with three editorial pieces dedicated to criticising the “sit-in”. The Herald
maintained some perspective and distance only publishing one editorial
piece about the Singleton episode and offering both a degree of support
and criticism of the refugees involved.
The editor of the Telegraph expressed personal outrage at the
incident. In the first editorial piece, entitled ‘Ungracious act’, the editor
described the actions of the refugees aboard the buses as ‘lamentable’,
juxtaposing the ingratitude of those involved with Australia’s generosity:
Australia is a generous country, offering sanctuary to these people
and 4000 of their countrymen. Even if conditions at the camp were
spartan, the protest was inappropriate and ungracious.713
The following day’s editorial, entitled, ‘When a fair go is not enough’,
articulated that the most pressing concern about the protest was ingratitude.
The editor wrote that, with Australia’s ‘rich, compassionate heritage’ of the
‘fair go’, it ‘is difficult for us to understand the reluctance of a group of
Kosovar refugees to accept our outstretched hand.’714 The protesters were
described as doing ‘their countrymen a disservice with what can only be
viewed as a petulant display of ingratitude.’715 The editor’s point was
supported by a Warren cartoon depicting a drought-stricken “battler”, who
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says: ‘If things are too rough – they can bunk with us.’ This editorial
reflects the populist, tabloid style typical of the Telegraph, catering to a
readership different to newspapers such as The Australian. It is this
formula that is most clearly affiliated with the Howard Government, in its
consistent attempts to vindicate the concerns of “battlers”.716

Warren cartoon from The Daily Telegraph, 17th June 1999, p. 10

On 17th June The Australian editorial, ‘Refugees are entitled to
complain’, expressed outrage at the ‘meanness’ of the response by
Australian officials to the refugees’ concerns about Singleton army
barracks.717 The editor criticised Ruddock, who ‘could offer no more
understanding than a snide remark that Australia had never promised fivestar accommodation.’718 The piece further described the anger felt by some
Australians toward the protesters as revealing ‘a sour and poisonous
underside’ to ‘our national character’.719 The editor wrote: ‘The vicious
response has revealed some Australians to be ungracious and selfish. One
716
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man said he felt like “punching (a refugee) in the face.”’720 The piece went
on: ‘Such meanness suggests that the primary motivation for bringing these
people halfway around the world was salving our conscience, not attending
to the welfare of people in desperate need.’721
The editor said that the refugees ‘have some justification for their
complaints’,722 linking the issues raised in Singleton to concerns expressed
during the planning stages of Operation Safe Haven:
despite concerns that they should be housed close to each other, to
the Australian Albanian population and the wider community, the
Federal Government has instead housed them in army barracks
scattered across the country. Authorities even had to fly an
Albanian community leader from Melbourne [Erik Lloga] to
Singleton to communicate with the protesters, underlining the
extent of their isolation.723
One of the most pressing concerns, the editor later wrote, was that the
Kosovars were ‘housed in army barracks away from the eyes of most
people.’724 The Federal Government’s reaction to the Singleton incident,
the editor stated, demonstrated ‘the flint-hearted control of the
bureaucracy,’ as ‘Ruddock played to the morally indignant gallery by
suggesting that if they did not accept his rules they could go home’.725
Opinion columnists, as evident in this analysis, do not always
coalesce with the purported editorial position. However, they perform an
important political role in upholding the ‘democratic postulate’ of the
media.726 By including “diverse” opinion, newspapers are able to
reproduce the appearance that the news media is committed to a variety of
public (rather than corporate or private) interests. The Australian, in seven
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opinion columns, provided a diverse range of commentary concerning
events in Singleton. The newspaper’s columnists were both supportive and
critical of the “sit-in” (generally) at least once, while offering direct
support to the Salihus at least five times and only being critical of the
family on one occasion. The Telegraph published five opinion pieces that
discussed the Singleton protest, with four of these being severely critical of
those involved, and one that was somewhat supportive (though not
explicitly). The Herald only published two opinion pieces about these
events, being critical of the “sit-in” on one of these occasions, while
offering support for both the “sit-in” and the Salihus in another.
The Telegraph’s Miranda Devine was scathing toward the
protesters informing readers of the efforts of the women of the Singleton
Quilters who had hand-made quilts for each of the refugees. She argued:
‘Australia, it seems, just can’t do enough to help the refugees. So it’s no
wonder that their seeming lack of gratitude has inspired much anger.’727
This was followed by commentary in support of Senator Tierney’s
description of the Singleton barracks, noting that the barracks had been
‘standard accommodation for soldiers and reservists for 50 years.’728 Of
course, the refugees were not soldiers (at least under their present
circumstances) and comprised families with small children as well as the
elderly. I have noted in Chapter 2 that the Safe Haven program was
initially intended to cater to families and mothers with children. Stewart
Foster had stated regarding the selection of refugees for evacuation to
Australia that the Department had ‘put an emphasis on women at risk,
those who are alone or with young children. But because the Albanians
have strong family links we’re also bringing a lot of family units, mum and
dad, their children and in some cases grandparents so they can provide
each other with emotional support.’729
Telegraph columnist Mike Gibson supported the position of the
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‘outrageous’.730 In his opinion piece, entitled, ‘When doing all we can is
not enough’, Gibson argued that Singleton barracks was better than ‘Those
stinking hell-holes [in Macedonia], in which Kosovar Albanians dropped in
their tracks, without food, without toilets, without heating, seemingly
without hope.’731 Much of the article centred on the notion of gratefulness
and whether the Singleton Kosovars deserved the assistance and generosity
that had been offered to them by Australians. Gibson cited one refugee
who had arrived in Australia many years before, who stated how ‘thankful’
she was ‘to be here’.732 He summarised his view of the protesters,
describing them as ungrateful, ‘five-star whingers’,733 while pointing out
that the conditions at Singleton were ‘met with the approval of their more
grateful colleagues’.734 The columnist promoted the idea that those who did
not voice any concerns must have simply been content with the services
provided by the Australian government.

2.8 Culture and class
A Warren cartoon accompanied Gibson’s attack on the protesters depicting
them as tourists aboard the ‘Kosovar Accommodation Reviewers World
Tour’. In the cartoon, four male refugees sit at the back of a bus as it drives
at pace away from Singleton barracks. The ‘Reviewers’ hold their thumbs
down as they sign a discontented ‘X’ on a clipboard checklist. The
refugees in the image are all men which supported other claims by the
media that the style of protest was typical of persons from a chauvinistic,
patriarchal Balkan culture. The physical appearance of the men, too, is
connected with images drawn earlier by Warren depicting the refugees as
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staunch, wearing stereotypically Balkan clothes (including the fur hat), and
sporting a long moustache and slightly unshaven face.
A second cartoon by Warren published on 18th June and titled ‘The
Kosovars Lament’, depicted male Kosovars in a similar light. The use of
these kinds of images to depict the Singleton protesters had significant
implications for the broader representation of Kosovar culture by the media
throughout Operation Safe Haven. The Kosovars were generally referred to

Cartoons by Warren in The Daily Telegraph: left, published on
16th June 1999, p. 10; right, published 18th June 1999, p. 10

as “Europeans”, identifiable by their Western “European-ness”, on 18
occasions by the Telegraph, 20 times in The Australian and not at all by
the Herald.735 However, there quickly emerged contention in news reports
following the protest about whether the Kosovars were to be viewed as
Western Europeans (and thus, “like us”) or as significantly different. For
the most part the willingness of the Kosovars to be satisfied with the
accommodation at Singleton was significantly linked to their ability to
735
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adapt to (or ‘hack’) Australian conditions and values.736 Pickering notes the
importance of representational binaries, particularly those denoting a clear
sense of familiarity/otherness. She says that it is through ‘binary
oppositions [that] difference is established’ which includes ‘the infinite
discursive possibilities for talking about “us” and “them”.’737 The
Australian cited at least 55 references to the Kosovars as significantly
“dissimilar, alien or Other” noting the language, religious and cultural
barriers they were supposedly facing (among other issues) upon arriving in
Australia. The Australian mainly cited these notions, however, in relation
to discussions taking place about the refugees, rather than suggesting the
Kosovars were significantly different to Australians. The Herald and the
Telegraph described or referred to the refugees in these terms on 12 and 28
occasions respectively.
Some of these comments included references to how the Kosovars
were intimidated by flora and wildlife in Singleton, including “snakes”,
“kangaroos” and the refugees’ descriptions of the Australian bush as a
“jungle”. On many occasions, the newspapers were very patronising
towards the refugees on this point, suggesting they should be able to
“hack” Australian conditions - including the below zero temperatures in
Singleton at this time of year – particularly when compared to those from
which they had come.738 Ramona Koval, writing in The Australian,
commented on the representational paradox:
Hark back to a few months ago when refugees first started
streaming into Macedonia and all the talk was about how like us
they were. They had mobile phones. They had Reeboks. They had
stylish jackets… They were easy to feel sorry for because they were
white and clean and nice.739
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In reference to the recent events in Singleton, Koval makes the point
sarcastically: ‘The refugees were so much like us that they preferred not to
freeze at night in a room with no privacy.’740
As Pickering says: ‘Representations of asylum seekers and refugees
in the press have been underpinned by concerns for the integrity of the
nation state… validat[ing] and [invoking] repressive state responses.’741
Shifting representations in the media is related to Gramsci’s notion of
consent as well as Hall’s ideas about representational power. Gramsci
asserts that consent is (re)produced via the ability of hegemonic interests to
bend and shift in relation to social trends and to do so on an ongoing
basis.742 Attempts at utilising and controlling the power of representation,
in this sense, can more accurately be defined as a representation of power,
available for scrutiny and dissection by scholars.743 Representational power
in the media is sustained by those in control of media production - who are
able to undermine the abilities of subordinate groups to determine their
own public persona. This process provides a vehicle for displacing and
dislodging the power of self-representation from the hands of subordinates
and to define such groups as unpopular and outcasts without significant
challenge.744
Pickering articulates that news discourse, ‘as a site of the
reproduction of hegemonic relations is an important locale to understand
the orchestration of consent.’745 This is because representations of refugees
in the news media ‘have the potential to tell us about the “normality” of
prevailing social orders.’746 As refugees routinely disrupt established
national/spatial orders, the view of refugees as “rebels” and “deviants”
emerges somewhat naturally from the perspective of those attempting to
support the existing consensus – from governments, to the media and any
other powerful institution. Government empathy for the Kosovars rapidly
declined as an authoritative, symbolic response to their dissention. It set the
740
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standard for the public to follow suit, as is further signified by the way both
the Government and popular conceptions of the refugees (as portrayed in
the

media)

resorted

to

denigrating

Kosovar

culture.

Negative

representations of the protesters were enhanced by the deployment of
popular stereotypes that existed prior to the sit-in – that, the Kosovars were
unable to communicate properly in English or share Australian “values”
and thus ought to be treated differently, patronised and have less expected
of them than “normal” people.
This process is linked to how minority social groups become
subject to intense “ethnicisation” in the media, “caged” by cultural
representations and stereotypes over which they have very little control.747
Media discourses perform an important ideological function in reaffirming
the potency of negative stereotypes as “common sense” racial and ethnic
categories.748 Pickering describes, further, how ‘Ethnic communities can be
quickly rendered homogenous, unfamiliar and strange within such
discourses.’749 Stereotypes provide journalists with useful analogies in
constructing their stories. An untimely description of the Kosovars in The
Australian was provided by Luke Slattery, who referred to the protesters as
‘busniks’.750 The Serbian chetniks (mercenaries or militiamen) who had
fought during the Yugoslav civil war (1991-92) had been hired by the
Yugoslav regime to fight in Kosovo against the KLA, expelling many
ethnic Albanians from the province.751 Such a generalisation about Balkan
migrant groups resonated with pre-existing stereotypes in Australia easily
deployed by the dominant cultural group attempting to keep the dissenting
refugees in check.
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The earlier status bestowed upon the Kosovars by the news media
as acceptable, “middle class” refugees further became the basis of much
criticism and resentment. The Telegraph, in particular, repeatedly
reinforced the point that the refugees involved in the Singleton incident
were not genuinely “in need” of assistance because of their supposed
affluence and education levels. The analysis revealed that the Telegraph
made references to the Kosovars as “middle class” on 13 occasions.752 A
similar trend was evident in The Australian, with these kinds of references
numbering 11 times, while there were zero “middle class” descriptors used
in the Herald. The Australian did not actively dispute this perception,
stating that the frustrations expressed by the refugees, many of whom were
middle class and used to living in cities and towns, were compounded by
the fact that they had been dispatched to a ‘bleak army camp hours from
Sydney – and the nearest Albanian community.’753 Lloga, speaking to The
Australian, said the refugees felt they were in the middle of nowhere in
Singleton. Several of the men he had spoken to on the buses were teachers
and one was a doctor. He claimed: ‘They had nice cars, they had nice
things, they would have gone out for cappuccinos, much as you and I.’754
The notion that the protesters were middle class, however, provided a firm
basis for criticisms expressed by columnist Miranda Devine. As she wrote
in the Telegraph, referring to comments made by an interpreter working at
the barracks: ‘He says the refugees who staged the sit-in are sophisticated
middle-class urbanites from the equivalent of Kosovo’s Double Bay –
designer refugees.’755 Devine added: ‘The story doing the rounds of the
East Hills refugee centre yesterday was that the ringleader of the holdouts,
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a charismatic man who “speaks like an American politician”, has “never
even been in the Macedonian refugee camps.”’756
The income levels of the refugees were a significant focus in media
coverage, with the number of terms depicting the refugees as “affluent”
comprising 44 in the Telegraph, 16 in The Australian but only one in the
Herald. The main target of criticism in this regard was Sabit Salihu, with
some reports referring to him as a “wealthy” man demanding a “five star
hotel” for his family from the Australian government. Senator Tierney and
the Immigration Minister both made these kinds of accusations. As Tierney
stated, on 16th June:
Some of them wanted a few stars accommodation more than we
could give them.757
Ruddock, playing down the refugees’ concerns, commented that the
accommodation provided was ‘appropriate’:
We don’t keep apartments available for thousands of people who
might need them or require them at any point in time.
We have appropriate accommodation in an emergency situation
which certainly is not five-star hotel accommodation, nobody said it
would be.758
A variety of criticisms were further made across the newspapers claiming
the Kosovars were “designer” refugees, who were “sophisticated” and
wore quality brand-name clothing.759

756

ibid.
Tierney, cited in Williams, ‘Camp no better than Macedonia’, op. cit.
758
Ruddock, cited in ibid.
759
Descriptions of the refugees as “urbanites”, coming from cities and large towns,
numbered 12 in the Australian, two in the Telegraph and zero in the Herald.
Representations of them as rural, poor or village “folk” comprised five in the Australian,
one in the Telegraph and zero in the Herald. This does not include representations of the
refugees in cartoons, which, on several occasions, continued to depict those Kosovars
delivered by the Australian government to Singleton as poor, rural villagers fleeing on
tractors and wearing peasant clothing. One such cartoon by Nicholson published in the
757

193

The shift from news articles being overwhelmingly supportive of
the refugees to a stance that was severely critical of them was significant. It
paralleled a major decline in popular empathy, while there was an increase
in descriptions of the refugees as wealthy, demanding, not genuinely in
need of assistance and exploiting Australia’s hospitality.760 As Pickering
notes concerning shifting representations of the Kosovars, at first, ‘the
inviolability of the nation state was sidelined as the rhetoric changed [from
a punitive, anti-refugee stance] with altered political imperatives…
however, only inasmuch as the objects of representations (refugees and
asylum seekers) remained passive.’761 For Pickering, the Kosovars were
acceptable only in the context in which they were deemed “ideal” refugees,
including: ‘[the] very young or very old, afraid; persecuted by an
internationally proclaimed oppressive state; present in Australia only by
invitation of the Australian government; they originated from “wars” and
“conflicts” in which Australia had a current political and publicly
proclaimed interest; and, they were visibly grateful to be in Australia.’762

2.9 Gratefulness and charity
According to Pickering’s analysis of the Singleton protest, there was a
swift

return

in media reports to ‘more conventional

devalued

representations of refugees’ as ‘ungrateful, aggressive, demanding,
draining and different.’763 Pickering’s conclusions, however, are only
accurate as far as the tabloid media was concerned. The idea that the
Kosovars were “ungrateful” numbered 55 times in the Telegraph, 20 in The
Australian, and seven in the Herald.764 According to a Rehame radio poll,
60 per cent of all callers expressed similar, negative sentiments about the
protesters.765 Popular talkback radio host John Laws proclaimed on-air on
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16th June that the refugees had ‘thrown our hospitality back in our faces in
a very discourteous fashion.’766 Such anger reflects the way unpopular
cultural and social groups throughout Australian history are routinely
sacrificed ‘for the sake of normality’767 which in turn legitimates the
incarceration or expulsion of such persons when they break or challenge
symbolic rules of exclusion. Prime Minister John Howard voiced his
opinion on the protest, linking it to the binary of un/gratefulness:
I would imagine the great bulk of the refugees who are immensely
grateful for the safe haven that Australia has provided would be
extremely embarrassed about the behaviour of a small number[.] I
think they would be a huge embarrassment to their fellow
countrymen.768
Gratitude was a central concern for Senator Tierney as well, who stated
that it was unfortunate that the incident ‘has tended to have an effect on the
attitude of the Australian people towards [Operation Safe Haven]. But they
should not judge the overall gratitude of the people who have come out
from Kosovo by the actions of a few.’769 Tierney’s account of the
Singleton protest in the Senate positioned the refugees’ gratitude and the
‘enormous generosity’ of Australians as central to the program. He
emphasised the importance of ‘pay[ing] special tribute to that
generosity’,770 despite ‘the actions of one man [Sabit Salihu] who may
have soured the taste of some of the very generous people in Australia’.771
Only The Australian resisted the Government’s emphasis on gratitude and
generosity. The newspaper deplored how, in relation to the protesters:
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‘word of their ingratitude spread, tainting the wider refugee population in
the process.’772
On the other hand, Australian “charity” – involving offerings, acts,
responses, monies, materials given or undertaken by Australians for the
benefit of the Kosovars – was noted at least 349 times in the Telegraph,
142 times in The Australian, and on 60 occasions in the Herald. The
Herald pointed out how one of Sydney’s most prestigious private schools,
Trinity Grammar, had transferred its annual cadet camp from Singleton
barracks to make room for the refugees.773 An article in the Telegraph
noted, while accentuating the criminal behaviour of refugees shoplifting in
Singleton, that local Lions, Rotary and Apex clubs had collectively raised
$20,000 and purchased cots, potties and babies bottles for the refugees.774
Hunter Valley coal miners had donated a further $10,000 to the Singleton
Safe Haven.775 As one local shopkeeper stated, noting the generosity of the
community: ‘What more can we do?’776
Evident is an attempt, particularly by the Telegraph, to establish
clear contrasts between the compassion and generosity of the Australian
public and “unappreciative”, “undeserving” refugees. This type of
coverage parallelled Tierney’s account of the Singleton protest in the
Senate where he described the efforts of local Hunter Valley residents as
‘overwhelming’777 while criticising leaders of the protest.778 The discourse
worked to demonise the refugees as ungrateful for Australia’s efforts,
support the Government in its efforts to control the image of the Safe
772
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Haven program, and silence or discredit critics (especially from within the
refugees’ ranks) by occupying a moral high ground. As Pickering says,
affirming Hall’s ideas on the role of the media in constructing social
categories of deviance: ‘The seductive and material power of language in
the representation of deviance can be seen in the binary logic deployed in
relation to asylum seekers and refugees: bogus/genuine; refugees/“boat
people”; law abiding/criminal; legal/illegal; good/evil.’779 Such logic
‘insists on the polarisation of the subject and provides communal comfort
in removing ambivalence through the forced choice of either/or.’780
Crucially, it has tended to be these kinds of punitive binaries that have
come to inform responses by the State, which in turn advocate the need to
combat deviance as the foremost goal.781
However, the charity/gratefulness discourse reveals much more
about the close and complementary relationship formed between the media
and Federal Government in their responses to the protest. The nature in
which charity is offered, in conjunction with how charitable sentiment is
deployed after assistance is given, presents a particular picture of the net
gain that is desired by the group offering it. Within media discourse, it is
possible to recognise how the recipient group becomes the object of good
intentions – to view the point at which they are completely overlooked as
subjects, grouped together and no longer identifiable by more niche,
individual needs.782 Moreover, collectivising the refugees into two distinct
binary groups - such as un/deserving, un/grateful, rebels/dignified –
performs a symbolic political function that is easily understood by the
public. The politicisation of the protest in this way provides a clearer
picture of the strategic objectives of the Government. That is, it
undermines negative press coverage of Operation Safe Haven, and
maintains the appearance of a compassionate refugee program while
imposing a tightly regulated and inhumane form of protection.
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One of the refugees residing at Singleton Safe Haven, referred to by
The Australian as Selvet, a mother of four children, said that before the
family’s arrival all she knew about Australia was that it is ‘end of the
world’.783 As The Australian commented: ‘Now she knows Australians
expect newcomers to act as if they have just been let through the gates of
paradise.’784 Despite widespread claims about the ingratitude of the
Kosovars in Singleton, the incident challenged the idea of Australia being
the “most generous country in the world.” During Safe Haven legislative
debates Ruddock applauded the prominence of ‘compassion fatigue’ within
the Australian community and the support the nation had shown in
assisting the Kosovars.785 He argued that Australia continued to be ‘out in
front’786 in responding to requests made by the UNHCR, noting how the
country already had ‘the largest [permanent refugee intake] in per capita
terms in the world.’787 In Senator Tierney’s explanation of the Singleton
incident to the Federal Parliament, he noted how, per capita, Australia’s
efforts in accepting 4000 refugees was five times that of the US (which had
accepted 20,000). He thanked the broad cross-section of the Australian
community – the Government, Department of Defence, DIMA, community
groups and individuals – who had ‘given so generously to this program.’788
The Singleton episode revealed the extent of the Australian
government’s generosity, and exposed the self-congratulatory appraisal
surrounding the evacuation program as cleverly manufactured political
rhetoric.789 The Australian argued: ‘Until [the Singleton incident], in fact,
we were still clapping ourselves on the back for our hospitality, after
admitting the Kosovars, to keep them on ice for three months, living in a
sort of legal limbo in isolated army barracks where they have to sign in and
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out.’790 In the end, the Government’s response to the questions posed in
Singleton was to repatriate the family who had carried on the protest,
refusing to be ‘dictated to’791 by refugees asking for better quality services.

3. An “Ungrateful” Lot: the Salihu family
3.1 The Salihus: from the bus to a hospital bed
By 17th June media reports about the Singleton barracks protest began to
shift some of the focus to three members of the Salihu family, the only
refugees remaining aboard their transfer coach. The Australian wrote that
the Salihus - which included Sabit (47 years of age), his wife Shaha (48
years) and Sabit’s elderly mother, Elmaze - refused to leave the bus
because Sabit was trying to ‘save face’.792 Lloga, who had arrived the day

Elmaze Salihu, as pictured in The
Australian, 18th June 1999, p. 4
(above); and, in The Daily
Telegraph, 19th June 1999, p. 9
(left)

before to be a liason between government officials and the protesters,793
said: ‘We do not want to force him to lose face, he has lost everything
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else.’794 Lloga recognised the importance of taking Sabit’s concerns
seriously: ‘Staying on the bus is a way of saying “I do exist, take notice of
me”’.795 He said: ‘This man is deeply traumatised. He has shut down and
we need to reach him.’796
Sabit Salihus concerns were not unreasonable, particularly
considering the medical needs of Elmaze, who was 74 years of age
(pictured above).797 Lloga stated that Sabit demanded better facilities for
his mother and wanted to be taken back to East Hills for this reason.
Elmaze was suffering from seizures, had respiratory problems, was
incontinent and required a toilet in her room.798 Sabit later stated in The
Australian that he had spoken to the captain of Singleton barracks on
arrival at East Hills. The Captain had assured him that facilities were good
enough for his sick mother. However, he added: ‘when we got there the
toilets and baths were 500m away[.] I could not let my mother stay
there.’799 The tragic scene was captured by the Telegraph, noting how
Elmaze had slept on the pull-down bunk bed at the rear of the bus while a
portaloo was set up behind the bus which ‘the aged woman frequently
alights to use’.800
Senator Tierney was scathing in his criticism of the family,
particularly Sabit, despite his assertion that he had a PhD in social
psychology and was more than capable of dealing appropriately with the
situation.801 Tierney described Sabit as the ‘total problem’ and the
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stumbling block to moving his family into the Singleton barracks.802 The
Senator added that Sabit Salihu had ‘lost support in the camp’ and that he
was acting ‘irrationally’.803 The Herald supported Tierney, declaring Sabit
‘is behind the bus protest which has tested the patience of the Government
and public and riled his fellow refugees’ who were ‘ashamed’ of him.804
The newspaper cited a suspicious member of the Albanian-Australian
community who was at the barracks to reinforce the point: ‘We should
send him back… Australia has supported and helped our people, yet he
shames us. Perhaps he was sent here by the Serbs to cause trouble for
us’.805 This supported Tierney’s description of Sabit as ‘intransigent’,
implying his demands were absurd and unreasonable.806
This criticism was juxtaposed with Tierney’s story of having spent
an evening sleeping at the Singleton barracks. The Senator told The
Australian the evening had been a ‘very comfortable night,’807 and noted in
the Telegraph that ‘the rooms are well-built and insulated from the cold.’808
He further disagreed with the protesters claims about the bathrooms,
stating that the distance to the amenities block was just 20 paces for
women and 50 for men, adding: ‘It’s just like in a caravan park.’809 Tierney
was reportedly photographed patting his bed at the base and commenting
that he had discarded blankets during the night because he was so warm.810
As The Australian’s Frank Devine stated, however: ‘the senator did not
have to share his room with half a dozen strangers or get up during the
night to take children to the outside toilets. He did not face an hour’s walk
into town and was not a modest woman dreading the communal showers…
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for Tierney to pretend he was sharing [the refugee’s hardships] was
fraudulent and foolish.’811
On the evening of 17th June, the Salihu family heeded the advice of
medical officers at the base. They agreed that their transfer coach should
drive Elmaze to the Singleton Hospital. The officers had been concerned
about Elmaze’s deteriorating condition which included signs of
pneumonia.812 Sabit later told reporters that his mother was diagnosed with
five separate illnesses and that doctors wanted to keep her in the
hospital.813 The family spent less than a day at the hospital and during that
time they were offered a private room. On 18th June, Tierney told The
Australian that the family had been offered, but rejected, a room with a
balcony, kitchen, ensuite and French doors opening to a veranda with
enough room to sleep three.814 He informed the reporters that the family
had been offered first-rate accommodation at Singleton Hospital, noting the
generosity of the staff: ‘The hospital was incredibly co-operative… [They
offered Mr Salihu] all the things he said he wanted for his mother.’815 As
Tierney noted the following week in the Senate: ‘I really take my hat off to
Singleton District Hospital for the generosity of their treatment of this
family.’816 Sabit was reported to have refused the hospital room because a
maximum of only three members of the family were permitted to remain
with Elmaze overnight. He stated that it would be preferable to keep to
family together, even though other family members were permitted to visit
during the day.
The family departed Singleton Hospital via taxi, arriving at the
local train station at around 4pm. Australian reporters David Brearley and
David Kennedy noted how the family would have to wait three hours in the
night cold before the next train to Sydney arrived in Singleton. The episode
came to a ‘sad coda’, they wrote, when the Salihu family ‘huddled on a
811
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platform at Singleton in the cold waiting for a train to return them from the
Hunter Valley to Sydney’s East Hills refugee base’.817 The family
members were joined by Sabit and Shaha’s two daughters (Valbona and
Mergim) and a son (Hysnije).818 Another son, 16-year old Adnan, decided
to remain at the Singleton barracks.819 As noted by The Australian, Sabit
‘was so concerned about getting away from Singleton that he had spent
$150 on train tickets.’820
Brearley and Kennedy, documenting their eyewitness account of
events at the train station, reported how Senator Tierney, ‘trouble-shooter
for Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock, paced the adjacent carpark
insisting that the Government had “bent over backwards to meet the
family’s needs”.’821 The reporters described how Tierney, waiting at the
station for the family to depart for Sydney, at no stage offered them
alternative transport.822 Brearley later commented: ‘At no stage between
3.30pm and 6.30pm did I see [Senator Tierney] approach the family,
although he did speak with them earlier. His plan was to see them safely
onto the train.’823 It is very clear that The Australian, unlike the Telegraph
or Herald, was pursuing a much more inquisitive perspective, one that
ultimately challenged the Government’s view of the Salihu family.

3.2 “Making” the story: interventions by The Australian and evaluating
the role of the Government
One of the most contentious issues to arise from the Singleton affair was
when Australian journalists Brearley and Kennedy offered to hire a taxi to
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take the Salihus to Sydney at the expense of $570.824 It was, as a former
editor-in-chief of The Australian later remarked, ‘a very tabloid thing for a
broadsheet that claims the quality high ground [as The Australian does]’.825
Defending their actions, the reporters stated simply that the refugees were
‘free to move about as they please’826 and that the actions of the Salihus
‘were entirely legal’.827 Under the terms of the refugees’ stay, as
recognised by The Australian, they were entitled to travel anywhere in
Australia, though at their own expense, if they rejected the Government’s
accommodation.828 The reporters’ actions, however, were viewed as a
direct challenge to the Safe Haven program by Tierney and Ruddock. The
reporters defied Government restrictions imposed on the media, having
secured just a few hours alone with the Salihus. Brearley and Kennedy
circumvented Government media spin and Departmental controls over
public relations concerning Operation Safe Haven.
The reporters, having spoken to an immigration official, confirmed
that the Salihus would be allowed to gain short-term access to the East
Hills centre. The family was greeted the next morning at 12.30am by staff
at the base, who were waiting with a wheelchair for Elmaze.829 The
Telegraph, which subsequently labelled the family ‘rebels’,830 had been
highly supportive of the Government throughout coverage of the incident,
describing how Senator Tierney had even ‘maintained a vigil at Singleton
base hospital’ alongside the family as they slept in the casualty waiting
room.831 The response by the Telegraph, however, corresponded to a
broader populist backlash against the protesters. It reflected the results of a
poll conducted by Melbourne-based tabloid Herald Sun in which 96 per
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cent of participants were against the protesters.832 As Mark Day, a former
editor of The Australian, observed, The Australian was ‘swimming against
the tide on the story of the Kosovo refugees,’ and, ‘By doing so the paper
took a robust stand against populism.’833
The Australian supported the actions of its reporters, as indicated
by the headline, ‘Ruddock attacks Good Samaritan gesture’.834 Ruddock
argued that the newspaper had compromised DIMA’s accommodation
arrangements, and that: ‘Those who assume responsibility for relocating
evacuees also assume a duty of care for them.’835 The Immigration
Minister stated that such ‘Undermining’ of the Department’s arrangements
‘puts seriously at risk our ability to manage further arrivals due within
days.’836 There were a further 410 refugees due to arrive at East Hills from
Macedonia on 20th June, while another 100 refugees were currently
residing there.837 Ruddock said, on 18th June, while the accommodation at
Singleton would remain available to the Salihus: ‘It is regrettable that one
family has stood out from all the others in so far refusing that
hospitality.’838 He viewed the Salihus rejection of Singleton barracks as
simply a matter of compliance, describing those who had moved into the
Safe Havens without protest as having ‘accepted Australia’s hospitality
with grace and dignity’.839 By 19th June, Ruddock stated that, having
rejected the Singleton accommodation: ‘there is no option [for the Salihus]
but to give them their other choice to return home.’840 The Immigration
Minister added: ‘Staying at East Hills is not an option’ and that ‘the
Kosovars

do

not

have

the

option

of

picking

and

choosing

accommodation’.841 The position of the Government was to regard
compliant Kosovars as graceful and dignified, while the protesters were to
832

Day, op. cit.
ibid.
834
Tanner, ‘Ruddock attacks Good Samaritan gesture’, op. cit.
835
Ruddock, cited in ibid.
836
Ruddock, cited in ibid.
837
Farr, ‘Rebel refugees to be sent home’, op. cit.
838
Ruddock, cited in Tanner, ‘Ruddock attacks Good Samaritan gesture’, op. cit.
839
Ruddock, cited in D. Murphy, ‘Go home, Kosovar family told’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 19th June 1999, p. 3.
840
Ruddock, cited in McGregor, ‘Kosovar family can go – Ruddock’, op. cit.
841
Ruddock, cited in Farr, ‘Rebel refugees to be sent home’, op. cit. Ruddock is also cited
on this point in Murphy, ‘Go home, Kosovar family told’, op. cit.
833

205

be were viewed as demanding and ungrateful – there was no middle ground
recognised by the Government, nor “special treatment” to be offered to any
of the refugees.
The response of The Australian to the Singleton protest extended
from a particular editorial agenda that set it aside from the Herald and the
Telegraph. Campbell Reid, sub-editor for The Australian, stated that there
was unanimity expressed at a recent editorial conference in which staff
were ‘appalled that the collective charity of the nation survived only until
one family among 4000 people crossed a line on accommodation
standards.’842 From the beginning of Operation Safe Haven, he explained,
The Australian’s editorial team very firmly claimed to advocate a human
rights agenda. Reid confirmed a week after the Singleton incident that The
Australian’s approach to the story had indicated its ‘willingness to take a
pro-active position on the issues confronting Australia’, that ‘We want to
be a voice of leadership’.843 Despite claims about compassion, the
newspaper actively catered to a more niche, ‘intellectual’ (as opposed to
populist) readership.844 The Australian, being the ultimate benefactor,
generated its own story as well as reader interest, but also crossed the line
between reporting events and creating news.
The Australian’s editor-in-chief, David Armstrong, ‘rejected’
Ruddock’s claim that the newspaper had ‘undermined’ the refugees’
accommodation arrangements.845 Armstrong said that the journalists had
acted out of compassion towards a family clearly disturbed by its
experiences.846 As another Australian reporter, David Tanner, wrote: ‘the
Immigration Department was prepared to let the group […] wait on a cold
railway platform for a journey that would have required them to change
trains at least twice and arrive in a city completely foreign to them late at
night.’847 Tanner added: ‘Once there they would have had to walk carrying
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heavy luggage for more than a kilometre in the dark to the barracks,
including crossing a footbridge over the Georges River.’848
As noted by Brearley, the response by the Immigration Minister
and Senator Tierney reflected a politicised transformation of the image of
the Kosovars in the media from ‘wretches to whingers’.849 The reporter
argued that the Government’s response, along with critical backlash in
other media, supported the notion that ‘any charity we offer Kosovo’s
refugees is conditional: a beggar’s gratitude is the prescribed response;
anything less renders the whole deal suspect.’850 Brearley went on:
‘Ostensibly […] the facilities fail to meet the needs of their ailing
grandmother Elmaze, but there’s more to the story.’851 He criticised
Tierney for attempting to ‘put the government spin on proceedings’, and
for stating that Sabit Salihu was ‘totally unreasonable’, that Elmaze’s
condition was ‘something they’d normally treat at home’ and that the
Government had ‘bent over backwards’ to accommodate them.852
Other media outlets and government spokespersons denounced the
actions of the reporters claiming they had breached the media’s code of
ethics. On 21st June, Tierney announced a senatorial inquiry into the
incident and threatened to lodge a complaint with the Australian Press
Council arguing that it was not the role of news organisations to create
news; rather, they were to simply report and stay out of it.853 He stated:
‘This is the case of a reporter crossing the boundary, and instead of
reporting the news, actually making the news’.854 The Telegraph supported
Tierney, deciding not to become involved due to ethical concerns. The
Telegraph’s editor-in-chief, Col Allan, commented: ‘If the story was an
interview with the family, fair enough[.] But the story here was the
family’s travels, and if you interfere with that, you’ve changed the course
848
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of the story.’855 The Telegraph claimed to have maintained the moral high
ground on the matter (as opposed to The Australian), although its response
very clearly indicates the political and populist leanings of the
newspaper.856
Day dismissed the criticism, describing how other media had
merely suffered ‘an attack of sour grapes because they, too, saw the story
being taken on a new course by the intervention of a rival reporter. They
were quick to invoke the position that reporters should not be
participants.’857 Most significantly, it was not only competing media
organisations that feared they had lost control of the narrative. The story
was no longer under the direction of public relations officers within the
Department of Immigration. The controls imposed by the Department on
the situation are implicit in statements later made by Sabit Salihu after
arriving home in Ferijaz: ‘no one could speak to us, not television people.
Even the Albanian people were frightened to speak to us [sic].’858 Frank
Devine accurately depicted the kind of control the Government had
attempted to impose on the media: ‘Before the first refugee set foot in this
country, Ruddock declared war on the media… [he] was afraid parts of it
wouldn’t look good.’859 Devine added: ‘Immigration officials flooded into
the camps as guards [...] to hold nosy parkers at bay… Ruddock’s guards
made the Kosovars feel at home by warning them to have nothing to do
with the western press.’860 Television coverage, he noted, was taken from
‘guided tours for television crews of “authorised” areas of safe havens’.861
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As The Australian’s editor indicated, at the core of the
Government’s concerns was the desire to dictate media spin concerning
Operation Safe Haven; ‘we had committed a cardinal sin: we helped a
family escape, for a time, the bureaucrats’ control.’862 He rebuffed
Tierney’s threat of a Senate inquiry, noting that: ‘Last night, he had the
dumb honesty to say we had acted unethically because we had opposed the
Government’s line.’863 This was in reference to the comments made by
Tierney, that: ‘This incident is a classic example of unethical practice. The
Government has taken a particular line and what News Limited has done is
facilitate the opposite.’864 As Day observed, underlying Tierney and
Ruddock’s criticisms of The Australian was the sentiment that the
Government was ‘miffed because it was seen as hard-hearted, uncaring,
and having lost control of the situation.’865

3.3 “Facts” about the Salihu family
The media provided a range of insights about the Salihus, particularly
Sabit, who was commonly reported to be the spokesman and head of the
family – and, according to the Telegraph, was the ‘ringleader’ of the bus
sit-in.866 However, depictions of the Salihu family in the media were
inconsistent, raising significant questions concerning the accuracy,
credibility and political leanings of the newspapers under investigation. It
was commonly reported that the Salihus had resided in their family house
in the town of Ferizaj in southern Kosovo, a town with 50,000 residents
before the war and located 40 kilometres from Pristina.867 However, there
were a number of variations, elaborations or details missing across the
Herald, Telegraph and Australian concerning aspects such as where the
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family had stayed in Macedonia before coming to Australia, as well as
Sabit’s occupation. The use of facts about the family was often consistent
with whether the article and more broadly the extent to which the
newspaper at hand had advocated support for the Singleton protest.
Some articles questioned whether the family were “genuine”
refugees and had been sincere in their intentions in coming to Australia.
Pickering describes how the choice of vocabulary reveals the ways in
which language that challenges the status of refugees is used by the press.
The effect of this, in her analysis, was that it cast doubt on the ‘legitimacy
and genuineness’ of refugees ‘without questioning the assumptions upon
which debatable terms such as “phoney” and “bogus” are based.’868 A
point of ambiguity was whether the family had actually been living in the
Macedonian Stenkovac refugee camp when they had applied to be
evacuated to Australia. The Telegraph speculated, without confirmation
and citing rumours circulating at the Safe Havens: ‘this wealthy man
stayed in a private home’.869 The links made here between affluence and
whether the family were genuine refugees corresponded to Senator
Tierney’s explanation to Federal Parliament, which emphasised: ‘It was
reported by the people who took the cab fare and the station fare that he
had plenty of money with him.’870 In The Australian, Sabit had informed
reporters initially that, while he had stayed in the camp with his wife,
daughters and sons, his elderly mother had been staying in a private home
in a Macedonian village near the camp. 871 Later, The Australian reported
that the family had ‘enjoyed the hospitality of an Albanian family in
Tetovo, Macedonia’s second city,’ while also spending time at
Stenkovac.872 The Herald, citing a member of the Australian-Albanian
community working with the refugees on the bus (who wished to remain
anonymous): ‘He is wealthy. I was told he did not spend a single day in a
camp in Macedonia.’873
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In relation to Sabit’s employment background, according to earlier
reports in The Australian, Sabit had been a truck driver but was
unemployed when Serb police told his family to leave the province or ‘be
decapitated.’874 Later, the newspaper described Sabit as a ‘trader’,
importing clothes for sale at local markets.875 The Telegraph described
Sabit as a truck driver as well,876 though elsewhere it was said he had been
a limousine chauffeur for 21 years.877 In most cases media reports
suggested that Sabit was different to most Kosovars - somehow more
selfish, wealthy and tricky – with the effect of isolating him and his claims
as extraordinary and unreasonable. The accumulated effect is reflected in
the links that emerged between the notions of genuineness and
gratefulness. Such connotations propagated anger and a sense of betrayal
as a “common sense” reaction, alongside the “common sense” resolution to
deport the rebels as soon as possible. As Pickering says, ‘Genuineness and
gratefulness become a newsworthy question’, particularly when popular
identity discourse in Australia is founded on principles of exclusion and
exclusivity.878 She goes on: ‘It is with relative ease that such rule breakers
are necessarily expelled from the community’.879
Points of contestation in media narratives - particularly in relation
to the embellishment or exclusion of certain details - have the effect of
casting serious doubt over the credibility of the subject. These ambiguities
provided an unstable view of the Salihus with the potential of generating
suspicion and undermining any claims they may have had to being
“genuine” refugees. The shift from empathy to outrage in the media is
reflected in how some sources attempted to represent Sabit Salihu as
wealthy, middle class and thus as undeserving of Australia’s assistance. As
The Australian wrote, capturing other media’s depictions:
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the media’s image of the family was changing: their wallets bulged
with crisp Australian banknotes, and Sabit was a wealthy man who
lived in a big house and made his fortune in the unlikely field of
chauffeuring. They were, one account suggested, ‘designer
refugees.’880
The newspaper went on, saying that the family had paid a ‘high price’ in
the media for its ‘middle class credentials, which have not even been
established.’881 Disputing these kinds of representations, The Australian
added: ‘Sabit wears a Nike jacket but there is nothing flash about him. And
his mother, wizened and weary, looks like she’s straight off the back of a
tractor.’882
Descriptions of the personal character of Mr Salihu comprised the
basis of much of the criticism of his actions. He was occasionally described
in news articles as the ‘patriarch’ of his family, a term that was used at
least seven times in The Australian, though it was only used once by the
Herald.883 Although the Telegraph did not describe Mr Salihu as a
‘patriarch’, it did utilise the term ‘patriarchal’ at least two times to suggest
that the protesters’ behaviour was supposedly reflective of Kosovar culture.
The descriptor ‘patriarchal’ was cited only once by the Herald and while
The Australian quite clearly supported the actions of its reporters to assist
the Salihu family, constant description of Sabit as the ‘patriarch’ of his
family reinforced negative sentiments that Kosovar culture was somewhat
chauvinist and male-dominated.884
From the range of public figures interviewed about the Singleton
protest, Senator Tierney most often used these kinds of negative,
“patriarchal” descriptors. As he explained to the Senate, describing the
earlier part of the protest: ‘We should understand that they are coming
from a very patriarchal society, and what these six leading men said
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actually went and people did follow what they said.’885 Such language was
part of attempts by the Senator to defuse criticism of the Singleton Safe
Haven and undermine Sabit Salihus’ claims. The central focus on Tierney
in media coverage underscores his importance as an authority on the matter
and for public understandings of the protest. Noting this, ALP Senator
Robert Ray (Victoria) criticised Tierney’s public relations efforts during
parliamentary debate. A major problem that emerged during the protest, as
Ray identified, was immense politicisation of the Safe Haven program by
the Immigration Minister from the beginning. Ray criticised the
Immigration Minister’s ‘very poor form in appointing only coalition
members to be patrons of the Kosovar refugees in Australia,’ describing
how the appointments ‘fit a pattern of sleaziness and pettiness’ that was
consistent with other areas of policy.886 Ray added: ‘That is not a bipartisan
approach. That is to do with petty, political-scoring in this country.’887 Ray
commented: ‘I wonder what Senator Tierney thought when the acid
dropped on him [as sole patron of the Singleton Safe Haven]. He would
have loved to have a co-patron […] to assist him at Singleton.’888 It was
not until eight days after the protest began that a co-patron representing the
Labor Opposition was appointed to the Singleton Safe Haven.
Tierney’s role as sole patron to the Singleton Safe Haven (until 22nd
June) and as Government spokesperson for the barracks was crucial to
public perceptions of the incident. His view was significantly influenced by
party conservatism, pressure from the Immigration Minister and the need
to uphold a positive public image of the Government while discrediting the
claims of the protesters. Writing in The Australian, Brearley argued:
‘Constrained by both law and Coalition policy, Senator Tierney kept his
distance [from the Salihus at the train station].’889 The public relations
dilemma for Tierney was two-fold. On one hand, the Senator was obliged
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to adhere to the party line. He would be acting against official policy by
assisting the Salihus in their efforts to return to East Hills, “undermine”
DIMA’s planning efforts and contradict the Minister’s position on the
matter. Moreover, the pressure placed on Tierney as the Singleton patron
and Government spokesperson was amplified by media coverage. As
Leech notes, one could only imagine ‘the shame [the Federal Government]
would have worn if Elmaze Salihu had caught pneumonia.’890

Philip Ruddock waving goodbye to the Salihu family,
from The Australian, 28th June 1999, p. 13

Conclusion
This chapter has investigated debate about the quality of the
accommodation facilities provided by the Australian government to the
Kosovar refugees. It is evident that Kosovars who were dispatched to
quarters in Singleton had legitimate concerns about the quality of the Safe
Haven program. I have evaluated the concerns of those refugees offered
accommodation at the Singleton barracks, as well as the position of the
Federal Government in upholding its obligations to UNHCR. One of the
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foreseeable problems at Singleton – as had been expressed by various
commentators during the planning stages of Operation Safe Haven – was
the distance imposed by the Federal Government between the majority of
the Australian community and the refugees. This was further noted by
critics

of

the

Government

during

the

Singleton

protests.

The

accommodation plan effectively isolated the refugees from the majority of
the Australian population as well as from Albanian communities capable of
assisting the Kosovars during their temporary stay. Under the Safe Haven
Visa program the Kosovars were “free to leave” (as Ruddock suggested)
the shelter of the Safe Havens, but faced foregoing Government protection
and support.
This chapter has discussed the relationship formed between the
media and the Federal Government in responding to the Singleton protest.
The isolation of the Kosovars was overlooked by the media (excepting, to a
degree, The Australian), as was consideration for the traumatic experiences
the Kosovars had endured. Moreover, debate about the suitability of using
army barracks was overshadowed by the refugees’ supposed insult to
Australian hospitality and popular outcries concerning their “ingratitude”.
The majority of media coverage supported the Federal Government in
these matters, frequently adopting the Immigration Minister’s and Senator
Tierney’s account of the Singleton protest. This coincided with a dramatic
transformation of popular conceptions of the Kosovars from welcomed to
ungrateful and the deployment of negative stereotypes by the media
including notions that the refugees were patriarchal, violent, suspect and
intransigent.
A close and complementary relationship between the tabloid press
and the Howard Government was clearly evident on these issues. Only The
Australian resisted the Government’s attempts to politicise and undermine
the refugees’ requests for better quality services. This was further
demonstrated by the activist role of the newspaper where staff intervened
directly to assist the Salihu family, producing scathing criticism from the
Government. The Singleton incident captures the way popular refugee
discourse has continued to be shaped by an expectation that refugees ought
to be grateful for the opportunities provided to them by Australia. It further
215

denotes that questioning of the country’s refugee programs and its
compassion is readily offset by popular campaigns to demonise refugees as
deviant and undeserving. The Singleton incident reveals the extent to
which Australia’s media institutions have been willing to support hostility
to refugees when they have asked for better quality protection and
treatment.
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Chapter 5: The End of Operation Safe Haven;
Repatriation and the High Court Challenge
Introduction
The aim in this chapter is to investigate the circumstances in which the
Kosovars were returned to their homeland by the Australian government.
Chapter 5 is set out in three parts. The first part examines the closure of the
Safe Havens and the repatriation of most Kosovar refugees between July
and the end of 1999. This section explores the rationale behind the Winter
Reconstruction Allowance, a monetary incentive offered by the Federal
Government to the refugees to leave Australia. It investigates the
Immigration Minister’s threats to detain the Kosovars, as well as the legal
ramifications wherein the Safe Haven Visa program enabled sending the
refugees home in the period immediately following the war.
In the second part of this chapter I examine a range of issues facing
Kosovars still residing in Australia in the early months of 2000. The main
focus is on the High Court challenge posed by some of the refugees to
prevent their repatriation together with media representations of this
episode. A secondary focus is on the removal of Kosovar refugees by the
Federal Government and the incarceration of those who continued to refuse
to leave Australia voluntarily. This section also explores media coverage of
the Department of Immigration’s “hunt” for refugees deemed “on the run”,
and the implications of the discourse of “compliance” that tended to shape
news reports.
The final part of this chapter elaborates on the circumstances facing
Kosovar refugees once they returned home in early 2000. The main
concern here is the extent to which the media supported both the Federal
Government’s “tough” stance on repatriation, as well as the humanitarian
concerns of the UNHCR.
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1. Sending the Kosovars Home and the Closure of the Safe Havens
1.1 Declared safe: What awaited the Kosovars upon their arrival home?
A peace agreement was reached between NATO and Yugoslavia on 9th
June 1999, eleven weeks after the beginning of NATO air strikes against
Serbian forces.891 The agreement was followed by the withdrawal of
Serbian troops and the division of peacekeeping duties in the province
between US, British, Italian, German and French troops.892 Kosovo became
a NATO protectorate and was directly administered by the UN until a
formal declaration of independence from Serbia was announced in 2008.
The withdrawal of Serbian troops and the rapid return of refugees from
border camps generated an atmosphere of panic for thousands of ethnic
Serbian Kosovars, many of whom fled to Belgrade in fear of reprisals by
the KLA.893
Although systematic persecution had ceased, the security and
economic situation of Kosovo was far from stable when the Australian
government began to repatriate ethnic Albanian refugees to the province in
July 1999. By mid-July, the UNHCR regarded much of Kosovo safe for
return. Canada and Germany had begun repatriating some Kosovar
refugees on 9th July,894 while a total 628,000 had returned home in the
month after the peace settlement.895 A UNHCR staff member in Canberra
stated that: ‘Our assessment is that while conditions remain precarious in
Kosovo, the situation is sufficiently secure for UNHCR to co-ordinate and
manage the return of refugees who are volunteering to return.’896 The
organisation stated that 64 per cent of housing had been damaged or
destroyed in the war, while ‘food was scarce, water contaminated and
health facilities severely damaged.’897 A concern for the RCOA was the
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speed at which refugees were returning, citing the ‘enormous challenge for
aid providers in Kosovo.’898
The situation remained unsafe for about 800 refugees who had lived
in Eastern parts of Kosovo before the war, a region that had become part of
Serbia proper as part of the NATO-Yugoslav peace agreement.899 There
was an obvious danger to these refugees if they were to be repatriated by
the

Australian

government.

Australian-Albanian

National

Council

chairman Erik Lloga stated: ‘We can’t deliver them to Milosevic only to
have them again thrown across the border.’900 He described how some of
the refugees never wanted to see the Balkans again, arguing: ‘There should
be an option for permanent residency for those who cannot go back or
aren’t willing to go back.’901 Many refugees wanted to remain in Australia
and rebuild their lives because they had no home to return to. As Lloga
commented: ‘Probably a large portion who have no connection with
Kosovo proper as it is now constituted, they have no country to return to –
but Australia does not offer an option of applying for refugee status.’902
Opposition immigration spokesperson Con Sciacca commented that
it made economic sense to allow the refugees to apply to stay in Australia
while they were in the country. Moreover, he added: ‘Even if as many as
50 per cent wanted to stay, that adds up to 2000 people, and that represents
only 2-3 per cent of Australia’s total (immigration) intake.’903 Sciacca
(along with the Democrats) called on Ruddock to amend the Safe Haven
legislation to allow those who wanted to apply for residency to do so
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onshore rather than after they had gone home.904 An immigration
spokesperson responded by stating that it had been made clear to the
Kosovars that they would have to return home before being granted more
permanent visa status.905 This sentiment was reinforced by Senator Kay
Patterson who had been appointed patron to all the Safe Havens. She noted
that: ‘We made sure before the refugees came that they were very clearly
counselled that it was a temporary arrangement, and they signed an
agreement indicating they were aware of that.’906
The Telegraph and the Herald were, for the most part, supportive
of the Federal Government’s position on repatriation. The Herald attacked
Sciacca for ‘abandoning the pretence of bipartisanship on the refugees.’907
The argument presented in the newspaper went on: ‘For the sake of some
easy politicking within the ethnic communities in Australia… He [Sciacca]
has undermined the UN efforts to restore community life in Kosovo. And
he has promoted a false hope among the refugees. A retraction is needed to
clean up the mess he is trying to make.’908 The newspaper later cited
Liberal Senator Eric Abetz, who called for an end to Labor politicians
‘cruelly’ raising false hopes about long-term settlement.909 This issue reemerged in April 2000 concerning the procedures in which Kosovar
refugees were able to return to Australia after being offered permanent
protection. It was noted by the Herald at this time how one family who had
already gone back to Kosovo would soon be allowed to migrate to
Australia. A DIMA spokesperson responded to criticism by denying that
sending the family back was a waste of money.910
The Australian was more concerned about the human rights of the
Kosovars, describing on 16th July 1999 how the Howard Government was
beginning to face pressure from state leaders to allow the refugees to
904
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remain permanently if they wished. South Australian Premier John Olsen
wrote to the Prime Minister, stating that up to eighty per cent of the
refugees being accommodated at Hampstead (Adelaide) and around thirty
per cent of those at Leeuwin barracks (Perth) wished to stay.911 The
following day The Australian reported that immigration officials had begun
to deny phone access and information to Kosovar refugees at Leeuwin
barracks. It was recognised that immigration officials had been ‘intent on
keeping the media out and a lid on the number of refugees wishing to
remain in Australia.’912 One of the refugees at Leeuwin told the newspaper
that immigration staff had stopped supplying phone cards after some of the
refugees had expressed a desire to stay in Australia. Amid a more general
tightening of media access to the Kosovars, a journalist and photographer
from The Australian were refused permission to enter the barracks, despite
having been given clearance two days prior.913 An immigration
spokesperson denied any increase in restrictions being imposed on the
media and stated that new phone cards would be issued to families on a
monthly basis.914
On 23rd July, the first chartered-flight from Australia to Macedonia
was boarded by 294 Kosovars following the UNHCR’s recommendation
for some of the refugees to return. The Herald described how the refugees
would simply be ‘bussed’ to Kosovo following their 30-hour flight to
Skopje.915 Ruddock addressed the refugees at an official farewell at Sydney
airport before their departure to Skopje. The Immigration Minister insisted
during the farewell that the refugees had left ‘on a voluntary basis’ as
consistent with UN guidelines and said that he hoped the refugees’ stay had
been ‘uplifting and hospitable.’916 Ruddock noted how the Kosovars were
911
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‘eager to be reunited with their families and friends and to begin rebuilding
their lives.’917 He added: ‘I hope that your experiences in Australia have
been to see how successfully people can live together in harmony,
constructively building lives and futures together.’918 Ruddock stated that
he hoped the Kosovars were able to see how ‘people from different
backgrounds can live together in harmony.’919 As I have noted elsewhere
this kind of statement worked to reaffirm a triumphal sense of Australian
superiority. This was consistently the case in media coverage that paraded
the success of Operation Safe Haven and was also congratulatory of the
Australian government and Australian “values”.920
As the Kosovars left the Herald reported that: ‘Where they are
going courts, hospitals and schools are struggling to reopen, water and gas
supplies are unreliable at best, and everywhere there are piles of rubbish.
But the Kosovars at Sydney airport yesterday did not care. They were
going home.’921 The newspaper’s description of life in Kosovo was
accurate in relation to the periods both under Yugoslav rule and following
the war. Prior to the conflict there had been a drastic shortage of public
services provided for Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav State.922
Nonetheless, there was a broader cultural subtext at work. Stereotypes
about poverty and underdevelopment in the province had continued to
inhibit media representations of the Kosovars throughout their stay in
Australia. The departure of the Kosovars at Sydney airport was, for Herald
readers, a scene of excitement and a harmonious narrative transition. The
Herald described how one refugee couple ‘could not wait to get home’
stating the desire for their first baby to be born in Kosovo.923 These images
reinforced the perception that the departure was part of an expected
sequence of events, and that no other option (such as permanent protection)
was possible or needed to be offered by the Australian government.
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The position of the Federal Government at this time was consistent
with statements made during the initial evacuations of Kosovar refugees to
Australia in one important respect. That is, that the refugees would need to
return home ‘when the Government says so.’924 It was inconsistent,
however, with comments made earlier by the Prime Minister and other
officials that the Kosovars would be welcomed to their “new home” with
‘open arms’.925 There was an ongoing tension between media
representations of the Government as compassionate, punitive and
suspicious of the Kosovar refugees. The Government’s position on
repatriation was, thus, a continuation of the contradictory rationale upon
which the Safe Haven program had been implemented from the beginning.
Prime Minister Howard indicated on 3AW Radio on 24th July that
some of the refugees might be allowed to stay in Australia permanently. He
noted, however, that each case would be considered on its own merit.
Howard said the position of the Government continued to be that the
Kosovars were in Australia on merely a temporary basis, adding: ‘We’re
reluctant to alter that, but in all of these things we’ll try and behave in a
sensitive sense, sensible fashion [sic].’926 Asked on the radio program if
some of the refugees would be allowed to stay, Howard said ‘Well, yes.
But I would prefer they went back[.]’927 As described by the Herald, the
Prime Minister had caused ‘a few raised eyebrows’ with his suggestion that
the Government would consider applications from Kosovars who wanted
to live in Australia.928 A spokesperson for the Prime Minister said shortly
afterwards that Howard’s remarks referred to refugees who wished to apply
for a different refugee visa after they had returned to Kosovo.
An important concern for the Prime Minister was, he argued, to be
consistent with humanitarian behaviour and not change the basis on which
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the refugees had come to Australia. He commented that, otherwise, other
refugees applying to come to Australia could be disappointed. Howard
maintained that providing the Kosovars with temporary safe haven was the
right thing to do; ‘It demonstrated to the world that Australia had a heart
and we made the lives of 4000 people who emerged from the tragic
situation that much more bearable.’929 In this regard, the Prime Minister’s
position on returning the refugees to Kosovo remained consistent with that
expressed during media coverage of the arrival at Sydney airport – they
were welcomed, as long as they remained compliant with official
procedures, particularly in view of the media. It signified the ways in
which the refugees’ plight had been incorporated into DIMA’s strategic
public relations campaign from the beginning which provided the Prime
Minister with a platform to promote the Government as compassionate and
caring.
The Immigration Minister, responding to Howard’s radio comment,
downplayed the possibilities of the Kosovars being granted permanent
residency. The main concern for Ruddock was whether the Kosovars were
‘genuine’ refugees, stating: ‘If someone is a genuine refugee and their
circumstances warrant consideration there is provision … for that to be
articulated, but I can’t see how somebody will be able to mount a claim for
persecution.’930 Ruddock said that, in the context of the new administration
in Kosovo, supervised by the international community, it would be difficult
for the Kosovars to ‘satisfy the criteria’ of proving persecution.931 He
added that the Kosovars would struggle to qualify for permanent protection
under the international refugee convention under these circumstances. 932
The differences between the views of the Prime Minister and Ruddock on
repatriation reflected a pattern of tension, as The Australian suggested, that
extended back to April when Cabinet had overruled the Immigration
Minister in allowing the refugees to come to Australia.933 The
Government’s reluctance to allow the Kosovars to stay in Australia ignored
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the fragility of the peace in their home country. As The Australian noted,
several months after the war had finished: ‘The Kosovo situation remains
fluid because of Milosevic’s hold on office and the reluctance of Kosovo
Liberation Army guerrillas to give up their weapons.’934 As columnist
Andrew Fraser described the situation: ‘Shelter has to be provided, homes
have to be rebuilt, commerce has to be re-established and good order
achieved.’935

1.2 The legal implications of sending the Kosovars home
The Kosovars were provided with no legal protections to challenge their
repatriation, though the drastic implications for their human rights were
well known to critics of the Safe Haven legislation from the beginning. The
temporary Safe Haven Visa imposed stringent limitations and removed – as
critics in the Safe Haven legislative debates had argued - “natural justice”.
The legislation denied the right of the Safe Haven Visa holder to legally
challenge a decision by the Immigration Minister to cancel that visa and
then forcibly repatriate them (and their families) from Australia. The
purpose of the visa was twofold (as stressed twice in the first reading of the
Safe Haven Bill in the Senate) – to maintain the Government’s
commitment to the UNHCR to temporarily protect 4000 Kosovar refugees;
and to ‘maintain the integrity of Australia’s migration and humanitarian
programs.’936

Democrats

Senator

Andrew

Bartlett

(the

party’s

spokesperson on immigration matters) was concerned that the Bill would
create a ‘class of visa holders who can be removed easily with minimum
cost and with no regard for the opportunity for appeal. The legislation
seeks to do this by insulating the minister from the fetters of the rule of
law’.937 ALP Senator Barney Cooney (Victoria) commented, similarly:
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‘why is it that we do not have provisions that allow the decision making to
be overseen by a process, either quasi-judicial or judicial?’938
Sciacca had, moreover, been concerned with the way the
Government had created a visa class that denied the opportunity for appeal
and individual choice and discarded the principles of natural justice. He
stated: ‘[T]o draft a piece of legislation with such latitude can create a
dangerous precedent.’939 Sciacca noted that similar concerns had been
expressed by organisations such as Amnesty International, RCOA, the
International Jurists Association, the Law Council and many others.940 As
Curren states, judicial review ‘can only help prevent abuse and errors by
immigration officers and the Minister, whose determinations may involve
the life or death of safe haven recipients.’941
Both the Safe Haven legislation and Operation Safe Haven were
designed to deal with the collective rather than individual needs of the
Kosovars. The Safe Haven Visa, in other words, did not recognise the
Kosovar refugees as individuals with distinct needs under the law. Curren
notes how the visa sat uneasily with the basis of common law:
that is, that the law is to be applied to the individual facts and
circumstances of each case, rather than uniformly applied
irrespective of the individual circumstances of the case.942
Curren states how ignoring the fact that different cases raise different
issues can run the risk of injustice, ‘or in case of refugees fleeing
persecution, a risk of return to the country where they will be exposed to
personal danger.’943 Petro Georgiou (Liberal Party Member for Kooyong)
had also been concerned about aspects of the Safe Haven Bill that signalled
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a major departure from previous immigration policy that guaranteed human
rights protection. He noted the implications the Bill would have for entire
families holding the Safe Haven Visa following the cancellation of an
individual’s temporary Safe Haven status by the Immigration Minister.
Georgiou went on: ‘While we are all aware that there are reduced rights for
non-residents, the imposition of what seems to be a form of collective
sanction is something that, as a matter of principle, we should be very
concerned about.’944
As I have noted, the Safe Haven program obviously limited the
independence of the Kosovars while resident in Australia. The limited
weekly allowance, the establishment of control-orientated accommodation
and the location of the Safe Havens (four of which were in remote areas)
meant that the Kosovars were highly dependent on the Federal Government
throughout their stay. The $20 per week allowance was much less than that
available to Kosovar refugees evacuated to other countries. Germany, for
instance, had granted $80 per week for adults and $40 for children.945 The
Government discouraged the Kosovars from residing with friends or family
in Australia by tying the allocation of benefits to the condition of staying at
the barracks. It inhibited the refugees’ ability to attain any reasonable
independence by denying (at first) and then significantly limiting the
amount of paid employment they could obtain. The Federal Government
used these measures to control the Kosovar refugees and dictate their terms
of residence without being subject to external checks on those powers.
Effectively, the Kosovars had very little economic incentive or legal right
to remain in Australia under the terms of the Safe Haven Visa, nor any
capacity to challenge their repatriation.

1.3 The Australian Government’s Winter Reconstruction Allowance
To encourage the remaining Kosovars to return, the Australian government
offered $3000 to each adult and $500 per child under-18 years of age as
944
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part of its offer of a Winter Reconstruction Allowance on 24th August.946
This would assist individuals in re-establishing their lives back home, the
Federal Government argued, as well as assisting them in restocking
businesses, and buying seeds for farms, building materials and furniture.947
Ruddock issued a two-month deadline for the remainder of the Kosovar
refugees to depart Australia in order to receive the Allowance (an offer
valid until 30th October 1999). This was despite recent figures produced by
the UN that an average of at least five people were injured or killed by
landmines each day in the province.948 It was further reported that up to
thirty per cent of NATO’s cluster-bombs had failed to explode on impact,
with many still scattered throughout the countryside.949 Refugees at
Singleton Safe Haven said that the money was not enough to persuade
them to leave Australia. Nexhat Bajrami, 24 years of age, had been
residing at the Singleton base with his wife when he stated: ‘I don’t care
about the money. I look for work everyday in Singleton. I want to stay.’950
Fadil Bllaca, whose farm near the Southern Kosovo town of Gjilan had
been destroyed in the conflict, said he wanted to remain in Australia and
that the money would be better offered to his friends who had already left
for home but were ineligible for the money.951
Ruddock assured the Telegraph that those who had already returned
would be given aid from the international community.952 The allowance
offered by the Australian government was, he argued, in line with the
UNHCR’s request to assist Kosovars in returning home. The Winter
Reconstruction Allowance eventually cost the Federal Government $4.1
million with the Immigration Minister later commenting that: ‘The
allowance made good economic sense as the amount of the allowance was
946

See L. Martin, ‘Kosovars To Be Paid $3,000 To Aid Return’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 25th August 1999, p. 5. Here, it is stated that the money was planning to be
disbursed to the refugees in the form of travellers’ cheques.
947
York, op. cit., p. 88. See also Martin, ‘Kosovars To Be Paid $3,000 To Aid Return’, op.
cit.
948
S. Mann, ‘Optimism Shines Through The Pain’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21st
August 1999, p. 25.
949
ibid.
950
N. Bajrami, cited in D. Way and A. Kamper, ‘$3000 offer to go home’, The Daily
Telegraph, 25th August 1999, p. 2.
951
See comments by F. Bllaca, as cited in ibid.
952
ibid.

228

offset through savings in accommodation and other support costs of the
safe havens.’953 Sciacca criticised the Immigration Minister. He concluded
that the allowance made economic sense but said it did not address the
question of the Kosovars’ safety once they returned. He stated that:
‘Economically, it makes sense to spend around $6 million to encourage
these people to go back, given that currently, the operation is costing
Australian taxpayers around $10 million a month.’954 The fact remained, he
stated, that just below one thousand of the Kosovar refugees in Australia
were from Eastern Kosovo, the area now under Serbian control.
The Australian government’s Winter Reconstruction Allowance
was comparable to the post-war assistance offered by other countries to
repatriated Kosovar refugees. By August 1999, Switzerland had given cash
and materials valued at around $US3000 to returnees. Germany had
offered $US300, while Norway provided kit homes.955 A concern for the
UNHCR, however, was that the amount of money given by foreign
governments to returnees remained susceptible to a highly unstable
economy. A UNHCR spokeswoman in Geneva stated that, while the
Australian government’s offer was generous and welcome, prices in
Kosovo were rising fast and changing every day.956 Adding volatility to the
situation was that many of the refugees, the spokeswoman added, would
not have jobs to return to.957 Some media reports described how blackmarket operators were taking advantage of the situation958 and the expense
of returning to Kosovo at this point in time seemed illogical to many
refugees still in Australia.959
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Almost half of the Kosovars who had been evacuated to Australia
had returned home by 9th September and the Safe Havens at Singleton,
Puckapunyal and Hampstead were closed by the end of the month.960 East
Hills Safe Haven had officially closed for the Kosovars by 29th September
as well, and most of those remaining at the base (468 in total) were
transferred elsewhere to make way for 1438 refugees evacuated from East
Timor under a different temporary protection scheme.961 One of Ruddock’s
concerns, The Australian noted, was that the Kosovars might contract
‘tropical diseases’ from the East Timorese and that there was no way to
separate the groups due to communal dining and recreation rooms.962
Ruddock reiterated that the Kosovars must leave Australia by the end of
October 1999 (when the Safe Haven Visa was set to expire). Afterwards,
the Immigration Minister began to reduce the medical and other types of
support previously made available to the Kosovars.963
Between August and October 1999, 2268 refugees had accepted the
offer of the Winter Reconstruction Allowance. Ruddock noted that the
Allowance was equivalent to two years’ (pre-war) earnings for the average
Kosovar worker.964 The generosity of the Government in this regard
accorded with the image that the refugees were low skilled, impoverished
nothing. We have no idea how we are going to start to rebuild and it is so expensive to live
there compared with Australia.’
960
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peasant workers. This was a stereotype that the Government continued to
deploy at various times during Operation Safe Haven, despite the fact
Government officials had previously described the refugees as whitecollar, “middle class” people from Pristina.

1.4 Closure of the Safe Havens and the threat of incarcerating Kosovar
refugees
The Federal Government extended the visas held by the 1800 Kosovars
remaining in Australia in late September. Around 800 Kosovars were
permitted to remain in Australia until early 2000. Many of these were from
Eastern Kosovo (the area now under Serbian control), while others
required ongoing medical treatment or wished to avoid the difficulties of
the winter season at home. Ruddock had initially said that the other 1000
refugees must leave on the chartered flight of 26th October or be considered
‘unlawful non-citizens’ subject to detention and removal.965 The RCOA
was concerned about the increasing pressure being applied to Kosovar
refugees to leave Australia, stating that the Immigration Minister’s
approach amounted to ‘bullying tactics’.966 While having their visas
extended for one month, these 1000 refugees were again threatened with
detention by the Immigration Minister if they refused to leave Australia by
30th November 1999. Ruddock’s view on their repatriation was that it was
simply a matter of “fairness”. He stated that: ‘It gets down to this question
as to what is fair… There are many people who would like to stay and they
have gone.’967
Around ninety per cent of the Kosovars had returned home or to the
refugee camps of Macedonia by early November.968 A month later there
were only 498 refugees remaining in Australia, with 366 residing at
Bandiana Safe Haven, 71 at East Hills and 61 residing at various Safe
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Haven centres. 969 Some Labor politicians attempted to sway the
Immigration Minister away from pressuring Kosovar refugees into leaving
Australia. Tasmanian Premier Jim Bacon (ALP) said it was unfortunate
that such pressure was being applied and that he had tried to change
Ruddock’s mind.970 He went on: ‘There is plenty of room for them in
Tasmania,

although

the

Commonwealth

has

the

constitutional

responsibility to deal with these matters.’971

1.5 Comparison with the response of the international community to the
issue of repatriation
From the beginning the Immigration Minister had been reluctant to
accommodate Kosovar refugees under the temporary arrangements sought
by the UNHCR. Ruddock had proceeded with Operation Safe Haven only
at the insistence of public backlash, the Cabinet and international pressure.
In line with the interests of the Cabinet he had promoted the notion that
Australia’s humanitarian refugee resettlement program was the most
generous (per capita) in comparison to other countries.972 Nonetheless the
agreed figure to accept 4000 evacuees was significantly less than the
intakes of other nations. The US and Turkey had agreed to relocate 20,000
Kosovar refugees each temporarily; Norway had accepted up to 6000;
Germany received 10,000; and, Canada accepted 5000.973 Hundreds of
thousands more remained in neighbouring Balkan countries such as
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina. The Australian
government’s reluctance to accept a greater number of refugees was
compounded in its haste to repatriate the Kosovars at the end of the initial
three-month stay period.
King compared the response of the international community to the
assistance provided by the Australian government. Her assessment was that

969

Ruddock, in ‘Kosovar Refugees’, House of Representatives: Official Hansard,
Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 17th February 2000, p. 13870.
970
Darby, ‘Kosovar Refugees Pressured To Leave’, op. cit.
971
J. Bacon, cited in ibid.
972
Ruddock, in ‘Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Safe Haven Visas) Bill
1999; Second Reading’, House of Representatives: Official Hansard, Commonwealth of
Australia Parliamentary Debates, 11th May 1999, p. 5039.
973
See figures shown in ‘What has happened to the refugees’, op. cit.

232

the Canadian government accommodated the Kosovar refugees much more
willingly and, unlike the Australian government, recognised the need to
account for their international human rights. The Australian government,
by comparison: ‘having to further the interests of the Australian people and
take domestic social and economic factors into account, merely accepted
the minimum responsibility under its international obligations to appear to
be playing a fruitful role in the containment of this human tragedy.’974
King aptly describes the Safe Haven Visa as a ‘restrictionist policy,
severely limiting the rights and opportunities of the Kosovars in
Australia.’975 Overall, Canada’s program was far more humanitarian,
recognising the long-term interests of the Kosovars and offering the choice
of permanent resettlement.
The Australian Safe Haven legislation did not provide the Kosovars
with an individual determination process in Australian law. This was in
breach of Article 34 of the UN Convention on Refugees.976 On the other
hand, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guaranteed the human
rights of Kosovars granted Safe Haven, whereas no such law exists in
Australia.977 King also notes that the accommodation arrangements
provided to the refugees in Canada were much more appropriate and
sensitive to their needs. Although both countries housed the refugees in
army barracks, Canada allowed for greater freedom and mobility and did
not (unlike Australia) penalise those who chose to leave the
accommodation. Moreover, the Canadian accommodation program granted
priority to locations where there already were Albanian communities and
support services available. By contrast, the Australian Safe Havens were
‘disused and semi-used military barracks’ and so were far more insensitive
than the accommodation provided by Canada.978 The situation was further
exacerbated, as I noted in Chapter 4, by the notion that nearby several of
the Safe Havens army training exercises continued to be carried out. These
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exercises involved the use of live explosives.979 In many ways King’s
assessment is correct: ‘the real Australian motivation [behind its response
to the situation in Kosovo] was clearly self-interest and the desire to be
seen as acting as a responsible international citizen… [T]he intention of the
Australian response was clearly […] to limit the rights and abilities of
those Kosovars selected to remain in Australia in any capacity.’980
Several organizations, including the RCOA and Amnesty
International, expressed doubts about the legal implications of the Safe
Haven Visa. They question whether the Kosovars truly understood the
process in which they were participating.981 As I have noted, recipients of
the visa, before being evacuated to Australia, had been forced to sign a
declaration that they understood and agreed with the Australian
government’s offer - that temporary safe haven was for a limited period
and would leave when the government required them to.982 Savitri Taylor
describes how the Kosovars were not provided with any official
information about the criteria against which their requests to remain in
Australia would be assessed and like other commentators she noted official
arrangements were not put in place for the provision of legal advice, free or
otherwise, to the Kosovars.983
The only avenue for gaining a different form of refugee protection
in Australia under the Safe Haven legislation was via the personal
assessment of the Minister. There was considerable doubt raised over
whether the Minister had used these powers fairly. In November 1999
Ruddock agreed to receive personal submissions from those Kosovars
fearing persecution.984 Among those thought to have applied, The
Australian noted, there were mainly adults of mixed-marriages, gypsies,
979
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those likely to be accused of collaboration with Serbia and those whose
homes were now in Serbia proper.985 Those Kosovars who had applied in
writing to the Minister to be considered for more permanent status did not,
Taylor points out, receive equal opportunity to have their claims assessed.
DIMA officials conducted interviews with the ‘head of family’ in assessing
which of these claims proceeded to the Minister. Taylor goes on: ‘the fact
that only heads of family were interviewed raises serious concerns about
the extent to which facts relevant to the making of treaty-based protection
claims by other members of the family emerged through the interview
process.’986 This would have had significant implications for women, for
instance, subjected to sexual violence and who might have been too
ashamed to reveal the fact to other family members.
Assessing the Safe Haven legislation, Curren says: ‘The problem in
the main is that Australia continues to deal with the issue of refugees as an
issue of domestic politics… and [requiring] the preservation of an illusive
largely Anglo Saxon identity’.987 The creation of Safe Haven status was
very purposefully a means of stemming the flow of refugees in the long
term whilst enabling Australia to respond to an immediate need to grant a
haven;
and thus serves the dual purpose of appeasing the calls for a
humanitarian response by the electorate whilst limiting the degree
to which those who hold safe haven status can apply for some
longer term of protection.988
Citing journalist Richard McGregor of The Australian, Curren says that
Australia’s immigration program continued to resemble a ‘defensive rather
than positive ethos… [in which] politicians are now following what they
believe is an entrenched antagonism to newcomers’.989 This correlates to
Jupp’s view that Australian immigration has in recent years come to value
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compliance at the expense of more flexible, humanitarian arrangements.990
The concept of safe haven, as Curren notes, is ‘a good one in theory’ but
(in Australia’s case) created broader problems for the people of Kosovo.991
As noted by the RCOA in November 1999, there remained lack of
effective rule of law and an atmosphere of general instability in Kosovo.992
The Australian government potentially contributed to instability in the
region by repatriating the Kosovars without proper legal restraint and a
sense of precaution.

2. The High Court Challenge and the Removal of the Remaining
Kosovar Refugees
2.1 Detention of the Kosovars at Bandiana and the High Court challenge
By March 2000 the cost of the Kosovar Safe Haven program for the
Federal Government had amounted to $100 million.993 On 16th March, the
Telegraph recorded that the Immigration Minister had begun to re-assert
pressure on those Kosovars remaining in Australia, most of whom were
residing at Bandiana barracks.994 He ordered refugees with ‘no valid reason
to be in Australia to leave’ and to board a chartered flight for home on 8th
April.995 (The scheduled flight was eventually postponed to the 9th April,
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following technical problems).996 A spokesperson for the Immigration
Minister said the Government hoped there would be no need for any forced
removals, but threatened the use of chemical tranquillisers against those
who refused to leave. The spokesperson stated: ‘if people refuse to
cooperate with the departure order we would expect appropriate and
reasonable action would be taken[.]’997 The Immigration Minister, the
Telegraph noted, said that it was now an appropriate time for the remaining
Kosovars to return home with the Kosovo winter coming to an end, adding:
Clearly, those who are too sick to travel – along with their
immediate family – will remain in Australia until they are well
enough to leave. But I expect families who have no valid reason to
be in Australia to leave on the return flight[.]998
This was despite that fact, wrote the Telegraph, that many Kosovar
refugees had ‘begged’ to be allowed to stay in Australia.999 Many were
afraid to return because their homes were in the Eastern border region and
because Southern Serbia had ‘become a flashpoint in the recent weeks
[sic].’1000 The RCOA was a vocal critic of the way the Government was
handling the issue of repatriation, arguing that its process of determining
whether it was safe to return was too simplistic.1001
On 5th April, around 120 Kosovar refugees residing at the Bandiana
Safe Haven protested against the Government’s decision not to allow them
to stay. It was several days prior to their scheduled refugee flight from
Australia to the Balkans. Immigration officials said that 223 of the 370

996

‘Plane glitch delays Kosovars’ return’, The Sunday Telegraph, 9th April 2000, p. 3. See
also F. Cumming, ‘Late Hitch Grounds Kosovars’, The Sun-Herald, 9th April 2000, p. 15,
which states that the problem was twofold. A delay caused by bus failure at Bandiana
pushed the scheduled flight beyond the allocated time slots in the Balkans, which made
the plane and its crew unavailable. A replacement plane was found by the Government for
the next day.
997
Department of Immigration spokesperson (unnamed), cited in McKinnon, ‘Kosovars to
go in April’, op. cit.
998
Ruddock, cited in ibid.
999
‘Kosovars beg to stay’, The Daily Telegraph, 31st March 2000, p. 10.
1000
Lloga, cited in M. Denney, ‘Long way home for Kosovo refugees’, The Australian,
24th March 2000, p. 8.
1001
‘Kosovars beg to stay’, op. cit.

237

refugees housed at the barracks were on the flight departure list.1002 Over a
hundred of the refugees, as described by the Telegraph, marched in protest
for four kilometres along the Kiewa Valley from Bandiana to Wodonga,
seeking a last minute reprieve.1003 The NSW Albania Association’s
Catherine Ordway described on 8th April how some of the refugees ‘are
suicidal, they so desperately don’t want to go. I don’t think you’ll find
many people on the plane tomorrow.’1004 The Herald revealed how two
young female refugees – who were sisters staying at the Bandiana barracks
- had attempted suicide the previous week. As the Herald wrote: ‘The
attempted overdoses … came on the night Mr Ruddock addressed refugees
at the camp whom he had ordered home.’1005 The sisters were reportedly
recovering in the local Wodonga hospital. Ruddock’s response was void of
empathy or a willingness to acknowledge the sisters’ trauma. He stated
that: ‘It’s unfortunate people are taking this action when they have been
given assurances it’s safe to return to Kosovo.’1006 He later commented that
the suicide attempts were part of a plan by the teenager girls to pressure
him.1007 The Prime Minister responded to questions about the attempted
overdoses, emphasising on a Melbourne radio program the temporary
nature of the Kosovars’ stay: ‘I am very conscious of the emotion of all of
this. But they came here on a certain basis and, difficult though it is, that
basis has to be adhered to.’1008 The subtext to Howard’s position on the
repatriations was symbolic, stating that if the Kosovars did not leave it
would create an ‘enormous headache’ in relation to future claims, as
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‘everybody in the future who wanted to short circuit the procedure would
invoke the example of the Kosovars to do so.’1009
Ruddock had in early April implemented changes to immigration
policy that involved severely limiting welfare benefits available to the
parents of migrants, scaling down humanitarian refugee intake due to a rise
in the number of boat people, and placing an emphasis upon “skilled”
migrants.1010 Labor leader Kim Beazley deplored Ruddock’s attacks on
“illegal immigrants” and, alongside his decision to remove the remaining
Kosovars from Australia, accused the Immigration Minister of playing
wedge politics.1011 Ruddock reacted furiously to these criticisms. The
Herald reported him asking: ‘Have you ever been to a refugee camp? …
Go to Kenya … The circumstances are appalling[.] You might say, it
doesn’t matter how many people you bring through in the refugee program.
But it does. It’s $21.5 million per thousand over five years. I have to go in
and argue for [extra refugee places] in the Budget process, I don’t get
it.’1012 Ruddock added: ‘If you had to judge them against the person sitting
in the refugee camp … you would take the person in the camp, every
time… Why should I take 500 places out of the program for the Kosovars;
1,600 places out of the program for East Timorese asylum seekers; 6,000
for unauthorised boat arrivals and then take as many more that keep on
coming and then see we have no refugee program… It’s not wedge
politics. It’s about consistency and it’s about fairness’.1013 Ruddock’s view
was in line with those sentiments being propagated by the Government
about a “flood” of applications for refugee protection. However, it also
reflected both the conservatism that typified many of his official statements
as well as the “checks and balances” style of the Howard Government.1014
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Extending from this rationale, the Kosovars who chose to stay in
Australia were described by Ruddock as acting on ‘bad advice’,1015 which
culminated in a High Court challenge that was heard on 7th and 10th April.
Melbourne lawyer Basil Nuredini and barrister Andrew Flower challenged
the Federal Government on behalf of 81 Kosovar refugees from the
Bandiana Safe Haven.1016 The refugees’ counsel argued that the group
should be exempted from repatriation because, in accordance with
international refugee conventions and UNHCR guidelines, they feared
returning home, had witnessed atrocities and their homes (for at least 64 of
the refugees) were in areas now dominated by Serbs.1017 They stated that
that the Immigration Minister failed to consider the UNHCR report when
considering their request for protection visas. The report, the refugees’
counsel went on, stated that most Kosovars could return safely from their
temporary relocation in foreign countries except for those in certain
categories - including those who had witnessed atrocities and others whose
homes were in areas now dominated by Serbs.1018 The refugees won a
reprieve from repatriation on the first day of proceedings pending the
outcome of the challenge and were able to avoid boarding the 9th April
chartered flight home.1019
The Federal Government ultimately ignored international legal
obligations designed to override any laws (including the Safe Haven
legislation) to protect the human rights of refugees. As the UNHCR’s
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Director of the Division of International Protection commented, in relation
to the Safe Haven Visa program:
at law, the [UN Refugee] Convention cannot be made unavailable
for persons for whom it was intended, even while its application
can be delayed.1020
RCOA cited those groups considered to be at risk if returned to Kosovo
(according to UNHCR guidelines), which included ethnic minorities; draft
age males who could be considered to have evaded KLA conscription;
people who could be perceived as having supported the Serb regime (or
Serb sympathisers); female headed households without male support;
people from areas in which ethnic Albanians were a minority (including
Southern Serbia); and victims of extreme violence. The organisation stated
that, among those recently told by the Minister to leave Australia, there
were many Kosovar refugees who fitted into these high-risk categories.1021
The Government maintained a punitive position towards the
refugees throughout the proceedings. On the network Ten Meet the Press
program, Ruddock argued: ‘I’m satisfied that they have no claims that
would single them out over and above any other Kosovo Albanian for
persecution.’1022 The Telegraph defended the Government’s frustrations,
stating:
Taxpayers will spend $500,000 to send a two-thirds empty 747 jet
back to Europe today after 81 Kosovar refugees won a weekend
reprieve from repatriation.
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… Under a UN agreement, if the Kosovars’ court challenges fail,
the Federal Government will have to charter another 747 to send
them home.1023
A spokesperson for Ruddock informed the Telegraph that those refugees
involved in the High Court challenge would become unlawful non-citizens
after the case and would be held in detention. The Telegraph’s Michael
McKinnon emphasised the point in support of the Government: ‘The
Kosovars are here on safe haven visas … and signed agreements they
would leave the country.’1024
On 9th April, the Immigration Minister commented in the Telegraph
that he did not ‘expect problems’ at the Safe Havens following the outcome
of High Court proceedings. Bestowing on the refugees merely a “guest”
status, Ruddock said:
For most Kosovars, it’s safe to return home. My expectation is in
relation to guests – and these people have been guests for more than
nine months – when it’s time to ask the people to go home, they
should avail themselves of the opportunity. [sic]1025
However, the Immigration Minister was a little premature when it came to
the ‘problems’ the case would stir. That day, more than 100 refugees
residing at Bandiana Safe Haven refused to board their scheduled flight
home and instead conducted a hunger strike at the barracks.1026 The
Immigration Minister’s response was punitive and that evening the
Bandiana Safe Haven was reclassified as a detention centre. Bandiana
would thereafter hold the non-compliant refugees in detention until they
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could be transferred to another detention centre or be deported.1027 The
refugees were further informed via a Department of Immigration leaflet
that they would have to pay for their detention and removal.1028
Only 21 out of the expected 100 refugees from Bandiana had
boarded the transfer coach headed for Sydney airport. The remaining
Kosovars protested, refusing water and food and demanding that the
Minister reconsider their status. The Telegraph described how one male
refugee was taken to hospital after collapsing during the incident.1029 Lloga
urged the refugees to abandon their hunger strike. He was sympathetic,
stating that amongst the refugees were war crimes witnesses, ethnicAlbanians from Serb-dominated areas, defectors from the KLA and former
high-ranking officials in the Serbian government. Greens Senator Bob
Brown, in support of the protesters, had asked the Transport Workers
Union (TWU) to delay the Kosovars’ flight and undertake industrial action
on the refugees’ behalf. While some delay was caused by strike action in
Tasmania, it did not have the effect of preventing the refugees’
departure.1030
A decision on the High Court challenge was handed down the
following day. It found in favour of the Federal Government. All 81
refugees were subsequently ordered by the Department of Immigration to
leave Australia. DIMA spokesperson Phil Mayne, who was working at
Bandiana barracks, promptly stated in the Herald that ‘an appropriate level
of force’ would be used against those still unwilling to return home.1031
The Government was unperturbed by calls from within the Australian
community to reconsider its decision. The NSW Ecumenical Council, for
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instance, representing Catholic, Anglican, Uniting and 12 other religious
groups wrote to the Prime Minister and Phillip Ruddock urging them to
allow the Kosovar refugees to stay. 1032 Amnesty expressed further
reservations about Ruddock’s handling of the repatriation issue. The
organisation threatened to revoke Ruddock’s membership if he continued
to wear his Amenesty badge while performing his ministerial duties.1033
The Government refused to reconsider its position on the matter and the
refugees’ legal counsel stated that there would be no appeal to the
decision.1034
The Immigration Minister promised on 13th April that refugees who
left voluntarily on the next flight would be given application forms to
migrate to Australia to fill out on the plane. These would be part-processed
by Australian migration officials when they landed in Kosovo.1035 Those
refugees would be making applications for the special humanitarian
migration scheme which was designed for persons in situations of
discrimination, displacement or hardship.1036 The Federal Opposition
accused the Government of making a ‘cosmetic offer’ to ‘convince them to
leave’ and called for the refugees to be processed onshore.1037 The Minister
refuted criticism about the whole process being a “waste of money” saying
that it would set a bad precedent to allow people to apply onshore.1038
The following day the Federal Government toughened its stance on
the Kosovar refugees residing at Bandiana, ordering security personnel to
restrict all visitors from entering the barracks. The move prevented the
refugees from accessing legal counsel provided by non-Government
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sources.1039 Phil Mayne confirmed that all visitation rights had been
withdrawn so detainees could make decisions free of ‘external
influences.’1040 The Australian described how the refugees were instructed
to ‘pack their bags’ and, according to Kosovars inside the barracks, were
subjected to increasing pressure from DIMA staff to sign forms agreeing to
leave the country.1041 Refugees told The Australian, speaking via mobile
telephone, that ‘two truckloads of security guards had surrounded their
living quarters’ before they were ushered into one building. They were not
allowed to leave.1042 Two days later 116 Kosovars were repatriated and 21
others were relocated from Bandiana to Port Hedland detention centre.1043
Those departing for home had refused to sign an official declaration
for the Australian government stating their return was voluntary.1044 Taylor
notes that DIMA considered the repatriations ‘voluntary’ on the basis that
no physical coercion was used by the Australian government. This
characterisation, however, was not accepted by the UNHCR which defined
the returns as ‘induced’ rather than voluntary.1045 The Australian
government’s handling of the situation was a serious breach of the
UNHCR’s repatriation criteria which stipulates the importance of
‘voluntariness’ (an absence of physical, psychological or material pressure)
in the returning of refugees.1046 The Immigration Department later
defended its repatriation of the Kosovar refugees in the Senate, arguing that
none of the refugees had been forced to leave Australia. As Immigration
Department deputy secretary Andrew Metcalf stated: ‘They did volunteer.
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They did agree to get on that plane[.] There was absolutely no force
whatsoever used to secure their departure from Australia.’1047
Many of the refugees repatriated from Australia in April 2000 faced
immediate problems on landing in Skopje. On 6th April, the ALP’s Michael
Danby (Member for Melbourne Ports) read a UNHCR document to the
Lower House, which had informed Kosovar refugees returning home that:
‘No resources will be provided to you after you are distributed to the
various towns from which you come.’1048 Danby warned Federal
Parliament that: ‘We will be leaving these people without accommodation,
perhaps even without food.’1049 Senator Andrew Bartlett expressed concern
to the parliament on 12th April, noting that some refugees - who were
originally from areas now part of Serbia proper - were being repatriated by
the Australian government to other places in Kosovo. This was in response
to Ruddock’s comments the day before, in which the Immigration Minister
had stated that no-one would be forced back to Southern Serbia, but instead
would be taken to other parts of Kosovo. 1050 Bartlett pointed out that this
was contrary to the repatriation objectives of the UNHCR.1051 The UNHCR
had made it clear, according to the RCOA, that it was not appropriate to
send people from Southern Serbia into Kosovo. The Head of the UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had recently appealed to governments not to
forcibly return refugees.1052 In this way, RCOA argued, the Australian
government could not legally justify the forced return of the Kosovars.
RCOA commented: ‘They have a right to have their subjective fears
examined to determine whether these are well founded and if they are, to
receive Australia’s protection.’1053
By April 2000, there were distinct differences in the way the
various countries involved in temporarily relocating Kosovar refugees were
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handling the issue of repatriation. Initially offering temporary haven, New
Zealand by this time had allowed 600 Kosovar refugees the right to seek
permanent protection.1054 Canada offered permanent protection and
maintained a policy of voluntary repatriation. Canada allowed 5000
refugees to decide for themselves when to return.1055 About 2500 had
returned voluntarily out of those evacuated to the US. The remainder were
free to remain in the US with an offer of permanent protection on the
condition they pay the $US750 cost for the initial evacuation flight within
four years.1056 The UK, however, which had offered a 12-month visa to
Kosovar refugees in June 1999, was looking to repatriate those 3000
Kosovars still in Britain.1057 The stability of Kosovo in early April 2000
had in fact been downgraded by the UN, and the UNHCR Commissioner
had recently informed countries looking to repatriate refugees to do so very
slowly given the worsening security situation in Kosovo.1058 Circumstances
were further volatile considering NATO had promised to have 6000 police
on the ground in Kosovo at this time, when instead there were around
300.1059
The RCOA appealed to the Prime Minister, expressing concern
about the way in which the Government was attempting to justify the
returns - by citing the documentation signed by the Kosovars stating that
they would return and by citing advice from the UNHCR that it was safe to
do so. The RCOA’s view was that these documents were signed at a time
when ‘the NATO offensive was still underway and there was no clarity
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about the future shape of Kosovo nor about any potential risks on
return.’1060 The organisation went on, making the point that: ‘The
undertakings were signed by highly traumatised people who had just been
forced from their homes and who were residing in a very crowded and illequipped camp in Macedonia. It is understandable both that they would
have signed anything that would take them as far away as possible from the
trauma and that at that time, their vision of the future would have been
return.’1061 Another concern was how the Immigration Minister had
‘selectively quoted’ advice from UNHCR to argue that it was safe to
return.1062
Following the High Court challenge the UNHCR advised that
Kosovar refugees should have their cases comprehensively reviewed.1063
The UNHCR’s Peter Kessler, based in Kosovo at the time, stated on SBS
Radio that he had concerns about refugees being forced back to areas now
part of Southern Serbia, particularly towns such as Presevo and Mitrovica.
He added: ‘if they want to come back, that’s another matter… we think
there should be a definite go-slow.’1064 Kessler commented on the 7:30
Report, as well, saying that: ‘We do think it’s premature people are forced
back to Kosovo, a place where they don’t even originate from… So we
think there should be a definite go-slow until these people can possibly be
returned to their actual place of origin, which would be, in this case,
Presevo.’1065 A UNHCR official in Geneva, Jacques Franquin, made the
point that, although Australia was not alone in pushing for the repatriation
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of Kosovar refugees, it was ‘the only country in which the courts have
rejected claims of vulnerability.’1066

2.2 Media representations of the court case and deviance
The following analysis is based on media coverage concerning the High
Court challenge. I have drawn on a total of 63 newspaper articles published
between 1st and 30th April 2000.1067 There were two editorials concerned
with the Kosovar refugees in the Telegraph, two in The Australian and one
in the Herald. Editorials in the Telegraph and Herald were against the
Kosovars staying in Australia, while The Australian was much more
supportive of the idea.1068 Both editorials in the Telegraph supported the
Federal Government’s handling of repatriation, as did the editorial piece in
the Herald.1069 One of the editorials in The Australian was critical of the
Federal Government on this matter, while the other was only somewhat
critical. Editorials provide insight into the ideological position of the
newspaper. They are often the point at which the interests of the proprietor
are expressed via the editor. Editorials do not always reflect the opinion
being expressed by journalists and other contributors. They do, however,
signify ideologies around which the various components of a newspaper
are assembled.1070
By the same measure, opinion columns perform a democratic
function within the assemblage of a newspaper. Where they occasionally
do not agree with the purported position of the editor, they are often
1066
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included to uphold the notion that the media is committed to a balanced
representation of public affairs.1071 There was only one opinion column
that addressed the Kosovar refugees in the Telegraph, while there were two
in The Australian and six in the Herald. The Telegraph opinion piece was
against the Kosovars staying in Australia, while opinion on the matter in
the Herald was varied.1072 The opinion pieces in The Australian, however,
were much more supportive of the refugees staying Australia.1073 In
another light, opinion in the Telegraph typically supported the Federal
Government’s handling of the repatriation issue, while it was varied in the
Herald. Opinion pieces in The Australian, though, were more critical of the
Government on this matter.1074
As reflected in the content analysis, the Telegraph’s coverage of the
High Court case clearly favoured the position of the Federal Government.
The newspaper’s editor was highly critical of the Kosovar refugees for
protesting at Bandiana and the High Court challenge. Referring to a recent
poll, the editor noted how 43 per cent of the Telegraph’s readers thought
the Kosovars should be forced to leave Australia following the UNHCR’s
suggestion it was safe to return.1075 ‘Public sympathy for the refugees’, the
editor stated, ‘who have been guests in this country for more than nine
months would probably be greater if some of them had not become such
assiduous litigants.’1076 The editor depicted one refugee allowed to remain
in Australia, Nagir Zairi, as tricky and ungrateful. This was because Zairi
was suing the Australian government after his 4-year old son had fallen
1071
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from a bicycle at the East Hills centre and broken his leg.1077 The editor
went on: ‘Sadly, the bulk of the Kosovars who have already gone home,
presumably grateful for the hospitality extended when they most needed it,
are not the ones we will remember.’1078
The notion of “gratitude” was deployed in varying degrees by
editors and in general media coverage throughout April 2000. In the
Telegraph, the Kosovars were referred to as “grateful” six times, while
they were represented as “ungrateful” on seven occasions.1079 It is
significant, however, that descriptions of the Kosovars as “grateful” in the
Telegraph were predominantly used to depict those refugees who had
returned home (or had agreed to), and juxtaposed to representations of the
“ungrateful” who continued to resist repatriation. Other print media were
less occupied with this issue, with The Australian referring to the Kosovars
as “grateful” three times, while they were depicted as “ungrateful” only
once. In the Herald, the Kosovars were portrayed as being “grateful” once
and “ungrateful” twice.
On 11th April 2000, the Telegraph’s editor was again severely
critical of the refugees involved in the High Court case. The editor
mimicked Ruddock’s own words (noted earlier), referring to the actions of
those refugees as ‘ill-advised bids to gain public support’.1080 The piece
described them as a ‘recalcitrant group’ and deplored their ‘defiance of the
laws of the country in which they want to remain’.1081 The editor went on:
The anguish displayed by the Kosovar refugees remaining in
Australia and their stubborn refusal to leave with good grace belies
the truth of their circumstances and the efforts of the Australian
Government to assist them.1082
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The editorial piece typified the shift in the Telegraph’s narrative - from
being highly supportive of the refugees a year beforehand, to highly critical
commentary of those who had overstayed the Government’s welcome.
Almost one year ago, the editorial stated, ‘Australia offered an outstretched
hand and opened its heart to their plight. Most have now returned home to
rebuild their lives, grateful for the sanctuary Australia was able to offer
during what had been described as one of the worst humanitarian crises of
recent times.’1083 Those who remained in Australia, the piece went on, ‘are
doing themselves a disservice and have not kept faith with agreements they
signed with the Australian Government.’1084 The editor noted that the
refugees’ visas had been extended several times already, arguing that the
group who had lost the High Court challenge ‘should honour its
agreements and accept it is time to go.’1085 The piece further described the
situation in Kosovo:
Kosovo has been declared safe by a neutral umpire, the [UNHCR].
Despite claims to the contrary, no member of this group will be
endangered by their return. Each case has been reviewed by the
Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock. None are of mixed
marriages, were members of the KLA or held government positions
which could place them at risk.1086
Noting the individual protection agreements signed with the Australian
government, the editor stated: ‘It is impossible for them to remain [in
Australia] under these circumstances and should leave of their own free
will, acknowledging the generosity of the people of Australia.’1087
Conservative columnist Piers Akerman added to the Telegraph’s
criticism of the Kosovar refugees remaining in Australia. He cited portions
of the agreement signed by each of the refugees before arriving in
Australia. He argued that the case was simple:
1083
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Importantly, they [the Kosovar refugees] agreed and confirmed that
‘acceptance of the offer of temporary stay is voluntary on my part’,
‘my stay in Australia is for no more than three months’, ‘the period
may be extended if the Australian Government considers
circumstances require it’ and ‘I will not be able to extend my stay
in Australia unless permitted to do so by the Australian
Government and will leave Australia when the Australian
Government requires me to do so’. Which part of this agreement
have they now decided they did not understand?1088
Akerman added: ‘Sadly, those who opened their hearts may find it difficult
to do so in the future if their honest approach is not reciprocated by the
beneficiaries of their charity.’1089 The underlying subtext for these
sentiments in the Telegraph was the issue of compliance. The newspaper
focussed heavily on a binary of compliance/deviance, frequently
demonising those refugees unwilling to return and depicting them as
“overstayers”.
For the Telegraph, the implication was that the refugees were
deviant and unworthy of Australia’s ongoing protection. In the Herald, the
Kosovars were described as “uncompliant” on 39 occasions, although they
were depicted as “compliant” three times.1090 The refugees were depicted
as “uncompliant” 69 times in The Australian, while they were described as
“compliant” on six occasions. The Telegraph, however, referred to the
Kosovars as “uncompliant” on 199 occasions, while they were viewed as
“compliant” only 15 times. Descriptions of the refugees as “compliant” in
the Telegraph were typically used in conjunction with those Kosovars who
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had already returned home (or had agreed to return home). Overall, there
was much more focus on criminalising the Kosovars in the Telegraph, with
26 terms used to depict them as “deviant”.1091 By comparison, there were
just four descriptions of the refugees as “deviant” in both the Herald and
The Australian. It is not uncommon for news stories that focus on
“deviance” to offer compelling “human struggle” narratives alongside a
broader discourse aimed at criminalising socially unpopular groups. The
result is to produce stories centred on the value of “human interest” that are
also capable of shifting the focus away from the coercive disposition of the
State to police dissidence. These processes disguise punitive activities
conducted by the State, neutralising the appearance of coercion within the
everyday life of the community. As noted by Adam J. Berinsky and Donald
R. Kinder, individuals respond with greater understanding to news events
that are presented as a narrative, in sequences and as a coherent story. Such
news reports perform an ideological function, because a ‘good [media]
frame is at its heart a good story.’1092

2.3 On the run: DIMA and the “hunt” for overstayers
Around the time of the High Court challenge, there were 10 Kosovar
refugees listed by DIMA as “on the run” in Sydney as well as one man in
Tasmania (Akif Lutfiu).1093 Twenty-one others were also listed as missing
from the Bandiana Safe Haven after failing to take their seats on a
chartered flight home.1094 According to a DIMA spokesperson, not turning
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up to the 9th April flight arranged by the Government rendered those
refugees illegal.1095 The Immigration Minister announced that those
Kosovars who did not turn themselves in to DIMA officers by 12th April
would be sent to an immigration detention centre. He warned those
refugees who refused to leave Australia voluntarily that they would be
banned from applying to return for three years.1096 Ruddock said those who
were compliant with the Government’s plans to repatriate them would,
however, be allowed to apply for humanitarian visas to return to Australia.
The Immigration Minister further threatened that those 81 Kosovars who
had lost their High Court appeal would be forced to pay costs if they did
not agree to leave. He assured the Telegraph that none of the Kosovars
would be sent back to Serbian controlled areas.1097 Despite his assurances,
Ruddock ignored the claims of some refugees that they did not have any
homes to return to as a result of the conflict, and the prospects of those
whose homes were in Serbian controlled areas were not at all good. His
motivations were simply to repatriate the refugees to Macedonia, and
sooner rather than later.
In the Telegraph, there was significant focus on the refugee “hunt”,
a narrative underpinned by the idea of “compliance and capture”. The
Telegraph on 12th April described the situation in the following manner:
‘Immigration officers have begun their hunt for illegal Kosovars, with a
Department of Immigration interpreter’s residence one of the first places
targeted.’1098 The home of Sevdail Ramadani, who had worked as an
interpreter for DIMA at the East Hills Safe Haven, was raided by
immigration officers looking for Kosovars “on the run” in Sydney.1099
Earlier, an immigration spokesperson told the Telegraph: ‘We’re not going
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to have a Kosovar hunt; they will turn up.’1100 However, according to
several media accounts, Ramadani’s experience indicates otherwise.
Immigration officials arrived at his Sydney home with a search warrant,
searching in wardrobes and under beds throughout the home, including in
his 8-year old son’s bedroom.1101 Mr Ramadani informed the Telegraph
that he was disappointed at being treated with suspicion. A spokesperson
(unnamed) for the Australian Albanian Association said the raids had upset
quite a few people: ‘They are hunting for families with children who will
eventually give themselves up anyway[.] We don’t know how far the
Immigration Department will take this.’1102 The spokesperson also told the
Telegraph that the refugees did not deserve to be treated like criminals.
An immigration official emphasised that the Kosovars would be
arrested during ‘normal compliance operations’ which had been successful
in capturing over 13,000 illegal immigrants in the previous year.1103
Ruddock, addressing the Australian Albanian Association, stated that those
still “on the run” would be treated compassionately if they turned
themselves in.1104 He continued to resist calls, however, from various
community and church groups calling for the Minister to allow the
refugees to remain in Australia. The Immigration Minister stated that the
raids were ‘standard action given these people are now staying …
unlawfully [sic]’.1105
One of the refugees evading immigration officers at this time was
21-year old Artan Ajeti whose story was told by the Telegraph and the
Herald.1106 The refugee was ordered by the Federal Government to leave
Australia, despite claims that his home was in Presevo.1107 Ajeti stated in
the Telegraph that it was his desire to remain in Australia: ‘I have a job, I
1100
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speak English and every day it’s getting better. I am getting better at my
job and finding friends.’1108 Ajeti’s family (including parents and younger
brother and sister) had stayed in Kosovo, he stated, adding he had fled after
being forced to fight alongside Serbian forces. He said that, if forced to
return home, it was likely that he would have to spend the next twenty
years in a Serb prison.1109 Ajeti was unsure about where the Australian
government was going to send him: ‘Maybe they are just going to send me
into Kosovo and I will be forced to knock on doors.’1110
Ajeti’s story was shaped by two perspectives in the Telegraph: as a
narrative centred on “compliance and capture” and notions of illegality;
and, as a human-interest story concerned with the idea of survival. Broadly,
these factors signified and supported the authority of the Government to
uphold the integrity of the State via punitive and coercive measures.1111 His
request for permanent refugee protection in Australia had already been
rejected by the Immigration Minister. The Telegraph described how Ajeti
had evaded authorities after running away from East Hills Safe Haven,
hiding in a bathroom at a friends’ house (unnamed) for over a week. He
stated in the Telegraph that he felt the Federal Government was ‘running
after us as if we are criminals’.1112 On 14th April 2000, it was reported by
the Telegraph that Ajeti had turned himself in to immigration officials at
East Hills Safe Haven. He realised there were few options available to him.
He was repatriated shortly afterwards.1113
In July 2000, the Department of Immigration continued its search
for Kosovar refugees “on the run”. The Telegraph, however, was not the
only newspaper insisting on the idea of “compliance and capture”. The 19year old male refugee, Akif Lutfiu, had eluded authorities for three months
1108
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in Hobart. The Australian, which had interviewed Lutfiu in April 2000
while hiding from DIMA officers, described the refugee as ‘highly
agitated’ and noted that he was used to running from Serbian authorities
who had been trying to arrest him for some time back home. 1114 On 16th
July Lutfiu was finally arrested in the early hours of the morning at a
Hobart nightclub. The refugee had fled Kosovo during the 1999 conflict
without his parents (who had been deceased for several years).1115 He had
been one of the first Kosovars to arrive in Australia in May 1999, residing
at the Brighton Safe Haven for six months until being offered a room at the
home of the barracks’ bus driver.1116 Shortly after his arrest Lutfiu moved
to lodge a claim of racial discrimination against Ruddock with the
Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Commission. The Immigration Minister
responded by denying racial discrimination and noted that federal law
would override state law on immigration matters.1117 Lutfiu hoped the
claim would delay his deportation. However, before the claim was lodged,
he was deported on 23rd August, along with 11 other Kosovars being held
at Port Hedland detention centre.
The Hobart-based support network, ‘Friends of Akif’, had raised
$1300 to assist and provide shelter for Lutfiu the hope of delaying or
avoiding his repatriation.1118 A spokesperson for Greens Senator Bob
Brown, Steven Chaffer, had spoken to Lutfiu prior to his departure. Chaffer
commented on ABC Radio: ‘Akif was very low and very anxious and
frightened about going back to nothing because he has nothing to go back
to, no family to support him, no job, no money, nothing.’1119 Tasmanian
Premier Jim Bacon (ALP) had offered to sponsor Lutfiu (as well as another
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family) for a permanent visa, which Ruddock had initially agreed to.1120
However, the Immigration Minister was subsequently overruled on the
matter by the Prime Minister.1121 As Don Wing, the independent President
of Tasmania’s Legislative Council, stated: ‘John Howard vetoed it’.1122
The racial discrimination claim was lodged in November 2000 with
Tasmania’s Anti-Discrimination Commissioner, Jocelynne Scutt, taking
court action against Ruddock on behalf of Lutfiu.1123 The Immigration
Minister contested the writ and Lutfiu has not been allowed to return to
Australia. As the Herald noted in 2007, Lutfiu was ‘Still homeless and on
the run… Akif Lutfiu – or “Our Keith”, as Hobart friends nicknamed him has shuffled around Europe for seven years.’1124

2.4 Ruddock allows some Kosovars to remain in Australia
On 29th May 2000, having personally considered individual circumstances,
Ruddock announced that 28 Kosovar families (121 people) had been
allowed to apply onshore for permanent protection and a further 39
families (170 people) had their temporary stay extended.1125 By the end of
June new special long-term temporary visas (‘temporary humanitarian
concern’ visas) were created for 150 Kosovars who were undergoing
treatment for trauma. The visas provided the refugees with three years’
temporary stay in Australia, allowing them to receive ongoing medical
attention.1126 The decision meant that 150 places would be taken away
from the total allocation of 12,000 spots available under the humanitarian
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category for the coming year.1127 A year beforehand, the RCOA had
expressed reservations about ‘pinching’ places from the humanitarian
category, advocating the Government instead create an extra reserve of
places in ‘emergency situations’ such as Kosovo.1128
In August 2000, there were 30 Kosovars remaining illegally in
Australia. Twelve were deported at this time while 18 others remained in
Port Hedland detention centre. They claimed they had no homes to return
to.1129 On 31st October, after being ‘appraised of further claims, of an
individual character’, Ruddock allowed the Kosovars being held at Port
Hedland detention centre to apply for bridging visas which would release
them from custody.1130 The Minister announced in February 2001 that, on
the basis of new information provided to him, a Kosovar family who had
illegally overstayed their Safe Haven Visa would be allowed to apply for
permanent residency.1131

3. Experiences of Return
3.1 Media representations of repatriation: morality and humanitarianism
Concerns over the Kosovar refugees shaped much of the content produced
by Australia’s broadcast media throughout 1999. According to the Rehame
monitoring agency, out of more than 3 million monitored items on radio
and television, Kosovo ranked third in the most talked-about category
ahead of the Sydney Olympics, the republic referendum and the Goods and
Services Tax (GST).1132 As I have noted, the first Kosovar refugees to
return home departed Australia on chartered airplanes on 23rd and 26th July
1999.1133 Refugees residing at the Brighton barracks had been the first to
1127
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arrive in Australia and were among the first to leave. An emotional
farewell was described by the Telegraph when 81 Kosovars staying at the
Brighton barracks departed for Melbourne airport. The newspaper noted,
covering the farewell event held at the Safe Haven, ‘There were tears all
round’ with the Tasmanian Premier declaring the Kosovars ‘honorary
Tasmanians.’1134 Media coverage of Brighton Safe Haven throughout the
refugees’ stay had been overwhelmingly supportive of the Kosovars. The
Brighton refugees were frequently depicted by government officials as
friendly, clean and “middle class” people throughout the early stages of
Operation Safe Haven. None of the Brighton refugees had caused any
major difficulties for the Immigration Minister and their compliance with
regard to the quality of barracks accommodation met with positive media
coverage on their farewell.
The Brighton Kosovars were consistently depicted in media
coverage in a way that reinforced a positive image of the Safe Haven
program. The effect of these kinds of representations was to applaud the
Federal Government for offering a world of opportunity and freedom to
those facing persecution. The reality, however, was that this arrangement
remained temporary, a paradoxical scenario that was whitewashed by the
heightened emotion of the farewell of the Brighton refugees. The
Telegraph focussed in particular on the emotional departure of teenage
refugee Vedat Bajrami, reportedly an acting student from Pristina. A
resident at Brighton barracks, Bajrami stated that he had welcomed the
chance to come to Australia, and did not want to return to Kosovo.1135
Bajrami’s friend, Bashkim Zeqiri (who had been interviewed by the media
many times) commented similarly: ‘If I stayed here it would be great, it
would be my dream’.1136
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The Kosovars’ departure generated some charitable efforts by the
Australian community. In August 1999, the Telegraph reported that the
Southern Cross Quilters had organised the donation of 3000 quilts to the
Kosovar refugees remaining in Australia. The donation was part of the
organisation’s ‘Kosovo Quilt Drive’ that I have mentioned previously. The
drive had the aim of providing every Kosovar refugee with a handmade
quilt to take home.1137 Nevertheless and despite some instances of charity
and goodwill, many Kosovars who returned home after October 1999 were
left ‘stranded in […] miserable conditions without any material assistance
from Australia. They were not even put in touch with aid agencies able and
willing to help.’1138 As the United States Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants (USCRI) notes, television news bulletins showed the returning
refugees with all their possessions in plastic bags being left at their homes
with no means to repair them. They were without food or money and those
with Australian dollars were reportedly unable to exchange them.1139
Analysis of media coverage of the repatriations in April 2000
indicates varied use of moral and humanitarian sentiment in each of the
newspapers concerned. There were at least 98 references and descriptors
urging empathy for the refugees in the Telegraph, while in the Herald and
Australian there were at least 152 and 181 respectively.1140 There were
only three notions related to humanitarianism in the Telegraph, while there
were 44 in the Herald and six in The Australian.1141 Descriptions of the
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Kosovars as “children” or “babies” featured much less in comparison to
coverage in the month prior to the arrival of evacuees at Sydney airport a
year before. This paralleled a broader decline in media empathy for the
refugees in recent months.1142 Images of children can be viewed as part of
an attempt by the media to persuade the public of the moral motivations of
a particular political cause (such as during the evacuations and arrival at
Sydney airport). This kind of emotive content in news reports has the
ideological effect of extinguishing the doubts of disbelievers and
appropriating dissenting views into the dominant political order.1143 Unlike
coverage of the evacuation, references to children or babies numbered only
two in the Telegraph, eight in the Herald and 13 in The Australian. The
Telegraph was by far least supportive of the idea that the refugees should
be able to remain in Australia on grounds of “compassion” or for moral
reasons.
Analysis of earlier media coverage of the Kosovar refugee crisis
(see Chapters 2 and 3) revealed that moral or humanitarian sentiments were
occasionally (though not always) drawn on to supplement “national
values” such as “mateship”. Where humanitarian sentiments were referred
to, it was often in juxtaposition to the kinds of charity being offered by
Australians to the Kosovars, rather than in relation to “national values”.
The effect was to signify the moral standing of the Australian community.
In

the Herald,

there

was

only

one

reference to

notions

of

“mateship/equality/fair go”,1144 while there were 40 terms describing
“charity” by the Australian government and community to the benefit of
the Kosovars. 1145 There were at least 99 references to “charity” in the
‘human rights standards and their international responsibilities seriously’. Even so, the
frequency of references to “humanitarian” concepts in the Herald more than doubled those
drawn on by both the Australian and Telegraph which tended to invoke more emotive
concepts (such as ‘compassion’).
1142
This category included all references to “children, babies or childbirth”.
1143
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flights, transport, visits by the Immigration Minister to the Safe Havens, accommodation,
facilities used by the Kosovars and opportunities offered to them.
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Telegraph

while

there

were

no

terms

explicitly

related

to

“mateship/equality/fair go”. In The Australian, there were at least 69
references to “charity” while there was no explicit mention of concepts
related to “mateship/equality/fair go”. The relatively non-existent use of
“national values” in the repatriation coverage is explained by the ways in
which media organisations consistently attempt to position news narratives
in relation to popular national causes. In this case, it is plausible to suggest
that media coverage had the effect of watering down the significance of the
Kosovar refugee plight as a “national” interest.
Moral sentiment was further implicated by cultural commentary
that emerged in coverage of the repatriations in April 2000. Gender, unlike
the Singleton incident, was not a significant concern in this coverage. The
refugees were viewed as “chauvinist/coming from a male-dominated
culture” on one occasion in the Herald though none of these descriptors
were used by the Telegraph or Australian.1146 In the Herald, the refugees
were identified as “family people” or referred to by their family titles on 56
occasions. 1147 The Telegraph used “family” descriptors on 23 occasions,
while these kinds of terms numbered 39 in The Australian. There was no
explicit mention in the Telegraph or the Herald of the notion that the
Kosovars were “dissimilar, alien or Other”.1148 There were, however, three
descriptions of the Kosovars in this light in The Australian.1149 The
Kosovars were not referred to as “Europeans” in a more general sense in
any of the newspapers, which is interesting considering the amount of
attention given by the media to this fact during the evacuation and arrival
periods.
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Those refugees who had departed Australia on 16th April 2000 were
flown to Skopje from where they would be bussed to Pristina and then
taken to other towns and villages by the UN. Senator Bartlett described
how those who were repatriated at this time were under ‘enormous
coercive pressure’ to leave Australia. 1150 This was affirmed by refugee Veli
Dodi (described as an economist) who had resisted his removal from
Australia. Dodi, in a manner similar to other refugees quoted by the
Telegraph, stated that he did not feel he had been forced to return home.
However, he went on: ‘There was a sort of pressure[.] We were in
detention for a week.’1151 Dodi added: ‘The people supported us in every
way possible. Only the immigration minister was against us.’1152
Several other refugees informed the Telegraph that their homes had
been destroyed or damaged, and they therefore had nowhere to live. Samie
Thaqi described by the Telegraph as a 37-year old housewife, had been
removed from Australia along with her five children. She commented that
it would be up to international agencies to decide where her family would
live. Their home had been destroyed.1153 Thaqi was asked by the Telegraph
if she felt resentment towards Australians for the way the refugees had
been treated, to which she replied: ‘Not against Australians but against the
Australian Government. The Australian people were very good and very
supportive.’1154

3.2 The situation faced by returnees in early 2000
In January 2000 the UNHCR’s Paul Kessler described the situation on the
Serbia-Kosovo border as ‘extremely tense’. He cited multiple incidences of
murder, arson and violent clashes between Serbs, Albanians and Slavs in
recent weeks.1155 He stated that the ‘time is not yet right for large-scale
return of non-Albanian refugees… security cannot be guaranteed.’1156 The
1150

Bartlett, in ‘Refugees: Kosovo’, Senate: Official Hansard, Commonwealth of
Australia Parliamentary Debates, 12th April 2000, p. 13981.
1151
V. Dodi, cited in ‘Refugees say thanks’, The Daily Telegraph, 18th April 2000, p. 3.
1152
Dodi, cited in ibid.
1153
Gray, ‘Refugees arrive home in Kosovo’, op. cit.
1154
S. Thaqi, cited in ibid.
1155
‘Kosovo killings keeping Serbs out’, The Australian, 19th January 2000, p. 9.
1156
Kessler, cited in ibid.

265

UNHCR had also reported that the influx of returnees to Kosovo was
putting pressure on households who were already trying to make room for
returning family members and as aid agencies attempted to match growing
housing demands with under-resourced rebuilding programs. More than
60,000 homes had been destroyed in the war and the UN was hoping to
have completed the construction or rebuilding of 30,000 homes by the end
of the year.1157 UNHCR spokesperson Paula Ghedini urged continued
caution and restraint by the international community. She then added: ‘We
understand the political imperative of sending [refugees] back. We’re not
asking countries to hold off forever just to give us warning and some time
to deal with the problems.’1158 Ghedini further described how ethnic
tensions were beginning to escalate in the province and that increasing
numbers of returnees would contribute significant instability to the
situation.1159 Shopkeepers complained of being forced to pay protection
money to various KLA factions and there was a general air of violence and
hostility despite the presence of NATO and a new local civilian police
service (the Kosovo Protection Corps).1160
As Taylor notes, the majority of those Kosovars who were reluctant
to return home even after the European winter was over fell within the ‘at
risk’ category outlined in the UN refugee Convention. The security
situation remained volatile and the province still did not have a functioning
police force, court system or prison system.1161 Civil infrastructure,
including telephone, postal and banking services remained inadequate, and
there remained a serious shortage of housing. After a decade of economic
underdevelopment, a virtually non-existent public service, and with 65-per
cent of people unemployed, Kosovo was ‘hardly able to look after its
residents, let alone an inrush of half-starved newcomers.’1162 In March
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2000, the ALP’s Dick Adams (Member for Lyons) described to the House
of Representatives how he had ‘made inquiries through the postal systems
and the United Nations and I have found that letters go to Belgrade and no
further. There is no mail or contact system set up in Kosovo.’1163 He stated
that many refugees were still living in tents and temporary accommodation
at this time and that many ordinary services simply did not exist. As Taylor
comments, for up to a year after the war, few Kosovars had access to
legitimate sources of income, and struggled to feed themselves and their
families. By mid-April 2000, Bernard Kouchner (head of UNMIK)
‘pleaded for governments to stem the flow [of returning refugees] for fear
that Kosovo’s brittle peace and fledgling post-war infrastructure could
crumble.’1164 Ruddock responded by speculating that there was an
‘expectation’ that Kosovo refugees returning home ‘are going to have
homes rebuilt for them, hot and cold water and provisions for services’,
which were not even available in many other, non-European countries.1165
The Immigration Minister’s position was in clear contrast to his earlier
claims about Australia’s humanitarian record and its reputation as the most
generous country in the world.1166

3.3 Erik Lloga’s experience in Kosovo
Those Kosovar refugees who returned home on 16th April 2000 were
accompanied by Lloga whose experience was discussed in the Federal
Senate. On Melbourne’s 744 ABC radio Lloga had described how he sat on
the plane with the refugees to Skopje. He noted that there were no
Australian immigration officials aboard the flight, nor any on the ground to
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assist the Kosovars.1167 Lloga stated that he had personally taken refugees
to police stations, even feeding some with his own money because the
Australian government had not given them any. 1168 It was noted that those
refugees who had worked and earned money in Australia were unable to
exchange any Australian currency in Pristina. Lloga further described how
he had attempted to take some of the refugees to aid agencies in Kosovo
who had not even been advised of their arrival.1169
Robert Manne, referring to an interview with Lloga (speaking from
Pristina) on ABC Radio, described how the Federal Government ‘had not
supplied [the refugees] with the addresses of agencies to which they might
turn. It made no arrangements for their accommodation. It had not even
assured that on arrival the Australian Kosovars would have food to eat.’1170
Manne said that even ‘the cautious Lloga’ who had worked closely with
DIMA throughout Operation Safe Haven, ‘could not disagree’ with
comments that the Australian government had ‘washed’ its hands of the
Kosovars.1171 Following Lloga’s interview the Immigration Minister
downplayed Lloga’s concerns. The presenter, Terry Laidler, asked
Ruddock if he thought the Australian people would be ‘fuming’ about the
“abandonment” of the refugees. The Immigration Minister replied that
Laidler should not look at the situation from such a ‘Eurocentric’
perspective.1172 Manne described how immediately afterwards, ‘the
switchboard was alight’ with angry callers: ‘Every caller was ashamed.
Unlike the minister, none appeared to find it difficult to distinguish
between common decency and the Eurocentric point of view.’1173
According to the Rehame media monitoring service, in the week after
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Lloga’s radio interviews there was a ‘massive swing’ in caller opinion,
indicating that many Australians had reconsidered their support for the
Federal Government’s stance on the recent repatriations.1174 Support for
Ruddock’s decision to return the refugees fell from 39 to four per cent,
with many callers stating they felt “ashamed” and “embarrassed”.1175 The
majority of those who had called radio talkback programs after the
Kosovars had left ‘felt they should never have been sent back.’1176
There was a significant breakdown in communication between the
Australian government and the UNHCR that added a sense of confusion
and chaos to the repatriations. As Senator Danby stated, those refugees
who wanted to return to Australia were given no indication by the
Government as to the availability of Australian immigration officials in
Kosovo, nor when or how to contact them in order to apply for visas.1177
Danby noted how the ABC’s 7.30 Report had raised significant questions
about the safety of Kosovars returning to Serbian-controlled areas. He
further suggested that the repatriations were somewhat paradoxical, citing a
warning issued by DFAT that Kosovo was too dangerous for Australians
travelling in the region. 60 Minutes’ reporter Richard Carleton had also
returned with some of the refugees to their homes in Presevo (which was
under the control of Serbia). He described how the town was literally
occupied by Yugoslav tanks. Senator Danby noted how the refugees ‘were
crying with [Richard Carleton], wishing that they could return. We just
dumped them there. We just put them on a plane to Skopje and did not give
them any money or food or even alert the international aid agencies that
they were coming.’1178
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Conclusion
The Australian government’s response to the issue of repatriation was
cautious and politically conservative. Despite government claims to the
contrary it ignored the human rights of the Kosovar refugees as otherwise
guaranteed by international conventions. The Federal Government retained
the legal right to return the Kosovars to their homeland under the powers it
had obtained under the Safe Haven legislation. The Immigration Minister
was, as noted by the UNHCR, able to conduct an induced return of the
refugees without being subject to external checks on his powers. The
Federal Government’s response to the issue of repatriation was shaped by
an element of coercion and much more punitive towards the refugees in
comparison to most other countries.
The experiences of many of those refugees who returned to Kosovo
in the year after the war reflects an unwillingness by the Federal
Government to continue to promote their human rights. The Government’s
response was consistent with both statements it had made during the early
stages of Operation Safe Haven and the rationale behind the legal
restrictions imposed on the Kosovars under the Safe Haven program.
Under the legislation, the refugees were required to return when the
government said so. It further provided a means by which the Immigration
Minister maintained rigid control over all aspects of the lives of Kosovar
refugees offered temporary safe haven in Australia. The Government’s
response was, however, inconsistent with sentiments expressed earlier by
the Prime Minister during the arrival ceremony at Sydney airport, when the
refugees were “welcomed” with “open arms” (at least in front of the
media). As a contributor to the Herald noted, following the repatriations
that took place after the High Court case: ‘I didn’t see John Howard at the
airport, making speeches and handing out soft toys to the children. He
seemed so interested in their welfare just a few months ago.’1179
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Media

coverage

predominantly

supported

the

Federal

Government’s response. There remained, for the most part, a close and
complementary relationship between the objectives of the Federal
Government and media representations of the Kosovars during the High
Court case. The Telegraph and Herald were very critical of those refugees
that wanted to remain in Australia, although The Australian largely
objected to the Government’s treatment of the Kosovars. A significant
portion of media coverage represented those refugees involved in the High
Court challenge as unworthy of Australia’s ongoing protection. The
Telegraph, in particular, was critical of those refugees, depicting them as
uncompliant, “illegals” and deviant criminals. The overwhelming effect of
the media’s portrayal was to reproduce an image of the Kosovars as
undeserving of the charity that had been offered to them by the Australian
community.

The

media

most

frequently

supported

the

Federal

Government’s repatriation program while demonising those Kosovar
refugees who refused to leave Australia voluntarily. In my next chapter, I
elaborate the role of Australian media in influencing public perceptions of
the Kosovo war and in representing Serbs as the “enemy”.
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Chapter 6: The Kosovo War and Australia’s Serbian
Communities
Introduction
In this thesis it has been shown how ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees
were predominantly constructed by the Australian media as worthy of
humanitarian assistance. That is, until the refugees raised questions about
the quality of the Safe Haven program. My aim in this chapter is to balance
this scenario by taking time and space to explore media representations of
Serbian communities living in Australia during the Kosovo refugee crisis
in March and April 1999. Many Serbian Australians reacted with disdain
toward the Australian government’s decision to support the NATO air
strikes against Yugoslavia. Serbs in Yugoslavia were commonly depicted
in media coverage as the “enemy”, and were subsequently tarnished with a
negative stigma in the Australian media. This chapter explores the effects
of these representations on Serbian Australians. It investigates how the
media was useful for the Howard Government by supporting its nationalist
platform during the Kosovo war.
This chapter is set out in two parts. First, it examines the way the
Australian media demonised Serbs alongside NATO’s military efforts to
subdue the Yugoslav regime led by President Slobodan Milosevic. The
discussion investigates the representation of “East/West” divides in media
coverage and the notion that there were opposing cultural and political
boundaries between NATO-allied countries (such as Australia) and
Yugoslavia. The second section of the chapter investigates the mobilisation
of binaries by the media who referred to “good/bad” ethnic Serbs and how
this approach played out alongside notions of “loyalty/disloyalty” within
Australia during the Kosovo war. This section explores protests conducted
by Serbian communities in Australia against the NATO campaign and
media representations of these demonstrations. The media analysis in this
chapter is based on an examination of a total of 328 newspaper articles
published in the period 1st March to 30th April 1999. These articles
numbered 131 in the Telegraph, 88 in the Australian and 104 in the Herald
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and my analysis incorporates news items, editorials and opinion
columns.1180 My investigation is primarily concerned with issues affecting
Serbian Australian communities during the first month of the NATO
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia which began on 24th March.1181

1. The Yugoslav Foe
1.1 Background: the Serbian military campaign
The Australian’s foreign editor, Greg Sheridan, described Serbia as ‘an
impoverished dictatorship of 8 million people.’1182 The population of
Serbia in 1999 was actually closer to 7.5 million people. Serbia’s GDP was
$US17.63 billion and its GDP growth had declined rapidly in the previous
two years to -11 per cent. By contrast, the global average rate of GDP
growth was 3.19 per cent and Serbia was facing significant economic
strain.1183 There were approximately 100,000 persons claiming Serbian
ancestry living in Australia at the time of the NATO campaign in
Kosovo.1184 Australia had become a major destination for migrants from
Yugoslavia in the post-war period. It has been estimated that there were
around 100,000 dual Yugoslav-Australian citizens living in Australia by

1180

This includes the Sunday Telegraph, Daily Telegraph (morning and afternoon
editions), The Australian, Weekend Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald and SunHerald (Sydney). All articles were retrieved from Factiva, except afternoon editions of the
Telegraph, which were retrieved via microfiche. Duplicates in both editions of the
Telegraph were ignored.
1181
The media analysis incorporated news articles specifically focussed on protests
conducted by members of the Serbian community in Australia. It further analyses those
newspaper articles concerned about Kosovar Albanian refugees and the NATO campaign.
The content analysis excluded most articles specifically concerned about Australian aid
workers Steve Pratt and Peter Wallace, who were arrested during this period by Serbian
authorities on suspicion of espionage. It did, however, include articles concerned about the
aid workers where the emphasis was also on the NATO campaign, Yugoslav Serbs,
Australian Serbs and Kosovar Albanian refugees.
1182
G. Sheridan, ‘What’s the plan’, The Australian, 3rd April 1999, p. 19.
1183
World Bank, ‘Serbia - Data and Statistics’. URL: <http://www.worldbank.rs
/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/SERBIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:300929~pag
ePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:300904,00.html>. Accessed 11th January 2011.
1184
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), ‘Australian Ancenstries: 2001’, Census 2001,
2054.0, 2001. URL: <http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/3382D783B7
6B605BCA256E91007AB88E/$File/20540_2001.pdf>. Accessed 4th May 2011. Here,
ABS provides the figure of 97,315 Australians who claimed Serbian ancestry in 2001. See
also C. Miranda, ‘Albanians The Real Terrorists’, Daily Telegraph, 1st April 1999, p. 2.
The journalist cites the figure 300,000 as the number of Australians with Serbian ancestry
at the time of the Kosovo war in 1999. This far exceeds the statistic provided by ABS and
it is unclear where the journalist obtained this figure.

273

2002 which included many descendants of Yugoslav immigrants who
identified themselves as Serbs.1185 There were, moreover, around 5000
Australian dual citizens in Yugoslavia at the time of the Kosovo war.1186
Australians had witnessed ongoing conflict in the former
Yugoslavia presented in the media throughout the decade prior to the
Kosovo war. Nicholas Procter notes, in Serbian Australians in the Shadow
of the Balkan War, how ‘Television and newspaper images of the conflict
[between 1991 and 1996] sent shock waves through the world and these
have included the most horrific scenes of carnage, incarceration and
massacre.’1187 News reports about the horrors of “ethnic cleansing” in the
Balkans were commonplace throughout coverage of the Bosnian war. The
names of Serbian leaders in Bosnia - such as President Radovan Karadzic
and military commander Ratko Mladic - and in Serbia-proper became
synonymous with the notion of war crimes.1188 Procter’s ethnographic
study about the effects of the war on Serbian Australians notes how they
were ‘a group which was, and felt itself to have been, stigmatised
internationally.’1189
The “shadow” of these images, Procter says, has been ‘global in
outreach’ and has had a very real impact on migrants from the former
Yugoslavia now living in many parts of the world.1190 A commonality for
Australian Serbs, Procter found, was the sense that the world resented them
for being the instigators of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. He argues that:
‘what was significant in the Balkan war experience among Serbs around
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the world was that they were the group seen by most Western nations and
commentators as the main perpetrator of the conflict.’1191
Tension had been escalating for several years between the
Yugoslav government and the KLA in Kosovo. Serbian forces were
dispatched to Kosovo to subdue violent resistance by the KLA in midMarch 1999. The “unofficially” elected Kosovar Albanian leader, Dr
Ibrahim Rugova, was taken into custody by Serbian police shortly
afterwards - despite not being affiliated with the KLA. The political
movement led by Rugova had sought an independent State for Kosovo via
diplomacy and opposed the use of violence by the KLA.
The Yugoslav military campaign was conducted on two fronts –
one fought against the KLA and the other against NATO air strikes.
Various mercenary units, including ‘Chetniks’ and ‘Tigers’, were also
employed by the Yugoslav government to accompany the Serbian army.
The main objective of the militias was to force ethnic Albanian civilians to
leave Kosovo by “clearing” villages, towns and city sectors in which ethnic
Albanians had resided. Commentators have stated that the purpose of the
panic created by the non-military units was twofold: to secure Kosovo
politically by removing or downsizing the Albanian majority; and, to
destabilise the region forcing NATO-allied countries to relocate
refugees.1192
As the Telegraph described the Yugoslav campaign on 1st April
1999: ‘European leaders cited accounts – some documented, some not – of
“ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, of burned villages, murders of civil rights
and political leaders, internment of fighting-age men and systematic
destruction of ethnic archives.’1193 It was commonly reported by much of
the Australian news media that intellectuals and journalists were being
‘systematically killed off’.1194 The situation was typically represented by
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pro-NATO countries as the worst humanitarian disaster since the ‘Nazi
Holocaust’.1195 It had generated widespread panic in which 850,000
Kosovar Albanians fled (or were forced to flee) to neighbouring countries
as refugees.1196 The media’s representation of these issues can be viewed in
relation to the notion that, in the news media: ‘Symbolic contests are
waged with metaphors, catch phrases, and other symbolic devices that
mutually support an interpretive package for making sense of an ongoing
stream of events as they relate to a particular issues.’1197 Overwhelmingly,
coverage of the NATO intervention in The Australian, Herald and
Telegraph depicted the war as a conflict between West and East,
democracy and communist Yugoslavia, and morality and evil. The
prominence of these issues fluctuated throughout coverage of the conflict.
However, they remained the dominant subtext to the media’s
representation of the refugee crisis and the NATO campaign.
On 20th March 1999, the Australian government authorised the
departure of all Australian staff and their dependants from Yugoslavia.1198
Foreign Affairs Minister Downer stated that no Australian Defence Force
(ADF) units would be involved, though a small number of ADF personnel
on exchange with British and American units in the region ‘could be
deployed with their units’.1199 He said: ‘These attacks by NATO on
Yugoslavia are, of course, deeply regrettable, but the Australian
government supports the NATO air strikes against military targets in
Yugoslavia. We do regret that this action has become necessary… The
international community cannot simply stand by and watch as President
Milosevic’s forces continue to perpetrate the sort of human rights abuses
that have recently been perpetrated in Kosovo. It is an unreasonable
proposition to expect NATO leaders to sit on their hands in that situation
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and do nothing.’1200 Downer emphasised the point, though, that ‘our
argument here is an argument with President Milosevic, with his
government and with the instrument of his government, his armed forces. It
is not an argument with the Serbian people as a whole. The tragic situation
rests squarely with President Milosevic himself.’1201 The main contribution
made by the Australian government to the war effort was in the form of
money offered to Australian and International Red Cross, CARE Australia,
World Vision Australia and other aid agencies. However and as I have
shown, by early April, the Australian government had complied with the
UNHCR’s request to evacuate refugees from the region.
This chapter explores and evaluates the effects of media
representation of the Kosovo war on Australia’s Serbian communities. It
will also critically assess their reactions to the NATO air strikes. I have
recognised ethnographic factors when attempting to rationalise the issues
that emerged in media coverage. Procter notes that: ‘For many Serbian
Australians there is a symbolic past that lives very much in their present
situation. This past can be traced to recent and distant events in the Balkans
that are memorialised through a variety of cultural and religious
means.’1202 While the historical links between Serbs and the geographical
region of Kosovo remain contested, the historical connections emphasised
by many Serbs in relation to their homeland were crucial to shaping their
reactions to the NATO campaign. Many Serbs view Kosovo as the
“birthplace” of Serbian nationalism, following their military defeat near
Pristina by the Ottoman Turks in the 14th century. The defeat has remained
central to the national identity of many Serbs. This was particularly so
during the period in which Slobodan Milosevic was Yugoslav President.
His rise to power is often viewed as directly related to his ability to
promote the tragic plight of Serbs as a means of generating national
unity.1203
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For Serbs living in Australia, the tragic events in Serbia’s history
‘may be seen as elements that transcend nations and communities where
people live.’1204 They have often worked to reinvigorate symbolic
traditions that remain central to the way many Serbs imagine their cultural
identity, particularly in diaspora communities whose sense of homeland
nationalism sometimes reflects a strong sense of nostalgia.1205 The
radicalisation of Balkan ethnic nationalism in the 1990s can be rationalised
‘as an attempt to maintain or to recreate a sense of identity and community
in the face of the threat of cultural assimilation or annihilation’.1206 The
resurgence in Serbian nationalism around the world in the 1990s can be
understood as a consequence of decades of political disintegration between
the various republics of the former Yugoslavia. It is related to how these
countries

–

Macedonia,

Croatia,

Slovenia,

Montenegro,

Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Serbia - failed to overcome unequal economic
development within the Yugoslav Federation.

1.2 Personalising the war: Slobodan Milosevic and Arkan’s Tigers
Two days before the NATO air strikes began, the Telegraph described how
‘Armed Serbs wearing black masks and white jumpsuits drove thousands
of ethnic Albanians from their homes’.1207 Several weeks later, one
headline depicted how ‘The last village falls to the men in masks’.1208 The
media consistently depicted a scenario in which various militia groups,
including ‘Arkan’s Tigers’,1209 had been hired as mercenaries by the
1204
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Yugoslav regime to conduct ‘summary executions’1210 and ‘purge’1211
ethnic Albanians. The role of the militias, according to many media
reports, was to systematically “flush out” and brutally execute young
Albanian men of fighting age in various rural villages and towns.1212
Armed units were, the Telegraph wrote, ‘preying on ethnic Albanians’ in a
campaign of ‘genocide’.1213 In one headline The Australian depicted the
tactics of Arkan’s Tigers as: ‘Death stalks dispossessed’.1214 These ‘men
with masks’ carried knives, according to some of the refugees, wore the
symbol for ‘Arkan’s Tigers on their arms’ and conducted their roles with
‘terrifying consistency’.1215
Repeated reference to the “men in masks” was a potent use of
imagery. It presented Australian news consumers with clear indication of
the barbarity of Serbs. The notion of concealment signified the predatory
nature of these armed units as they carried out atrocities without moral
restraint. Such an image was a purposeful manipulation of the power of
visual imagery and metaphor, establishing a clear symbolic division
between the “evil” disposition of Serbs and the righteousness of NATO’s
allies. This sentiment is captured in one story that depicted the ‘most evil
war crimes’ in which ‘a Serb in a ski mask picked [a] tall, lovely girl from
the masses, shoved her into a dark garage and, along with three other
masked men, inflicted a final humiliation.’1216
By early April, the militias began to move into Pristina alongside
Serbian police. They were reportedly using tactics of fear and panic to
expel the entire ethnic Albanian population of the capital which was home
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to around 350,000 people.1217 Media reports discussed how many ethnic
Albanians were forced at gunpoint to leave their city apartments and board
trains departing for the Macedonian border. Pristina’s Albanians were often
described as being ‘herded’ en masse to the train station as if they had been
livestock.1218 The Telegraph noted how Serbian soldiers knocked on the
doors of ethnic Albanians in the capital, informing residents: ‘You have 15
minutes to leave.’1219 One headline in The Australian described the arrival
of Serbian police at the homes of ethnic Albanians living in Pristina as
‘Civilisation’s death knock’.1220 The capital had virtually been “emptied”
of its ethnic Albanian population within the first week April. Many of
those expelled were urban, middle-class professionals, with some reports
indicating that their higher level of education was a major catalyst for their
expulsion.1221
Those who arrived at the Macedonian border faced checkpoint
guards who had been instructed to prevent refugees from entering the
country by the Macedonian government. (I have discussed media coverage
of the situation facing refugees in “no man’s land” between the
Macedonian and Kosovo borders in Chapter 2). As the Telegraph
described it: ‘To make it harder, Serb guards warned them not to step
outside the [train] tracks where the walking was easier. The edges were
mined, they said grinning.’1222 It was commonly reported that Serb units
had looted the personal belongings of refugees en route to the Macedonian
border, that ‘Serb thugs’ had ‘seized’ documents and valuables, ‘leaving
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the victims with only the clothes they stood up in.’1223 There were reports
of Serbian forces taking advantage of the refugee column making its way
along the road to the Macedonian border. Serbian troops blocked the road,
one report stated, and only ‘For a price, the road was opened’.1224
The image of Serbian military and militia units intimidating
“innocent” Kosovar Albanians was prominent, marking a point of
departure between the morals and values of media consumers in proNATO countries and Serbs. There were several instances in which
newspaper reports cited Serbian officers intimidating new mothers, who
had given birth during the forced exodus, by saying: ‘Name the baby
NATO’.1225 Others described how Serbian soldiers had ‘mocked’ refugees
in Pristina. They told them ‘to enjoy their “free ride to Macedonia” and that
the trip was a “gift from the [Serbian] Government” [sic].’1226
Media reports pointed out that such tactics were designed to force
the Albanian population of Kosovo to ‘flee’ the province by generating
panic, fear and terror.1227 There was much coverage in the first month of
the NATO campaign concerning Serbian police who were reportedly using
torture. Some victims had testified in news reports that Albanians were
being branded with ‘lumps of red-hot iron on their bare skin. The iron was
shaped like a Serbian cross with four Cyrillic letters S.’1228 The symbol
stood for ‘Only Unity Saves The Serbs.’1229 This kind of coverage
significantly developed a personalisation of the ‘atrocities’ conducted by
Serb units in the Australian media.1230 The use of ‘Serbian commando
assault’ units by the Yugoslav regime to coerce the Albanian population
into leaving Kosovo was often denied by Slobodan Milosevic and other
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officials.1231 The Yugoslav ambassador to the UN, for instance, denied that
rape and murder was being conducted by Serbian troops, stating: ‘If
something of that kind were done there it [was] done by some irresponsible
individuals not belonging to our security forces [sic]’.1232 Such repeated
emphasis on the brutality of the police and militia in the media and denials
of such activities by Serbian leaders served to reinforce an impression of
the Yugoslav State as deceptive and morally bankrupt. These kinds of
images in the Australian media strongly correlated to the global political
order maintained by NATO. This is because an ‘observable pattern of
indignant campaigns and suppressions, of shading and emphasis, and of
selection of context, premises, and general agendas, is highly functional for
established power and responsive to the needs of the government and
major power groups.’1233
The notion that Milosevic was working alongside the militias (as
their employer) established a clear moral binary for Australian news
consumers, significantly personalising the idea that the President was
“evil”1234 and that ethnic Albanians and the actions of NATO were “pure”
and “just”. NATO spokespersons, such as Jamie Shea (and others),
emphasised how Milosevic was ‘re-engineering the ethnic makeup of the
province’ - by, as the Telegraph described, simply ‘murdering its
inhabitants’.1235 Media coverage frequently reproduced descriptions of
Milosevic offered by US President Bill Clinton. The descriptions were
typified by the argument: ‘If we don’t do anything … it will be interpreted
[by the Yugoslav leader] as a license to continue to kill. There will be more
massacres, more refugees, more victims, more people crying out for
1231
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revenge [sic].’1236 This was the position endorsed, as the Telegraph stated,
by leading NATO countries including Britain, France and Italy.1237 This
sentiment was adopted by the Australian Prime Minister who blamed the
‘stubbornness’ of Milosevic for the NATO campaign.1238 As Howard stated
on 26th March: ‘It became unavoidable because of the intransigence of
Milosevic[.] There has been plenty of opportunity to accommodate the
ethnic Albanian position in Kosovo.’1239 Downer added, speaking in the
House of Representatives, that it was Milosevic’s ‘further intransigence
which has brought about NATO’s authorisation of air strikes.
Responsibility for that situation lies squarely with Mr Milosevic, who at
every stage has thwarted peace efforts… [and committed] atrocities against
Kosovo civilians… Mr Milosevic and the Serbian leadership should now
be in no doubt of the international community’s resolve to end the
suffering in Kosovo.’1240 This sentiment mirrored the discourse of
international media in supporting the NATO campaign in Kosovo, which
focussed ‘laser-like on crimes of selected enemies, at the moment Serbian
devils.’1241
Various components of the Yugoslav State were commonly
depicted as a direct extension of the personality of Milosevic. This
included constant references to his “military machine” - the Serbian Army,
police and militias that were orchestrating atrocities against ethnic
Albanians.1242 The State itself was commonly represented as an
undemocratic, ‘hard-line’ regime.1243 The President was frequently
regarded by the media as untrustworthy (in relation to his interactions with
both ethnic Albanians and NATO officials) and often depicted as
1236
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deliberately

deceiving

his

own

Serbian

constituents

through

misinformation and a crackdown on political dissidence. It was regularly
noted how, for instance, ‘Yugoslavia’s government-controlled Tanjug
news agency’ was being used to disseminate falsehoods about NATO’s
intentions, and deny (or at least play down) the scale of the atrocities
against ethnic Albanians.1244
A point of contention, however, is how Australian newspaper
reports about atrocities committed by Serb police and militias cited
“eyewitness” accounts given by the KLA news agency. Newspaper reports
concerned about “massacres” and mass executions in Qirez, Orahovac and
Podujevo, for example, were uncritical of the reliability of KLA reports.1245
One of the major problems faced by journalists attempting to verify details
about the war was that the international media had been expelled from
Kosovo at the beginning of the NATO air strikes.1246 The great majority of
reports about atrocities being committed in the province were based on
testimonies offered by traumatised ethnic Albanians fleeing the conflict as
they arrived at the Macedonian and Albanian border.1247
On the other hand, there was consistent emphasis across the
Telegraph, Australian and Herald on how “government-controlled media”
was being used to manipulate Serbs into supporting Milosevic’s military
campaign.1248 The Australian reported, for instance, that the Milosevic
regime had ‘moved quickly to silence any opposition, shutting down
Belgrade’s independent radio station.’1249 The consistent focus on the
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Yugoslav government’s rigid control of Serbian media bolstered
perceptions in the Australian news media about the freedoms enjoyed by
citizens in pro-NATO countries.
Despite these claims about the lack of democratic freedom within
Yugoslavia, there remained clear evidence signifying NATO’s ability to
dictate media discourse in its allied countries. Statistics and facts about the
war and the refugee crisis given by NATO officials were overwhelmingly
reproduced without question by the news media. The war was fought by
NATO as much from the air as it was over the airwaves broadcast to the
homes of ordinary citizens in member and allied states.1250 One of the few
news articles that questioned the role of the media in NATO-allied
countries argued that: ‘it is really quite understandable that the Serbs
should try to prevent journalists from filming the results of the air strikes.
Those images that photojournalists and camera crews have transmitted to
the West are clearly being used in the West for propaganda purposes.’1251
The author went on to state that media reports in the first week of the war
were ‘vague and sketchy … These details, like the images of the weapons
of war, clearly come from military sources.’1252
The Herald’s Geoff Kitney asserted that ‘the [Serbian] state media
present an unending diet of nationalist propaganda. Half-truths, censorship
and distortion are its hallmarks.’1253 A similar perception was evident in
NATO’s military strategy to defeat Yugoslavia. The manipulation of the
media by Milosevic was such a concern for NATO that the organisation
attempted to “tap into” Serbian television frequencies to address Serbs
directly as they watched coverage of the war in their homes. On 6th April,
NATO broadcast a television signal in which a woman, speaking in
Serbian but with a foreign accent, attempted to enlighten Belgrade
residents by saying: ‘If only you knew the ethnic cleansing campaign was
going on down there [in Kosovo], you would be stunned [sic].’1254 On 22nd
April, it was reported that NATO jets had bombed Milosevic’s
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governmental headquarters which was also the location of a television and
radio station that was ‘owned by people close to the authorities’.1255
Serbian television was ‘hit chiefly’, a Pentagon spokesperson stated,
‘because [it was] part of President Slobodan Milosevic’s military and
political base.’1256
Milosevic was commonly viewed as ‘defiant’ towards NATO,
relentlessly pursuing a ‘brutal campaign to force ethnic Albanians out of
Kosovo.’1257 Bill Clinton commented during the early stages of the war that
Milosevic would rather ‘rule over rubble than not rule at all.’1258 A NATO
declaration vowed to continue bombing Yugoslavia ‘as long as it takes…
[and] until President Milosevic accedes to the demands of the international
community’.1259 That is, to achieve a ‘democratic transition in Serbia’ and
overturn ‘belligerent tyranny’.1260 The Yugoslav President refuted such
criticism. He referred to NATO as ‘aggressors’ and ‘criminals’1261 and, as
reported by the Telegraph, ‘brushed off the continued barrage, defiantly
promising to rebuild bomb-damaged structures’.1262
The Australian media produced the image of a contest of wills
between NATO’s allies and Yugoslavia, and one that would test the
resolve of all 19 NATO member countries. The resolve of Milosevic to
resist NATO, however, was often depicted in the media to be both
pointless and irrational indicating that NATO would easily and inevitably
obtain its objectives. A spirit of irrational defiance was, according to
various newspaper reports, a common trait that the Yugoslav President
shared with Serbs living in Australia as they conducted their anti-NATO
protests. As the Herald noted, citing a Macedonian cab driver: ‘The Serbs
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are orang-utans and Milosevic is a gorilla. There is no logic about those
people. They are mad.’1263 The irrationality of Serbian national unity
during the NATO air strikes was purported by the news media to transcend
both Yugoslav and Australian Serbs.

Serbs protesting in Belgrade, from The Daily Telegraph, 9th
April 1999, p. 30

This sentiment was reportedly the motivation for a number of street
demonstrations, vigils and concerts staged by Serbs in Belgrade. On 10th
April the Telegraph described how ‘thousands chanting “Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia” gathered on two major bridges in Belgrade and one in Novi
Sad to serve as volunteer “human shields” against [NATO] attacks’.1264
Initially, it had been intellectuals and academics that began the protests by
linking arms to form a chain over the river Sava (which runs through the
city). The protests had ‘grown dramatically’ over the next few nights with
more than several thousand people occupying various bridges around the
capital.1265 Those involved held signs that stated, ‘Clinton and Blair are
Nazi’s’, while concerts were also held on some of the bridges.1266 A
symbol used by those conducting a candlelight vigil in Belgrade – printed
on t-shirts and placards – was the “target” (see image above). This was
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intended to both antagonise NATO supporters and unify those who chose
to remain in the capital city. The Herald stated that the target was a
‘solidarity badge of honour’ and the Belgrade protests had ‘become a
symbol of defiance … which remains undiminished by NATO bombs’.1267
This sentiment was further typified in reports about the annual Belgrade
marathon which proceeded in mid-April despite the bombings. As one of
the competitors commented: ‘The tradition of the Belgrade marathon has
not stopped. Even if they continue to bomb us, the race will continue.’1268
Kitney reported, ‘Singing and dances as the NATO bombs fall: to the
outside it must be reinforcing the view that the Serbs are mad.’1269

1.3 East/West divides
The front page of The Australian proclaimed, on the launch of the NATO
campaign: ‘West prepares swift, severe strikes against Milosevic.’1270 As
the Herald reported: ‘The prospect of war plunged East-West relations into
crisis.’1271 Sheridan declared in one headline: ‘Fight the West must
win’.1272 The Australian’s Terry Plane depicted the NATO campaign as the
‘US’s rampant determination to mould the world in, if not its image, at
least its thought patterns in what appears to be a global video game where
America is always good and great.’1273 Russia remained ‘steadfast’ in its
opposition to the NATO intervention and had been against any US-led
military action in the region for several years.1274 As the Telegraph
reported, on 11th April: ‘Russian President Boris Yeltsin got tough with the
West yesterday, warning NATO not to drag Russia into Kosovo because it
could spark a world war.’1275
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The NATO campaign in Kosovo was represented by the media in
pro-NATO countries to be a direct consequence of post-Cold War political
alliances that had not yet stabilised. 1276 The conflict was frequently said to
be an extension of divisions that continued to exist between the “West” and
“East”, Washington and Moscow (which supported Serbia’s control over
Kosovo) and “civilisation” and the “uncivilised” Balkan countries. The
Herald noted that Russia’s post-war plans would involve an attempt to
establish the hegemony of ‘Eurasianists over Atlanticists’.1277 Sheridan
warned of a ‘hyper-nationalist reaction in Russia’1278 while elsewhere The
Australian commented that ‘The Russians have clout and cultural bonds
with the Serbs.’1279 The NATO campaign was frequently represented as a
conflict between the “old” dictatorships of Eastern Europe and the modern,
democratic international order. It was on many occasions depicted as a
campaign that would finally “lay to rest” the “long decayed” system of
Yugoslav “authoritarianism”. This perspective was reproduced in the
Herald, which stated: ‘NATO’s bombing campaign in the Balkans is the
end-game in the forcible dismemberment of Yugoslavia.’1280
This emphasis on the East/West divide featured in 90 references in
the Telegraph, 79 in The Australian and 114 in the Herald.1281 Notions of
East/West that appeared in media coverage of the Kosovo war were
ambiguous. There was rampant and often unqualified use of the term “the
West” in many news articles. Common phrases included repetition of a
variety of vague terms, such as “the West”, “Western leaders”, “Western
allies”, “Western European countries”, “Western officials”, “pro-Western”,
“a Western-dictated peace”, “Western media”, “East-West confrontation”,
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the “West” as “civilised”, and the “moral righteousness of the West”. In
one article, for example, The Australian stated that the NATO campaign
had resulted from the notion that ‘The West finally decided it could no
longer do business with Milosevic.’1282 It could be assumed that the author
is implying that NATO member States ‘could no longer do business’ with
Milosevic. This demonstrates, more importantly, the ways in which the
news media frequently adopted the notion of “the West” in place of the
political and military interests of NATO (or the US). These kinds of reports
encouraged the development of ideological unity and supported NATO’s
interests in maintaining global order.1283
The ambiguity in the way in which the term “the West” was
adopted by the media is further demonstrated in descriptions of Balkan
countries during the Kosovo war. Shifting and efficacious markers of
“Western European” and “non-Western” were at times utilised to make
clear the distinctions between Kosovar Albanians (those “we” are helping)
and Serbs (those “we” are at war with). By the same measure, though, the
notion of “Balkanisation” as “fragmentation” tended to underpin these
kinds of representations. The Telegraph, citing retired British Major
Charles Heyman, emphasized the “inevitable” and continuing divisions
that existed between the Balkans and the rest of the world: ‘[Former
Yugoslav President] Tito’s master plan was to turn Yugoslavia into the sort
of fortress that no one would want to meddle with. He succeeded against
both the West and the Warsaw Pact.’1284 The editor of The Australian
adopted this view of the Kosovo war, stating that it was the somewhat
inevitable result of the ‘tribal conflicts of the Balkans’.1285
Historians have often viewed the Balkans as a “tinderbox”, shaped
by continued clashes between ethnic groups for several hundred years. As
Fleming says, it is typical of Western European commentators ‘to lump [all
the Balkan countries] together’ while simultaneously stipulating that they
1282
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are helplessly embroiled in conflict and fragmented (or “Balkanised”)
‘along absurdly minute and definitionally obscure grounds’.1286 That is to
say, that ‘one of the primary characteristics attributed to Balkan lands and
peoples is the paranoia … of small differences.’1287 This view was
frequently promoted in news reports of the Kosovo war.1288 It is the view
that, ‘What people [from the various Yugoslav republics] once had in
common with each – their geographical belonging along citizenship lines –
had become obsolete, as “south eastern Europe had become split along
ancient lines separating Catholic from Orthodox, Rome from Byzantium …
neighbour from neighbour” [sic]’.1289 What was often overlooked were the
long term causes of the conflict, such as economic underdevelopment,
which are related to the effects of global capitalism and centuries of
Western European imperialism.1290
News coverage of the Kosovo war further demonstrated how the
media is able to personalise and nationalise conflicts for an audience by
focusing on injustices inflicted by an enemy on its citizens. It has been
noted elsewhere how ideological divides within a nation tend to be dwarfed
by the differences between nations through journalistic practices of
‘domestication’.1291 Through these processes, an enemy is easily rendered
uncivilised and barbaric when it is directly seen as harming persons who
are held in high-esteem in their country of origin. These sentiments are
typified in coverage of events involving CARE Australia aid workers Steve
Pratt and Peter Wallace who were taken into custody by Yugoslav border
guards on 1st April and accused of participating in espionage against
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Yugoslavia.1292 The aid workers were taken into custody while attempting
to cross from Yugoslavia into Croatia near the town of Lipovac.1293 Much
of the media coverage concerning the incarceration of Pratt and Wallace
was highly emotive, promoting the situation as an injustice to all
Australians. The Australian Prime Minister responded by stating that the
Federal government would do all it could to ensure that the CARE workers
were released; ‘I can say to their families … that we care about them and
we’re trying very hard, using every means at our disposal to get them back.
And … we pray that they will be safely returned. [sic]’1294 Through the
incident dominant assumptions emerged within political discourse that
Yugoslavia ought to be treated with caution. It was to be regarded as an
unlawful State carelessly incarcerating “innocent” aid workers taking part
in a non-partisan, humanitarian mission. In this light, the claims of
espionage made against Pratt and Wallace were commonly viewed by
media commentators as ‘preposterous’ and they were presented as coming
from a ‘preposterous source.’1295 While the allegations against Pratt and
Wallace were disputed by commentators in the Australian media, an
investigation aired by the SBS program Dateline on 2nd February 2000
revealed that CARE had been involved in espionage activities in the
Balkans which implicated the two men.1296

1.4 Moral support for the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia
News articles commonly referred to the NATO campaign against
Yugoslavia as a moral cause with significant implications for international
human rights.1297 They undoubtedly - at least in the minds of Western news
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consumers - set ‘the stage for intervention … all in a noble cause.’1298
Yugoslav Serbs were consistently depicted as a deviant and “lesser” moral
people, an image that bolstered the urgency and righteousness of the
NATO campaign. Terms used to describe the circumstances faced by
ethnic Albanian refugees that signified “compassion” or “empathy”
numbered at least 1029 in the Telegraph, 842 in The Australian and 817 in
the Herald. The use of “humanitarian” descriptors, including references to
the work of aid agencies, charities, universal human rights and moral
sentiments, featured 197 times in the Telegraph, on 322 occasions in The
Australian and 242 times in the Herald. The broader implication of this
was, as the Herald pointed out, that the ‘international community sees only
one people – the ethnic Albanians – as victims and ranks their suffering
above that of the Serbs.’1299
Herman and Chomsky’s study of mass media representations of the
Kosovo war supports these claims. They note how the media established a
clear binary between Serbs as “immoral” and “unworthy” victims of the
war, while depicting ethnic Albanians as victims of NATO’s enemy and
thus “worthy” of humanitarian assistance.1300 This kind of mass media bias
was ‘politically advantageous to U.S. policy-makers, for focusing on
victims of enemy states shows those states to be wicked and deserving of
U.S. hostility; while ignoring U.S. and client-state victims allows ongoing
U.S. policies to proceed more easily, unburdened by the interference of
concern over the politically inconvenient victims.’1301 The Australian
media’s coverage of the Kosovo conflict overwhelmingly supported the
sentiment that the victims of NATO’s enemies were worthy of Australia’s
best efforts to assist them, and ranked the hardships endured by Kosovar
Albanians higher than those experienced by Serbs.
There are significant political, cultural and religious implications in
the ways the mass media produced moral edicts on behalf of NATO. There
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was a consistent subtext played out in media coverage that a Western
European brand of Christian morality was driving the NATO campaign
against Yugoslavia. It was pointed out in the media that NATO was
determined to ‘move heaven and earth’ to ‘flatten the Yugoslav war
machine’.1302 The refugee crisis was frequently described as ‘an exodus’ of
‘Biblical proportions’, and purported to be a scene from the Old Testament:
‘An entire race on the move at the gunpoint behest of their Serbian
rulers.’1303 One Herald headline depicted the refugee flight as ‘The Escape
From Hell’.1304 The Vatican, noted a report in the Telegraph, had failed to
dissuade the Yugoslav leadership from its military campaign and had
‘denounced’ the ‘ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, calling it an atrocity that
“disgraces and bloodies Europe.”’1305 These kinds of media representations
emphasised the ‘saintly glow’ of American foreign policy as it ‘shines
through’, particularly as the NATO campaign was conducted at the dawn
of ‘the third millennium of the Christian era’.1306
Adding to this situation was the consistent depiction of the NATO
campaign as a fast, efficient “crusade” in which the US-led Western
military operation was highly superior and sweeping into the Balkans to
eject an evil and morally bankrupt dictatorship. Supreme NATO
commander, US General Wesley Clark, described his military plan as a
‘swift and severe’ campaign of air assaults involving over 400 aircraft from
the US, Britain, France, Germany and ten other countries.1307 The planes
were launched from air bases in Italy, England and aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean sea. Coverage of NATO air strikes launched across the
Adriatic Sea from Italy presented the image of American fighter jets
moving rapidly over Yugoslavia, dropping their payloads, and of the pilots
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returning to recuperate in their own sleeping quarters just hours later.1308
Images in the Telegraph depicted ‘NATO’S PERFECT SCORE’ and
successful bombing runs by ‘US B-1, B-2, F-117, F-16, and F-17
warplanes.’1309 The newspaper provided computer graphics and maps
showing the targeted areas around Serbia alongside pictures of military
headquarters and an oil refinery that had been successfully destroyed.1310
This kind of representation supported a moral subtext in which Serbs were
an enemy that could only be dealt with through overwhelming force.

‘NATO’s PERFECT SCORE’, from Daily Telegraph, 7th April 1999, p. 29

NATO’s plans to resolve the conflict ‘must have looked
commendable … as they were etched thousands of miles away.’1311 In
Virtual War; Kosovo and beyond, Michael Ignatieff says the Kosovo
conflict marked a new phase in global politics because of the central role
played by the mass media in legitimating the NATO intervention. It was
the first ‘virtual’ war that ‘looked and sounded like a war... [for] the
civilians and soldiers killed in air strikes and the Kosovar Albanians
1308
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murdered by Serbian police… For the citizens of the NATO countries, on
the other hand, the war was virtual… The war was a spectacle: it aroused
emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do.’1312 Ignatieff adds:
‘Technological mastery removed death from our experience of war. But
war without death – to our side – is war that ceases to be fully real to us:
virtual war.’1313 The virtuality of the war extended beyond representations
of the NATO campaign by the media to the very role of the combatants.
While there were 40,000 Serbian soldiers fighting on the ground, only
around 1500 NATO air-crew actually went to war.1314 As Ignatieff says:
‘For NATO combatants the experience of war was less visceral than
calculative, a set of split-second decisions made through the lens of a gun
camera or over a video-conferencing system. Those who struck from the
air seldom saw those they killed.’1315 An important element of mass-media
depictions of the war, then, was a post-Cold War subtext denoting the
techno-superiority of the countries supporting the NATO alliance.
Technology thus provided supporters of NATO with another binary used to
conceive the Yugoslav foe - as economically, technologically and
politically backward.
The purported historical significance of the NATO campaign was
frequently emphasised in media reports. Comments by Prime Minister
Howard typified this sentiment, denoting a connection between the Nazi
Holocaust and Yugoslavia’s campaign of “ethnic cleansing”. He noted that:
‘History has told us if you sit by and do nothing, you pay a much greater
price later on.’1316 As the editor of the Telegraph described matters: ‘Not
since World War II has there been a more tragic exodus on the scale that is
occurring in the former Yugoslavia.’1317 Repeated links were made
between the atrocities committed by the Nazi’s in World War II and the
Yugoslav campaign in Kosovo, ‘one of the largest human catastrophes in
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modern history’.1318 Sheridan described the conflict as the result of
Milosevic’s 1989 policy in which he ‘instituted an effective apartheid
system between Serbs and Albanians.’1319 The implication was that
Milosevic’s policies had continued to develop since that time in polar
opposition to contemporary standards for international human rights. They
defied the logic of what had become a major symbol for human rights (at
least in wealthy Western European countries) in the latter 20th century - the
abolition of apartheid in South Africa.1320 The Minister for the
Environment and Heritage (representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs in
the Senate), Senator Robert Hill, commented similarly in Federal
Parliament. He called for President Milosevic to ‘adhere to internationally
accepted human rights standards in relation to all of the people of
Yugoslavia, withdraw his forces from Kosovo and cease the barbaric acts
that he is inflicting upon ethnic Albanians in Kosovo’.1321
Bette Denich elaborates on the ways in which Holocaust
iconography has been adopted in contemporary historical discourse by
Western European countries as part of a ‘symbolic revival of genocide’.1322
She notes how, during the summer of 1992, ‘the world was shocked by
reports of so-called “ethnic cleansing”, and by photographic images of
emaciated people held captive in detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The resemblance to World War II Holocaust images alerted international
public opinion to the occurrence of a specific kind of violence, employed
to remove whole populations on grounds of their ethnic identity.’1323 The
shock of similar images presented by the media depicting “genocide”
during the Kosovo war is related to the way in which the term has become
1318

ibid. See also comparisons with the ‘Holocaust’ in S. Thomma and B. Shlachter,
‘Gravediggers recall a Holocaust image’, Daily Telegraph, 20th April 1999, p. 24. See also
reference to ‘the largest humanitarian aid effort in Europe since the end of World War II’
in J. Zubrzycki, ‘Agencies step up refugee aid calls’, The Australian, 1st April 1999, p. 9.
See also A. Rabinovich, ‘Jews take in victims of a new holocaust’, The Australian, 14th
April 1999, p. 11. See also Kitney, ‘Balkans On Brink of War’, op. cit.
1319
G. Sheridan, ‘Kosovo races can live together’, The Australian, 9th April 1999, p. 13.
1320
See also reference to ‘apartheid’ in ‘Nine days in the Balkans’, The Australian, 3rd
April 1999, p. 10.
1321
R. Hill, in ‘Balkans Conflict’, Senate: Official Hansard, Commonwealth of Australia
Parliamentary Debates, 31st March 1999, p. 3611.
1322
B. Denich, ‘dismembering Yugoslavia: nationalist ideologies and the symbolic revival
of genocide’, American Ethnologist, 21(2), pp. 367-390.
1323
ibid., p. 368.

297

synonymous with the Nazi persecution of Jews. The notions of genocide
and Holocaust have come to sanctify with profound immediacy the moral
position of those who invoke the terminology.
Media representations of the “humanitarian disaster” unfolding at
the Kosovo-Macedonian border in the first week of April 1999 often
referred to the same statements and evidence produced by NATO’s media
offices in Brussels and elsewhere. The supposed universality of the claims
made by NATO is reflected in comments by The Australian’s Greg
Sheridan who described Yugoslavia as an ‘appalling humanitarian
cauldron’.1324 This is echoed in Senator Hill’s description of events, that
‘NATO is fighting oppression; it is fighting an appalling situation’.1325
Serbs, it was commonly implied, ought to be thought of as “different” to
NATO’s allies and thus treated accordingly, because Yugoslavia was
determined to follow its own “rules” rather than those set out under
universal human rights conventions. The notion of humanitarian crisis
played a significant role in media coverage, supporting NATO’s moral
claims to be protecting ethnic Albanians from Serbian aggression. The
image of Serbian troops using ethnic Albanian men as “human shields” to
protect themselves exacerbated concerns for the human rights of the
refugees even more greatly, lending weight to the notion that human rights
violations were being conducted by a deviant, sneaky and tricky enemy.1326
The frequent use of images of the plight of ethnic Albanian children
and women further reinforced the idea that the NATO campaign was a
moral crusade. As Procter says, these kinds of images work as ‘a sort of
“photographic headline” designed to attract and retain a worldwide
audience and, if possible, to agitate them into some sort of response.’1327
Mention of the plight of children and women numbered, respectively, 136
and 94 in the Telegraph, 44 and 75 in The Australian and 73 and 53 in the
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Herald.1328 A significant focus, as well, was the violence inflicted against
ethnic Albanian men. Representations of the plight of ethnic Albanian men,
including the abuse they endured at the hands of Yugoslav authorities,
military or militia, featured 73 times in the Telegraph, on 69 occasions in
The Australian and 36 times in the Herald.
The drastic moral implications posed by the “rape” of Albanian
women were described by the US President as ‘truly chilling’.1329 Annie
Crowe argued in The Australian that rape was ‘being used as a tool of
degradation and demoralisation’ by Serbs as part of their ‘war strategy’.1330
She stated that it was a form of ‘genetic imperialism’ in which women
would be giving birth to babies as a result of their brief encounter with
Serbian soldiers.1331 Other women who fled to the Macedonian border held
babies in their arms that had died while awaiting assistance in “no man’s
land” between the borders.1332 There, families slept under the open sky
without food, water, shelter or medical help for several days before the
border was re-opened by Macedonian authorities.1333 The effect of these
kinds of images, particularly as they were utilised so widely across the
media, was to extinguish any disbelief over the moral credentials of the
NATO campaign.1334 Australian media coverage supported the global
political agenda of the US and Britain in which they viewed themselves as
freed from the ‘old-fashioned constraints of world order’, and as
‘enlightened states [which] can dedicate themselves with full vigour to the
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mission of upholding human rights and bringing justice and freedom to
suffering people everywhere, by force if necessary.’1335

2. The Response of Serbian Australians
2.1 The Serbian community protests in Australia
The moral position of NATO - as portrayed in media images of the Kosovo
war - frustrated, hurt and riled many Serbian Australians. Their Yugoslav
kin had been tarnished with the stigma of being uncivilised, immoral,
corrupt, deceitful and inhumane. The protests staged by Serbian
Australians around Australia were an expression of their outrage against
this stigmatisation in the international media, as well as against the Federal
Government’s publicly declared endorsement of NATO’s actions.
The first major protest discussed by newspapers occurred in Martin
Place in Sydney on 28th March 1999 outside the offices of the US
consulate. Media estimates of the crowd size ranged from 5000 to 7000.1336
The majority of news commentators did not mention that the demonstration
consisted of many families, children and the elderly. It was not noted,
either, in media reports whether members outside of the Serbian
community had participated. Some of the protesters conducted violent acts,
with various reports confirming that several police had been injured by
those who threw rocks, bricks and chunks of concrete (see image in
Appendix 7).1337 Two news camera operators were also injured during the
demonstration as well as a Herald photographer.1338 A Channel 7
cameraman reportedly suffered bruised optic nerves and impaired
vision.1339

1335

Chomsky, The New Military Humanism; Lessons From Kosovo, op. cit., p. 4.
The figure of 7000 is cited in K. Minogue, ‘Charges laid over riot; Man to appear for
flag theft in Serb protest’, Daily Telegraph, 8th April 1999, p. 2. The number 7000 is also
given in A. Riley, ‘Expat Serbs fly home to war’, The Australian, 30th March 1999, p. 12.
The number 5000 is given in M. Brown, G. Jacobsen and P. Cornford, ‘Serb Protesters
Attack Police’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 29th March 1999, p. 6. See also the figure of
5000 given in L. Kennedy, ‘Security Overwhelmed By Huge Crowd’, The Sydney
Morning Herald, 29th March 1999, p. 6.
1337
For instance, see Minogue, op. cit.
1338
See ibid., and Brown, Jacobsen and Cornford, op. cit.
1339
S. Spencer and C. Mira, ‘Serbs will help, Church leaders say they will identify
offenders’, Daily Telegraph, 31st March 1999, p. 2.
1336

300

Vesna Grubisic, secretary of the Serbian National Defence Council
in Australia, informed the Herald that organisers of the demonstration in
Sydney, which included leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, had
planned a peaceful protest. She commented: ‘If there was any violence, it
was not done by our people[.] We cannot control someone who happens to
be passing in the street.’1340 Grubisic added that the organisers and priests
had asked Serbian Australians to show self-control and suggested that any
acts of violence might have been carried out by supporters of Kosovo.1341
Ilija Glisic, one of the organisers of the demonstration and President of the
Serbian National Federation of Australia, informed ABC television’s 7.30
Report that while there ‘were some hotheads there’, ‘We condemn [their
reactions] … and hope that those hotheads that were creating the
disturbance are dealt with accordingly. We were unaware that was
happening because there were so many people there yesterday. That was
happening on the fringe of that demonstration. The demonstration by and
large was comprised of families.’1342
Later that day demonstrators in Sydney relocated to the Opera
House where the Prime Minister was addressing members of the public as
part of Greek national day celebrations. The Telegraph reported that ‘The
Serb protesters jeered Mr Howard when he took the podium’ demanding
that he withdraw Australia’s support for the NATO air strikes.1343 The
Prime Minister responded to the crowd, stating that ‘the argument of the
NATO countries is not with the people of Serbia but rather the government
of Serbia.’1344
Around 6000 members of the Serbian community protested against
the NATO air strikes in Melbourne on the same day. The Telegraph
described how the demonstrators broke windows at the US consulate, lit
fire-crackers, burned an American flag and then ‘spat on the ashes’.1345
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Protesters reportedly ‘erupted in wild cheering when [they were] told
Serbia had downed a stealth fighterbomber.’1346 A smaller demonstration
was staged by around 400 members of the Serbian community outside the
US Embassy in Canberra. They reportedly threw eggs at police, although
no officers were injured.1347 It was further reported that smaller
demonstrations in Adelaide, Perth and Hobart were ‘largely peaceful’.1348
Members of the Serbian community protested at least two more times
outside the office of the US Consulate General in Melbourne. Around ‘500
angry Serbs’ demonstrated outside the Melbourne office on 4th April,
reportedly smashing windows with ‘bricks and other items’ although there
were no arrests made by police.1349
A second Sydney demonstration against NATO air strikes in
Yugoslavia was organised by members of the Serbian community. It was
held on 11th April. The number of protesters was much less than the first
rally with around 3000 people demonstrating at Sydney’s Domain
arena.1350 Again, it was not noted in media reports whether any persons
from outside of the Serbian community attended the rally. There were no
reports of violence or injuries suffered by police during the second
demonstration in Sydney. Around 850 police officers had been placed on
duty by the Police Commissioner to monitor the crowd. By dispatching so
many police officers to monitor the protest, the Commissioner had initiated
a symbolic display of force. The presence of the police officers, which
comprised around 30 per cent of the crowd at the Domain, was a visual
reminder that aimed to ensure protesters conducted themselves without
resorting to violence.

2.2 The Serbian National Federation of Australia
The emotion of the first Sydney protest for Serbian Australians was
significantly compounded by the nature of the main group behind the
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demonstration. The Serbian National Federation of Australia was described
in Procter’s ethnographic study as ‘a powerful nationalist group in
command in Australia’.1351 Procter was informed by the Federation that
many Serbian Australians were ‘hurt and upset by the treatment they had
been given by the Australian government and international media’ and he
noted that ‘the Federation was sensitive to this issue’.1352
The motivations behind the Sydney rally were a continuation of
frustrations noted by members of the Federation throughout the early-mid
1990s who felt that the Serbian community had been “abandoned” by the
Australian government. Ilija Glisic had stated in 1994 in a Serbian National
Federation of Australia newsletter that Serbian Australians had been
betrayed and abandoned by the conduct of the Australian government
during the Bosnian conflict. Such included the notion that Australian
military personnel had been involved in UN bombing campaigns against
Bosnian Serbs without official approval being given by the Australian
government. Glisic accused the Australian government of treating Serbian
Australians as “second class citizens”. He noted that this had made many
people within the community very angry.1353
The Serbian National Federation of Australia played an important
political role for the Serbian community by the time of the Kosovo war. It
provided an avenue for Serbian Australians to channel their anger and
frustrations over conflict in their homeland and challenge the Howard
Government’s decision to support the NATO air strikes. Loring Danforth
makes the point that: ‘Well-organized and politically mobilized diaspora
communities can, therefore, play an important part in a triadic set of
relationships involving diaspora communities themselves, their host
countries, and their homelands.’1354
On the other hand, while diaspora organisations ‘serve as sources
and mediators of ethno-national identification’, they may also be ‘rather
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prone to antagonisms’ from factions within their memberships.1355 In this
sense, there has been stringent need within some ethnic organisations to
assert strong, symbolic leadership in their attempts to maintain
cohesiveness. The activities of ethnic organisations can reflect ongoing
struggles between members over the authenticity of those identities and
their links to homelands. For the Serbian National Federation of Australia,
the organisation’s internal dynamics were further aggravated by the
dominant political discourse of the period about non-British migrant
groups and increasingly unpopular views towards multiculturalism.
Developments in the fields of communication and transportation in
the later twentieth century have undoubtedly enabled immigrant
communities to remain much more deeply involved in the national
struggles of their homelands than they ever could before.1356 The Serbian
National Federation of Australia played a significant role as a mediator for
Serbian Australians as they attempted to rationalise the Kosovo war. In
addition to this, as Procter concluded, ‘Serbian bonding and belonging in
Australia’ is often mediated through ‘the Serbian Orthodox religion, local
sport and recreational settings, politics at a federal level, and family grief’
and ‘guided by global and local pressures and frustrations.’1357
Organisations and activities co-ordinated by Serbian Australians in the
early-mid 1990s provided avenues for members of this ethnic group to
engage ‘a new ethnic Serbian consciousness’ as the ‘old verities of
“Yugoslav” identity fell apart’.1358
What is clear is that the demonstrations organised by the Serbian
National Federation of Australia symbolised growing resistance by ethnic
groups from the former Yugoslavia to the disintegration of homeland
bonds. It reflects how, ‘in the contemporary world, ethnic and religious
pasts are being uprooted and old cultural traditions updated and recast into
a highly emotive and sensitive force.’1359 A common trait within the
Serbian Australian community, moreover, has been a strong attachment to
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‘Cultural and historical events regarding perceived wrongs against Serbians
in the recent and distant past… Serbian Australians have a belief, thought
and feeling structure that informs their understanding of themselves as
demonised and misunderstood by the West and others.’1360 A sense of
‘long distance devastation’ can be seen in the ways Serbian Australians
reacted to the Kosovo war.1361 That is, ‘the unpleasant experience of
watching from afar as homeland people and places are being destroyed….
[and] not having contact with friends and family and/or not being able to
help and comfort family’.1362
This kind of response, Procter says, has been typified by the actions
of those who are ‘completely absorbed by feelings of anger, frustration and
powerlessness… emotional exhaustion, sadness, withdrawal and a feeling
of being “hurt” by what a person saw and heard from the electronic and
print media.’1363 Zlato Skrbis describes the effect of this kind of longdistance nationalism as all consuming, as ‘a group-based phenomenon
which pervades both public and private spheres of life.’1364 He adds, it is an
increasingly more common phenomenon in which ‘nationalist processes …
transcend a relatively strictly limited locality.’1365

2.3 Media representations of the protests: editorials and opinion columns
In this section, and throughout the remainder of this chapter, I more closely
explore and evaluate the implications of the media’s presentation of the
Serbian community protests in Australia. That is, I have set out to consider
the ‘attention given to a fact - placement, tone, and repetitions, the
framework of analysis within which it is presented, and the related facts
that accompany it and give it meaning (or preclude meaning).’1366 The total
number of newspaper articles that discussed the Serbian protests in
Australia was (at least) 23, which included 14 in the Telegraph, six in The
Australian and three in the Herald. There was only one editorial that
1360
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discussed the Serbian protests. It was published by the Telegraph. The
Telegraph’s editor was highly critical of the demonstrators and predicted a
pattern of insubordination and violence emerging within Australia’s
problematic “ethnic communities”. He noted that: ‘For the second time in
five weeks Australians have been subjected to violent ethnic protests
prompted by events in Europe over which Australia had no control.’1367
The actions of Serbs were viewed as similar to those carried out by Kurds
two months earlier when they ‘ransacked’ the Greek consulate in Sydney.
The protests were condemned by the editor who mimicked Premier Carr by
describing both incidents as ‘not the Australian way.’1368 The editor
criticised Serbs in Sydney and Melbourne who ‘broke away’ from the main
protests to participate in ‘displays of gratuitous and unlawful violence’.1369
The piece went on: ‘these tragic circumstances [of war] do not give
migrants the right to break laws and attack police in the country that has
provided a sanctuary from the turmoil of their homeland.’1370
There were two opinion columns that discussed the Serbian protests
in the Telegraph, while there were none in either The Australian or the
Herald. Both opinion columns in the Telegraph were highly critical of the
protests.1371 As Michael Duffy stated, conflating the scenario: ‘Last Sunday
more than 5000 Australians rioted in Martin Place in support of the
genocidal regime in their country of birth, Serbia [sic].’1372 Duffy
constructed links between descriptions of those involved at the protest and
the image of Serbian militiamen as “masked thugs” that was frequently
reproduced across the media. He argued that: ‘They are tough guys, these
Serbs. One of those in Sydney wore a black T-shirt with the words
“Serbian Republic Born in Blood”. Shopfronts were smashed. Six police
were injured by flying stones and lumps of concrete.’1373 The columnist did
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not, however, take note of the families and individuals who had
demonstrated peacefully. Exclusion of these details added weight to
Duffy’s suggestion that multiculturalism was responsible for providing
Serbs with a license to commit crimes. Duffy had even added: ‘As you
would expect in a tolerant society like ours, no arrests were made.’1374 The
Telegraph’s Mike Gibson, similarly, dismissed the protesters as irrational
‘Serbian sympathisers’ and “un-Australian”.1375 He stated: ‘If these
demonstrators sincerely believe in a fair go, if they truly believe in the
Australian way, why don’t they get down there and protest to the Yugoslav
Ambassador to Australia[?] Why don’t they add their voices to those
millions of voices of the people of Australia, calling for the release of their
fellow Australians, Steve Pratt and Peter Wallace?’1376 The aggression
demonstrated by several “hothead youths” (as claimed by organisers of the
rally) towards police is related to Procter’s conclusion that: ‘[the] process
of younger Serbian Australians being drawn into the vicarious effects of
the [early 1990s] Balkan war appeared motivated by the anger and
frustration arising from long distance nationalism and local and global
hurts. In addition to this, there was a mix of symbols, memories and
traditions passed down from generation to generation, woven into
contemporary Serbian Australian social life, that were being destroyed.’1377
The range of “sources” used in news articles has significant
implications for the way public opinion is formed.1378 The inclusion of a
diverse range of “voices” allows the media to claim to be representative of
consuming belief that inhabits the living and the dead … “[that the land of Serbia]
represents people’s life and blood”.’
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a wide spectrum of interests and perform an important social-democratic
function.1379 Statements by figures in authority – government politicians
and police - featured most in media coverage concerned about the Serbian
community protests in Australia. In the Herald, police sources were
directly quoted once, while John Howard was cited five times. By contrast,
spokespersons from the Serbian community involved in the protest were
cited only three times. In The Australian, a representative from the NSW
state police was cited once, while members of the general community
(callers to talkback radio) were cited five times. There were, moreover, five
references to (or quotes from) members of the Serbian Australian
community who were directly involved in the protests, as well as one
Serbian Australian who was not involved in the protests. In the Telegraph,
quotes from sources in positions of authority featured most frequently. The
Prime Minister was quoted 15 times about the protests, while Premier Bob
Carr was cited eight times. Police sources on the protests numbered 14
times, while the Serbian community (general, not specified as protesters)
were cited on 23 occasions. Protesters were quoted in the newspaper only
five times, while other members of the Australian community were cited
14 times. The Telegraph’s support for the Premier is typified by the
comment, ‘Mr Carr was unequivocal: “You are not entitled to pursue a
violent protest on Australian soil about old struggles overseas. It is not
permitted. It’s not on. It’s not the Australian way.”’1380

2.4 The elusive binary: Serbs as “White” and “Other”
Representations of Serbs in Australian newspapers during the Kosovo
conflict frequently asserted that significant divides existed between
Western-European or “White” Australian culture and that of the Serbs.
Explicit references were made to ethnic Serbs as “dissimilar, alien or
Other”. These numbered 16 in the Telegraph, 10 in The Australian and 31
in the Herald.1381 On the other hand, the notion that Serbs were
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“identifiable by their European-ness or as White” only featured three times
in The Australian, once in the Telegraph and was non-existent in the
Herald.1382 This is in clear contrast with the analysis presented in Chapters
2 and 3 in which ethnic Albanian refugees were more commonly depicted
as “White” or “Europeans”. Such a binary supported and worked to
naturalise the assumption that Serbs represented a major threat to the
“innocence” and “purity” of those being persecuted by the Yugoslav State.
Much of the focus was on the deployment of oppositional categories used
to mark and make more visible the “moral” standing of ethnic Albanians
and the “immorality” of Serbs.
Another point of contrast between these findings and those I
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 is the lack of representation of Serbs as
“family” types. In the earlier chapters, I noted how ethnic Albanians were
constantly referred to in terms of their family roles or titles. Procter
recognised the effects of the Balkan wars (1991 to 1996) on Serbian
Australian families by noting that: ‘While many of us have been
loungeroom spectators of the conflict, people with cultural and emotional
ties to the region identified completely with the pain and anguish of what
they saw night after night on the television screen.’1383 Yet, there were no
references to Serbs as “family” people in the Herald. However, there were
42 instances in The Australian where Serbs (predominantly Australian
Serbs) were referred to by their family titles. These types of titles were
only used on eight occasions by the Telegraph.
The Australian focussed on one Serbian Australian family in
particular, discussing (in three separate articles) the migration of Miroslav
and Sandra Mlinar from Yugoslavia to Australia several years
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beforehand.1384 The headline of one article concerned about the Mlinar’s
described how, ‘Half a world from Kosovo, families are torn apart’.1385 The
report commented: ‘The tearing apart of the Mlinar family is just one
identifiable impact in Australia of the war escalating half a world
away.’1386 Miroslav was a dual Australian and Serbian citizen and ‘one of
many Serbians returning from Australia to protect their spiritual
homeland’.1387 He noted that his responsibilities to Yugoslavia were
simple: ‘I’m a Yugoslav citizen, it’s my obligation.’1388 The Australian,
unlike the other newspapers, provided insight into some of the concerns
facing Yugoslav Serbian families living in Australia. Sandra described
how, for example, for some Serbian families, ‘it is harder to stay [in
Australia] than to go.’1389 The newspaper presented an image of the
Mlinar’s as “just like us”, as similar to “mainstream” Australians whose
lives centred on the importance of “family”. It was reported that Mr
Mlinar’s motives for returning to Belgrade were not simply to take up arms
against NATO, but also ‘to be with his family’ who were still living
there.1390 These articles represented the protests as a way for families to
express their concerns, noting how Miroslav had been one of the speakers
at the initial Sydney protest. The Australian provided Sandra with an
avenue to dispute media representations of the protest as violent. As she
stated: ‘Do you think I would take my seven-year-old son along if I
thought it would be dangerous? [...] Television just showed a couple of
hotheads – it did not show the babies and grandmothers in the crowd.’1391
Signifiers of the status of Serbs as Other include references to them
(including the Serbian Government) as animalistic and outcasts.1392 The
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Herald promoted this view, asserting that the NATO campaign only served
to deepen perceived divides between Serbs and the wider world; ‘It has
reinforced in the national consciousness [of Serbs] the idea that Serbs are
the outcasts of the world, the untouchables of Europe, despised and
excluded simply because they are Serbs.’1393 There was at least one
instance in which Australian Serbs were described as “European”, although
this was secondary to the notion that they were childish and irrational. As
stated in the Telegraph: ‘some Europeans never grow up. It used to be that
they expressed their hatred of each other at suburban soccer matches …
Make no mistake, there are households of hate throughout Australia where
the chants of ancient enmities obviously replace Twinkle Twinkle Little
Star.’1394
The connection between soccer matches as a forum for Balkan
ethnic groups to express their “mutual hatreds” extends, in one sense, from
events that occurred in the early 1990s. In one instance in 1991 there was a
protest conducted by an estimated 12,000 Croatians at a Sydney soccer
stadium.1395 There were further protests conducted in Melbourne at this
time, including one in which 7000 Croats and Slovenes massed in the city
square. In both instances these groups declared their support for
independence from Yugoslavia and denounced President Milosevic.1396 It
can be construed that media representations of Balkan migrant groups as
“violent” and “radical” during the NATO campaign in Kosovo were related
to incidents that occurred in Australia several decades before. In 1978, for
instance, the Fraser Federal Government introduced new legislation and
employed law enforcement agencies to crackdown on anti-Yugoslav
paramilitaries operating and training combatants in Australia, including the
Croatian fascist group Ustashi.1397
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It can be concluded that these episodes contributed to media
discourse on the “radical” and “violent” nature of Balkan migrants and
there were clear continuities in media representations of both the 1991
protests and those conducted by Serbs in 1999. As Procter notes: ‘Along
with the television news of the [1991] conflict were the street protests,
media releases and other “activity” of and by the various groups from the
former Yugoslavia living in Australia.’1398 Media discourse throughout the
1990s repeatedly emphasised the susceptibility of Balkan groups to their
passionate hatreds of each other. Much of this coverage linked the issues of
war, ethnicity and migrant community politics within Australia without
specifically dealing with each of them. Procter states that there is little
doubt that: ‘Whenever Serbian Australians gather at the soccer ground,
customs, language and lifestyle, came together to form a kind of unity
which was the result of shared similar background [sic].’1399 Symbols used
by Serbian Australians at these soccer matches – such as the Serbian
national flag, three-fingered salute or slogans about being “born in blood”
– were commonly utilised as ‘symbols of unity, belonging and bonding …
[that are] more readily experienced than explained.’1400 Danforth played
down concerns about “blood” slogans being used by ethnic groups,
stipulating that national identity commonly ‘constitutes a natural or
spiritual essence often identified with a person’s blood or soul.’1401
Criticism by the tabloid media about soccer matches - commonly depicted
as an “ethnic” sport in Australia - was very clearly an ideological attack on
the organisational capacities of Serbian Australians, construed in media
discourse as a threat to Australia’s hegemonic norms.

2.5 Violence, aggression and compliance
My analysis has identified a range of descriptors used to represent
Australian and Yugoslav Serbs in a negative light.1402 Descriptions of
1398
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ethnic Serbs as “unlawful or uncompliant” numbered 147 in the Telegraph,
55 in The Australian and 84 in the Herald.1403 Descriptions of this ethnic
group as “deviant” numbered 86 in the Telegraph, 69 in The Australian
and 40 in the Herald.1404 More common, however, was the notion that
ethnic Serbs were “aggressive, agitators or violent”. There were consistent
depictions of Yugoslav Serbs as the source of violence and agitation
against both ethnic Albanian Kosovars and NATO.1405 Ethnic Serbs were
represented as “aggressive, agitators or violent” at least 707 times in the
Telegraph, 330 times in The Australian and on 398 occasions in the
Herald.
The effect of this kind of repetition in the media overwhelmingly
reinforced an image of Serbs (generally) as violent agitators and compelled
to aggression by virtue of their ethnicity. This is particularly in light of the
notion that positive representations of Serbs were by comparison almost
non-existent. The power to “name” or label Serbs in this way ‘is one of the
elementary forms of political power precisely because it involves the
power to bring into existence that which is being named.’1406 In this sense,
the power to name is also signified by the ability of dominant groups to
displace minorities by mobilising unpopular labels referring to them.

violent; chauvinist or masculine-dominated culture; “un-Australian”; “backward”, poor or
uneducated; and Orthodox Christianity portrayed in a negative light. This includes
representations of ethnic Serbs living in both Yugoslavia (including political leaders,
soldiers, police and ordinary citizens) as well as those living in Australia.
1403
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Serbs in relation to international law or Australian law, or where they were viewed as
being uncompliant with the wishes of NATO (including the US and UK) or with the
wishes of the Australian government or police. The term “dictator” was also included in
this category where President Milosevic was inferred to be a leader who had taken power
with force, rather than via lawful consent. This category is different from that of
“deviance”, which is explained further below, although some terms were coded in both
categories where their meanings overlapped.
1404
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1405
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Lazar Stankov and Goran Knezevic, in their comparative study on
social attitudes and values systems among Serbs and Australians, point out
that: ‘It is sometimes assumed that normal political behaviour in any
society (democratic or otherwise) is influenced by perceptions and attitudes
that differ from the extremes only in degree, not in terms of quality. This
provides justification for those holding particular stereotypes to label a
whole nation, or some other large group of people, as being prone to
terrorism and radical actions or represent “forces of evil”.’1407 The
impression that Australian Serbs were disposed to violent behaviour like
their Yugoslav counterparts was reinforced by media representations of the
Sydney protests. The Telegraph also depicted the first Sydney protest as a
scene of chaos and lawlessness:
Windows were smashed and police pelted with rocks and chunks of
concrete when about 7000 local Serbs protested in Sydney
yesterday… The demonstration … turned violent [when] protesters
moved on the MLC building… One man brought down the
American flag which was later burned while other protesters threw
missiles, set off firecrackers and smashed the building’s windows…
The protesters were armed with Serbian flags…1408
Even The Australian, which was least critical of the protests overall,
described how (in relation to the first Sydney demonstration): ‘Protesters in
the 7000-strong crowd pelted police with pieces of concrete and torched a
US flag.’1409 As the Herald described the scene: ‘Fifty police
reinforcements with riot shields, and the dog squad, were called to Martin
Place to support 50 colleagues under attack from Serb demonstrators trying
to enter to MLC Centre… [they were] Backed up by 30 security guards and
30 officers from the NSW Protective Security Group’.1410
The Herald, moreover, later noted how ‘Police put on their biggest
turn-out since the anti-Vietnam marches’, as ‘950 police – one to every
1407
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three or four protesters – monitored the protest and guarded the United
States Consulate-General offices … at Martin Place’ during the 11th April
demonstration.1411 The newspaper described how the major increase in
police presence was a direct response to ‘the scene of a violent protest’ that
emerged during the initial protest ‘in which police were pelted with eggs,
vegetables and rocks, and cars and windows were smashed.’1412 There were
200 police posted in front the MLC building and ‘large teams of police also
patrolled underground railway stations and Hyde Park.’1413
No violence occurred during the demonstration and Police
Commissioner Ryan ‘applauded’ the peacefulness of the protesters, stating:
‘If I had not had enough [police] here today and a few windows in this
street were smashed, could you imagine the criticism we would be getting
then?’1414 This kind of representation reassured the public that all measures
were being taken to prevent “lawlessness” and the violence that emerged
during the initial protests. Media coverage reinforced the impression that
the initial protests had been “out of control” and worthy of a major police
crackdown on the way Serbian Australians conducted their demonstration.
Glisic commented that the heavy police presence was a waste of taxpayers’
money. He argued that the violence at the previous protest was the work of
a small minority. Glisic added: ‘[The police] knew it was only four youths
last time. It’s not a consensus in the Serbian community and I think that the
Premier and the Police Commissioner overreacted.’1415
The symbolic weight of the heavy police presence at the 11th April
rally in Sydney was articulated across many news articles. One Telegraph
headline described the 28th March protest as a ‘riot’ with the accompanying
article reporting on the charges brought by police against one of the
protesters.1416 The report emphasised the criminality of those involved in
the ‘riot’ describing how a 25-year old man had stolen the US flag that had
been hanging outside the embassy. The man was charged with ‘malicious
1411
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damage to the flag pole’.1417 The arrest was the ‘first from the Serbian
community-led demonstration’ which resulted in damage to other property
and assaults on police and representatives from the media.1418 The
Telegraph blanketed all of the protesters with the violence that occurred at
the rally, representing the event as disorderly and “out of control”; ‘The
crowd [of around 7,000 protesters] had been demonstrating against the
NATO attack on Yugoslavia when the protest turned violent [at] about
2pm … The protesters were carrying Serbian flags … Riot police were
called in when demonstrators began throwing lumps of concrete at
police.’1419 The newspaper emphasised the injuries inflicted on police, with
one officer ‘hit in the head by a chunk of concrete, another struck under the
eye by a rock and one suffered ear injuries when a fire cracker exploded
close to his face.’1420 The Serbian community had been called on by police
to ‘help … identify some of the more violent demonstrators.’1421
The ‘destruction’, it was reported, had cost a local restaurant around
$20,000 worth of damage.1422 The Telegraph further linked the Serbian
community ‘riot’ to the actions of other ethnic groups who were “out of
control”. Referring to demonstrations by Australian Kurds outside the
Greek consulate the newspaper stated that: ‘It was the second time in five
weeks Australians were subjected to violent ethnic protests prompted by
events in Europe over which Australia had no control [sic]’.1423 The
following day, the Telegraph published the article, ‘Violence shatters city
haven’, describing the ‘violence and lawlessness’ of the protesters (see
image below).1424 The report centred on the owner the Criterion restaurant,
located next to the US Consulate MLC building, which had been ‘trashed
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by an angry brick-throwing mob.’1425 The owner Farah Habib criticised the
way police had ‘[stood] back and allow[ed] these acts of violence to
happen’.1426 Habib challenged NSW Premier Carr to ‘make these streets
safe’, deploring those ‘who [use] our streets as battlefields’.1427 Adjacent to
this article was an expose on how police were planning to deal with the
11th April protest in Sydney. ‘Arrest squads’ of around 850 officers were
being mobilised to prevent any more ‘emotionally charged’ violence.1428
On radio 2UE Premier Carr reportedly ‘appealed to the Serbian community
to respect the law and know that violence was not the way to protest.’1429

News reports on the ‘violence’ that took place during Serbian community protests in Martin
Place (Sydney) on 28th March 1999, as depicted in The Daily Telegraph, 9th April 1999, p. 8
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The Australian and three times by the Herald. The main religion of ethnic
Serbs, Orthodox Christianity, was occasionally drawn on to depict them in
a negative light. Negative depictions of Serbian Orthodox Christianity
numbered two in The Australian and one in the Herald, while there was no
criticism of the religion in the Telegraph. This added some weight to
representations of the ethnic group as somewhat different or irrational
because of their “Eastern” preferences. Procter provides insight into one
reason why the Serbian Orthodox church was not subjected to more intense
scrutiny by the media during the Kosovo war. As he noted, during the
earlier Balkan wars in 1990s, ‘Serbian Australians were encouraged by the
Serbian Orthodox Church to avoid physical clashes, property damage and
violent acts towards other former Yugoslav groups living in Australia
through the spiritual qualities of suffering, self-sacrifice and forbearance to
tolerate others… Clearly, the role of the Church in helping to create
informal,

calming networks,

designed

to achieve restraint,

was

instrumental in helping people to cope with their hardships’.1430
There was no gendering of representations of Serbs in any of the
newspapers and there were no descriptions of Serbs as coming from a
“chauvinist/masculine culture”. The protesters were depicted or inferred to
be “un-Australian” on three occasions in the Telegraph, while there were
no such depictions in the other newspapers.1431 An opinion piece in the
Telegraph criticised the decision by some people with dual SerbianAustralian citizenship to return to Yugoslavia to fight against NATO,
stating: ‘what patriot would betray his own country so willingly?’1432 The
columnist went on to argue that these people needed ‘a lesson in
citizenship.’1433
As noted earlier in this chapter, the majority of newspaper reports
condemning Yugoslavia repeatedly centred on a binary that depicted, on
the one hand, the rational and moral position of NATO, and, on the other,
the illogical and irrational nature of Serbs. The latter sentiment was
1430
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emphasised when newspapers cast doubt on the concerns of Serbian
leaders in Australia who had stated that ‘Atrocities in Kosovo including
mass murders were a product of Albania’s own terrorists and US
propaganda’.1434 Serbian community spokespersons had claimed that ‘the
air raids were continuing because of an American agenda to dominate
Europe’ and that ‘the dismembered Kosovo Albanians and mass graves
were the result of terrorist activity by the [KLA]’ rather than Yugoslav
military activity.1435 News coverage emphasised the refusal of Serbian
community leaders to accept the “truth” about the campaign of persecution
being perpetuated by Yugoslav forces. Within the context of the broader
media discourse these notions supported the idea that the organisers of the
Serbian community protests in Australia were “blind” to the official
position of NATO that most “rational” people believed. Such a process
worked to segregate or “cage” Serbian Australians as “irrational” and to
position them as somewhat abnormal and “misled”.1436
Prime Minister Howard deplored the protests organised by Serbian
communities. His comments played an important leadership role in
legitimating the popular view of Serbs as an Other that was promoted by
the media. As Savage and Tiffen confirm: ‘The institutional power with
which politicians are authorised gives their words a status that conforms to
newsworthiness and demands publication. The words and actions of
ministers, particularly the prime minister or premiers, regularly receive
attention regardless of the potency of the action proposed.’1437 The Prime
Minister stated (in both the Herald and Telegraph) that the violence that
occurred at the initial anti-NATO demonstrations in Sydney and
Melbourne should be ‘utterly condemned’.1438 Howard said that
Australians of Serbian descent had every right to peacefully demonstrate
against NATO action, but the violence that caused injury to police was
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unacceptable. He went on: ‘Australians of Serbian descent are a respected
part of the Australian community. They have contributed much to our
country. I am sure that the violent behaviour of a few will be strongly
condemned.’1439 According to the Telegraph, the Prime Minister ‘warned
Australians of Serbian descent to leave their hatred in their homeland.’1440
As one Telegraph headline stated: ‘PM condemns riot’.1441 Howard had
reportedly ‘warned people of Serbian background that there was no
sympathy in Australia for violent demonstrations’ and that Australia had
‘no tolerance for violent protest’.1442 The reaction of the Prime Minister
signified that the Serb protests presented a sudden and unanticipated threat
to the hegemonic norms of White Australia. What is clear are the ways in
which the presence of a major, seemingly well-organised ethnic group had
produced a degree of alarm, generating a heavy-handed response by those
in positions of authority. The actions of organised ethnic groups have
frequently been contested by established Australians because they
comprise a significant challenge to ‘aristocratic White dominance’.1443
One of the protesters wrote to The Australian to contest media
reports about the 28th March protest in Sydney. The author, Borislav Erceg,
provided a different interpretation of the violence perpetrated against
police.1444 He stated that a policeman had provoked the incident when the
officer ‘addressed the crowd as “barbaric people”’, after which several
youths reacted with anger.1445 Erceg expressed ‘outrage regarding the
media treatment of the Serbs’ attending the protest, stating that ‘the
presence of whole families with children and elderly people speaks for
itself.’1446 The purpose of the demonstration, he said, was to allow John
Howard to recognise the disapproval of the Serbian community for the
Federal Government’s support for the NATO air strikes.

1439

Howard, cited in Cole-Adams, op. cit.
McPhedran, ‘Jumbo Fleet to Pick up Refugees’, op. cit.
1441
‘PM condemns riot’, Daily Telegraph, 2nd April 1999, p. 6.
1442
ibid.
1443
Hage, White Nation, Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, op. cit.,
p. 192.
1444
B. Erceg (Cabramatta), Letter, The Australian, 1st April 1999, p. 14.
1445
ibid.
1446
ibid.
1440

320

A majority of news articles further supported a discourse about
Serbs as “alien” to the Australian “way of life”. The Australian pointed out
that coverage of refugees fleeing Serbian forces and the NATO bombings
was ‘by far the biggest news story’, generating over 3000 items in the
electronic media.1447 The newspaper cited recent polling by Rehame media
researchers, stating that: ‘The Australian community’s perception of
events, as reflected by talkback radio [over the past week], demonstrated
that as a nation we have little understanding of an issue so alien to the
Australian way of life.’1448 The article went on: ‘Nowhere was this more
evident than in callers’ responses to the protests in Australia by members
of the Serbian community against NATO’s bombing of Serbian targets.’1449
Statistics revealed that half of the 207 calls about Kosovo focused on the
protests, with the majority of callers – 67 per cent – ‘voicing their
disgust.’1450 Callers typically viewed the protesters as “ungrateful”, and
strongly believed that ethnic conflicts should not be aired in Australia. One
caller to 4BC radio stated: ‘don’t these Yugoslavians realise that they are
now Australians? [sic]’1451
Some callers demanded that the protesters be deported while others
‘demonstrated a deep-seated discomfort with multiculturalism’.1452 There
were no direct concerns raised in the Herald about Serbian community
responses to the Kosovo war in relation to either multiculturalism or
Australia’s immigration program. The Telegraph cited concerns about
multiculturalism eight times. The concerns linked the Serbian protests to
the “failure” of multiculturalism. There were three concerns cited by The
Australian about multiculturalism, though only two of these were in direct
reference to the Serbian protests.1453 As noted in The Australian, another
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caller on 6WF radio stated: ‘the protest underlies the fact that
multiculturalism never works anywhere’.1454
These callers disputed the way multiculturalism supposedly
‘encouraged immigrants to continue to define themselves in terms of their
ethnic or national origin.’1455 They attempted to challenge the freedoms
offered by this policy for ethnic groups to organise themselves, contest
power and ‘become actively involved in the educational and religious
activities of [their] diaspora.’1456 Only a handful of callers voiced more
moderate views, pointing out that protesting was a democratic right, no
matter how recently the protesters had migrated to Australia. The
Australian analysed the issue, noting: ‘While there was an obvious public
interest in the conflict, the coverage also revealed a “not in my backyard”
mentality and a sense of fragility about Australia’s ability to remain
separate from such events.’1457

2.6 Positive representations of Serbs
Very few newspaper articles represented Serbian communities in Australia
in a positive light. The analysis did, however, identify a variety of positive
descriptors used to represent Australian and Yugoslav Serbs.1458 Serbs
were described as “lawful or compliant” on 14 occasions in the Telegraph,
seven times in The Australian and four times in the Herald. 1459 They were
depicted as “decent” four times in the Telegraph, 17 times in The
Australian and on six occasions in the Herald.1460 For the Telegraph,
1454
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Australian Serbs were depicted as “decent” when leaders of the Sydney
Serbian community had ‘pledged the violence would not spill on to
Australian streets’.1461 Ethnic Serbs living in Australia were represented as
“ordinary Australians” on two occasions in the Telegraph, four times in
The Australian and only once in the Herald.1462 As Police Commissioner
Peter Ryan said of the second protest in Sydney on 11th April: ‘In the end
they made their point without violence – that is the Australian way.’1463 Sir
Ronald Wilson, described by the Telegraph as a ‘Human rights critic’,
deplored opponents of the protest who failed to recognise that ‘these were
Australians who were demonstrating’.1464 He criticised ‘a leading member
in our government’ (suggested by the newspaper to be either John Howard
or Bob Carr) for saying that the ‘demonstrators’ conduct was
unacceptable’.1465 There were no explicitly positive representations of
Serbian Orthodox Christianity in the Herald or the Telegraph, although
The Australian depicted the religion in a positive light at least three
times.1466
One article in the Telegraph proclaimed that ‘not all [Serbs are] war
criminals’ and cited concerns by Australia’s Ambassador to Yugsolavia
about calls ‘to bomb the Serbs’.1467 The Ambassador, Christopher Lamb,
criticised media coverage of the fighting in Kosovo, which he said often
led to all Serbian people being branded war criminals. As Lamb stated:
‘There’s no basis for that, the media have used the ethnic word very
loosely for a long time[.] We have to distinguish between Serbs and the
situation their government has put them in.’1468 He went on: ‘I’d like
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people to understand that Serbia is a multi-ethnic state and Serbs within it
are not by themselves guilty of war crimes.’1469
There were positive depictions of Serbs offered in several opinion
columns, all of which were in The Australian. As James Murray stated:
‘The wholesale demonisation of the Serbs seems a gross injustice, despite
the constant theme that the grievance is solely with Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic.’1470 Sheridan was also critical of increasingly
negative perceptions of Serbs, saying: ‘We are in danger of demonising the
whole Serb people, a manifestly ridiculous thing to do, when it is really
their President, Slobodan Milosevic, and some of their military
commanders who alone deserve condemnation.’1471 Robert Miller provided
similar insights as well, describing Serbs as ‘Pawns in a Western Game’,
and criticising NATO’s attempts at bombing Serbia into submission.1472 He
went on, in The Australian: ‘The Serbs are a proud people, even to the
point of suicide when they consider themselves to be unjustly treated.
Some would call their traditional view of the tribulations they have
suffered over the centuries a form of collective national paranoia. But
anyone in Serbia who isn’t paranoid over the current wave of NATO
bombings and the systematic demonisation of Serbs by the international
media simply doesn’t understand the situation.’1473 Despite these
criticisms, the dominant focus on Serbs in the media, as disposed to
violence and aggression, supported the image that Serbia was little more
than a nation of war criminals.

2.7 Citizenship and loyalty
Two days after NATO air strikes began the Telegraph emphasised the need
for Serbs living in Australia to declare their national loyalty. The article, ‘It
won’t flare up here, local Serbs pledge’, centred on moves by Sydneybased Serbian community leaders to promise ‘the violence would not spill
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on to Australian streets.’1474 Glisic affirmed that, while Australian-based
Serbs would protest, there would not be violence on the streets or targeting
of Albanian groups in Sydney.1475 There had, moreover, been a broader
public backlash against Serbs in other news mediums, evident in the views
expressed on talkback radio following the first protest in Sydney. Many of
these demanded that Serbian communities demonstrate their loyalty to
Australia. One caller stated that the protesters ought to be deported, saying
on radio 2GB: ‘these people have no right to be in our country if they are
going to act like this … I’d deport the lot of them [sic]’.1476
The notion of loyalty is typically prominent in mass media
coverage of war. Debates about the loyalty of Australia’s Serbian
communities had taken place alongside a much broader discussion about
ethnicity, multiculturalism and the maintenance of White governmental
power. They related, too, to the ways in which multiculturalism has been
used by Federal governments as a means of governing cultural diversity in
Australia. It can be viewed that multiculturalism is the organisation of
society so that ethnic segments are incorporated and dominated by other
groups. Ethnic segments would otherwise be separate societies not bound
by the State.1477 Hage says, too, ‘some even assert, in a matter-of-fact
manner, that the whole point of multiculturalism is to avoid ethnic
concentrations or ethnic ghettoes… Once “they” start concentrating […]
they could become an alternative will and the national will has to go in and
disperse them.’1478 An element of coercion extending from popular
discourse has often been adopted as a means of reproducing dominant
interests and the dominant mores of society. It can be viewed in the way
the Australian news media has frequently produced “scapegoat” campaigns
based on popular fears about ethnic deviance, promoting coercive measures
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through which the hegemonic cultural group is able to police
dissidence. 1479
The mass media performs an ideological role in purporting to
expose ethnic deviance, and plays an important function in sustaining
political loyalty to the State. Such can be viewed in representations of
policing during the 11th April demonstration in Sydney, dubbed by some
critics as “overkill” and reactionary. These images are related to popular
manifestations of the “fifth column” threat within Australia in recent
decades. That is, an “enemy within” who raises new questions about
citizenship, identity and loyalty at times when the country of residence is in
conflict with their country of origin.1480 The media analysis provides strong
evidence, as well, to support the notion that the media tends to parade
dominant White cultural values as a means of legitimating coercive
measures against those deemed “disloyal”, ethnic Others.
The Telegraph was punitive towards those involved in the first
Sydney protest, questioning their loyalty as Australian citizens. At least
three articles (including one editorial) emphasised the breach of Australian
laws by the protesters, with one stating: ‘Serbs will help, [Serbian
Orthodox] Church leaders say they will identify offenders’.1481 The
Telegraph frequently focussed on “scapegoating” those responsible for
violence at the protest, while criticism of the violence was expressed much
more indirectly by the other newspapers. The Telegraph was much more
emotionally invested in publicising efforts to locate violent protesters and
punish the offenders, for (allegedly) breaking the law and their disloyalty
to Australia. There was a clear attempt by the Telegraph in articles
concerned about the first Sydney protest to blanket the entire Serbian
community with a sense of shame for the actions of a minority of
protesters. A coercive discourse was adopted by the Telegraph which
required the Serbian community as a whole – from religious leaders to
community organisations – to perform a self-policing role and demonstrate
1479
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“proof” of their loyalty in order to be “accepted” back into Australian
society. The means by which Serbian Orthodox Church leaders were
required to prove their allegiance in this instance was to ‘hand over those
responsible for [the] violent demonstration in Sydney to police.’1482 These
practices of ethnic profiling by White Australians are typical, particularly
in the construction of ‘the web of moral panic [about “ethnic crime”] and
ethnic stereotyping’.1483 The immense pressure placed on Serbian leaders
extended from the ideological practices of the dominant cultural group, as
‘certain types of immigrant cultures (and their children) [are held]
responsible for social conflict and hence not deserving of belonging.’1484
It was reported in the Telegraph that at least 15 Australian men of
Serbian ethnicity had recently flown to Yugoslavia to serve with the
Serbian military during the Kosovo war.1485 One columnist, Carmel Egan,
denounced Australians with Serbian citizenship who had decided to fight
against NATO. Egan ignored the issues and obligations facing those with
dual Australian and Serbian citizenship. The declaration of a state of
emergency by the Yugoslav government at the outbreak of NATO
bombings obliged all male Serb citizens of fighting age to take up arms.
Egan accused Serbian men who had returned to Yugoslavia of
‘Hiding behind the Australian flag’, ‘taking advantage’ of the freedoms
offered under Australian law to be combatants ‘against our national
interests.’1486 Egan demonised these men, linking notions of disloyalty with
barbaric acts, such as committing ‘unconscionable, unthinkable, even
unpunishable acts upon the Albanians of Kosovo’.1487 The columnist
denoted the supposed disposition of Serbs to act violently and uncivilised;
‘These are citizens who once sought sanctuary in our tolerant, benign land
or were born and educated here but have too easily reverted to the
familiarity of relic hatreds.’1488 Egan focussed on how one man, Ranko
Djokic, had left his family in Australia to return to Belgrade and fight
1482
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against NATO. Djokic had declared earlier that he was returning to ‘defend
my country from anyone who is threatening the peace, stability and
sovereignty of my State.’1489 Egan asked how Djokic would be able to
return freely to Australia after the war and ‘perhaps even [to] the security
of our generous taxpayer-funded welfare system.’1490 The columnist stated:
‘Perhaps it is time the Federal Government did more than mumble about
what it means to be Australian… what patriot would betray his own
country so willingly? Australia stands for justice, peace and freedom in
Kosovo alongside the forces of NATO… Mr Djokic needs a lesson in
citizenship. He either joins with us as Australians or we should dispatch
him, and everyone who would spill blood for tyrants like Milosevic, back
to their “homelands”.’1491
One of the implications that Egan did not note, however, was that
Serbian-Australians have tended to maintain higher levels of direct
engagement with the activities of the Yugoslav state than dual citizens
from other migrant groups. As Greg Brown points out, for instance, ‘unlike
the Italian and Croatian examples, [Yugoslav] citizens must normally
return to Yugoslavia to vote and engage in homeland politics.’1492 This
supports the idea that, for Serbian dual-nationals, the notion of returning to
Yugoslavia for the war was expressly an act of national service and was
quite separate from the issue of loyalty. A major subtext to Egan’s concern
is the ongoing struggle between migrant groups and members of the host
society to construct a common national identity, particularly in the wake of
shifting global alliances and occurrences that transcend national and
geographical borders.1493
At the core of these issues is the notion that ‘dual citizenship within
immigrant communities raises awkward questions that gnaw at the bone of
what it means to be Australian and a citizen.’1494 Brown adds: ‘Though
officially tolerated, dual citizenship has traditionally been a target of scorn
and derision associated with suspicions of fifth columns and threats of
1489
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subversion.’1495 The popular response towards dual citizenship is typically
that it ‘strengthens incentives for migrants to retain homeland fealty,
potentially hinders immigrant integration into the receiving society, and
encourages natives’ suspicions of divided loyalty.’1496 The notion of dual
citizenship

‘challenges

Australians’

sense

of

“boundedness”

in

troublesome ways’ and as such popular fears have the potential to be
exacerbated because these discussions usually take place at intersections
between ‘concerns about loyalty and national identity’.1497 These kinds of
fears are played out in recognition of the reality that national identity is not
necessarily the same as the passport one holds.1498

Conclusion
As discussed in this chapter, media coverage demonised Serbs as the
“enemy” during the Kosovo war while sanctifying NATO air strikes as a
noble and moral crusade. The media’s criticism of Serbs was littered with
descriptions of them as evil, irrational, agitators, violent and inhumane.
News reports overwhelmingly reinforced the impression that all Yugoslav
Serbs, by virtue of their ethnicity, had contributed to the systematic
persecution of ethnic Albanian Kosovars. Media coverage worked to
naturalise a direct line of accountability between the actions of the
Yugoslav government, army and military units, and the solidarity
expressed by Serbs during the war.
The effect of this kind of media coverage was immediate and
profound for Serbian Australians. It generated an emotional response that
culminated in a series of major protests around Australia against the NATO
campaign. The protesters contested these media images, disputing the
notion that Serbs were somehow naturally disposed to violence, agitation
and aggression. The Australian media’s response to the protests was to
blanket the entire Serbian Australian community with a sense of shame for
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the violence conducted by a handful of protesters. Media discourse was
coercive and demanded the protesters undertake measures to publicly
reaffirm their loyalties to Australia.
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Conclusion
This thesis has outlined the experience of the Kosovars in Australia
alongside the role of the media in perpetuating the notion of “acceptability”
in a broader debate about immigration. The evacuation of the Kosovar
refugees to Australia highlighted a number of important and contemporary
issues and raised questions about the conditions under which refugees have
been accepted into the Australian community. Klaus Neumann made the
point that recent debates over refugee policy have tended to lack an
‘informed historical perspective’, and ‘point[s] the finger at politicians and
journalists, and at historians.’1499 He noted that:
Count the number of books written about the history of immigration
in the past fifty years, and compare it to the number of books
written about Australian military history, political history, social
history or cultural history. Or count the number of articles about
immigration and refugee topics published in the main journal in the
field, Australian Historical Studies. Or the space accorded to
immigration and refugee issues in general histories of postwar
Australia.1500
Neumann called for a more constructive debate about refugee policy, and
identified several key areas that remain heavily under-researched.1501 This
thesis has covered several areas nominated as research priorities by
Neumann.
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It has been shown that while the experience of the Kosovar
refugees has remained largely neglected by scholarship, their plight played
an important role in effecting the changes brought about in Australia’s
refugee policy in 1999. The evacuation of the Kosovar refugees to
Australia provided the initial impetus for the introduction of the Howard
Government’s temporary protection regime.1502 The Howard Government’s
Safe Haven program has been described with some accuracy as policymaking ‘on the run’.1503 The Government implemented this policy as a
strategy to regain public favour - after having initially rejected the
UNHCR’s request to assist Kosovar refugees. The Safe Haven program
was hastily conceived and implemented as a response to the UNHCR’s
sudden need to accommodate hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian
refugees waiting for help in Macedonia. The program also embodied an
important and historical shift in Australian refugee policy from permanent
to temporary protection.
A number of continuing practices have been central to the
development of refugee policy in Australia. An example of a continuing
practice is the public relations strategies employed by federal governments
and the Department of Immigration. I have noted the work of immigration
scholars such as Jupp, Kunz and Collins and identified a link between the
way post-Second World War DPs and the Kosovars were “sold” to the
Australian public by government officials. My thesis has demonstrated that
the safe haven refugee policy had a strong undercurrent pandering to
popular conceptions of which migrant/refugee groups qualify as
“acceptable”. While the evacuation of the Kosovars to Australia was part
of a global humanitarian mission, as was ostensibly the acceptance of the
DPs after the Second World War, both instances allowed many Australians
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to reaffirm a triumphal sense of national virtue as central to conceptions of
Australian citizenship.1504
Much of what has been outlined challenges the dominant
representation of refugees in the media today. As Sharon Pickering
observed: ‘what is absent from the press … is any consideration of seeking
asylum from the point of view of the asylum seeker.’1505 I have discussed
how the range of sources used in news media had a significant affect on the
way public opinion formed in relation to the Kosovar refugees.
The arrival of the Kosovars at Sydney airport provided immediate
positive publicity for the Howard Government. The Prime Minister,
positioned on a ceremonial dais in front of the Australian flag, capitalised
on an opportune moment for his government. At the same time, the
Australian news media, which was given exclusive access to the event,
reproduced a perception of the Howard Government as caring and
compassionate. This thesis has showed that the media played a crucial role
as mediator of the public’s understanding of the Safe Haven policy.
News reports commonly focussed on the notion that Australians
saw themselves as the most generous people in the world and that their
efforts in assisting the Kosovar refugees were highly commendable.
However this same media coverage overlooked concern about the paradox
that, while Australians may have supported compassion towards the
refugees’ plight, the Government had introduced a new visa category that
was highly restrictive. It trespassed on the Kosovars’ human rights.
This thesis has considered the quality of the accommodation
facilities provided by the Howard Government to the Kosovar refugees. I
discussed the impact of the isolation that was imposed by the Government
on refugees offered accommodation in rural areas. The analysis of the
Singleton barracks focussed in particular on protests by Kosovar refugees
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who argued that the conditions at the army base were unsuitable for
children, families and the elderly. I paid particular attention to the
Government’s dealings with the Salihu family and the Immigration
Minister’s efforts to demonise them in the media for not complying with
the Safe Haven program.
My thesis has emphasised the importance of the relationship
formed between the media and the Howard Government in responding to
the Singleton protest, and how debate about the suitability of using army
barracks was overshadowed in media coverage by the refugees’ “insult” to
Australian hospitality. The Singleton incident generated significant public
backlash to the Kosovars and popular outcry over their “ingratitude”. It
was a crucial media event that transformed popular conceptions of the
Kosovars from worthy and welcomed to complaining and ungrateful.
The Federal Government’s response to the issue of repatriation at
the end of the Kosovo war was shaped by an element of coercion and a
much more punitive attitude towards the refugees in comparison to most
other countries. I documented the High Court challenge brought by
Kosovar refugees against the Federal Government in April 2000 in an
attempt to prevent their repatriation. It was also noted how media coverage
worked to support the Federal Government’s repatriation program and its
efforts to generate the consensus that those Kosovar refugees who refused
to leave Australia voluntarily were “criminals” and “illegal” non-citizens
which was a legitimate description of them in the wording of the Safe
Haven legislation.
The final chapter of this thesis revisited some of the concepts I had
discussed previously about popular Australian nationalism, identity and
conceptions of migrants from the Balkans. It highlighted consistencies in
the ways the media reproduced notions of the “Other” in relation to both
ethnic Albanian Kosovars and Serbs living in Yugoslavia and Australia. I
explored the relationship between the mass media, NATO and NATOaligned countries (such as Australia) and evaluated the role of the media in
facilitating support for the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia. It was
noted how the news media worked to reproduce an image of Serbs as
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“evil” and “uncivilised” and provided the subtext to popular criticism of
anti-NATO protests staged by Serbs living in Australia.
My thesis has raised issues that continue to occupy a central place
in discussions about Australia’s refugee policy. The influence of populism
on Australia’s refugee policy remains strong. There are ongoing debates
about the obligations of federal government to individual non-citizens who
have been persecuted and sought Australia’s protection. The news media
continues to play an important role in generating public consensus on
asylum seekers.
The individual circumstances faced by refugees have often been
overlooked within Australian political discourse. Many refugees who have
experienced persecution and been granted protection in Australia have
benefited from the compassion of the Australian community. The mutual
benefits of this situation are often forgotten.
By conducting a prolonged study on the experience of the Kosovar
refugees in Australia, I have increased my own understandings of the
complexities and contradictions within Australia’s refugee policy. The
study has allowed me to gain a clearer view of paradoxes in popular
identity discourse in Australia, and how those aspects have come to
determine changes and developments in refugee policy. This study has
provided a window into what drives the generosity and compassion
expressed by Australians when confronted by a humanitarian disaster. It
has allowed me to understand their experiences of generosity as well as
mean-spiritedness.
Through this study I acquired a greater appreciation of the notion
that historical inquiry cannot substitute the authenticity of the lived
experience. It is impossible as a researcher to fully grasp the emotional and
physical impact of the lived experiences of the Kosovar refugees. It was
difficult to engage these events through the study while endeavouring to
remain objective and distance myself from the refugees and their
circumstances. Still, the study has allowed me, in a sense, to bear witness
to the journey of the Kosovars after they fled their homeland and were
ferried to Australia, and my hope has been to convey part of this journey to
the reader.
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There are many aspects of the experience of the Kosovars that
remain unexplored, but which I was unable to accommodate due to the
analytical confines and time restraints of the study. As the thesis evolved
the primary focus of the study and its sources centred on media and policy
analysis. This was at the expense of oral testimonies and in-depth
interviews such as those I had considered conducting with key government
officials and former refugees.
There are many avenues that remain in terms of expanding the
focus of this study outside of the policy and media-centric view of the story
that I have presented. There is much need to incorporate the oral
testimonies of the Kosovars and to allow for an appreciation of the voice of
the Kosovars unmediated by government and media spin. In future
research one aim is to incorporate oral sources into my existing analysis of
Operation Safe Haven. I hope to conduct interviews with evacuees, NGOs,
operational staff and government officials. These interviews are an
important final step in my research for this case study. The approach will
be to compare and contrast the testimonies of Operation Safe Haven
evacuees with the narrative presented by the Australian media about them.
This will be important in challenging the lack of voice offered to refugees
in public debate.
As shown in this thesis public perceptions of Operation Safe Haven
were significantly mediated by the Howard Government. Some Kosovar
refugees were interviewed by the Australian media and featured in heavily
stylised news pieces that supported the public relations strategy of the
Department of Immigration. Some of the Kosovars were warned by
immigration officials not to speak to journalists, though a number of
refugees commented in the media about their experiences in Australia after
being repatriated. They commented on the strictness of the regulations
imposed on them by the Howard Government.
By incorporating oral testimonies into my analysis of Operation
Safe Haven, the intention is to evaluate the salience of media
representations of the Kosovar refugees alongside the Government’s
purported stance toward them. This research will enable me to produce
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new evidence about Operation Safe Haven from the perspective of the
refugees.
It is not the role of researcher to make recommendations to
governments on what they ought to do if and when they are faced with
similar circumstances in the future. However, governments and policy
makers would benefit immensely by taking into account the Howard
Government’s experience with the Kosovars refugees. The Government’s
response to the Kosovar refugees was paradoxical. This is because the Safe
Haven program simultaneously advocated compassion and meanspiritedness. It promoted both the need to fundamentally guarantee human
rights as well as a legal paradigm in which refugees were no longer
protected by the international human rights and refugee conventions. If
anything else, governments and policy makers ought to consider avoiding
these kinds of paradoxes which can (and did) lead to legal challenges and
the legalising of a moral oxymoron.
Another aspect of the study that Australian federal governments
ought to recognise is that they are obliged to respond to more than simply
the desires of their national constituents. In a globalising world one of the
roles of federal government is to act as a responsible global citizen and
recognise the existence of and reasons for conventions on international
human rights. National governments should strive to demonstrate an
awareness of the international implications of their policy responses to
humanitarian issues, and whether those responses reflect a national
character that is forward-looking and capable of accommodating the
changes brought about by developments in the modern world.
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Post-Script: “I’d rather live in a tent, Mr Ruddock”
This thesis concluded by arguing for the need to restore the
“humanity” of refugees (including their internationally recognised human
rights) in Australian political discourse. I recognise the importance of
moving beyond the victimisation of refugees in scholarship and
acknowledging their agency as human beings.
The story of the Kosovar refugees does not end with their
repatriation. Indeed, some of the Safe Haven Kosovars stayed in Australia
and permanently re-resettled, though most of the refugees have moved on.
In many ways, their lives continue to be shaped by Australia’s role in
offering temporary Safe Haven and in facilitating their return home.
The shared experience of Kosovars is currently reflected in efforts
to establish an independent, democratic system of government in the
recently formed Republic of Kosovo. Cultural life in Kosovo is beginning
to flourish twelve years after the end of the rule of the Serbian-Yugoslav
regime. Vedat Bajrami, one of Kosovo’s best-known screen actors and
comedians, continues to pursue a career in performance – which may well
be related to his brief stint as a DJ on Hobart community radio in service of
the Brighton Safe Haven refugees.1506
Australia’s treatment of the Kosovar refugees has had ongoing
consequences for their lives. The Kosovars’ continuing story is one of
significant human interest. Recognising the need to provide refugees with a
“voice” and “face” in the debates that impact on them, I have decided to
include an anecdote from Sabit Salihu and a description of his family’s
arrival home after departing Australia. The Salihus departed Sydney airport
for Rome on the morning of 22nd June 1999. From there, the family told
The Australian that they planned to fly to Macedonia, with the intention of
then driving to their hometown of Ferizaj.1507 The town had suffered
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heavily from Serb attacks and bombardments, although the fighting had
ceased and the town declared safe by UN observers.1508
The Australian documented the Salihus return, describing how the
Salihu family’s home remained intact but most of their property was taken
by Serbian troops.1509 It was further described how imported clothes worth
around $US50,000 had been stolen from the Salihu residence which Sabit
had planned to distribute at local markets. Sabit told The Australian that
the family’s life savings had been invested in the clothes. He said he did
not know how the family would be able to survive because there were no
other forms of employment available in the current climate.1510
A great number of homes in Ferizaj had been destroyed in the war.
Reporting from Ferizaj on 28th June, Matthew Stevens from The Australian
stated that there was no longer any major tension in the town between
ethnic Serbs and Albanians. He stipulated that this was probably because
most ethnic Serbs had left when NATO forces arrived. UN staff
commented that Serbs would eventually try to return. However, as Sabit
Salihu suggested, local Albanians would find it difficult to ‘be friendly’.1511
The Australian also shed new light on aspects of the Salihus
experience in Australia. The elderly Elmaze Salihu told the newspaper of
her concerns about staying in Australia, that with her extremely poor health
she feared she would die in a place other than Kosovo.1512 The Australian
described how, for Sabit, ‘getting Elmaze home was what all the bitterness
in Australia was really about’.1513 Sabit further commented: ‘This is her
place, her home. She should be here. We all should. It doesn’t matter that
there is little food or no doctor. This is where we must be.’1514
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Photographs of the Salihus after returning home to Ferizaj - with Elmaze
(left), then the family home, and a family group photo - and the Salihus
waiting at Singleton train station. From The Australian 28th June 1999, p. 3

On 17th August 1999, the Herald depicted Sabit as much more
relaxed and comfortable since returning home with his family. The
newspaper described Sabit as the ‘Kosovar refugee who quit Australia after
17 days and became a media pariah’, who was ‘regretful but not
repentant’.1515 The Herald depicted Sabit as casually ‘chain-smoking’
while offering thanks to the Australian Government: ‘I thank them because
I know it’s a problem when you take a crowd of people into a civilised
state, because there is another mentality operating there, a different
mentality from the one that operated where we had come from.’1516
The Herald confirmed reports about the lack of employment
available in Kosovo, and described how ‘looters’ had ‘ransacked’ many
homes in Ferizaj.1517 However, the Salihus ‘3-bedroom house, unlike the
homes of several neighbours, escaped the torches of retreating Serb
forces’.1518 Sabit informed the Herald that he had recently obtained
employment as a translator for the Polish troops serving in Ferizaj with the
UN peacekeeping force.
The Herald further noted the manner in which Sabit, sitting in ‘his
neat, but austere, loungeroom’, recalled ‘the conversation that probably
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sealed his return to postwar Kosovo’.1519 As Sabit commented: ‘[Ruddock]
said to me through an interpreter: “So, you want to go back even though
your home has probably been destroyed?” And I replied: “I will go back
just to live in a tent in the backyard.”’1520 The Herald added: ‘He can see
the humour in it now.’1521
In October 2010, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard followed
through on her promise to the Australian Greens (who formed an integral
part of her minority Government) to allow a moral debate about the war in
Afghanistan. Both sides of the House used this as an opportunity to make
their defence policies known and to justify their support for the war from a
moral perspective.
A similar debate might be allowed over the moral implications of
some of the mainstays of Australia’s current refugee policy. These include
the moral implications of housing refugees in isolated, quarantine-like
camps that are typically manned by armed personal and located either
offshore or in remote desert towns. One of the reasons for this is to prevent
refugees from mixing with the general population. This fear of refugees
being “let loose” into the community often emerges quite subtly in political
and media discourse, and few politicians will publicly challenge this
popular mindset.
These kinds of fears dominated media coverage of a Woodside
(near Adelaide) town meeting as recently as 3rd November 2010, when
Liberal Party leader Tony Abbott turned out in support of the panicstricken view of the local community. Abbott continues to be one of John
Howard’s most vocal supporters. While admitting that refugees had to be
housed somewhere, Abbott emphasised the grievance that locals were not
consulted before Immigration Minister Chris Bowen announced refugees
would be housed in the local community. Abbott also commented that the
housing to be offered to refugees was too good for them. He argued that
asylum seekers were being given the “red carpet” treatment. He had, as
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Bowen noted, taken a punitive approach to the issue of housing quality
when it came to refugees.
Politicking and the vexed question of appropriate housing for
refugees aside, Abbott presents a strong case in calling for more dialogue
with communities about this issue. The furore over the placement of
refugees in local communities has provided the Federal Government with
an opportunity to promote the moral implications of refugee policy and win
community support for the placement of refugees in non-isolated
conditions. The question is whether they will take up this opportunity.
Lacking more assertive leadership in the current political climate, the
national community has not seemed to be able move beyond its fear of
refugees living “among us”. The Prime Minister’s approach to refugee
policy ought to encourage Australians to imagine themselves as global
citizens with international responsibilities.
The most significant development in refugee policy in recent times
was the High Court decision on 11th November 2010 to allow refugees
being held in offshore detention the right to appeal rejections of their
applications for asylum by the Department of Immigration. This was a
major step forward in terms of dismantling the temporary protection
regime established by the Howard Government. The extent to which the
Gillard Government will eradicate the policy of temporary protection,
however, has been brought into question. In April 2011 Bowen showed a
willingness to reintroduce temporary protection visas and stated that he
was considering issuing Safe Haven Visas after asylum seekers had
protested at Villawood detention centre in Sydney.
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Appendix 1: Images of Kosovar children, April to
early May 1999

Images (clockwise): British army engineer with
children, The Daily Telegraph, 13th April 1999, p. 22;
man with child, The Daily Telegraph, 7th April 1999,
p. 4; children lining up for food, The Daily Telegraph,
1st May 1999, p. 27; ‘Children with hope’, The Daily
Telegraph, 6th May 1999, p. 4; ‘Looking for help’, The
Daily Telegraph, 5th May 1999, p. 29.
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Appendix 2: Images of the Kosovar refugees before
and after their arrival in Australia

Above: smiling refugees board a Qantas jet during a stopover in Bangkok, from
The Daily Telegraph (Afternoon Edition), 7th May 1999, p. 1

Above: photographs of Kosovar
children at East Hills Safe Haven, from
The Daily Telegraph, 9th May 1999, p. 5;
below, female Australian Army Private
with refugee boy at East Hills Safe
Haven, from The Australian, 10th May
1999, p. 2
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Appendix 3: Images of the first Kosovar refugees to
land at Sydney airport in the Telegraph

Images (top to bottom): ‘Safe at
last’, The Daily Telegraph, 8th May
1999, p. 5; ‘Standing room only’,
The Daily Telegraph, 8th May 1999,
p. 1; ‘… a young refugee holds a
NATO drawing last night’, The
Daily Telegraph, 8th May 1999, p. 5
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Appendix 4: Images of the Kosovar refugees in The
Australian

Above, from The Weekend Australian, 8th-9th May 1999, p. 1;
below, from The Weekend Australian, 8th-9th May 1999, p. 5
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Appendix 5: Media images of the Singleton Barracks

From The Australian, 16th June 1999, p.
2 (left); and 17th June 1999, p. 4 (below)
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Appendix 6: Media images of the Salihus

Photographs of the Salihus in
The Australian: boarding a taxi
at Singleton Hospital (left), 18th
June 1999, p. 4; stopping at a
McDonald’s restaurant on the
way to Sydney (bottom left), 18th
June 1999, p. 1; and, arriving at
East Hills Safe Haven (below),
19-20th June 1999, p. 6.

Left: Elmaze and Sabit Salihu arriving at
East Hills barracks, from The Daily
Telegraph, 18th June 1999, p. 4
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Appendix 7: The Serb “riots” as depicted in The
Sydney Morning Herald

From The Sydney Morning Herald, 29th March 1999, p. 6
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